Myanmar Junta on the Defensive

For the first time, the military junta is losing ground to a powerful alliance of Ethnic Armed Organisations and the People's Defence Force

by Ashok K Mehta

On 3 September,  the palace in Mandalay,( HQ Central Command ), the second biggest city in Myanmar after Yangon, faced its first rocket attack. The Southwest Rakhine state could fall shortly with two strategic ports overlooking the Bay of Bengal- Sittwe leased to India and Kyaukphu leased to China- and Manaung left in Junta’s possession in Rakhine. Military coups in the past have not failed in Myanmar. It has the biggest military in southeast Asia not unfamiliar with coups. Thailand holds the dubious record of 32 coups since 1932. More than nearly four years later, Gen Min Aung Hlaing-led Junta in Myanmar is fighting a losing battle but this time not against Buddhist monks and civil society but against a well-coordinated alliance of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO), local militia and the new People’s Defence Force born out of ousted Aung San Suu Kyii’s National League for Democracy which is calling itself the National Unity Government (NUG). They are the Resistance.

Myanmar military officers march during a parade to commemorate the 74th Armed Forces Day in Naypyitaw, Myanmar on Wednesday, March 27, 2019. [ Photo: AP]

The junta had so far managed rebels and revolts seeking autonomy/independence through ceasefire agreements. The junta is a formidable triservice force adept in counter-insurgency. For it to be flailing is surprising. Battlefield losses have been unprecedented in both territory and manpower through battle fatigue and fighting its people has been taxing on the psyche of soldiers and Generals. An implosion is no longer fanciful. Reliable sources place 70 per cent loss of territory. The Resistance does not control all the territory that the Junta retreated from as it does not have holding capability. But it does control key sectors along the borders that the junta ceded due to surrender/desertions.


Stretched for troops Junta has followed a scorched earth policy: indiscriminate bombings by artillery, helicopters and aircraft to avenge defeat that UNHRC’s Volcker Tolker(?) has called genocidal. This has led to nearly 400,000 IDPs with many having crossed over into neighbouring Bangladesh, India, China and Thailand. Junta has had to abandon trade routes to China in the northern Shan state; along the Karenni National Army-controlled border with Thailand at Myawaddy; in Rakhine state with Bangladesh and parts of Mizoram in Chin state and in Sagaing region opposite all of Manipur except Ukhrul and Moreh that PDF controls.

The Kuki-Zo-Chin people in Chinland are ethnically similar to Mizos. Chinese have had active links with the Arakan Army in Rakhine state which traverses India’s Multi-Modal Kaladan river connectivity project originating in India-operated Sittwe Port in Rakhine, the key to India’s Act East policy. So, with the Junta forced out of Chin, Rakhine, Sagaing and Magwae, contiguous with the Indian border, New Delhi must engage these new power wielders. But it is dithering which could lead to Chinese fishing in troubled waters in a region where Manipur is breaking into a new dangerous phase of inter-ethnic conflict.


Earlier in September embattled Gen Hlaing warned civilians in territory captured by Resistance that it will soon counterattack to regain ground. He also declared the Three Brotherhood Alliance in Shan state as a terrorist organization. It is these groups including the Arakan Army, that have captured the prestigious Army’s North East Command at Lashio and in Shan state and now Mandalay.’s Central Command headquarters, is threatened.

How much longer the junta can fight on multiple fronts is unclear even as Gen Hlaing has continually extended the emergency while advocating holding of election which is most unlikely. He is disinclined to use the good offices of pro-Junta countries in ASEAN like Laos, its current chair, Cambodia and Thailand to start a dialogue which the PDF and EAOs will reject as they see the balance of advantage with them. With the economy in grave distress, this war cannot go on indefinitely.


China has and continues to play a crucial role in supporting the Junta and selected EAOs in the north and west. China and Russia are the junta’s main sources of military hardware though India too has provided non-lethal military equipment. Army tanks, artillery and small arms are Chinese. So are most of the transport and fighter aircraft. The same goes for the Navy though India has provided Coast Guard vessels.

Russian MiG 29 and Su30 aircraft have been serviced by HAL and India has provided aviation fuel which is a sanctioned item. New Delhi has called for a ceasefire and a return to a democratic process but its support for the Junta is undiminished as it burnt its fingers two decades ago in supporting NLD in preference to the Junta which led to Chinese ascendency. Although the Junta has a love-hate relationship with Beijing it is forced to take its support due to its proximity and domination of the economy. Still, India must review its policy due to the changed ground reality and engage the forces that control the border areas.


A working relationship with the Arakan Army and Chinland authorities is essential to restore stability to troubled Manipur. It should also consider establishing humanitarian corridors to provide succour and relief to people bombed out of their habitat.India can keep reciting the import of its Act East policy to Asian neighbours but its implementation is contingent upon the operationalisation of connectivity projects like the trilateral highway through Myanmar to Thailand and the Multi-Modal Kaladan river project from Sittwe Port to Paletwa and on to Mizoram. India’s eastern and western flanks are both vulnerable especially the east which is sandwiched between Bangladesh and Myanmar. A triangulation of threats from Pak-China-Bangladesh can not be ruled out.

Ashok K. Mehta is a radio and television commentator, and a columnist on defence and security issues. He is a former Major General of Indian Army. After joining the Indian Army in 1957, he was commissioned in the 5th Gorkha Rifles infantry regiment in the same year. He had fought in all major wars India went into, except the Sino-Indian War of 1962. And he was also on a peacekeeping mission in Zaire in the year 1962 and in the Indian Peace Keeping Force,  Sri Lanka (1988-90) and it was his last assignment in the Indian Army. He is also a writer of several books and a founder-member of the Defense Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defence, India.