Economic Despair and Political Fragmentation Leave Voters Uncertain, Creating an Unpredictable Election Terrain Ahead of the September 21 Presidential Elections
by Tisaranee Gunasekara
“What can be worse than the worst?” Seamus Heaney (The burial at Thebes)
In October 2014, the Centre for Policy Analysis published its third survey mapping the thinking of the Lankan people. The survey did not ask any questions about voting intentions. Given the repressive nature of Rajapaksa rule, the answers would have been misleading. But there was a question which helped understand the direction of electoral winds: the state of one’s household economics. 54.5% of respondents (including 54% of Sinhalese) said that their household economic condition worsened compared to what it was two years previously. 45% of respondents (including 45.6% of Sinhalese) said that their household economic condition either improved or stayed the same.
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| Young children being brought to the election rally, highlighting early engagement in the democratic process. |
Since 2005, the Rajapaksas have been defining Lankan politics as a battle between patriots and traitors. The framing worked while the war was on, and so long as the hope of a substantial peace dividend burned immediate and bright. By 2014, disillusionment was setting in and people were beginning to prioritise the economy over everything else. The answers given to the question about household economic condition clearly indicated that a majority of Lankans would not vote for Mahinda Rajapaksa in the upcoming Presidential election.
If the UNP and the JVP did not field a common candidate, the anti-government vote would have split, enabling a Mahinda victory. But in November 2014, the opposition united around the candidacy of Maithripala Sirisena. Mahinda Rajapaksa, despite misusing every State resource, breaking every electoral rule, and unleashing a wave of violence, could obtain only 47.6% of the vote. Sirisena won with 51.3% of the vote.
This August, the CPA released the results of its newest survey with the research conducted in July. Once again, there are no direct questions about voting intentions, only indicative ones which indicate much.
A key finding is that only 21.3% of Lankans think that their personal economic condition has improved compared to one year ago. 77.5% think it got worse. Had the upcoming election been a simple government vs. opposition contest (as Lankan elections have been since 1948), had the opposition united around a common candidate – as in 2014 – the outcome would have been predictable – a clear victory for the oppositional candidate. But the 2024 Presidential election is a Lankan first, because it is a four-way contest (Namal Rajapaksa has no path to victory. But he might perform better than generally expected, especially with his father campaigning for him). The acrimonious contest between the NPP/JVP and the SJB is dividing the non/anti-government vote and making an outright victory by any candidate a near-impossibility.
Public perception of the state of the economy complicates the picture. A clear majority of 51.1% think that the economic crisis is not getting better or worsening. But a surprisingly large number of Lankans disagree; 3.7% think that the crisis has been resolved while 42.5% think that though we are still on the rotten bridge, we are also moving in the right direction.
The answer to the question as to which candidate is best suited to handle the current needs of one’s immediate family adds another layer of complexity. Ranil Wickremesinghe leads with 24.3%; Sajith Premadasa polls 19.3% and Anura Kumara Dissanayake 15.5%.
When it comes to specific economic and governance issues, Wickremesinghe scores better than his two main opponents. A plurality of voters trusts him to find alternative approaches to economic recovery, address unemployment, and resolve the economic crisis while a majority trusts him to negotiate a better deal with the IMF. He is also trusted by a plurality of voters to ensure post-war reconciliation, uphold democratic rights of the people, and preserve law and order, ahead of Premadasa and Dissanayake.
Dissanayake is trusted by a plurality of voters to combat corruption, hold those responsible for the economic crisis accountable, and bring justice to victims of the Easter attack. He is the least trusted to negotiate a better deal with the IMF and to uphold the democratic rights of the people.
Premadasa is the most trusted to address the problems of minority communities.
Reading the CPA survey together with the July results of the IHP’s monthly opinion polls indicates that Ranil Wickremesinghe has the backing of about a quarter of the electorate. This can expand in the coming weeks, since, according to IHP polls, his popularity has been increasing from February, reaching an all-time high of 23% in July. His net favourability rating too has improved by a massive 40 points between June and July. Though he is still in the negative territory (-24), he is less unpopular than Premadasa (-44). Dissanayake’s score has improved by29 points, making him the only candidate with a positive net favourability rating (3).
With no clear favourite in sight, the eventual victor is likely to lack the legitimacy that comes with a first round/majority win. Electoral volatility will result in political and socio-economic volatility. Continued turbulence seems the only certainty in these uncertain times.
Shifting sands
The IHP has been tracking voting intentions for more than two years. And over that period, the fortunes of the main candidates seesawed. 2023 ended and 2024 dawned with Dissanayake at 50%. His electoral fortunes increased to 53% in February. Then the tide turned. In March, Dissanayake was down to 44% and Premadasa up at 41%. In April both lost support, tying at 39%. Their fortunes continued to decline; by July, Dissanayake’s support stood at 37% and Premadasa at 36%. All the while, support for Wickremesinghe increased slowly but steadily. Little wonder he would have postponed the election by one year if he could have! Times seems to be on his side.
The reason for these fluctuations can be understood by considering a key finding in the CPA survey. By July 2024, a majority of 57.1% had decided which candidate to vote for while the other 42.9% remained uncertain. The uncertain group represents floating voters and their choice seems to change in unpredictable ways, month to month. Tamils, Muslims, and Malaiyaha (Upcountry) Tamils are more undecided than Sinhalese, the young more than the old, women more than men, urban voters more than rural ones.
Lankan electorate today is akin to shifting sands, hardly surprising given the unprecedented nature of the 2022 economic crisis. The effect of that crisis on the political opinions of the electorate can best be described by reaching into the Communist Manifesto: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.” Unmoored by the crisis and its continuing impact, almost half of voters are wavering between candidates. There are no clear favourites or entrenched positions. Voters seem to be acting with considerable deliberation, trying to decide which candidate could get them through to the other side, without capsizing the boat again.
Lack of trust in all candidates is another reason for voter uncertainty. According to IHP polls, economic crisis is the number one priority of all Lankans. According to the CPA survey, only 37.8% of Lankans believe that the election will have a decisive impact on the crisis; 37.6% think that the election will have some impact but not a decisive one. 18.6% think that the election will have no impact and 16% are uncertain whether the election will have an impact or not. This means most Lankans do not believe that the winner (whoever he is) can definitely resolve the economic crisis. Voters seem more sceptical than they have ever been, more disinclined to believe in exaggerated claims and over-the-top pledges. This disbelief also explains the negative net favourability ratings of the candidates. The race will not go to the best – because there’s no such person – but to the one who’s likely to do the least harm.
The NPP/JVP has been the main beneficiary of electoral shifting sands, so far. Its surge from the 3% in 2019 to possibly around 40% in 2024 is due to massive haemorrhaging of the SLPP vote. According to the IHP, nearly a half of Gotabaya voters are now supporting Anura Kumara Dissanayake (48%). This is unsurprising given the ideological affinity between the SLPP and the NPP/JVP. Both are legatees of 1956, the children and the grandchildren of that transformation. They are axiomatically aligned to the two foremost symbols of that change, the monks and the military. Predictably, the NPP/JVP manifesto makes no commitment to the 13th Amendment. Both formations believe in economic nationalism, though the NPP/JVP is more adept at dressing it up in modern progressive garb. Occasionally, though, the truth peeks out. Sunil Handunnetti, who might become the next finance minister if Dissanayake wins, often traces our economic decline to the abandoning of closed economic policies in 1977.
The shift in voting intentions is not limited to Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s 6.9million. As of July 2024, Sajith Premadasa retains only 67% of his 2019 vote – 9% have shifted to Ranil Wickremesinghe and 14% to Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Even Mr. Dissanayake retains only 89% of his 419,000 votes; 6% have shifted to Premadasa and 4% to Wickremesinghe.
According to the CPA survey, almost 29% of voters do not trust any of the candidates to address the current needs of their immediate families while more than 12% are undecided as to which of the candidates is best positioned for the task. Most of the undecided voters will eventually vote for someone. But who that someone is still up in the air. Despite confident assertions by some candidates, the outcome of the election is far from certain. Dissanayake and Premadasa seem the current front runners. That can change if Wickremesinghe’s support continues to increase at the Feb-July pace. It ain’t over ‘til the people sing.
The presidential millstone
All major candidates have released their election manifestos. All of them read like wish lists – pledge after pledge with no indication as to how any of it is possible in a bankrupt country. Whatever the outcome of those Santa Claus like economic pledges, there’s one promise that the candidates should be held to – the abolition of Executive Presidency.
Sajith Premadasa and Anura Kumara Dissanayake have pledged to return to a parliamentary form of government. Ranil Wickremesinghe has promised to let the new parliament decide the fate of the Executive Presidency. Going by the past, none of them are likely to honour their promises if the public remain bystanders.
Presidential system was supposed to make order out of chaos. It has done the opposite, repeatedly. It is likely to become an even greater agent of pandemonium in the hands of a president voted by not a majority but a plurality of people.
During his nine-year rule, Mahinda Rajapaksa demonstrated the dictatorial dangers inherent in the Lankan presidential system. On 21 November 2014, Maithripala Sirisena walked out of the Rajapaksa government, and publicly accepted the mantle of common oppositional candidate. Addressing a media briefing, he promised to abolish the Executive Presidency, defining it as a political and moral calamity, and a crucible of injustice. “We came to a clear decision with the UNP to abolish the Executive Presidency,” he stated. “I ask the people to give me power to abolish the Executive Presidency in 100 days.”
The mistake was to let that promise fade into the background, post-victory, to be satisfied with the 19th Amendment. This monster cannot be de fanged or reformed. A stake through the heart is the only solution.
Executive Presidency and democracy work in countries unburdened by a monarchical past, like the United States. France had a monarchical past, but she also made a republican revolution, and beheaded a king for good measure. In ancient Lanka kings were killed by usurpers, and not by their own subjects under the banner of liberté, égalité, fraternité. In that crucial absence, the Executive Presidency gives rise to monarchical longings in the holder, and instincts of servility in most others.
The absence of inner-party democracy in Lankan political parties also make the country particularly unsuitable to an Executive Presidency. Party leaders are decided not by open primaries but by entrenched interests or secret cabals. In Sri Lanka, there are no democratic spaces within the main parties. The JVP is no exception to this rule. Its inner workings are even less transparent than those of other parties.
Executive Presidency is the unholy grail of Lankan politics. JR Jayewardene bragged about its omnipotence, claiming that the only thing it couldn’t do was to turn a man into a woman and vice versa. The system was extremist from and in conception, revelling in its limitlessness. It is resistant to reform. Maithripala Sirisena became a serial violator of his own 19th Amendment. Ranil Wickremesinghe is doing the same with his 21st Amendment. As the quality of Lankan political class declines, the presidency would be occupied increasingly by men/women less and less suited to be wielders of such power. If the choice is uninspiring in 2024, think of what we are likely to be faced with five years from now, or ten…
If Maithripala Sirisena honoured his pledge, Lanka and Lankans would have been spared of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and 2022. This time around, the promise of abolition must be remembered and kept.
The writer is a senior political commentator in Colombo.
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