Iran shrewdly assessed at a very early stage that contradictions were inevitable in Biden-Netanyahu equations post-October 7 and the Greater Israel agenda and the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy are pulling in opposite directions.
by M. K. Bhadrakumar
The latest Israeli spin has it that Iran cannot make up its mind whether to retaliate or not for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh on July 28 while on a visit to Tehran for the inaugural of President Masoud Pezeshkian.
The hypothesis here is that there must be a standoff between Pezeshkian and hardliners of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) with the new president pushing back against any aggressive strategy against Israel.
 |
| The Palestinian resistance group Hamas appointed Yahya Sinwar (2nd from left) as its political bureau chief on August 6, 2024 |
Prima facie, it is a ridiculous spin. But Iran rebutted it, nonetheless, with the Acting Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani stating as recently as on Saturday night that Tehran “will make the aggressor Israeli regime pay the price for its aggression in a legitimate and decisive action.” Those were carefully chosen words.
But how come Iran didn’t act for a fortnight already? Several factors are in play here. First, Pezeshkian has not yet formed his government. He submitted his list of proposed ministers to the Parliament for approval only yesterday. The executive branch of the government is carrying on with day-to-day functioning.
Nonetheless, according to Russian media, Pezeshkian did speak about Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel at a meeting with the visiting Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu on July 5 in Tehran.
That said, do not rule out that there could be some calibration in the timing. After all, Israel is in panic and reports say people stay awake at night fearing Iranian attack. According to IRNA, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, for all his bravado, evacuated four of Israel’s important intelligence and security bases in Tel Aviv.
Second, Iran will not act as “spoiler” when regional states and the US are pulling all stops to pick up the threads of the Gaza ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel. The fact that Israel agreed to the talks on Thursday suggests that Netanyahu also sees advantages in returning to the negotiating table.
Of course, Iran will also be carefully weighing the scale of its attack on Israel. After all, Haniyeh was killed in a covert operation in which there was no Iranian casualty.
However, the clincher is going to be the progress in the upcoming talks. Iran may altogether postpone the operation if the Israeli side gives guarantees at the talks not to invade Lebanon and withdraws troops from the Gaza Strip.
Tehran could potentially reconsider its position if a radical change occurs in the situation in the region following the conclusion of a truce between Hamas and Israel.Expectations are running high. And, make no mistake, Tehran has a much closer equation with Yahya Sinwar than it had with Haniyeh.
Therefore, the high-stakes diplomacy this week leading to the talks scheduled for Thursday to secure a hostage and ceasefire deal in Gaza becomes an inflection point.
Iran’s UN mission in New York said in a statement on Friday, “Our priority is to establish a lasting ceasefire in Gaza. Any agreement accepted by Hamas will also be recognised by us.” The statement reiterated Iran’s right to self-defence against Israel but also added, “However, we hope that our response will be timed and conducted in a manner not to the detriment of the potential ceasefire.”
Tehran is intensely conscious that the outcome of the Hamas-Israel talks (with the participation of CIA Director William Burns) in terms of the release of American hostages is the stuff of Joe Biden’s presidential legacy as much as it holds the potential to burnish the prospects of the Democratic Party candidate Kamala Harris in the November election.
Jordan is acting as go-between to enable Washington and Tehran to sensitise each other their respective problematic borderlines. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi visited Tehran on August 4 for talks with Ali Bagheri. They met again on the sideline of the OIC extraordinary meeting in Jeddah on August 7 (which was by the way, a diplomatic coup for Tehran.) In between, Biden spoke with King Abdullah of Jordan.
The White House readout said Biden and Abdullah “discussed their efforts to de-escalate regional tensions, including through an immediate ceasefire and hostage release deal. The President thanked His Majesty for his friendship, and affirmed unwavering US support for Jordan as a partner and ally in promoting regional peace and security.”
Meanwhile, Biden is using all channels available to moderate Iran’s attack on Israel. The Americans have also openly dissociated themselves from the killing of Haniyeh. They have reportedly conveyed to Tehran that an escalation is fraught with the risk of a US-Iran conflict, which is avoidable.
Finally, in the range of discourses over Iran’s retaliation, what is overlooked generally is that Iranians invariably have a strategy, unlike Israelis who resort to knee-jerk reactions. Therefore, the ‘big picture’ becomes important here.
Iran is not looking for war, especially when it has done exceedingly well so far to cut losses and turn the table on Israel in a cost-effective manner. Israel’s international image is in the mud and not all the freshwater in the Sea of Galilee can wash off the filth.
Iran’s number one priority will be to have the western sanctions removed. Supreme Leader Khamenei’s deal with Pezeshkian quintessentially narrows down to improving the economy by getting rid of sanctions and making it possible for Iran to gain its rightful place in the international order by using its vast resources optimally.
All major pronouncements by Pezeshkian have signalled his prioritisation of Iran’s relations with the West. Quite obviously, Pezeshkian is walking a tight rope, as Javad Zarif’s announcement of his resignation as the president’s deputy for strategic affairs shows.Zarif is reportedly peeved that the steering committee responsible for candidate selection picked only three out of the 19 names he had proposed for the cabinet posts!
Be that as it may, Abbas Araghchi, introduced as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, had served for 8 years as the deputy to Zarif during Hassan Rouhani’s presidency, playing a key role in the nuclear negotiations (JCPOA) with the Obama administration. The European powers see Araghchi as a ‘moderate.’ Indeed, he makes an effective interlocutor for Tehran in western capitals — and it is the clearest signal so far that Iran’s foreign policy trajectory is leaning toward constructive engagement of the West.
Smart thinking involves the brain getting precedence over brawn. That is where Iran scores over the die-hard Zionists in Tel Aviv who are still wallowing in the culture of the Nakba.
Iran shrewdly assessed at a very early stage that contradictions were inevitable in Biden-Netanyahu equations post-October 7 and the Greater Israel agenda and the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy are pulling in opposite directions.
Equally, Iran has drawn the correct conclusions out of the standoff in April where it displayed its formidable military capability to inflict pain on Israel while also prompting the US to prevail upon the latter not to react! In the entire chronicle of US-Iran tango since 1979, such a thing never happened before.
Why should Tehran give up that pathway leading to the rose garden? For sure, Tehran will inflict even greater pain on Israel than in April. But, fundamentally, the 900-pound gorilla in Tel Aviv has to be tamed with a smart admixture of hard and soft power — and, it also involves the West. And to that end, Iran will restrain itself and remain a nuclear threshold state.
M. K. Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat by profession. Roughly half of the 3 decades of his diplomatic career was devoted to assignments on the territories of the former Soviet Union and to Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Other overseas postings included South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, and Turkey. He writes mainly on Indian foreign policy and the affairs of the Middle East, Eurasia, Central Asia, South Asia and the Asia-Pacific.
Post a Comment