Russia's near-peer status is based on its population, military-industrial complex and resource endowments, which guarantee that even if Russia faces long-term problems, it will remain a major international actor for the next several U.S. presidential administrations.
by Kazi Anwarul Masud
Nicholas K Gvosdev, an expert in Russian Affairs and Professor in National Security in the US Defense College wrote an article on whether Russia is an US adversary or just a “competitor. He wrote and I quote the world as it is moved into the middle decades of the twenty-first century is starting to look more “normal”. The United States remains the globe’s predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own. The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, daresay, comfort, with dealing with rivals.
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| Russian President Vladimir Putin looks through a window during his working visit to Dagestan Republic, in Derbent, Russia, Wednesday, June 28, 2023. (Photo: Dmitry Yermolenko, Sputnik, Kremlin ) |
WASHINGTON MUST DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A ‘COMPETITOR” AND AN ‘ADVERSARY”
In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. We have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia. Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters.
RUSSIA NO LONGER CONSIDERS THE WEST AS A COMPETITOR
Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). It also returns us to the question of whether the as it is moved into the middle decades of the twenty-first century, the world is starting to look more “normal” in terms of the overall patterns of human history. The United States remains the globe’s predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own.
CAN THE US ADMINISTRATION DISINGUISH BETWEEN COMPETITOR AND ADVERSARY?
The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, perhaps the expertise with dealing with rivals. In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. We have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia. Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters.
RUSSIAN CHALLENGE ALONG WITH CHINA
Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). Dealing with Russia as a serious competitor—even given its economic size and population endowment—also requires facing up to the challenge of how to compete. A serious competitor has at its disposal the ability both to accept punishment within acceptable losses (which appears to be the tally sheet for the effectiveness of current Western sanctions on Russia) as well as to raise costs (as Russia has done in the Middle East). Russia is able to do this because it possesses, for the near and medium term, sufficient reserves of power that cannot be wished away or for which a strategy of predicting negative trends for Russia after 2050 is not feasible. In meeting that competition, the U.S. political establishment must tackle whether the goal is to try and deter (or compel) Russia to change course, or to push for the removal of Russia as a major power by moving beyond deterrence and compliance to provoke or accelerate factors that would lead to a decline in Russian power.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A COMPETITOR AND ADVERSARY
The former strategy is consistent with dealing with a competitor; the latter for an adversary. It also goes without saying, however, that the latter approach is much costlier and riskier, especially when dealing with a nuclear-armed power.” based particularly on the reality that Russia is one of the few countries which can credibly project power beyond its immediate border, especially military power. Russia’s near-peer status is based on its population, military-industrial complex and resource endowments, which guarantee that even if Russia faces long-term problems, it will remain a major international actor for the next several U.S. presidential administrations President Biden’s administration identifies Russia as a “near-peer competitor. In dealing with near-peer competitors, there are two strategic choices. One is to turn a near-peer competitor into a near-peer partner; the other is to turn a near-peer competitor (and potential adversary) into a non-peer competitor. Again, these are two very different strategic choices which would utilize very different policy tools and, as the Mayflower Group has noted, would carry different sets of costs and consequences. I steal Jill’s point as my own conclusion: “We need to re-think how we deal with Russia. Confrontation combined with an endless cycle of sanctions isn’t the answer, even if sanctions sometimes are justified. But a “Let’s just be friends” approach won’t do either.
NEED FOR A BIPARTISAN SUSTAINABLE POLICY TOWARDS RUSSIA
For our own security, says Nicholas K Gvosdev, US needs a bi-partisan, sustainable policy based on a realistic definition of why the US even cares about Russia.” “That means tackling not only what we don’t like about Russian behavior, but what we are prepared to do, and pay for”. Nikolas K. Gvosdev in the aforementioned article adds that the United States remains the globe’s predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own. The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, perhaps expertise with dealing with rivals. In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. “We says, Nicholas K Godsev, have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia. Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters.
CHANGE IN RUSSIAN POSITION IN THE DEFINITION OF THE “WEST”
Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). In the same article he adds the world as it is moved into the middle decades of the twenty-first century is starting to look more “normal” in terms of the overall patterns of human history.
DESPITE US BEING PREDOMINANT MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER
The United States remains the globe’s predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own. The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, expertise with dealing with rivals. In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. We have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia. Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters.
CHANGE IN RUSSIAN POSITION IN THE DEFINITION OF “WEST”
Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). He adds in the same article that the world as it is moved into the middle decades of the twenty-first century is starting to look more “normal” in terms of the overall patterns of human history.
The United States remains the globe’s predominant military and economic power, to be sure, with additional vast reserves of soft and “sticky” power that helps incentivize other countries to align themselves with U.S. preferences. But other countries have resurged or obtained greater wherewithal to push back on U.S. agenda-setting or to insist on agendas of their own. The United States policy establishment, however, lacks experience and, expertise with dealing with rivals. In particular, Washington must come to grips with the distinction between a “competitor” and an “adversary.” A competitor seeks advantage, but usually will agree to shared rules of engagement, and does not necessarily see competition as zero-sum or even hostile. We have a tendency, however, to lump competitors as being no different that adversaries, or to assume that the very act of competing with us (in trade, technology or for advantage) must be interpreted as a sign of hostility. This has, in recent years, created new tensions with long-standing security partners in both Europe and Asia. Getting this distinction right with Russia also matters.
Russia has moved from a 1990s position of seeking inclusion with the West into a position of a competitor. Is that competition—for geopolitical influence and geo-economic advantage—manageable within an overall cooperative framework? If it is not, there are implications for U.S. policy—which would require the United States to decide how much of its time, resources and attention should be spent on meeting a Russia challenge (and what other challenges can be spared U.S. attention). He adds in the same article “competitor” based particularly on the reality that
CONCLUSION
Russia is one of the few countries which can credibly project power beyond its immediate border, especially military power. Russia’s near-peer status is based on its population, military-industrial complex and resource endowments, which guarantee that even if Russia faces long-term problems, it will remain a major international actor for the next several U.S. presidential administrations.
In dealing with near-peer competitors, there are two strategic choices. One is to turn a near-peer competitor into a near-peer partner; the other is to turn a near-peer competitor (and potential adversary) into a non-peer Biden’s administration identifies Russia as a “near-peer competitor” based particularly on the reality that Russia is one of the few countries which can credibly project power beyond its immediate border, especially military power. Russia’s near-peer status is based on its population, military-industrial complex and resource endowments, which guarantee that even if Russia faces long-term problems, it will remain a major international actor for the next several U.S. presidential administrations. In dealing with near-peer competitors, there are two strategic choices. One is to turn a near-peer competitor into a near-peer partner; the other is to turn a near-peer competitor (and potential adversary) into a non-peer competitor.
Kazi Anwarul Masud is a retired Bangladeshi diplomat. During his tenure, he worked in several countries as the ambassador of Bangladesh including Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and Germany
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