Mythbusting Afghanistan

Taliban Movement, like all movements, has a lifespan that should be granted, while understanding its compositional diversity

by Inam Ul Haque

 

Afghan analysis space is filled with certain myths created particularly by Afghan watchers of Afghan and Pakistani origin. Such myths can steer any naïve policymaker into a different and uncharted territory. Some myths were created on purpose mainly by Pashtun academics to lionise Afghans fighting the Soviets, and most recently the US/NATO occupation forces. Some myths were generated by IEA’s military ascendency against the Afghan and foreign forces. Perpetuation of such myths in a different environment served certain policy ends in context, however, persisting with them in a changed environment can result in faulty policy outcomes. From the mythical romanticism of ‘holy warriors’ in wars against the USSR and the US-NATO combine to the pragmatic reality of ‘soldier-ruler’, after the fall of Kabul, the reincarnation is phenomenal. Let’s scan the mythological landscape.

Workers harvest saffron flowers in Herat province, Afghanistan, Nov. 13, 2023. (Photo by Mashal/Xinhua)

Myth no 1. Afghans are better left alone; Afghanistan being sovereign, hand-off policy suggested. Easier said than done in the real world, when vital interests and massive investments are at stake. In a research paper on Pak-Afghan bilateralism, while pursuing a Master’s degree in IR in 2003-2004 at the NDU Islamabad, the line of argument by this scribe was that “despite short and mid-term animosity, Afghan state and society would be friendlier towards Pakistan in the long-term (2030) because of the inescapable multidirectional interdependence, where Afghan dependence on Pakistan is substantially more than other way round.”

This interdependence creates problems as well as leverages for Pakistan. As half of Pakistan… KPK, Balochistan and the NMDs are co-joined twins with eastern Afghanistan, with situation on either side affecting the other. TTP as a sticking no 1 variable is a case in point. So, in the prevailing milieu, how can Pakistan remain indifferent to the situation in Kabul…geostrategically, politically, in the security realms and economically? It should not!

Myth No 2. Afghans can resolve their differences by themselves. It is basically an extension of myth no 1. If this was the case, why would there be a need for Geneva Accords, Mecca Accord and Doha Agreement (and Doha Process 1,2 and recently 3), facilitated, participated, adopted and implemented by foreign stake holders and Afghans? Yes, sociologically the Afghan Conflict Resolution Mechanism (CRM) in the form of jirga at various levels is robust enough to iron out intractable problems, but only when there is no outside interference and support. CRM becomes foreign-dependent and, therefore, ineffectual when internal players are beholden to foreign interests, as has been the case in recent Afghan history.

Myth No 3. IEA is not amenable to force. IEA leadership is pragmatic, savvy and wise, knowing when to withdraw, or claim an alibi when their rhetoric runs counter to reality. Their recent denial of TTP safe havens on Afghan soil and pronouncements that TTP is a Pakistani issue, with IEA nothing to do with it, is a disclaimer and retreat behind rhetoric in the face of intractable and undeniable facts.

Afghan yield to pressure when pressure is formidable. Their retreat from Pakistani territory during Bajaur Operation in 1960-62, when PAF punishingly bombed the Royal Afghan Army, is a case in point. Succumbing to Soviet pressure, Afghanistan would have been a Soviet Socialist Republic, had it not been for Pakistan’s lead role during the Jihad (1979-1989).

Afghan yield to pressure when pressure is formidable.

Deployment of right leverages at right time will always result in change of course by Afghans…overtime, even if the present-day obstinacy makes such shift improbable and less visible. Afghan/Pashtun strategic patience involves opponents in an excruciating contest of grit and will, where holding the nerve is the calling and winning strategy. And to do so, knowing Afghan/Pashtun sociology and psychology helps…difficult indeed.

Myth No 4. IEA is militarily ten-foot tall and may embroil Pakistan in a war of unbearable attrition. Learning wrong lessons by Taliban rank and file from IEA’s previous military campaigns is never helpful. As mentioned, had it not been for Pakistan’s steadfast support in laying a weapons, ammunition, equipment and manpower conduit from Pakistan to the Seven-Party Alliance fighting the USSR; had it not been for Pakistan’s technical and continuous military support and advice; had it not been for Pakistan taking around five million uprooted Afghan on its soil purely on humanitarian grounds, and under Islamic, Pashtun and neighbourly amity, without being a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; and had it not been for the indispensable logistic support to Afghan mujahideen leaders, fighters and families in Pakistani hospitals, schools and work places…Afghanistan would have been a Soviet Republic.

Likewise, if it was not for Pakistan’s ostensible ‘double game’ with the 50-nation alliance next door; and for safe havens in Pakistan’s erstwhile FATA; and Taliban leadership’s comfortable homes across Pakistani cities, the IEA leadership would still be battling the US/NATO in Afghan mountains, instead of enjoying peace and ruling Kabul. Doha parleys were unthinkable without ISI/PAKMIL interlocution. You just need to read Zalmay Khalilzad.

Yes, IEA rank and file seem to have taken wrong military lessons vis-à-vis Pakistan from both wars, against the Soviet Union, and the US-NATO combine lately. Pakistan — unlike Russians, Americans and Europeans — knows Afghan human geography well. Under ‘hypothetic’ scenario of bilateral hostilities, PAKMIL would never be interested in territorial acquisitions and dominance, it would enjoy a ‘just cause’ (like the IEA in the cited conflicts), have short supply lines and greater operational synergy, and the advantage of ‘interior lines’. So, the adventurous IEA rank and file, IF ANY, gunning for border fights, beware! IEA’s saner leadership knows this and their comparative national power potential.

If there is one lesson from the Soviet pullout and the US/NATO leaving Afghanistan recently in the end, it is the indispensability of Pakistani sanctuaries and safe havens. Without these, the bravest of the brave would be biting the dust.

Myth No 5. Afghanistan provides ‘strategic depth’ to Pakistan. Nothing could be further from reality than this imaginary iteration by some military thinkers, inadequately schooled in the art of strategy. It is in fact Pakistan that provides strategic depth to Afghanistan. Without this ‘depth’, Soviet troops would still be in Afghanistan, and mujahideen in mountains or in exile. Yes, IEA ascent to power, ‘engineered and assisted’ did provide Pakistan with ‘Strategic Dividend’ against a ‘two-front war’ scenario (India plus Afghanistan), that by itself is a wrong strategic notion forwarded by some Pakistani military planners, too fearful of the ‘Pashtunistan Bogey’, and not knowing the Pashtun sentiment.

Myth No 6. Pashtuns in Pakistan would want to reunite with parent state of Afghanistan, hence the bogey of greater Pashtunistan. This is an unrealistic figment of imagination by some non-Pashtun segments of the Pakistani Miltablishment, who cite this bogey to justify their appeasement of Kabul and other Pashtun nationalists, insensitive and unaware of the larger Pashtun sentiment. In 2001, as a Directing Staff in Staff College Quetta, a colleague (later Lt Gen) would heatedly argue for this fallacy of thinking. Pashtunistan issue is dead, and its raising, if any, by nationalists are feeble attempts by them to stay politically relevant, and to maximise political advantage in the Federation of Pakistan, just like small ethnic groups do elsewhere.

In the prevalent stable political construct, Pakistani Pashtuns look up to Islamabad, whereas Afghan Pashtuns throw their lot with Kabul. Yes, ethnic amity and common heritage would always work to foster positive bilateralism and neighbourly coherence, hence that must be fostered.

Afghanistan, barring occasional border flare-ups (motivated mainly by easement rights, smuggling interests and other local dynamics), would never go whole-hog against Muslim Pakistan.

Myth No 7. Hostile Afghanistan presents Pakistan with two-front war scenario, simultaneously with India and Afghanistan. This is again a notion of Pakistan’s strategic construct advocated by the Miltablishment…that is also too far-fetched. Besides being unrealistic, it also encourages appeasement of Kabul and/or overt and at times unnecessary involvement in Afghanistan’s segmentary politics. In both cases, the ensuing policy stands on borrowed legs.

Afghanistan, barring occasional border flare-ups (motivated mainly by easement rights, smuggling interests and other local dynamics), would never go whole-hog against Muslim Pakistan. Kabul clearly knows the comparative national power potential (NPP), Pakistani leverages and the futility of such exercise, more than ‘some’ movers and shakers in Islamabad. In all three Indo-Pakistan wars, Afghanistan despite friendlier ties with India, never ever postured to take military advantage of the situation. Pashtuns on either side ensure security against third parties…just see historic continuum.

This myth also generates grandiose strategic iterations, like the ‘necessity’ of Pakistan consequently seeking ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan…the notion deflated last week. Such uncalled-for overt patronisation hurts Afghan sensibilities and is better when avoided.

Myth No 8. If IEA wants, it can initiate effective (ejection) action against TTP. As mentioned repeatedly, IEA is incapable, more than it is unwilling to eject the TTP. Having understood the IEA predicament, Pakistan should continue to pursue religious diplomacy with Kabul, launch IBOs relentlessly (cis and trans-frontier), share intelligence and other support with Kabul, ratchet up diplomatic pressure and grant the TTP-issue a normal lifespan. Pakistan needs to do what it needs to do without making politically motivated absurd statements.

Myth No 9. Pakistan never had any coherent Afghan policy. I hear this argument in important discourses from knowledgeable figures, who ironically were involved in policy formulation. This is perhaps attracting attention by saying something ‘negative’…knowing well its absurdity. We partnered with the rest of the world in successfully rolling back the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, next door; Pakistan helped Afghans win their independence from 50-nation occupation force led by the US, and wisely pursued a policy protecting its national interests…as far as its NPP could permit; Islamabad remains the indispensable and most relevant interlocutor for stabilisation of Afghanistan, and yet — sadly and ironically — we are said to have no coherent Afghan policy. Re-reading some recent history would correct the ridiculousness of such blatantly anti-Pakistan, and self-belittling iterations.

Our foreign office, military, political government and intelligentsia followed a first-rate Afghan policy to protect Pakistan’s core national interests as far as possible, under a given environment. Yes, policy implementation is not a clear-cut and clean affair, and has fallouts, that even powerful countries cannot escape…despite the alignment of policy objectives and direction. America’s meddlesome involvement in the Middle East would help detractors understand this truism. Policy improvement, review, fine-tuning and calibration to respond to emerging crises is a constant process that should continue.

And policy should remain institutionalised, and not personality driven.

Myth No 10. Pakistan has exhausted its leverages vis-à-vis Afghanistan. This was the observation of a respected Afghan watcher during a diplomatic function recently in Islamabad, shared by many. It is also an absurd fallacy. Other than historic, religious, ethno-linguistic, social, psychological, trade, economic, political and diplomatic leverages that Pakistan enjoys vis-à-vis Kabul as argued, Kabul’s only leverage against Pakistan is Pashtunistan, if TTP is considered as transient dictate of the environment. And the Pashtunistan issue is out of sync with ground realties and overtaken by changing times. Today even Afghans (inclusive) — having lived in the relative safety and prosperity of Pakistan — want to make Pakistan their permanent home, come what may!

Afghan refugees find it unthinkable to be uprooted again and thrust into the uncertainty of Afghanistan. Afghan grocery shopping is not possible without Pakistan’s border markets (hence the tension with fence). Female education, denied to Afghan diaspora inside their own country, is available to them in Pakistani schools, colleges and universities. Besides quality education, it affords them lifelong friendships. Healthcare at doorstep is available to Afghans already in Pakistan, and those re-entering for medical treatment, importantly at affordable costs, way cheaper than India, as some Afghans like to tout. Pakistani Embassy and consulates cannot handle the visa deluge. The list is long than the space can permit… dear drawing room intellectuals.

Myth No 11. Trade potential with Central Asia through Afghanistan is immense. One grew up with such noise about the ‘potential’ that hasn’t actualised despite Soviet Central Asia shedding the Soviet yoke in the 1990s. For over three decades this mantra has remained a mantra. The wealth flowing through pipelines, the gold and goods through container trucks, and the people and ideas on knowledge highway hasn’t happened. We need to re-assess the Central Asian potential realistically and Afghanistan’s role in it pragmatically under cold calculating commercial logic, and not under historic romanticism. We might be surprised.

Myth No 12. IEA is a monolith. Without deep socio-historic insight into Afghanistan’s segmentary politics, it is easier to consider the Islamic Emirate that evolved from the Afghan Taliban as a monolith. It would be useful to dissect IEA’s religious, ideological, political, cultural, tribal and ethnic profile to understand it well.

First religion and ideology. IEA mostly follows the Hanafi Islam, of taqleedi school of thought, steeped into the Deoband tradition emanating from the chain of Haqqani madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Briefly, Hanafi is one of the four widely practiced jurisprudence in contemporary Islam, following the fiqh (lawfare) of Imam Abu Hanifa (699-767 AD). Taqleed is the Subcontinent’s version of religious practice, emphasising ‘following’ the clergy as opposed to re-interpretation or ijtihad. Deoband, Saharanpur, UP, India is the alma mater for taqleed in the Subcontinent with pervasive religious influence. Its leaders played a leading rule in Muslim political organisation and education in the 1860s. Haqqani is the nom-de-guerre used by graduates of Darul-Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak, KP, Pakistan, and its affiliate madrassahs elsewhere in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Since its inception between Kandahar and Maiwand in eastern Afghanistan in 1990s, Taliban Movement has steered clear of Salafi Islam practised by some Afghan resistance groups (Harkat and Hizb) and Shia influences under Hizb-e-Wahdat. Its alliance with Salafist al-Qaeda, espousing universal appeal for Sharia-based revolutions, was a patron (al-Qaeda)-client (IEA) relationship, that remains tactical in nature, and is nurtured by a curious mix of Islamic brotherhood and the tenets of pashtunwali — the Afghan/Pashtun tribal code. In this universe, religious practice is subservient to tribal, specifically the pashtunwali ethos. IEA recalcitrance on girls’ education and female employment is a case in point.

Within the broader Movement, Kandahar the spiritual head of the Movement is the ideological mover and shaker under the venerated Maulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada, hence my repeated emphasis on religious diplomacy with Kandahar. Kandahar is ideologically puritanical and symbolic. Northern Afghanistan — Khowst, Paktia, Paktika, Nangarhar, etc — bordering Pakistan have remained under the influence of Siraj Haqqani et al. These are formidable fighters making up the bulk of IEA’s military power. Haqqanis voluntarily joined IEA during the 1990s and were not coopted under duress like many other groups. Hence Haqqanis yield influence and their distinct identity within IEA. Puritanical Kandahar and pragmatic Khowst share ‘the need to present a united front to the world beyond Afghanistan’ as an “existential compulsion”. They need to be seen on one-page despite the cited backgrounds and differences.

Second, ethnically the IEA, although predominantly Pashtun (95%), also has a sprinkling of non-Pashtun elements from northern Afghanistan, especially from the Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen ethnic groups. IEA decided to penetrate northern Afghanistan around 2006 from Farah province, fanning into Nuristan, Badakhshan, etc.

Besides, IEA is also a conglomerate of disparate groups, like Central Asia’s IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan), China’s ETIM (Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement), TTP, al Qaeda, Arab fighters, Punjabi Taliban, etc following different ideological strands, and religiosity levels.

Third, culturally IEA is not steeped in equal measure into religious zealotry, as significant renegade elements from the erstwhile Soviet era mujahideen groups, criminals, highway men, brigands and disgruntled government employees form its rank and file. The Movement actually started against the immorality, excesses and cruelty of strongmen and their militias, who had divided Afghanistan into their fiefs after the Soviet pullout in early 1990s. They had established checkpoints all over and would exact taxes and levies and administer punishments. Led by seminary students, the Movement over a period incorporated all segments of Afghan society through negotiations, appeasement, motivation and use of force.

And in this all-male enterprise, there is no female cadre known, other than the female students of madrassahs inside Afghanistan.

Four, IEA mirrors Afghanistan’s tribal mosaic especially in case of its Pashtun cadre. Afghan tribalism emphasises loyalty, following, and the power of collective. Tribal identity is segmentary and results in weak political organisation among Pashtuns as a whole, therefore it is important to hold things together using religion as the much-needed glue. IEA is traditionally populated by clergy namely the Akhunds, the Mojaddedis, the Maulvis, the Sheikhs, etc. Haqqanis of Loya Paktia (grater Paktia) are mainly from Zadran tribe (Mezi subtribe) with their spiritual and military power resident in Pakistan’s north Waziristan District, warranting collaboration with Wazir, Daur and Mahsud tribes on the Pakistani side. Whereas, the Kandahar elite is ‘mainly’ from Hotak (Ghilzai) and Durrani tribes, collaborating with the Suleman Khel, Kakar and Achakzai tribes on Pakistani side of the Durand Line.

Five, politically the IEA has hardliners represented by scholars and clerics; and moderates including the comparatively liberal younger cadre. Whereas the elderly non-yielding conservatives see everything through a spiritual and Islamist prism, emphasising the virtues of jihad and disregarding modern life and its bounties; the younger moderates are more worldly, IT-savvy and image-sensitive. In this see-saw for power and influence, conservatives have the final word. So, in the final analysis, relative opening-up of the Movement to a semblance of modernity would be possible over time in mid to long-term.

Taliban Movement, like all movements, has a lifespan that should be granted, while understanding its compositional diversity, as discussed.

That brings us to Myth No 13. IEA can re-orient the Afghan Transit Trade through the Iranian port of Chabahar, cutting reliance on Karachi and Pakistan. Landlocked Afghanistan heavily relies on transit trade from Pakistan through five joint border crossings at Torkham, Ghulam Khan, Angoor Ada, Spin Boldak and Dand-e-Patan. The Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment’s first deputy head, Mohammad Yunus Momand recently claimed development of Wakhan Corridor and Chabahar Port as potential alternatives. India too seeks trade with Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia through Chabahar Port cutting off Karachi and Gwadar. IEA has reportedly committed a $35 million investment in Chabahar.

Whereas such attempts would betray Pakistan’s longstanding goodwill and concessions, it is easier said than done. A tilt towards a sanctioned Iran would compound IEA’s problems of international legitimacy and undermine its residual influence with Pakistan. It is also not possible in the near to mid-term, given that ATT through Pakistan is deeply entrenched in the bordering business elite. These Sunni Pashtun traders may find it hard to trade through a Shiite Iran, that uses leverages much more punishingly than a sympathetic Pakistan.

Maj Gen Inam Ul Haque retired from a distinguished military career spanning nearly four decades, including key roles in Operation AL-MIZAN combating terrorism along Pakistan’s Western borders. A graduate of prestigious military institutions and holder of multiple master’s degrees, he now chairs companies promoting Pakistan’s defence exports, tourism, and home improvement. He contributes a weekly column to the Daily Express Tribune, engages actively in Rawalpindi Islamabad think tanks, and participates selectively in TV shows. Based in Islamabad, he can be contacted at tayyarinam@hotmail.com.