Can India stand aside on the question of Russia’s attack on democracy and continue to receive benefits from the U.S. and others?
by Kazi Anwarul Masud
INTRODUCTION
Mayuri Banerjee is a Research Analyst with the East Asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Her research focuses on India-China relations, particularly the role of memory and trust after the 1962 war and Indian media’s perception of China. In an article, she traced the history of the Sino-Indian border dispute, highlighting its long and complex history. Key points include:
Aksai Chin: This disputed territory, administered by China but claimed by India, lies at the intersection of Kashmir, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Aksai Chin is mostly uninhabited high-altitude wasteland, but it has significant pasture lands at the margins.
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| In this file photo provided by the Indian Army, tanks pull back from the banks of Pangong Tso lake region, in Ladakh along the India-China border on Feb. 10, 2021. Five Indian soldiers were killed when a military tank they were travelling in sank while crossing a river in the remote region of Ladakh that borders China, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said Saturday, June 29, 2024. (Indian Army via AP, File) |
CHINESE DISREGARD OF McMAHON LINE
The disputed territory south of the McMahon Line is in an area formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh). The McMahon Line was signed between British India and Tibet as part of the 1914 Simla Convention, but China disowns this agreement, stating that Tibet was not independent when it signed the Simla Convention. The conflict escalated in 1962 when Chinese troops attacked Indian border posts in Ladakh in the west and crossed the McMahon Line in the east, resulting in significant casualties. There were border clashes in 1967 in the region of Sikkim, despite an agreed border. In 1987 and 2013, potential conflicts over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) were successfully de-escalated.
IN RECENT TIMES, MULTIPLE SKIRMISHES BROKE OUT ALONG THE UNDEFINED LINE
Multiple skirmishes broke out in 2020, leading to dozens of deaths in June. Agreements signed in 1993 and 1996 aimed to address the boundary question, including confidence-building measures and defining the LAC. Various dispute resolutions have been established over the years. In summary, the India-China border dispute remains ongoing, with historical roots and periodic tensions. Diplomatic efforts continue to find a resolution to this complex issue.
BILATERAL DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES DID NOT SUCCEED
The success of the bilateral dialogue mechanisms and confidence-building measures needs to be assessed according to three aspects: management of border conflict, addressing the bilateral trust deficit, and resolution of the border dispute. A cursory review indicates that both countries have achieved minimal success in these areas. For instance, in managing border conflict, maintaining peace and tranquility along the LAC has been a key objective. Although China and India have avoided a major 1962-style confrontation, the number of military incursions by China rose sharply, from 334 in 2014 to 606 in 2019. Military standoffs between the two countries have grown longer and more difficult to resolve. Local feuds between the armies have escalated from fistfights and stone-throwing to more violent measures, including the use of clubs studded with nails or wrapped with metal barbed wire. These instances point to a lack of local-level communication and understanding, despite diplomatic proclamations of friendship and cooperation. Additionally, despite high-level political and diplomatic exchanges, the trust deficit between the two countries has only widened.
PERCEPTION OF CONSIDERABLE SECURITY THREAT EXISTS ON BOTH SIDES
There exists a perception of a considerable security threat on both sides as India and China have rapidly upgraded their border infrastructure and military capabilities along the disputed border. A vigorous border infrastructure race has developed between the two countries, with both sides building extensive road and railway connections, upgrading military facilities, and increasing troop deployments for quick mobilization. This has aggravated insecurities and is considered a primary reason for the frequent border skirmishes along the LAC. The Doklam (2017) and Galwan Valley (2020) clashes were triggered by road-building activities undertaken by China and India, respectively. Increasing military capabilities, assertive behavior, and intense distrust suggest that peace along the LAC depends on the political wisdom of their respective governments. Even after numerous Joint Working Group meetings and Special Representative Dialogues, the border dispute remains unresolved. The negotiation process, which follows a principle of package settlement through a sectoral approach, has failed to go beyond routine delegation meetings and joint declarations.
ASCENT OF XI JINPING AND NARENDRA MODI RAISED HOPE OF FINAL SETTLEMENT OF BORDER DISPUTE
The ascent to power of Xi Jinping in China and Narendra Modi in India, known for their strong leadership and corporate style of politics, had raised hopes for a final settlement of the border dispute. However, domestic political considerations and strategic threat perceptions continue to severely constrain their ability to undertake sweeping decisions to resolve the dispute. The border dispute remains a major issue impacting Sino-Indian bilateral ties.
EXPERTS CONTEND THAT DISPUTED BORDER DOES NOT POSE SECURITY THREAT TO CHINA
Experts contend that the primary reason for the difference in approaches is that the disputed border does not pose a security threat to China, and therefore Beijing is willing to wait for a more beneficial resolution. In contrast, New Delhi sees the border dispute as a source of instability and worries that China would use the unresolved border to bully India. Intense nationalism in both countries further inhibits the resolution of the border dispute.
FOR CHINA, THE BORDER DISPUTE IS LINKED WITH TIBET AND THE DALAI LAMA
For China, the border dispute is intrinsically linked to Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Since the Chinese Communist Party has always projected the Tibetan government-in-exile negatively, territorial concessions involving Tawang would endanger China’s rule in Tibet and be seen domestically as a sign of weakness. For India, no political party could propose a territorial exchange with China without jeopardizing its electoral prospects, as memories of the 1962 war continue to haunt the Indian national psyche.
CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR AND CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN SOUTH ASIA HAVE CAUSED UNEASE TO INDIA
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and China’s growing influence in South Asia have emerged as new irritants for Indian policymakers. Similarly, Beijing is annoyed by India’s increasing proximity to Southeast Asian countries and its diplomatic-military exchanges with the United States, Japan, and Australia. These issues further erode political will in both countries, making territorial exchange or political settlement a daunting task. Managing the border dispute is both a political and economic necessity for India and China because any major confrontation would hurt the long-term development prospects of both and have significant repercussions on Asian stability and prosperity.
INDIA AND CHINA SHOULD BUILD STRATEGIC TRUST, OPEN DIALOGUE, AND VERIFICATION MECHANISMS ALONG THE DISPUTED BORDER
India and China should aim to build strategic trust through open dialogue, information exchange, and verification mechanisms along the disputed border. Enhancing military-to-military communication, technological collaboration, and engagement on multilateral platforms is essential for building trust. Public perception needs urgent attention through civilian exchanges to dispel stereotypes and negative perceptions. Track-II dialogue involving strategic-affairs experts and academics from both countries could identify new areas for cooperation. The border dispute will remain a pressing challenge in Sino-Indian ties, but it is in the national interest of both countries to prioritize their larger bilateral relationship while erecting confidence-building measures and dialogue mechanisms to preserve the benefits accruing from the relationship.
TOP-LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN JOE BIDEN AND NARENDRA MODI
The Diplomat reported that the United States and India recently completed a ministerial dialogue between U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, and their Indian counterparts, Minister of External Affairs Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh. This “2+2 Dialogue” was preceded by a video conference between U.S. President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with both leaders looking forward to meeting again shortly in Tokyo. Although the “2+2” was nominally focused on international security and was the first to occur since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the world’s two largest democracies paid relatively little attention to the largest international assault on democratic values since World War II and what Russia’s assault means for international peace and security.
IMPORTANCE OF INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO NARENDRA MODI
Jaishankar’s views are of tremendous importance to the Modi government and to Modi himself. Jaishankar has been the Minister of External Affairs since the start of Modi’s second term and became Foreign Secretary soon after Modi began his first term as Prime Minister. Jaishankar’s framework is significant as it reflects the views of many Indians, particularly India’s traditional academic and governmental elites.
JAISHANKAR’S CONCEPT OF “THE WEST” IS NOW CENTERED ON THE USA
Jaishankar’s concept of “the West” is now centered on the United States. This concept derives from U.S. leadership of a network of treaty obligations designed to constrain the Soviet Union and international communism. Jaishankar references Japan, South Korea, and all OECD countries as part of “the West.” In this analysis, “the West” is not a geographic designation but a political concept growing out of the Cold War. India is not part of “the West.” Adding to the historic estrangement caused by colonialism, the U.S., as the leader of “the West,” has imposed on India a “Goldilocks” policy of supporting and suppressing India to ensure it is neither too weak nor too strong. Historical examples include the U.S. support during the 1962 invasion by China and the lack of support during the 1971 war for the independence of Bangladesh.
A STRENGTH OF THE JAISHANKAR DOCTRINE
A strength of the Jaishankar doctrine is that it allows for full cooperation on “non-political” aspects of the U.S.-India relationship. The United States has supported India’s economic development, and with the dismantling of India’s top-down economic model, the way is open for cooperation on all “non-political” fronts. However, political endeavors related to international security and strategic matters require a more circumscribed relationship due to the East vs. West dichotomy. The Cold War ended badly for India, as the USSR and Russia were no longer strong sources of support. This situation requires India to maintain a distance from the United States and the West where Russia is involved, a stance referred to as “strategic autonomy.” This autonomy involves resistance to outside requests, comments, or questions concerning India’s strategic or political choices, viewed as infringements on national sovereignty.
CAN INDIA STAND ASIDE ON THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA’S ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY?
Can India stand aside on the question of Russia’s attack on democracy and continue to receive benefits from the U.S. and others? This is the question posed by the 2+2 Dialogue. The answer is probably “yes,” provided India can continue to provide value to the United States in maintaining the current power balance in Asia. The Biden administration has been quite adept at understanding this dynamic. In response to questions concerning India’s position on Russia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin and Secretary of State Blinken have both made public statements and conducted private conversations emphasizing the partnership aspects of the U.S.-India relationship.
Kazi Anwarul Masud is a retired Bangladeshi diplomat. During his tenure, he worked in several countries as the ambassador of Bangladesh including Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and Germany
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