In the most poignant revelation from the Brandt letters are handwritten notes for his meeting at Bonn in November 1971 with Indira Gandhi, where he admits that Bonn had limited influence and was not a leading player in the international arena. Even so, his part in persuading Dhaka to do away with the trial of the 195 Pakistani PoWs implicated in war crimes became the open sesame to other intractable issues bedevilling relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
by Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s era is over and the Social Democrats are back. During the 50th anniversary of the 1971 Indo-Pak war, the name of Chancellor and Social Democrat Willy Brandt must be recalled for the stellar role he played in its aftermath. Little is known about his part in the erstwhile Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), India, Bangladesh, and for that matter, Pakistan.
On a visit to the Willy Brandt Archives in Bonn in 2014, I chanced upon a treasure trove of letters exchanged between Brandt and Gen Yahya Khan, President ZA Bhutto, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from 1971 to 1974. Many of the Brandt letters were in German and had to be translated into English with the help of a young German historian, Peter Beule, who also helped in putting into the European context the contents of the exchanges between Brandt and these leaders.
I made a presentation of my research in December 2016 to the Berlin Centre for Cold War Studies. No one till then had studied Brandt’s role in facilitating the post-conflict resolution and accountability following the 1971 war, backed by monetary and humanitarian aid. The rapport between Brandt and Gandhi contributed to political and diplomatic stability in the subcontinent. Pakistan signed its first Bilateral Investment Treaty with the FRG in 1959.
For India, the main concerns were the genocide unleashed after the military crackdown (Op Searchlight, March 26), the secret trial in Pakistan of Mujibur Rahman and the return of 10 million refugees that had fled to India. Garry J Bass in his book Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and a Forgotten Genocide called the upheaval the biggest humanitarian crisis involving 10 million refugees ranking in the slaughter league of Bosnia and Rwanda. Stanley Wolpert, in his book Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan says: “If only Bhutto had abided by election results, there would have been no Bangladesh and no reason for Indian intervention.”
The 13-day lightning campaign which thwarted the Pakistan-proposed ceasefire, thanks to six vetoes exercised by the USSR (following the Indo-USSR Treaty of Peace and Friendship of August 1971) that bought time, led to the abject surrender of all Pakistan forces. It was preceded by a 21-day diplomatic blitz by Gandhi. India’s deft use of hard and soft power in its biggest ever humanitarian intervention became the first R2P (Right to Protect) against genocide.
The FRG, as a country not completely recovered from the ravages of World War II, not a member of the UN and still embedded in the Cold War, was mending relations with the East. It was a traditional ally of the US, which had good relations with Pakistan, which was helping Washington to open up to Beijing.
In the most poignant revelation from the Brandt letters are handwritten notes for his meeting at Bonn in November 1971 with Gandhi, where he candidly admits that Bonn had limited influence and was not a leading player in the international arena. Even so, his part in persuading Dhaka to do away with the trial of 195 Pakistani PoWs implicated in war crimes became the open sesame to other intractable issues bedevilling relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Although relations with India were based on the charter of peace and democracy, the FRG’s foreign policy doctrine noted that “good relations could be negatively influenced if India, under pressure from USSR, were to develop diplomatic relations with German Democratic Republic.” For Bonn, it was critical that it be the first country to establish relations with the GDR. India’s compliance with Brandt’s desire to regulate its relations with the GDR became the cornerstone of the Indo-German relations.
According to an article in Der Spiegel in December 1979, the price the FRG paid for making India delay establishing diplomatic relations with the GDR was its early recognition of Bangladesh on February 4, 1972, becoming one of the first European countries to do so as others followed suit, much to the annoyance of the US. This, in turn, led to very cordial relations between the FRG and Bangladesh and Brandt and Mujibur Rahman. Brandt and his emissaries acted as negotiators between Pakistan and Bangladesh over the sensitive questions of the release of Sheikh Mujib; repatriation of 93,000 PoWs and the trickiest of all, clemency by Bangladesh of the 195 Pakistani PoWs accused of genocide. Brandt’s foreign minister Walter Scheel was involved in protracted discussions with Rehman and his special envoy MR Siddiqui to forego the trials (on the assurance they would be tried in Pakistan, which never happened), citing German experience after the war and the Nuremburg trials. Scheel pointed out that war crime trials would stir new emotions in Pakistan and cited Germany’s own experience and how it had to make compromises. Brandt provided generous aid, which was badly needed by the newly born Bangladesh.
On April 9, 1974, a tripartite agreement was signed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh after which Dacca agreed to not try the PoWs, which, in turn, led to Pakistan and Bangladesh recognising each other as Bhutto had made recognition of Bangladesh contingent upon the release of the PoWs. On April 12, the simultaneous repatriation of 93,000 PoWs, including the 195 Pakistanis held for war crimes, Indian PoWs and 3,00,000 Bengalis, had started. The back channel work done by Brandt and his team has, surprisingly, remained obscured.
On the 50th anniversary of the Liberation War, the FRG and Brandt’s contribution to the post-war stabilisation of the subcontinent through its early recognition of Bangladesh and persuasion of Dhaka to forego war trials must be recognised. The India-Bangladesh Maitri Divas will be incomplete without acknowledging Germany’s role in it.
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