Sri Lanka: Walking on an Unknown Terrain

The State Intelligence Service and the PSC Report

by Dinesh Dodamgoda

The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) report on the Easter Sunday Terrorrist Attack was made public on last Wednesday. This article aims to comment on observations made by the PSC on Intelligence Agencies’ role, especially the role of the State Intelligence Service (SIS).

“Intelligence and law enforcement occupy different worlds, but they are parallel worlds that have common dimentions”, stated Frederic F. Manget, a former member of the Senior Intelligence Service at the CIA. Manget’s attempt was to emphasise that intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies have two different roles.

John A. Gentry, a former intelligence analyst at the CIA, observes that while successful intelligence depends on the activities of intelligence organisations, it also depends upon non- intelligence agencies of government like foreign and defence ministries and troops in the field – decisions and actions beyond the control of intelligence services.

Therefore, one cannot correctly asses intelligence performance without appreciating different roles played by intelligence and law enforcement.

The PSC Report

The PSC report finds, “failure by the SIS has resulted in hundreds of deaths, many more injured and immeasurable devastation to Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans and that must not be treated lightly.” This is a serious allegation levelled against the SIS.

The PSC report states that ‘the failure to act’ upon prior ‘intelligence information’ that was available, and delays in sharing them with ‘relevant intelligence’ and security personnel by the Director, SIS were parts of failure of the SIS. The Director, SIS bears the ‘greatest responsibility’, the PSC report notes.

As we noted previously, the ‘responsibility to act’ upon intelligence lies with law enforcement but, not with intelligence. Yet, the PSC report did not appreciate the different roles played by intelligence and law enforcement.

Absence of professionalism

The accusation levelled against SIS for not sharing ‘intelligence information’ on time is another erroneous observation by the PSC. It is worth noticing here that words use by the PSC to refer intelligence as ‘intelligence information’ is technically incorrect as information and intelligence has different subject meanings. Information is described as raw data whereas intelligence is the product of the analysis of information. This careless usage of words is an indication that the PSC did not have the level of professionalism it ought to have in assessing and documenting intelligence performance for an official report.

The Director SIS was alerted on 4th April 2019, verbally and briefly about an attack, and on 5th April, he was informed in writing by his source. After receiving ‘information’, which is raw data, it is a responsibility of an intelligence agency to analyse it in order process information into ‘intelligence’.

On the following day, 6th April, ‘intelligence’ was shared with the Secretary of Defence, the reporting authority for the Director, SIS, and on 7th April, he requested the CNI, Chief of National Intelligence who is the intelligence head of the country and responsible for coordinating intelligence agencies, in writing to provide further instructions. The IGP was informed on 7th of April by the Director, SIS. In addition, a letter was sent to the IGP by the CNI on 8th of April.

On 9th April, the Intelligence Committee Meeting (ICM) was brief by the Director, SIS and informed that a further report in writing will be submitted by the same evening. However, the CNI did not provide a briefing to the ICM on the subject, although he already had the report submitted by the Director, SIS with him.

Intelligence was provided

The PSC report further notes the following:

“On 20th April 2019, the Director, SIS received via WhatsApp a message from his source. The Director, SIS informed the PSC that he passed the message to Secretary, MOD, IGP, CNI and called them to follow up. The IGP had directed him to inform the CNI, Senior DIG- CID, Senior DIG-WP. He also claimed he informed STF during this period. On 21st April 2019 morning, the Director, SIS received another message regarding the attacks. At this time the Director, SIS had immediately called DIG- WP, the IGP and Secretary, MOD.”

However, apart from sending some letters to a few DIGs, no serious action was planned and executed by the IGP upon receiving intelligence and frequent reminders. According to the British counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST, some steps have to be taken by law enforcement agencies upon receiving intelligence. They are, Protect and Prepare.

‘Protect’ is concerned with reducing the vulnerability to terrorist attacks by target hardening, and ‘Prepare’ is the final strand, which recognises that it may not be possible to prevent every single terrorist attack and planning is needed for improving the nation’s ability to respond to an attack if it occurs.

Although intelligence was shared by the SIS, law enforcement agencies did not act to Protect and Prepare. The accusation made by the PSC against the SIS for not sharing ‘intelligence information’ on time is misleading, and the failure lies with law enforcement agencies, including the IGP.

Incorrect information

Another accusation was that since 8th April 2018, a full one year before the incident, the Director, SIS had in writing to the IGP requested for the shutting down of investigations by others into Zahran, which resulted in the SIS becoming the sole investigator into Zahran.

This is not true, as this writer learned that the said request was made by the Director, SIS with regard to a person connected to Al-Qaeda, and had nothing to do with intelligence gatherings on Zaharan by other agencies.

A dry run

The PSC notes a failure on the part of the SIS to act upon the subsequent ‘intelligence information’ received after the explosion on 16th April 2019 in Kattankudy. The PSC concludes that the Director, SIS bears ‘the greatest responsibility’.

However, the PSC report states, “After receiving intelligence of the explosion in Kattankudy on 16th April 2019, the Director, SIS realises the connection to the explosives found in Vanathavillu and realises it is a ‘dry run’. The Director, SIS sent images of the explosion to the Secretary, MOD via WhatsApp and followed by a call to brief him. On 18th April 2019, Director, SIS had sent a special report to the IGP and CID saying that the explosion is linked to Zahran and it is a ‘dry run’. On 19th April 2019, Director, SIS calls IGP and says “Sir, Meka Prashnayak” (“Sir, this is a problem”). He had then said that the matter should be given to the CID. On the same day, Director, SIS had called, Senior DIG-CID, Mr. Ravi Seneviratne and said: “You have the people... IGP wanted me to tell you”. On 19th April 2019, Director, SIS informed DMI “There is an incident like this. You have to act fast. Tell your people”. On the same day, Director, SIS had called Director, TID- “You have to take this seriously, because this is definitely a blast. This is Zahran’s activity. We cannot take it lightly”.

Despite having all these information, law enforcement agencies failed to act in this instance as well. The writer is of the opinion that either the PSC members do not understand the meaning of the word ‘dry run’ or they simply ignored the importance given by the Director, SIS to the said incident.

A written submission of a prosecutor

The length of the article restricts the possibility of discussing further points. However, even from the above points discussed, it can conclude that the PSC report made negative conclusions about the SIS’s performance without properly and reasonably evaluating evidence the PSC had in hand.

This is a serious error as it may not only generate a negative impression on SIS but, can demoralise the SIS community who in fact, was the only agency that provided intelligence about the attack. Interestingly, the PSC report does not draw attention to major failures of law

enforcement agencies, including failures of the IGP, with the same enthusiasm the PSC demonstrates when criticising the SIS and its Director.

Therefore, as a citizen, this writer can conclude that the failure of the SIS has not resulted in hundreds of deaths and immeasurable devastation to Sri Lanka and Sri Lankan’s, and it was the failure of law enforcement authorities, including the IGP. The PSC report is a written submission of a prosecuting lawyer who serves his client than a written judgement of an impartial judge.

[The writer is an Attorney-at-Law, holds an M.Sc. on ‘Global Security’ from the Royal Military College of Science, UK and a Fulbright scholar on ‘National Security’.]