The Maldives is estimated to have racked up
over $1.3 billion in debt to China.
by Indranil Banerjie
It is time once again for smiles and handshakes. After
several years of frigid relations, India and the Maldives are back to the
bonhomie of a traditional friendship. The new Maldivian President, Ibrahim
Mohamed Solih, who won a somewhat unanticipated election victory this October,
was in New Delhi this week, calling India the “closest friend” of his country.
President Solih’s New Delhi visit and pronouncements
marks a radical shift in the decidedly pro-Beijing policy adopted by his
predecessor, the rabidly anti-Indian strongman Abdulla Yameen. Mr Yameen had
kicked off his authoritative rule by sacking and imprisoning the country’s
first democratically-elected President, Mohammed Nasheed, and ruthlessly
suppressing real and imagined rivals, including the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
Mr Yameen had virtually cut off all relations with India,
forcing Prime Minister Narendra Modi to cancel his 2015 state visit to the
Maldives. An unperturbed Mr Yameen had continued to cosy up to China, which
poured in money into a number of big-ticket projects including a 2-km-long sea
bridge linking the Maldivian capital, Male, with its airport.
China is believed to have secured permission to build
ports and military installations in some of the 1,192 islands that comprise the
tiny Indian Ocean republic. Chinese naval ships too began to visit Male. When
Male cancelled a planned military exercise with New Delhi, it was clear that
the country had slipped into the Chinese camp.
Now, with Mr Yameen out and Mr Solih in the top seat, it
emerges that Chinese investments in the Maldives were part of a familiar
pattern designed to induce indebtedness and further tighten Beijing’s iron
grip.
The Maldives is estimated to have racked up over $1.3
billion in debt to China. This amounts to more than a quarter of its entire
GDP.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pledged $1.4 billion in
aid to the Maldives which should get that country out of the debt trap sprung
by China. This payout is expected to bring Male back to New Delhi’s fold.
A similarly fortuitous turn of political events in
neighbouring Sri Lanka has recently gladdened New Delhi. The pro-China
political usurper and former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had
unconstitutionally replaced the country’s democratically-elected Prime
Minister, Ranil Wickremesinghe, was forced out late last week. India openly
welcomed the reinstatement of Mr Wickremesinghe, and its external affairs
ministry spokesman added: “We are confident that India-Sri Lanka relations will
continue to move on an upward trajectory.”
Mr Rajapaksa, it will be recalled, had made some major
concessions to Beijing and had ended up indebting his country, compelling
Colombo to lease out its Hambantota port to China.
Mr Wickremesinghe might be pro-India, but this is not the
case with a large and powerful section of Sri Lanka’s political class, which
includes the country’s President, Maithripala Sirisena, who had dismissed him.
India might have won a reprieve in the Maldives and Sri
Lanka, but that could well be temporary. It was the internal politics of the
two nations that had worked in India’s favour and not any overwhelming
geopolitical dynamic.
Like it or not, China will continue to remain an
attractive proposition in this region with its deep pockets and the potential
of balancing New Delhi. Fears of Indian hegemony in South Asia will similarly
remain an ineluctable factor in the geopolitics of the region.
On the other hand, fears of the Chinese dragon hug
contrasted with India’s tendency to peddle soft power could make regional
leaders think twice before once again putting all their eggs in Beijing’s
basket.
In the long run, however, matters can only get more
complicated in India’s neighbourhood, principally because China’s commissars
are intent on making the Indian Ocean their playground.
The rapid development of the Chinese blue water Navy
spells ultimate Chinese assertivenesshere as it already is in the China seas.
An aggressive rival in the region is already severely
testing India’s influence and infusing new uncertainties. The kind of abrupt
anti-India shift and an equally abrupt course correction of the kind seen in
the Maldives and Sri Lanka, far from being exceptions, could well become the
norm in the future.
In order to immunise our interests from the mercurial
politics of the smaller, inherently insecure regional nations, New Delhi
requires a broader, more overarching strategy. One possibility would be a
closer and more pragmatic tieup with Japan to secure both the military and
economic environment of the Indian Ocean region. Japan, unlike the Western
powers, does not possess a negative militaristic persona, despite its
historical past.
Its defence-oriented military is seen more as a balancing
than a bullying or predatory force. The same cannot be said of China or the
United States, two nations that are looked upon with considerable suspicion in
today’s world, especially in the Indian Ocean region.
Tokyo, despite its manoeuvres designed to reassure
Beijing, is quietly but resolutely moving towards building a formidable naval
capability. Its latest decision to build destroyers capable of hoisting the
naval version of the US-made F-35 fighter is a major step towards developing a
high degree of deterrence as well as the capacity to operate far from its
territorial waters.
Equally significant is Japan’s decision to develop a
military base in Djibouti, which already hosts a similar US and Chinese
presence. These decisions point to Japan’s seriousness in emerging as a key
security player in the Indian Ocean region.
New Delhi would do well to dovetail its plans with that
of Tokyo. Such an alliance would only be mutually helpful. Japan also has a huge
pool of investible capital which could be invested in the region in a judicious
mesh of economic and security interests.
New Delhi has taken baby steps in this direction but
falters due to an excessive concern with Beijing’s sentiments. While it must comply
to a degree with Beijing’s rigid demands to avert military pressure on its
borders, New Delhi must simultaneously, even brazenly, pursue a
politico-economic-military alliance with Tokyo.
A strong, credible geopolitical alliance in the Indian
Ocean region will be the greatest stabilising force. This could also be the
best deterrent against future unsettling alliances and detrimental agreements
like the ones witnessed in the Maldives and Sri Lanka.
The writer is an independent security and political risk
consultant based in New Delhi
Post a Comment