| by Upul Joseph Fernando
( June 12, 2013m Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The question on everyone's mind these days is how India will react to the much talked-about proposal to introduce amendments to the 13A. Obviously, President Mahinda Rajapaksa thinks India can do nothing. The bilateral agreements signed by the Sri Lankan Leader with his Chinese counterpart during the former's recent visit to that country, provides a clear indication that the national security of Sri Lanka has been underwritten by China, as enshrined in the agreement to enhance political communication and support each other's efforts in safeguarding national independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Worthy of close scrutiny
The international media highlighted this agreement as being worthy of close scrutiny by Washington and New Delhi. This could even be a pre-emptive security measure to discourage India from reacting unfavourably to a possible amendment to the 13A. It is possible that Rajapaksa would have planned the amendment campaign with Weerawansa during their China visit.
There is a growing school of thought that if the 13A is tinkered with, India could resort to a drastic reactive measure such as taking re-possession of the Kachchatheevu Island. For sometimes now, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister, Jayalalithaa Jayaram, has been vigorously agitating for it; she has even gone to court for a legal determination of the contentious issue of Kachchatheevu. All Tamil Nadu politicians are with her in this matter, and they insist the island rightfully belongs to Tamil Nadu. They contend that then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, gave it to Sri Lanka on a platter to please her friend, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, thereby helping her to shore up her flagging popularity in the country and to cement their friendship further.
Prof. Suryanarayan in a written commentary on the issue titled, 'Kachchatheevu - public opinion in Tamil Nadu' makes reference to it as follows:
'The ceding of the island of Kachchatheevu was a result of a deliberate political decision taken by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who wanted to come to the rescue of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who was facing serious domestic problems. The acquisition of Kachchatheevu was projected by Colombo as a great diplomatic victory over India, but in the process, the interests of the government and people of Tamil Nadu were sacrificed by New Delhi in the name of mending fences with its southern neighbour.'
Bug bear for MR
Indira Gandhi's largesse in simply awarding Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka strengthened Bandaranaike's waning political fortunes considerably at the time, as it was touted as a big diplomatic victory for her. Mahinda Rajapaksa was the youngest MP in the Bandaranaike Government then, and presumably, he too would have taken pride in the successful outcome of the Kachchatheevu affair.
Now it seems the Kachchatheevu affair is turning out to be a bug bear for Rajapaksa. That is, if by any chance India takes repossession of it, blame will be squarely placed on Mahinda's plate, resulting in a massive loss of face and damage to his image – as that of the conqueror of LTTE terrorism. From the Indian perspective, such a move would help shore up the Congress Party's flagging fortunes in Tamil Nadu, furthering its electoral prospects there.
Past experience reminds one of India's artful capacities in playing its cards close to its chest, especially in its important strategic pursuits. During the war in 1987, while India was exerting pressure on J.R. Jayewardene to discontinue the war effort, they were working on a separate secret plan for invasion of Sri Lanka, if persuasion did not work. It was code named Poomalai (Garland). The following extract from 'Tigers of Lanka' provides more details about this plan.
"Although the 4 June air drop was portrayed as a hastily devised response to the Sri Lanka blockade of the Indian relief flotilla, it was not so. The Military Intelligence (MI) had thought of it well in advance as a contingency. A day before the drop, the MI – which had got sucked into the Sri Lankan affairs in 1986 was ready with a map of Colombo marked with the offices and residences of President Jayewardene, Prime Minister Premadasa, Athulathmudali, Joint Operations Command (JOC) Chief, Nalin Senaviratne, Sri Lankan Police Chief, Ernest Perera and the three service chefs. In the case of Athulathmudali, the MI also had the address of a Burgher woman he was known to be friendly with and whom he reportedly visited in the evenings, accompanied by a lone security guard. The grandiose plan was to seize all the VIPs – including the President and Prime Minister – if the Indian planes were shot down by the Sri Lankans.
Strength of police
The MI also found out the strength of all police stations and military garrisons in and around Colombo and location of open grounds where Indian troops could be conveniently Para dropped or landed to carry out the blitzkrieg. These included the St. Peters College Ground, Havelock Park, CTB (Ceylon Transport Board) playground, Police Grounds, the Colombo Campus, the Royal College Ground, the Sports Ministry playground, the SSC Cricket Ground, the CCC Ground the NCC Ground, the Galle Face Green, the Campbell Park, the St. Joseph's College Ground, the Zahira College Ground, the St. Benedict College Ground and the Sugathadasa Stadium.
The MI also wanted to print notices in the Sinhala language to be air dropped over Colombo in case its operations got underway. But no Sinhala language printing press was found in India or London, despite an exhaustive search. Finally a Tamil contact bought 35 kilos of Sinhala print sets in Colombo for Rs 60,000 (Sri Lankan) and despatched it to India by Indian Airlines flights in seven sealed packets of five kilogrammes each.
To prevent any possible backlash on the Indian community, the Indian High Commission asked its diplomats and staff and Indian nationals in Colombo to move into luxury hotels ahead of 4 June. But fortunately, the air drop passed off peacefully. No wonder, Dixit later called the so-called mercy mission, 'Operation Poomalai' (Garland), India's 'first military projection into Sri Lanka, short of actual violence.' What he did not say was that had Colombo reached violent, it would have ended up as 'Operation Red Garland.'"
In light of above, contrary to what Mahinda Rajapaksa thinks as improbable, Indian could deliver a devastating blow to his prestige among the people by re-annexing Kachchatheevu.
 The question on everyone's mind these days is how Ind...){kind=link}