| by Upul Joseph Fernando
( May 29, 2013, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) It is becoming increasingly apparent that Gotabhaya Rajapaksa's assent and blessing is even more vital than that of the President's in holding the Northern Provincial Council elections and implementing a process of reconciliation with the Northern Tamils. He is the government's point man in so far as the Northern Province's political strategy is concerned.
At a time when the government is acting expeditiously to conduct the much hyped elections for the Northern
Lalith was the architect of the Vadamarachchi military operation, which paved the way for Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. Gotabhaya, who was a senior military officer then, undoubtedly would have had firsthand experience in the twists and turns of the operation. When J.R. Jayewardene prevailed upon Lalith to scuttle the military operation under severe pressure from India, Lalith was extremely annoyed and dejected. Gotabhaya in the thick of the battle then could have felt the same frustration.
Gotabhaya is now as Lalith was then, not receptive or amenable to any Indian influence in Sri Lankan affairs. During his time as Minister of National Security, Lalith had managed to infiltrate the RAW, India's intelligence service, as highlighted in the book, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, an extract of which is given below.
"When the author asked Jayewardene whether India would have invaded if Sri Lankan troops had continued with the anti-LTTE offensive in Jaffna, he said: "Lalith told me he was informed that India will not allow us to take Jaffna. If I wanted the offensive to continue, then I would have had to sack my National Security Minister. India would not have invaded Sri Lanka. India would have helped the LTTE. I would have been a puppet." Lalith Athulathmudali, the then National Security Minister confirming Jayewardene's version added, "We also had information from other sources in India that RAW was planning to step up military supplies to the LTTE." Perhaps Athulathmudali was correct – it is believed that one of his trusted contacts, the late Tissa Jayakody, Sri Lanka's Deputy High Commissioner in Madras had managed to establish a close rapport with Senior RAW and IB officials, who provided much of the needed information about Sri Lankan militant activity in India as well as the Indian militant link to Colombo. Athulathmudali referred to this achievement by stating, "We had penetrated the Indian Intelligence setup." He added, 'penetrating intelligence' gave us quite an accurate picture of India's designs vis-a-vis Sri Lanka."
Indian perception even today is that Lalith worked hard to sabotage the Indo-Lanka Agreement. The then Indian High Commissioner, J.N. Dixit, in his book Assignment Colombo has this to say about Lalith.
"Lalith Athulathmudali considered himself a combination of Machiavelli and Bismarck. A former President of the Oxford Union, a successful lawyer and Professor of Law, he was clear in his mind that his destiny was to be the President of Sri Lanka. He was intellectually bright, lucid in articulation. He was clever, but I dare say he was not wise. He believed that his political talents would enable him to overcome his critics in public life, both at home and abroad by a mixture of negotiating skills, back channel connections and intrigue. The Bismarckian aspect of his person was his conviction that he, by a combination of political sleight of hand and coercive force, would end Tamil separatism and terrorism without having to respond to their aspirations. He was also not averse to establishing contacts with Indian leaders bypassing Jayewardene. He managed this with the LTTE bypassing both Jayewardene and the Indian leaders. He did not succeed with the Indian leadership, because neither Mrs. Indira Gandhi nor Rajiv Gandhi responded to his overtures. He had a modern and rational mind and in private conversations he occasionally told me that but for the burdens of culture and history, the Sri Lankan ethnic problem could not have reached the point of crisis it had done. He kept telling me that had the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement been implemented, things would not have come to such a negative pass. He, however, found that his political future depended on supporting the strident xenophobic Sinhalese approach towards Sri Lankan Tamils. This led to his negotiating stance with India throughout the period of 1983 to 1989 and his activities against the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement. He fell to an assassin's bullet in an election meeting in his constituency, Ratmalana, a year before Premadasa's assassination. While professing friendship with India, he was a committed advocate of Sri Lanka developing relations with Pakistan, the United States and Israel, which created the strategic environment provoking Mrs. Gandhi to generate pressure on the Jayewardene Government. Sri Lanka certainly lost a dynamic and highly intelligent political leader with his disappearance from the scene."
In the book titled Tigers of Lanka by Narayan Swamy, more evidence is presented to further confirm Lalith's role in trying to wreck the peace agreement.
"The same day, the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted a LTTE boat carrying 17 guerrillas, including Kumarappa and Pulendran. The Navy disarmed them and took off their cyanide capsules. They were brought to Palaly, where both the IPKF and SLA had their bases.
The news spread like a flash. The LTTE screamed foul, saying the arrests were a violation of the India-Sri Lanka Accord under which all militants had been granted amnesty. The Sri Lankans said the amnesty pertained to the pre-accord period and that the 17 were armed in violation of the Accord. The LTTE argued that the September 28 agreement signed by it with India allowed the Tigers to retain their personal weapons. Jayewardene went on television to say that the Tigers were returning from Tamil Nadu with arms. The LTTE contacted the IPKF and demanded that the 17 should not be taken to Colombo. But Athulathmudali insisted that they be brought to the Sri Lankan capital, if for nothing else at least to be presented before the TV cameras.
India was on a tightrope. Gen. Depinder Singh flew to Colombo and urged Jayewardene not to insist on their being taken to the Sri Lankan capital. The President refused to relent and on the contrary demanded to know why the Indian Army was unable to bring the LTTE to heel. Dixit, who was in New Delhi at the time, cut short his holiday and dashed to Colombo to make a similar request to Jayewardene. But the President rejected it, saying Athulathmudali was adamant. On 4 October, Mahattaya met the prisoners after taking permission from the IPKF and quietly distributed cyanide capsules to all of them.
Until the last moment, the IPKF was confident that the LTTE prisoners would not be allowed to leave Jaffna. LTTE supporters had already begun collecting outside the Palaly base, demanding to see the captives. An Indian General told a Sri Lankan Brigadier not to fly the 17 to Colombo. "If they die, there will be a bloodbath," he warned. The prisoners had already begun to flaunt their cyanide capsules.
The IPKF threatened to block with armoured cars any Sri Lankan plane intending to fly the prisoners to Colombo. The Sri Lankan Brigadier contacted Colombo and reported the tense situation. But he was threatened with arrest if he did not bring the Tigers to the Sri Lankan capital. The Sri Lankan Army knew about the LTTE's cyanide cult and kept doctors on the ready while trying to march the prisoners to the aircraft. But it was a mission doomed if ever there was one. Once the LTTE members sensed they were about to be taken to Colombo and the IPKF was also not resisting, they bit the capsules.
Twelve of them, including Pulendran and Kumarappa, died although they were rushed to a nearby IPKF-run hospital. Five LTTE activists survived the ordeal.
It was a death blow to any further prospects of peace. Anticipating trouble, the IPKF went on maximum alert. But there was no stopping the LTTE now. Those who knew the Tigers realized that the worst could be expected any time now. The LTTE was like a wounded tiger, volatile and dangerous."
Considering the similarities of the situation then and now, it is not irrelevant to think that India could be conceiving Gotabhaya as another Lalith who attempted to dismantle the peace accord. Just as India persuaded JR to establish Provincial Councils under the peace accord, India has at present got Mahinda to agree to hold Northern Provincial Council Elections. India then saw Lalith as a powerful obstacle they had to face, because he had the security forces and the police under his command. Today, Gotabhaya has the security forces and the police under his command. In this scenario, one could easily surmise and it may not be surprising, if India sees Lalith's double in Gotabhaya.
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