| by Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne
( April 17, 2013, Montreal, Sri Lanka Guardian) In 1943 the American psychologist Abraham Harold Maslow published a paper in which he propounded a hierarchy of human needs. Diagrammatically, this hierarchy takes the form of a pyramid with five layers, starting at the bottom with the most important. After receiving the very basic human needs in the bottom most layer such as breathing, food, water, the human climbs to the next layer which includes security of body, health, family and other needs that ensure stability and safety. The other three layers leading to the top involve such needs as friendship, sexual intimacy, self- esteem, confidence, respect of others, morality, creativity, spontaneity and others of a similar nature.
Obviously, the terrorist is not interested in attacking the needs identified in the top three layers of Maslow’s pyramid simply because he cannot have any influence on them. Restricted to the two basic layers, he has, in several instances, tried to pollute water, threaten breathing with noxious gases, and poison food. However, he or she, as the case may be, is most successful in threatening and attacking security of body. This could well be because, for one, it is easy to indulge in this particular activity and, more importantly, it is spectacular and grabs immediate attention of the targeted society.
I believe this is what happened during the Boston Marathon.
Two bombs struck near the finish line of the Boston Marathon on Monday 15 April, turning a celebration into a bloody scene of destruction. One of the dead was an 8-year-old boy. Hospitals reported that at least 144 people were treated immediately after the bombs went off, with at least 17 of them in critical condition and 25 in serious condition. At least eight of the patients admitted were children and ten of the injured in the blasts had their legs amputated. The blasts triggered widespread screaming and chaos, shattered windows and barricades and sent smoke billowing into the air.
Spectacular enough for the terrorist/s? You bet. Brian Jenkins once said: “terrorists want a lot of people watching…not a lot of people dead”.
Are terrorists crazy, or suicidal, or psychopaths without moral feelings or feelings for others? Clark R. McCauley, Professor of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, in his book “The Psychology of Terrorism” says, “thirty years ago this suggestion was taken very seriously, but thirty years of research has found psychopathology and personality disorder no more likely among terrorists than among non-terrorists from the same background”. He is of the view that the occasional lone bombers or lone gunmen who kill for political causes may indeed suffer from some form of psychopathology and goes on to distinguish between such killers and terrorists in groups, especially groups that can organize attacks that are successful, who are likely to be within the normal range of personality.
So who is a terrorist? One definition is: “one who uses the threat of violence, either by oneself or with small groups against non-combatants of large groups, for avowed political goals. The key to this definition is the combination of small groups killing non-combatants. Terrorism is the warfare of the weak, the recourse of those desperate for a cause that cannot win by conventional means”.
A Report prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress and published in September 1999 (note, before 9/11) titled : The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism : Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? states:
“Unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by conventional means, international terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terrorizing the general public. Through the choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the targeted nation, terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on the public of their targeted enemy or enemies with their act of violence, despite the limited material resources that are usually at their disposal. In doing so, they hope to demonstrate various points, such as that the targeted government(s) cannot protect its (their) own citizens, or that by assassinating a specific victim they can teach the general public a lesson about espousing viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own”.
The terrorist thrives on displacement or overflow of missed opportunity, which is his response to measures of counter terrorism driven by deterrence. Studies have shown that stringent measures, when adopted against a particular type of crime belonging to a generic group (such as hijacking in the spectrum of unlawful interference against civil aviation) would be effective enough to reduce that particular type of crime. However, it might give rise to increase in other forms of crime belonging to that generic group. Called the displacement theory, this pattern has applied in particular to civil aviation, as seen in the decrease in offences against aircraft after the events of 11 September 2001.
In order that basic strategies are employed for preventing crime and to combat crime when prevention is impossible, crime prevention strategies adopt two methods of combating crime. The first method is to prevent or stop potential criminal acts. The second method is to apprehend and punish anyone who commits a criminal act. These methods follow the philosophy that the prevention of crime can be achieved by increasing the probability of apprehension and applying severe penal sanction to a crime. For example, installation of metal detectors at airports increases the probability of detecting and apprehending potential hijackers or saboteurs. Theoretically the high risk of being apprehended decreases the potential threat and the stringent penal sanction that may apply consequent to such apprehension compound the ominous quality of the preventive means taken.
Many studies focus on aspects of the deterrence theory with the application of the theory to the varied effects of criminology applications on various modes of crimes. These studies relating to the prevention of crime attracted interesting conclusions which went on to reflect that increasing certainty and the severity of punishment reduced the rate of homicide in the United States. It was found by one study that the effect of severity was greater than that of certainty. There were negative correlations between certainty of imprisonment and total felonies. Another observation was that increasing certainty of punishment decreased the incidence of homicide, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft. It was also found that certainty appeared to have an independent effect separate from severity of punishment. In view of the fact that effects of severity decreased as certainty of punishment decreased, it would be reasonable to conclude that it is better for policy to concentrate on increasing certainty in order that such an approach would be more effective.
The application of the above approach within U.S. resulted in an increased number of police on patrol, which resulted in a decrease in the number of robberies in New York City subways. Also, increasing the number of police on patrol decreased the number of outdoor felonies in the Twentieth Precinct of New York. Increasing the certainty and severity of punishment for drunk driving has similarly been is effective in reducing drunk driving.
Generally, these studies support the hypothesis that two factors lead a criminal to perceive a greater risk of punishment. These factors are: first, certainty, or a high probability of being arrested and convicted, second, the severity of harshness of the punishment. Certainty and severity of punishment an each have an individual effect on crime prevention; but there is a greater impact when certainty and severity are combined.
Deterrence as a theoretical concept that can be applied in most instances of criminology with practical results is based on the basic assumption that individuals are rational beings. Rationality promotes benefit maximizing behaviour that appears to human beings even against constraints. This means that individuals as rational beings pursue their maximizing goals by making the best choices they can. The underlying concept of the deterrence theory supports the hypothesis that rationalists consider potential criminals as rational decision-makers faced with constraints and uncertainty in their decision making process. The explanation of governmental actions follows the same pattern of the rational model. Therefore, an analyst could conclude that criminals and governmental officials are engaged in a "game" where criminals try to maximize their illegitimate goals through the "least expensive" (apprehension and punishment) approaches and governmental policy makers try to prevent crimes by increasing the probability of apprehension and creating a punishment measure which will serve as a deterrent.
It would be interesting to learn of the types of security measures were applied at the Boston Marathon. Were they sufficient to repel the displacement theory? Why did the terrorist/s attack the Marathon rather than Times Square on New Year’s Eve? Should there be more vigilance at places where crowds gather and should places be cordoned off and cleansed before a major event?
Questions…questions… but no answers.
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