| by Upul Joseph Fernando
( February 14, 2013, Colombo. Sri Lanka Guardian) The Indian media reported that Alok Joshi, Chief of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) had visited President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Guest House at Tirupati, where he was staying. In practice, a meeting between the Chief of the country's secret service and visiting foreign Head of State is a rarity. J.R. Jayewardene is the only head of Sri Lanka to have had a meeting with the chief of 'RAW'. Usually, the chief of 'RAW' meets the leader of a foreign country only when there is a crucial issue pertaining to India or a perilous situation involving the country of that leader.
In 1988, A. Verma, then chief of the Indian secret service, met President J. R. Jayewardene to confirm the implementation of the Indo-Lanka Accord to which India was a signatory. What Professor Rohan Gunaratne revealed in his book titled, Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, in relation to this meeting and the events connected therewith is noted hereunder:
"On 26 April 1988, A. Verma, the head ( Read an exclusive interview with A.K. Verma which published by the Sri Lanka Guardian on 2008 ) of RAW, flew into Colombo. Verma's visit was known only to a handful of men in Indian and Sri Lanka. In Colombo, only three men knew about it. They were M.M. Gunaratne, Director-General, Intelligence and Security, Ministry of Defence, under whom the Special Task Force (STF) and National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) were placed, Zerny Wijesuriya, Director, National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and President Jayewardene himself. Even people like Dixit, the high profile Indian High Commissioner, Gamini Dissanayake, influential minister and co-architect of the Accord, General Sepala Attygalle, Defence Secretary, General Cyril Ranatunge, the General Officer Commanding the Joint Operations Command, and W.M.P. B. Manikdewela, the Secretary to the President did not know. Lalith Athulathmudali, the National Security Minister, was also not fully informed – perhaps he would have been partly informed by the effective private intelligence network he operated.
In India, Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister, Grirish Chandra Saxena, the National Security Adviser to the Indian Prime Minister, Chandrasekaran alias Chandran of RAW and only two or three other officials knew. Subsequently, when two prominent Sri Lankans in the government became aware of the RAW connection, they were very annoyed.
Verma travelled undercover and spent about 48 hours in Colombo. He tried to convince Jayewardene the LTTE was interested in joining the mainstream and that he should cooperate with the negotiating intermediary – RAW. Verma held discussions with M.M. Gunaratne on the morning of 27 April. He was well informed about the conflict, and had personally negotiated with the TULF, the militant groups including the LTTE, and was keen to obtain certain assurances from President Jayewardene before he once again met with Kittu in Madras. Verma stated that all Tamil groups were agreeable to enter the political process. He stated that the LTTE too was keen to do so, but subject to certain conditions being satisfied.
RAW head meets Jayewardene
28 April 1988 was historic day when the head of RAW met President Jayewardene. According to a high level source in New Delhi, Jayewardene was cautious. However, he cooperated at least at the beginning, and even Gandhi who intensely disliked the LTTE thought that with the support of Jayewardene, India will be successful in striking a deal with the LTTE. Verma said the LTTE is keen to "surrender 700 of the estimated 1,000 big weapons the LTTE have in their possession and they would like to retain 300 weapons for their security." Verma added: "With the surrender, a ceasefire would be announced. The LTTE would thereafter publicly support the Accord. The balance weapons will be released gradually, once the LTTE feels assured that a climate of security has descended on the North and East." Verma asked President Jayewardene whether he could respond to the LTTE by announcing that the Government of Sri Lanka will hold elections in the North and East for once council (under Article 37 A of the Provincial Councils Act). This was to be done when the groups were ready to enter the political process and before the date of the elections for the North and East was to be announced, and soon after all other elections were completed. Verma stated that a referendum as stipulated in the Accord would subsequently be necessary, for people to accept or reject the merger.' Verma requested Jayewardene to make two other public statements regarding two LTTE requests as an explicit demonstration of goodwill and gesture towards the LTTE. One was to be on the release of detainees in custody. RAW was told that 3,634 had been released and only 627 were in custody, and that even they would be released in due course. The other request was on the use of the 1982 electoral register for the elections. The President agreed to the latter.
Assessed
Sri Lanka's position was explained to RAW by President Jayewardene. He said the Sri Lankan Government expected the Indian authorities to disarm all militants fully. The categories of weapons and equipment in the possession of the LTTE as assessed by the Sri Lankan authorities were, 700 of all categories of small arms, heavy and light mortars, RPGs, LMGs, MMGs, GPMGs, 50 caliber guns, hand guns, hand grenades, all stocks of ammunition and explosives and all types of radio communication equipment. Jayewardene stated that this information could be made available to General Kalkat of the IPKF. Verma said RAW would give a five-week ceasefire period to surrender the weapons, but Jayewardene said two weeks would be adequate. Verma said the modalities of the ceasefire will be discussed between the IPKF and LTTE. Jayewardene suggested that the Sri Lankan GOC, General Cyril Ranatunge discuss this with the Indian commander, as no group should be allowed to carry arms during this period as this would lead to infighting among groups and movement of weapons for hiding.
With regard to the proposal by RAW to grant Indian Rs 150 crore for the rehabilitation of the North and East, including an outright grant of Indian Rs 50 crore to the LTTE, President Jayewardene said the funds should be channelled and administered through the Sri Lanka Government. Jayewardene agreed to the RAW proposition that there be an understanding between the two governments, and that a larger share should be for the LTTE. At the request of RAW, Dixit was kept in the dark. Verma stated that "Dixit is presently not held in favour by the Indian Prime Minister and therefore does not play any significant role in the process of negotiations." Verma stated that the reason Dixit lost his influence over the Prime Minister were, "firstly the public disclosures of payments made to LTTE on the eve of the Accord, secondly, his arrogance and overbearing attitudes and thirdly, by his conduct and action, which has made him increasingly unpopular with Sinhalese and Tamils."
The Indian Defence Minister,
K.C. Pant, visited Colombo between 30 May and 1 June and discussed the future course of action with President Jayewardene. RAW continued to pressurize President Jayewardene to make three announcements. Secret message continued to be relayed between Delhi and Colombo. On 14 June 1988, Verma under the cover of a code name wrote to his Sri Lankan counterpart. It read:
'Secret, 14.6.88, My dear (code name), During the visit of our Defence Minister, you would have heard about the progress being made in getting LTTE to cease fire, surrender of arms and participation in the electoral processes. During my own meeting with you on April 28 and with the President, it has been decided that certain public statements will be made as an explicit demonstration of good will and gesture. Now those elections of 2 June and 9 June have ended with such great accomplishment, I would be grateful if those public statements could be made. Our negotiations with the LTTE have reached such a crucial point and further progress depends directly on public demonstration of the proposed gestures. You would no doubt recall that they relate to declaration about elections to one council in North and East, release of detainees and use of 1982 register for electoral purposes... Would it therefore be possible for you to request the President to have these statements made immediately? Kindest regards. Yours Sincerely, (Code name)-III."
"India proposed a time schedule for the political processes in the North and East. This was prepared by the RAW in consultations with Dixit. The schedule was as follows:
12 June, to announce the North East merge. 15 June, LTTE to announce support to the Accord, readiness to surrender arms and join the political process. 16 and 21 June, discuss with LTTE military leadership, the modalities of surrender and ground rules for the observance of informal ceasefire. 22 to 25 June, surrender of first lot of arms at designated centres and informal ceasefire begins from 25 June. 26 June, the formation of the rehabilitation committee. 30 June, appointment of a governor for the combined province. 10 to 12 July, surrender of the second lot of arms. 27 July, surrender of the balance lot of arms and formal declaration of the ceasefire. 31 July, necessary amendments for the use of the 1982 electoral register. 1 August, President to direct Elections Commissioner to call for nominations for the Provincial Council elections of the North and East. 2 October, elections to be held. 5 October, election results to be announced. President Jayewardene's deadlines were 22 June for the announcement, 7 July, for the final surrender and 20 September for the election results to be announced. But events took such a course that neither of the deadlines could be met.
The LTTE in Madras issued a statement which confirmed the extent to which the RAW had pressurized Kittu and the extent to which Kittu could commit the LTTE. In summary, Kittu stated, "That the present confrontation between the LTTE and India is a forced one and there is an immediate need to put an end to this conflict and to alleviate the sufferings of our people... We have declared before and we continue to stand by our pledge to cooperate in the implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. We still insist that the implementation should have the desired effect of safeguarding the interests and aspirations of our people... We are willing to hand over 700 usable small arms (excluding the locally manufactured ones, pistols and grenades) at pre-designed places to the authorities concerned. As a first step, we will hand over 300 arms on a date mutually agreed, to facilitate declaration of ceasefire, which will end all armed hostilities. Following the first hand over, the remaining 400 arms will be handed over in due course. The representatives of the Government of India have suggested a time period of five weeks to hand over those 400 arms. We have conveyed this suggestion to our leader Pirabhakaran and are awaiting a reply from him.... the LTTE is also willing to join the electoral processes and contest the envisaged Provincial Elections provided for... We are willing to let all groups who were involved in the ethnic conflict to contest the elections and let the Tamil people choose their representatives... We expect the Government of India to afford full protection to the LTTE cadres and to the leaders. We also expect the Government of India to disarm totally other militant groups. The ban on the LTTE will have to be lifted, and we are yet to find a solution for the repeal of the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka... Our experience in the past has been one of broken promises. We, therefore, expect the Government of India to take up with the Sri Lankan Government improvements on the devolution package and ensure the implementations as the 13th Amendment of the Constitution is very unsatisfactory... We would expect the Government of India to reduce and relocate the IPKF after ceasefire in consultation with the LTTE leadership... We expect the Government of India to allot IC Rs 150 crores for the rehabilitation of the people in the North and the East. As part of this fund, IC Rs 50 crores should be set apart for the rehabilitation of LTTE carders, their families, sympathizers and helpers, and for the reconstruction of LTTE-related institutions. The LTTE should be consulted in the appointments to the Committee to administer the fund of IC Rs 100crores..."
Verma's return to Sri Lanka
On 19 June, Verma returned to Sri Lanka and presented to President Jayewardene the statement issued by Kittu. Jayewardene was unhappy with the LTTE proposition to surrender 700 usable arms as this would totally exclude half the number of small arms, heavy weaponry, explosives, grenades and communication equipment. He was also unhappy that the LTTE was going to take five weeks to surrender 700 arms. Subsequently, President Jayewardene was to communicate to Prime Minister Gandhi. The surrender of arms and entering of the political process being a voluntary effort and knowing the logistical efficiency of the LTTE, a shorter period such as two weeks will be more than adequate. In fact, the LTTE were given only three days according to the conditions governing the Accord of July 1987, to surrender all weapons. President Jayewardene also informed Verma that the LTTE request to disarm all the other militant groups fully excepting themselves would give rise to dangerous consequence if implemented.
President Jayewardene informed the RAW on 20 and 21 June, that he would make the three announcements requested by the RAW, provided that the LTTE gave a clear and a positive assurance to the Indian authorities that they would surrender all categories of weapons, grenades, explosives and communication equipment during a period of two weeks. Jayewardene also stated that at the commencement of the informal ceasefire, a certain predetermined quantum of arms can be surrendered as an act of good faith. The Sri Lankan and the IPKF GOCs were to determine the approximate stocks in the LTTE's possession, so that the LTTE would not be able to withhold any quantities. On 20 June, the RAW chief responded to his counterpart in Sri Lanka. On the issue of surrender of arms, the head of RAW said,
"The LTTE have been informed about your President's request that they should totally disarm themselves. They are already aware that besides surrender of arms like grenades, pistols, revolvers and locally made weapons like mines, mortars, LMGs, MMCs, RPGs to be handed over should not be less than 700. I expect the message regarding the need to totally disarm, to have reached Prabhakaran by now.... Regarding your proposal for a two-weeks' period for surrender of weapons, the LTTE have sought five months, and we have suggested five weeks. This too has yet to be confirmed... With regard to the proposed grant of Rs 50 crore to the LTTE, there would be Sri Lankan Government representatives in the committee which will administer this sum. The LTTE is aware of this."
This clearly indicated that RAW was trying to elicit support from Colombo for devolution."
However, the recent meeting the RAW chief had with Mahinda Rajapaksa was to convey the message of the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to resume the Provincial Council operations in the North in conformity with the Indo-Lanka Accord, at a juncture when Rajapaksa does not care two hoots and ignores the instructions given by both Manmohan Singh and the Opposition Leader Sushma Swaraj, to revive the Provincial Councils in the North. Previously, when Rajapaksa went on pilgrimage and visited Temples and Kovils, he also went to Delhi and met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Even after India supported the US resolution against Sri Lanka in 2012, Rajapaksa, following his Sanchi visit, travelled to New Delhi and met Singh. It was only during the last visit that Singh did not meet Rajapaksa and instead sent the Chief of RAW to meet him.
The 'language' of the Indian Foreign Ministry and that of the secret service are distinctively different. Besides, to say the meeting lasted 30 minutes means the Chief of RAW had perhaps gone to convey a message. And that message would not have been a request to implement the '13-plus', rather, it would have been about the consequence if the 13-plus is ignored or overhauled altogether.
Moreover, from 1983 to 1991, following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the RAW had been directly and openly meddling in the Indo –Lanka relationship, a fact Rajapaksa cannot treat lightly.
( The writer is well reputed journalist based in Colombo, Sri Lanka. He is working for the Ceylon Today, an independent daily newspaper where this piece was originally appeared)
 The Indian media reported that Alok Joshi, Chief of Ind...){kind=link}