| by Dr. Ruwantissa Abeyratne
( February 7, 2013, Montreal, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Colombopage (a Sri Lanka Internet page) reported that the Sri Lanka Parliament on 6 February 2013 had moved a draft revision bill to revise legislation on terrorist financing, on the basis that the country needs a complete legal framework in order to suppress the financing of terrorism, which would no doubt suppress terrorism in turn. It was also reported that the draft bill to amend the Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act No 25 of 2005 was presented to Parliament and that the debate on the proposed amendments will continue on 7 February as well.
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Terrorists intimidate society by spreading shock, fear and alarm. They bring to bear the stark reality that all humans are vulnerable. And they ensure lasting results. Take for instance the attacks on 11 September 2001 when aircraft were used as weapons of mass destruction.
Presumably, the 2005 Act was prompted by the United Nations initiative of 1999 - when the United Nations General Assembly, on 9 December 1999, adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, aimed at enhancing international co-operation among States in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and punishment of its perpetrators.
The Convention, in its Article 2 recognizes that any person who by any means directly or indirectly, unlawfully or wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out any act which constitutes an offence under certain named treaties, commits an offence. The treaties listed are those that are already adopted and in force and which address acts of unlawful interference with such activities as deal with air transport and maritime transport. Also cited is the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.
The Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism also provides that, over and above the acts mentioned, providing or collecting funds toward any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in the situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, would be deemed an offence under the Convention.
Both the United Nations Convention and the proposed amendments to the Sri Lankan Act are undoubtedly proactive measures towards protecting society and bringing to justice the perpetrator. These initiatives brought to my mind the philosophical question: what impels people to finance terrorism? (a quick answer would be “money” although one cannot rule out ideology) And what impels the terrorist to kill others and, in some instances, to kill himself (not to mention the female suicide bomber)?
Terrorists intimidate society by spreading shock, fear and alarm. They bring to bear the stark reality that all humans are vulnerable. And they ensure lasting results. Take for instance the attacks on 11 September 2001 when aircraft were used as weapons of mass destruction. This made air travel, which was once a fun experience, a nightmare riddled with stress. Terrorism could be a one-off attack as in 9/11 or be sustained over a long period, like what happened in Northern Ireland where over a period of thirty years, the same amount of persons as in 9/11 were killed by terrorist attacks. Terrorism could be the result of a combination of factors: evil; hatred; revenge; vindication and power. The question is: “what is the root cause of these factors?
Trudy Govier, in her highly readable book A Delicate Balance: What Philosophy Can Tell Us About Terrorism (Westview:2002) suggests that the causes may be poverty, lack of opportunity, absence of institutions permitting democratic political participation, simplistic and intolerant ideologies, resentment and envy, and real or perceived inadequacies in government. Govier says in the Preface:
“As we struggle to come to terms with vulnerability and fear, we are exposed to a moral rhetoric of evil and justice and encouraged to cultivate a sense that we are engaged in a battle of good and evil. Some such appeals are manipulative and superficial, but others are heartfelt…I find the rhetoric “evil” alarming, not because I don’t believe evil exists but rather because of its tendency to polarize and oversimplify. The notion that those who attack us are simply evil discourages questioning and thought and suggests that we can save ourselves only by destroying evil others. I believe that is a dangerous illusion.”
She says seeking revenge is both morally and practically objectional and seemingly aligns herself to Immanuel Kant who based his categoricalist morality on the dignity of the human, the Kantian objection to revenge being based on the premise that using the suffering of a person to satisfy oneself is morally objectionable because it treats the person as a means only and fails to respect the person’s human dignity. There is a school of thought that advocates the philosophy that retributive punishment is based on the morality of anger and that from a social contract point of view, punishment, within a properly constituted civil society, is a legitimate and necessary response to crime.
In understanding the terrorist (if that is at all possible) one might argue that the terrorist does not come within Aristotle’s golden mean of virtuousness (a state between excessive courage or recklessness and cowardice or lack of courage). Instead, the terrorist would fall into the category of recklessness where he is impelled by what is now called the law of outrage – which is a theory that supports defiance against unjust denial of rights. It is noteworthy that Aristotle, in his Nichomachean Ethics said that the proper sphere of courage lies in the battlefield, which impliedly rules out the terrorist as a courageous person.
If we were to treat the terrorist as a hostis humani generis (enemy of humanity) which he or she is, we may have a philosophical dilemma in terms of the danger he poses to society, in which case it may not just simply boil down to revenge or retributive punishment. Our response would be based on the fundamental importance of the duty of protecting society. Michael Sandel, Professor at Harvard has asked the following question from his students during his course “Justice”. “Suppose you caught a person a day before 9/11 and you knew he had critical information that could have prevented the deaths of 3000 people the following day, and this person refused to provide information under any threat, would you have tortured him to get that information?
I have asked my students a similar question, when I addressed the legal issue of pre-emptive attacks and preventive attacks against terrorists. “suppose you are remotely piloting a drone which you aim at a known target (house), having solid intelligence that a terrorist leader, who is known to be planning an attack the following day on a village of 500 people, is in the house, having supper with his wife and two teenage children, would you still launch the attack that would kill the terrorist, but also certainly kill the wife and children?
Philosophically, the dichotomy would lie on the one hand in Kant’s theory of human dignity and the value of human life and Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian theory of consequentialism and happiness and the good of the majority, on the other.
Perhaps the answer may lie in Aristotle’s teleology, which is based on the ultimate purpose. In this context, the ultimate purpose would not be killing the terrorist, which would be a means to the end, but would be of protecting society. But then where would Kant’s philosophy go?
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