| by Upul Joseph Fernando
“New Delhi’s current gesture of rediscovering another memorial at Palaly, along with the occupying genocide Sinhala military, signals negatively when there is demand for international investigation of war crimes in the island....”
( February 28, 2013. Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The above was posted on the Tamilnet on 23 February 2013, following the visit of Indian High Commissioner, Ashok Kantha, to Jaffna, where he paid tribute to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) at the memorial in Palaly.
 |
Delhi is well aware President Rajapaksa has his own reservations about the role of the High Commissioner, Ashok K. Kantha. It is also well known President Rajapaksa avoids meeting the Indian HC quite often. Though a change of HC is quietly sought by Sri Lanka, India is not in an obliging mood at present.
The IPKF memorial was rediscovered many years after the end of the war. When this ‘rediscovery’ is considered in tandem with the account given in ‘The Hindu’, it seems to contain something more than what meets the eye. In fact, it alludes strongly to the possibility of it being not just a mere rediscovery of a long forgotten memorial, but India’s unequivocal assertion a strong bond exists between India and Northern Sri Lanka.
As reported in the Hindu, the memorial had been rediscovered by the Indian Consul General in Jaffna on information given by some Northern people. It is a strange coincidence the Indian Consul General, who was appointed nearly three years after the war came to an end, happened to be the person to rediscover this memorial. Strangely enough, even during the LTTE control of Jaffna, Palaly was under the control of the security forces. Even after Jaffna was liberated in 1995, there was no indication of any IPKF memorial there.
Sudden discovery
However, the sudden discovery of this memorial points to another possible interpretation; that the Sri Lankan Government neither recognized its existence nor considered it important enough to attach any significance to it. The government’s negligence of it even while setting up another memorial in Colombo is beyond comprehension.
A website run by ‘Bharath Rakshak’ (defenders of India) has documented the Indian security forces’ operation to dislodge and arrest Prabhakaran and his senior cadres in Jaffna in a descriptive article titled ‘Descent into danger - the Jaffna University Helidrop’. This security forces operation involved dropping Indian Para Commandos on to the grounds at the Jaffna University and taking control of the LTTE headquarters. It was hailed as an extremely heroic deed by the Indian soldiers and those who sacrificed their lives in the fighting were posthumously awarded the ‘Vir Chakra’ military award. A post-mortem examination of the failed operation included the following.
Post Mortem
“It is never known as to how close the LTTE leadership came to being captured or eliminated during the raid. But radio intercepts supplied by the Sri Lankan intercept stations suggested at one stage the LTTE Supremo Prabhakaran sent a ‘good bye’ message to other LTTE stations elsewhere. Prabhakaran had said in his message he may not get out of the battle and asked other LTTE commanders to act on their own. The LTTE Deputy, Mahathaya, was known to have been in the same area trying to organize the LTTE counter attacks.
What went wrong?
- An inaccurate estimate of the opposition the helicopters would face is one thing. No one had a clue to the ferocity of the LTTE opposition at the landing ground – instead of the unopposed landings, it turned out to be a desperate battle for survival.
- The Sikh Light Infantry (LI) troops were inadequately trained or equipped for the SHBO. SHBOs required troops familiar with embarking and disembarking the helicopter in quick time. All equipment ammunition would have to be carried on a man-pack basis. The Sikh LI troops were unfamiliar with the SHBOs as well and got bogged down with the 500kg heavy ammunition boxes. It is considered highly probable the ammunition could not be passed onto the Sikh soldiers in time.
- The Sikh LI troops were also not given enough time to get battle SHBO inoculated. They had just then arrived from Gwalior and were pushed into battle within a day. The sudden exposure to battle was a jolt to them. On the other hand, the Para Commandos were at their peak. They carried all ammunition and equipment on a man-pack basis and their battle drill was very efficient.
- The four Mi-8s available for the operations was insufficient – During the helidrop to land the 480 troops needed much higher air support – but the outbreak of hostilities was not forecasted – and the operation could not be delayed till more air support could come in. Maj. General Harkirat Singh, GOC 54 Div, in the interview with rediff.com mentions he had put in a request for nine helicopters, which was bought down to four just before the raid. He mentions he had communicated this requirement to the GOC in C Southern Command, Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh and he received a confirmation from Maj. Gen. A.S. Kalkat, CoS of the IPKF HQ in Madras the airlift capability had been sanctioned. When and where this failed to be communicated to the IAF has not been clear.
Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, GOC in C. Southern Command at that time and Overall Force Commander of the IPKF writes in his memories it was an acceptable risk to launch the mission – The prize of getting the LTTE leadership was too valuable and a successful mission would have cut short the slogging match going on elsewhere in the Jaffna Peninsula. Depinder states in his book given adequate resources and communication facilities, he would have gone ahead with the raid if such a situation occurred once again. Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh is also of the same view. He had said that casualties were expected, and if Prabhakaran had been captured, it would have been well worth it.
The first reports of this mission trickled into the country’s newspapers on 13 October. Though till that point of time, the entire IPKF casualties mounted to no more than 23 killed, reports came in where the LTTE claimed they had surrounded a group of 200 ‘Commandos’. The next day after the Para Commando team was extricated, a spokesman confirmed the casualties of the Sikh LI – stating ’30 troops declared as missing from the previous day’s operations are now classified as having been killed’. Suddenly the nation saw the casualty list jumping by 100% in a day.
The details of the mission appeared in the press in a matter of days. A report published on 21 October edition of ‘The Hindu’, by a ‘Special Correspondent’ mentioned some details of the battle for the first time. An excerpt had been used at the beginning of this article. The report went on to state: “Unfortunately in the darkness, the Sikh LI Jawans were put down in a clear ground some 2 km away from the intended Landing Zone. The Para Commandos disembarked successfully but the Sikh LI Jawans were trapped in a heavily built up area and though surrounded, fought valiantly for 24 hours before being overwhelmed.”
Gupta visited Jaffna peninsula
The same details were repeated in a story by Shekhar Gupta that appeared in ‘India Today’ Magazine’s February 1988 edition. Gupta visited the Jaffna peninsula and flew over the battle area towards the end of 1987. He had interviewed some of the Army Commanders in the field and bought out a boxed item in the magazine. The report detailed the whole murderous battle in great detail for the first time for the Indian Public – something that was not done before. However, the report repeated the same points as the earlier Hindu news report, mainly that
1. The Sikh LI troops were dropped at a different location from where the main force of the Para Commandos was. Further the ‘India Today’ article carried a photograph accompanying the general area showing a small ground to the south of the main football field. An accompanying legend suggested the Sikh LI troops were dropped separately at this smaller ground.
2. Both reports suggest the Sikh LI troops were heli-dropped ‘right on top of LTTE battlements’.
The above two points appeared to be the general consensus among the top brass of the army. Unfairly the version puts the blame on the IAF for the loss of valuable lives of the Sikh LI soldiers by mentioning they were dropped away from the main force.
The aircrew involved in the airdrop are categorical the troops were dropped on the same ground where the Para Commandos were dropped earlier.
The alleged landing ground indicated in the photograph where the Sikh LI troops were supposed to have been dropped is too small to even accommodate an Army Chetak, let alone two Mi-8s. Besides the Sikh LI Jawans were not dropped in a single wave, but in two different shuttles along with Para Commandos. There was no question of the Sikh LI Jawans getting separated or being dropped separately.
An Inter Services Joint Court of Inquiry was conducted into the event. All the major participants were interviewed. Maj. Sheonan Singh, the only surviving officer on the ground, who took part in the battle minced no words in defending the Air Force’s pilots. The air force had done a fine job, he said. The Sikh LI troops were dropped exactly where the army wanted them to be dropped. Ultimately the Joint Court of Inquiry came to the conclusion the IAF pilots had not made any mistakes in landing the troops.
Epilogue
January ‘88 saw many gallantry awards being announced for actions in the Siachen Glacier as well as the IPKF operations in Sri Lanka. The Para Commando Leader, Major Sheonan as well as the deceased Company Commander of the Sikh LI detachment, Major Birendra Singh, were given the Vir. Chakra. Lt. Col. Dalvir Singh, who led the rescue operation as well as Major Anil Kaul, the Armoured Corps Officer were other officers who earned the Vir. Chakra. Three Sikh LI soldiers received the Vir. Chakra posthumously and two Para Commandos involved in the Operations too got the Vir. Chakra.
At first none of the award citations put forward by the IAF was cleared, but with the clouds of doubts lifting over the operation, the army forwarded the citations for the IAF pilots. In recognition of their role and participation, all four pilots of the Mi-8s, Wg. Cdr. VKN Sapre, Sqn. Ldr. T.K. Vinayraj, Sqn. Ldr. D.R. Duraiswamy and Flt. Lt. V. Prakash were awarded the Vir. Chakra. The four co-pilots to the above, Sqn. Ldr. V.S.N. Nath, Fg Offcer Sanjay Bishnoi (by then a Flt. Lt.), Flt. Lt. B. Ramesh and Sqn. Ldr. A.D. Sonpr were given the Vayusena Medal (Gallantry). Other crewmembers were given commendations by the Chief of Air Staff or by the Air Officer Commanding in Chief. This operation marked one of the few missions in the IAF combat history that resulted in a huge cache of awards to the personnel involved.
109 HU was the longest serving unit in the IPKF operations, remaining there till withdrawal. Today, they are still flying from Sulur. Most of the pilots who flew in that mission have now retired. Gp. Capt. V.K.N. Sapre retired as the Station Commander, Mohanbari, and is now flying for a private operator in Pune. Gp. Capt Vinayraj retired as COO, Hakimpet, and had settled down in Hyderabad. Wg. Cdr. D.R. Duraiswamy too retired in the late 90s. Flt. Lt. Sanjay Bishnoi retired as a Wing Commander in the late 90s. Last heard, Flt Lt. V. Prakash was still serving as were half of the Co-pilots and crew members.
The Paras don’t talk about their special operations much, keeping in line with the ‘hush hush’ nature of the Para Commando battalions. Major Sheonan Singh, was serving as a Brigadier with the Parachute Regiment in late 2001.
The 13 Sikh LI now holds a special Ardas and Akhand Panth on 12 October every year to honour their 30 lonely and gusty comrades on the brutal killing fields of the Jaffna University. No official publication has been brought out by the Armed forces in connection with the ‘forgotten war’ that the IPKF had fought a long time back, some fifteen years ago in a not so far off land called Jaffna.”
In paying tribute to the heroic soldiers of the IPKF who paid with their life in Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, the Indian High Commissioner may have been motivated by the belief India has an inherent responsibility of looking after the interest of the Northern Tamils. In fact, he had stressed this fact and the strong bond that exists between them at the tribute ceremony for the war heroes. In this instance, he may also have been sounding a warning to the Sri Lankan political authority the IPKF sacrifices were made for the sole purpose of ensuring the Tamils’ political rights through the implementation of the 13th Amendment.
Well aware
Delhi is well aware President Rajapaksa has his own reservations about the role of the High Commissioner, Ashok K. Kantha. It is also well known President Rajapaksa avoids meeting the Indian HC quite often. Though a change of HC is quietly sought by Sri Lanka, India is not in an obliging mood at present. Kantha’s handling of matters over here has pleased Delhi and as such they protect him; especially since former High Commission senior officials were seen to have got their priorities mixed up, thus rendering their influence here diminished. In light of the above, the Indian High Commissioner’s rediscovery of IPKF memorial could very well be a fresh attempt at regaining India’s lost prestige in Sri Lanka.
( The writer is a senior journalist with the Ceylon Today, a daily based in Colombo, where this piece was originally appeared)
