Political leadership must give serious thought to it
| by Gen V P Malik (retd)
( January 23, 2013, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The government’s reaction after the recent violation of a ceasefire agreement and barbaric behaviour of Pakistan Army personnel in the Mendhar sector has highlighted two inter-related issues: lack of security inputs in India’s Pakistan policy and the delayed reaction in handling sensitive incidents on the Line of Control or borders.
India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire agreement along the Line of Control on November 26, 2003. A month and a half later, on January 6, 2004, Pakistan pledged that it will not allow its territory, including Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, to be used by terrorists to carry out activities against India. The ceasefire held without major incidents and there were not many violations till 2010. However, ceasefire violations since then have increased substantially. As compared to 57 in 2010, there were 117 violations in 2012.
Till date, Pakistan has taken no action to remove Kashmiri militants’ training camps and launch pads that exist across the Line of Control, alongside its regular army deployment. Generally, these violations are initiated by the Pakistani forces to facilitate terrorists’ infiltration across the Line of Control or the International Border. While Indian troops do retaliate in such situations to stop and deter intrusions, the rules of engagement do not allow them to cross the Line of Control. Despite a multi-pronged approach to contain infiltration, which included strengthening of border management and multi-tiered and multi-modal deployment along the Line of Control/International Border and infiltration routes, construction of border fencing, improved surveillance technology and weapons and equipment for deployed troops, over 235 Pakistan-based terrorists attempted to infiltrate in 2011. According to intelligence reports, 121 terrorists managed to infiltrate in 2012 as compared to 52 in 2011. This should also be linked to the recent increase in the terrorists’ activities and assassination of panches and sarpanches in J&K.
It is also well known that Pakistan has resiled from taking action against 26/11 perpetrators. The mastermind, Hafiz Sayeed, and his organisation, though banned by the UN and the US, continue to spew anti-India venom.
Beheading and mutilation of dead bodies of soldiers are extremely sensitive issues, particularly during peace time. These are not only barbaric but also extremely provocative when troops are in an eyeball-to-eyeball deployment. The anger and humiliation among the troops can easily spill over: it has to be handled sensitively and tactfully by military leaders. As revealed by the Army Chief, this is the second incident in the past two years. With more details now available, it is clear that the last incident was planned and executed by regular Pakistan Army personnel. Indian troops deployed on the Line of Control can be expected to respond suitably at a time and place of their choosing.
In recent months, Pakistanis have also begun to lay landmines on the foot tracks between Indian posts. It shows that the situation along the LoC is definitely not ‘as usual’. Pakistan wants progress on talks but has not changed its agenda on terrorism or violence and destabilisation in Kashmir. It has backtracked from promises made earlier. Apparently, in our efforts to improve political, social and economic relations with Pakistan, security issues have taken a back seat.
Let us now see how we reacted to the last incident wherein Pakistani soldiers violated the LoC ambushed an Indian patrol, beheaded a dead soldier and mutilated another.
As details of this incident got known through the media, there was visible anger and resentment in public and within the Army. None of our political leaders or district officials went to see the shocked and distressed families of the jawans till they learnt that some members had stopped taking food. That is when tragedy-driven rhetoric overtook rational decision-making and responses.
We went through a bureaucratic routine initially. The Defence and External Affairs Ministers made feeble statements to the media. Pakistan’s High Commissioner was given a demarche. The National Security Adviser and the Defence Secretary — not the Army Chief who would know the situation on the ground and its impact on the morale of his personnel better than anyone else — briefed the Prime Minister. Two Service Chiefs, however, made known their response in a straightforward style. To many, it appeared that the government and the armed forces were not on the same page. The electronic and social media, meanwhile, intensified public agitation.
Some attempts were made to diffuse the situation through defence journalists who wrote in the newspapers that such ‘beheadings’ had been common and done in the past also — a specious argument. The public feelings among the young Indian generation on such matters today cannot be compared with that of the past. We seem to have drawn no lessons from Nirbhaya’s tragic rape and murder case. Nor did we consider the feelings within the Army, ex servicemen and all the villages, towns and cities who send their children to the Army.
I am not suggesting that we should escalate the military situation, or even make a U-turn in the course of our grand strategy. The point I wish to make is that in the current fast-moving strategic and security environment, it is essential to keep the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making loop. We must have a direct politico-military interface for quick appraisal of the situations and military advice as it exists in all democratic nations. We must institutionalise the attendance of Service Chiefs in all meetings of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet Committee on Security pertaining to such defence issues.
The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff
 ( January 23, 2013, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guard...){kind=link}