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by Patrick Mendis
Harvard
International Review
(
December 10, 2012, Boston, Sri Lanka Guardian) The confluence of the
militarized economic development, widespread corruption, alleged war crimes,
the concentration of all powers in the executive presidency, and family members
easily getting elected to parliament, along with the arrogance and jubilant
aftermath of the Eelam War, has presented a negative international image of the
once-Buddhist and democratic nation.
The Potential War Between China and the United
States
Sri
Lanka, the “pearl” of the Indian Ocean, is strategically located within the
east-west international shipping passageway. Like the old Silk Road that
stretched from the ancient Chinese capital of Xian all the way to ancient Rome,
modern China’s strategic and commercial supply line extends over the Indian
Ocean and the South China Sea to include the focal transit port of Sri Lanka at
the southern tip of India. Today, over 85 percent of China’s energy imports
from the Middle East and mineral resources from Africa transit through Sri
Lanka and other so-called “string of pearls” ports. Beijing seeks to protect
these “pearls” as strategic economic arteries anchored all the way from the
Persian Gulf and African waters to Hong Kong. Colonel Christopher Pehrson at
the US Army War College describes this elaborate network as:
“The
manifestation of China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to
increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic
relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China
Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the
Arabian Gulf.”
To
meet increasing demand for resources and to secure their maritime trading
routes through the Indian Ocean, China has either built or reportedly planned
to construct vital facilities in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Maldives, Myanmar,
Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. In addition to these projects,
China has reportedly been exploring the expansion and establishment of other
facilities at eastern and western maritime choking ports of the Indian Ocean –
the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea as well as the Strait of Malacca – to
address growing piracy issues, especially around Somalia, Indonesia, Malaysia,
and the Philippines.
Sri
Lanka, the “crown jewel” of Beijing’s naval strategy, will soon have the over
US$100 million Chinese-built Lotus Tower in Colombo – the highest edifice in
South Asia and the nineteenth tallest building in the world – that can
reportedly be seen from New Delhi. The Buddhist-inspired (through the Lotus
Sutra), soaring telecommunication tower symbolizes not only Beijing’s foreign
policy slogan of “Peaceful Rising,” but also projects an aura of power
radiating from the former Middle Kingdom. Suddenly awakened to this reality,
the United States and a “string of pearl”-encircled India are increasingly
worried about the Chinese adventure in subtlety and its possibly concealed
intentions for the Indian Ocean.
The Nervous Neighbor and the Assertive Visitor
One
main cause of grave concern for Delhi and Washington is the construction of a
billion dollar all-inclusive deepwater sea port at Hambantota – a small fishing
village of 21,000 people on the southeastern coast of Sri Lanka. In exchange of
generous financial, military, and diplomatic support to Sri Lanka, China has
now begun to reap the benefits of its strategic investment on the island by
using the sea port as a re-fuelling and docking station for the Chinese Navy
and commercial shipments. Hambantota is also one of President Mahinda
Rajapaksa’s constituencies and is represented by his 25-year-old son Namal in
parliament – an implicit but masterful move to advance a political dynasty in
Sri Lanka through an extensive network of family members who now govern the
island and foreign diplomacy. It is a strategy famously dubbed the “Colombo
Consensus” by the Economist magazine in London.
Critics
have also pointed out that China has financed a comprehensive array of other
infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka, including an oil-storage facility, a new
airport, a coal-fired power plant, and an expressway, all of which are
reportedly negotiated and managed by Rajapaksa family members. With cheap
commercial credit and imported Chinese labor, Beijing also builds main roads
and public buildings in the war-damaged northern and eastern regions, and
constructs a modern performance arts center in Colombo. China has not only sold
diesel railway engines and earthmoving equipment in the name of post-conflict
reconstruction, but Chinese companies have also invested in electronic and
garment-making industries for which the government of Sri Lanka established a
special free-trade zone exclusively for Beijing.
Given
India’s previous military debacle in Sri Lanka (similar to the US debacle in
Vietnam) and the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE
suicide bomber, New Delhi leaders have restrained themselves from direct
involvement in this new strategic pairing. At the same time, Sri Lankan
Buddhist and Sinhalese leaders are sensitive to the fact that the island’s
northern neighbor Tamil Nadu state – home to more than 60 million Tamils – has
a historic kinship with their ethnic and religious counterparts in northern Sri
Lanka.
More
importantly, however, a complex disposition of global geopolitics (for example,
the Nobel Laureate Dalai Lama and his Buddhist followers in the Tibetan
parliament-in-exile just north of Delhi) has been a major concern for India, as
well as for China. India has continued to be vigilant about becoming the
traditional nexus between London and Washington, whereas the British Navy used
the island’s China Bay in Trincomalee as a regional naval base until 1957 and
it is still being occasionally used by visiting US Navy ships. In addition,
their military outpost on the island of Diego Garcia (leased by London to
Washington until 2036) is also in close proximity to India and Sri Lanka, and
remains a constant irritant to Indian Ocean Zone of Peace advocates. As the
dominant regional power in South Asia, India is faced with a glut of complex
historical issues (like Tibet and Pakistan) and emerging realities (like
terrorism and separatism) as China expands its economic and maritime networks
through Sri Lanka.
Could
Sri Lanka become a “Chinese island” in the Indian Ocean? Less than 25 miles off
the coast of India, the rivalry between the US and its ideological nemesis Cuba
comes to mind when one thinks about the increasingly autocratic, family-run
Buddhist nation, which controls an estimated 70 percent of the national budget
according to Jeremy Page of the Sunday Times in London. Therefore, might the
nuisance Sri Lanka and its first family ever become more like “India’s Cuba” in
the future?
In
January 2012, President Rajapaksa revealed to a group of foreign correspondents
that “Sri Lanka is no pearl on China’s string” but maintained that Indians are
his “relations” and Chinese are his “friends.” The president intentionally left
out the United States, traditionally the largest trade partner, and implied the
British were neocolonialists who—along with the Americans—had successfully
called for an external war crimes investigation against the Rajapaksa
administration in the UN Human Rights Council in March 2012.
Despite
all this, the increasing Chinese influence on the island is hardly a match for
the global and regional power competitions over Indian Ocean supremacy. But the
octopus-like, Colombo-centric new Silk Road is at the hub of an emerging Great
Game for the new century.
The Colombo Consensus
Sri
Lanka has been under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank – both undergirded by the influence of American foreign policy –
over the past three decades, including their austerity measures and the
conditionality of these two Bretton Woods Institutions’ (BWIs) structural
adjustment programs. It has been a painful experience for islanders whose
social welfare in education, health, and agriculture was reduced by structural
changes and budgetary reductions. The conditionality of Washington’s policy
prescription, known as the Washington Consensus, has primarily been influenced
by American-led trade liberalization, economic growth strategy, and democratic
system of governance and transparency.
With
the spectacular rise of Chinese economic success, which had opposed the
conditionality of the Washington Consensus, Beijing has begun to challenge the
“trinity” of Washington institutions (the World Bank, IMF, and the US
Department of the Treasury) by offering concessional financial assistance and
commercial loans to other countries, and quietly developing a “string of
pearls” in the Indian ocean. In Colombo, The Sunday Times reported that China’s
Export-Import Bank provided more than US$6.1 billion loans in 2009 for post-war
development projects in Sri Lanka; this was more than the loans provided by
traditional donors (the United States, India, and Japan) combined.
Unlike
the BWIs in Washington, the Beijing Consensus has no conditions – like
structural adjustments, policy reforms, competitive biddings, or democratic
transparency – attached to their loans. The Sri Lankan ambassador to the United
States told the New York Times in February 2010 that his “country looked for
investors in America and around the world, but China offered the best terms,”
and that Sri lanka doesn’t “have favorites.” In a final analysis, the Beijing
offer of US$6.1 billion without conditionality over the Washington loan of
US$2.6 billion was certainly more attractive for Rajapaksa. Indeed, the Chinese
policy of non-interference in domestic affairs and respect for national
sovereignty and local politics is one of the “best terms” for the Colombo
administration.
Intersecting Sino-American and Indian Relations
As
Colombo secured funds from Beijing and Washington, the United States and India,
the most powerful and largest democracies in the world, have jointly pursued a
mutually-beneficial strategy to advance their shared political and economic
philosophy. As American firms begin to invest in India in the wake of the
US-India civil nuclear pact, Japanese companies have also agreed to invest
US$10 billion on an “industrial corridor” that extends 1,500 km between New
Delhi and Mumbai – the booming commercial capital on the west coast. With such
open economic and liberal trade policies, India has moved away from its
historically lethargic “Hindu rate of growth” and non-aligned Movement foreign
policy to a more western-oriented and robust economic, diplomatic, and military
force on the world stage.
Beijing
has perceived these actions as a sign that the United States and its allies
(like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) are deliberately using India not only as
a huge consumer market for their products and services but also as a
counterweight to China in South Asia. China has simultaneously agreed to build
two nuclear power plants for its traditional ally, Pakistan – the Indian
arch-rival. There are now over 60 Chinese companies with more than 10,000
Chinese workers employed on 122 major development projects in Pakistan,
including the Gwadar port and Saindak copper mine site in Baluchistan as well
as the Gomal Zam dam project in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas.
With a range of massive development and deepwater sea ports in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, China has actively put forward
counterpoised strategies to discourage or limit the American presence in the
region.
The
United States views China’s “string of pearls” naval strategy not only as a
balance of power issue but also as a show of force; the high-tech Lotus Tower
in Colombo is the latest example. America’s involvement in Afghanistan (and
increasingly in Pakistan) and the Central Asian republics as well as security
and military ties to South-East Asian countries (like Indonesia, Singapore, and
Vietnam) and north-east Asian countries (South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan) is
more than an emblematic challenge to China’s pronounced “Peaceful Rising”
foreign policy. Beijing leaders – especially military leaders – feel that the
United States has encircled them geo-strategically with US bases and is selling
advanced weapons to countries like Taiwan, a renegade republic in the Chinese
perspective. Caught in the middle both figuratively and literally, the
constellation of perceived threats makes India and Sri Lanka equally nervous.
Adhering
to the path of “Peaceful Rising,” China has negotiated a number of settlements
of territorial disputes with Russia, Vietnam, and India. These unprecedented
diplomatic acts by Chinese leadership point to a different vision of power in
international negotiation and diplomacy. At the UN Climate Summit in Copenhagen
in December 2009, for example, both China and India – the world’s largest and
fourth-largest emitters of greenhouse gases – joined forces together to oppose
American-led demands for supporting strong anti-global warming measures. At the
Cancun climate-change meeting in Mexico in December 2010, China took a leading
role advancing an agreement. Such diplomatic triumphs made the evolving scope
of international relations between and among America, China, and India even
more complex.
The
leading trio also shares a common enemy: terrorism both at home and abroad.
Having global trade interests and investment opportunities, whether competitive
or complementary, each nation continuously searches for greater security and
stability in the Indian Ocean region as a prime necessity for their own
national progress and employment. President Barack Obama’s visit to China, soon
followed by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s trip to Washington in
November 2009, clearly signified the importance of the Chindian (that is,
Chinese and Indian) role in South Asian security. Some commentators viewed the
trajectory of political, military, and economic interdependence as a new
pragmatism of cooperation and competition. In response to an influential
December 2009 bipartisan US Congressional report (“Re-charting US Strategy on
Sri Lanka” ) on Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean passageway, the Obama
administration has now begun to “reset” its approach to Sri Lanka.
The American Response through Colombo
With
the support of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, the Obama White House
initially followed a Bush-like foreign policy to isolate Sri Lanka on the
grounds of human rights violations and alleged war-crimes committed by both the
military and the LTTE. By overriding America’s geopolitical interests in Sri
Lanka, the American administration initially pushed the UN Secretary General to
appoint an independent panel to investigate the atrocities committed by each
party; Colombo successfully thwarted Ban Ki-moon’s initiative with Indian
backing and Chinese support in May 2009.
Following
continued pressure from the United States, the European Union and the United
Nations, the government of Sri Lanka established the Lessons Learned and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) with members appointed by President Rajapaksa
himself. As the media publicized human rights violations alongside horrible
images from Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration took a softer view
on Sri Lanka and its challenges. Commenting on Sri Lanka’s civilian casualties
and the humanitarian crises of May 2009, President Obama said:
“I
want to emphasize that these photos [of Sri Lanka] that were requested in this
case are not particularly sensational, especially when compared to the painful
images that we remember from Abu Ghraib, but they do represent conduct that did
not conform with the Army Manual. That’s precisely why they were investigated.”
Balancing
the uneasy challenges of hellish war situations and geostrategic interests, the
United States subsequently lent implicit legitimacy to the LLRC in Colombo.
After the Sri Lankan external affairs minister was invited to meet with
Secretary Hillary Clinton at the State Department on May 28, 2010, Clinton
said:
“I
want to thank Minister Peiris for our productive discussion today and commend
him for his commitment to the reconciliation process. The United States pledges
our continued support to Sri Lanka.”
The
minister also promised Clinton that detainees would be resettled within three
months, but more importantly, he called for “a multidimensional relationship
with the United States,” suggesting movement beyond alleged war crimes and
human rights issues according to the State Department. The bipartisan authors
of Re-charting US Strategy on Sri Lanka, Senators John Kerry (Democrat) and
Richard Lugar (Republican), were more blunt, declaring:
“As
Western countries became increasingly critical of the Sri Lankan Government’s
handling of the war and human rights record, the Rajapaksa leadership
cultivated ties with such countries as Burma, China, Iran, and Libya. While the
United States shares with the Indians and the Chinese a common interest in
securing maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean, the US Government has
invested relatively little in the economy or security sector in Sri Lanka,
instead focusing more on Internally Displaced Persons and civil society. As a
result, Sri Lanka has grown politically and economically isolated from the
West.”
Having
a greater awareness of China’s strategic and long-term geoeconomic foundation
in Sri Lanka, the Kerry-Lugar Report made a cautionary note on America’s
geopolitical interest and strategy: President Rajapaksa was forced to reach out
to other countries because the West refused to help Sri Lanka finish the war
against the LTTE. These calculations, if left unchecked, threaten long-term US
strategic interests in the Indian Ocean.
The
two senators concluded: “With the end of the war, the United States needs to
re-evaluate its relationship with Sri Lanka to reflect new political and
economic realities.” Then, they added: “While humanitarian concerns remain
important, US policy toward Sri Lanka cannot be dominated by a single agenda.
It is not effective at delivering real reform, and it shortchanges US
geostrategic interests in the region…This strategic drift will have
consequences for US interests…US policymakers have tended to underestimate Sri
Lanka’s geostrategic importance for American interests…Sri Lanka is
strategically located…directly in the middle of the ‘Old World,’ where an
estimated half of the world’s container ships transit the Indian Ocean.”
Understanding
Sri Lanka’s strategic importance to the United States, Sri Lankan Foreign
Minister Peiris reinforced a similar vision outlined by the two Democratic and
Republican senators – carefully using the word “multidimensional” to describe
the nature of a new Great Game of larger geopolitical and geoeconomic dynamics
in the region involving China and India. As an island nation, Sri Lanka’s
long-term survival is equally dependant on continuous connection to both the
“Old World” and old friends like the United States.
The Paradox of the Colombo Consensus
With
the Colombo Consensus depicted by Rajapaksa Family Inc., Sri Lanka has departed
from its long-cherished trademark of Western-style parliamentary democracy,
open markets, and liberalized trade policies. Despite widely reported
corruption and nepotism, the Rajapaksa dynasty appears to be pursuing a unique
development strategy within a complex environment of global realities and
domestic needs; all development projects must be channeled or approved by either
the president himself or his older brother, Basil, head of the Ministry of
Economic Development, who is notoriously known as “Mr. Ten Percent” for
demanding a ten percent commission over every project. The president’s younger
brother, Defense Secretary Gotabaya, has integrated the Ministry of Urban
Development under his command in order to employ military personnel in the
public work programs.
The
confluence of the militarized economic development, widespread corruption,
alleged war crimes, the concentration of all powers in the executive
presidency, and family members easily getting elected to parliament, along with
the arrogance and jubilant aftermath of the Eelam War, has presented a negative
international image of the once-Buddhist and democratic nation. According to
the Colombo-based Sunday Leader, mentor to Mahinda Rajapaksa and previous
president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, said her successor’s “abuse of power” meant
international relations have “spiraled down reaching a new low in the country’s
history.” The former president then added that “Rajapaksas are uneducated and
uncultured rascals,” concluding that the corruption is “appallingly bad” and
the political climate is “vindictive and threatening.” The powerful
characterization of her protégé further added to the notoriety of the Rajapaksa
family, which is allegedly involved in extra-judicial killings and the
disappearance of journalists.
With
this worldwide reputation, the success of the Colombo Consensus and Sri Lanka’s
human progress will now be defined by the degree of democratic freedom that the
government allows for its people – not the absolute freedom enjoyed by
combative leaders and their families who govern the island in the name of
national interest for personal aggrandizement. If their professed faith in
Buddhism would work, the doctrine of karma, outlined in the Lotus Sutra, will
self-correct the power-play journey the island has embarked on, and their
personal destiny and karmic legacy. But if the subtle and emerging tensions of
a possible proxy war ever lead to direct conflict between either American,
Chinese or Indian forces, an enormous tragedy for the “crown pearl” in South
Asia would result. It may indeed cause a sad detour from the peace-driven,
Colombo-centric new Silk Road of China.
Patrick Mendis, author of Trade for Peace and
Commercial Providence, is an affiliate professor of public and international
affairs at George Mason University. He acknowledges with thanks the assistance
of Leah Green at Hong Kong University in writing this article.
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