| by Tisaranee Gunasekara
Courtesy: Himal Mag
( December 4, 2012, Colombo, Sri
Lanka Guardian) In overcoming the Eastern Province’s challenge to their power,
the Rajapaksas have browbeaten the judiciary, undermined devolution, and seeded
new conflicts.
 |
Lankan history teaches us that ethno-religious conflicts cannot be stage-managed. Once ignited, they assume a life of their own, untameable by those who fathered them for political gain.
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa does not
hesitate to cavort where men less well-connected fear to tread even gingerly.
As Defence Secretary and President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s younger brother, he has
no need to mind his language. His verbal outbreaks are of the highest political
relevance since they provide invaluable glimpses into the opaque mental
universe of the Rajapaksas. So when Gotabhaya Rajapaksa repeatedly advocates
immediately repealing the 13th Amendment, attention must be paid. Especially so
since Rajapaksa equates that Indian-induced legislation (which introduced power-devolution
in Sri Lanka) with the Norwegian-brokered Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) of 2002.
Says Rajapaksa: “The 13th Amendment and the CFA didn’t serve the people of Sri
Lanka. Instead they facilitated interests of various other parties, including
the LTTE. Interestingly, both supported the separatist cause.”
Hitherto, only the most diehard
Sinhala supremacists decried the 13th Amendment as pro-LTTE and pro-separatist.
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s public endorsement of those outré views marks a menacing
new turn in Lankan politics. That dangerously fallacious equation repackages
the 13th Amendment as a threat to national security, enabling the Rajapaksas to
condemn its supporters and defenders as traitors.
Basil Rajapaksa, another
Presidential Sibling and the Minister of Economic Development, took the
argument a step further by advocating the replacement of provincial-level
devolution with village-level decentralisation: “The Janasabha system is the
unit of devolution… It is a new village concept…. Now, we have amended the
Constitution for the 18th time. We will now do so for the 19th time.” The icing
on this anti-devolution confection was provided by President Mahinda Rajapaksa
himself. In his 2012 Budget speech, the President endorsed his siblings’
depiction of provincial-level devolution as pro-separatist and irrelevant to
public wellbeing: “A change in the prevailing Provincial Council system is
necessary to make devolution more meaningful to our people. Devolution should
not be a political reform that will lead us to separation….”
With all three Rajapaksas ranged
against the 13th Amendment, devolution is as good as dead. The 19th Amendment,
which would replace limited devolution with minimum decentralisation, is likely
to be born as soon as the impeachment motion against Chief Justice Shirani
Bandaranaike is concluded and a Rajapaksa acolyte placed at the head of the
Supreme Court.
The Rajapaksas’ antipathy towards
devolution, like their antipathy towards such pillars of democracy as
separation of powers, judicial independence and media freedom, is rooted in the
Siblings’ project of achieving familial rule and dynastic succession. As Basil
Rajapaksa stated recently, power-centralisation is the Siblings’desideratum:
“In other countries who are successful, they were successful because
immediately one person he takes the decisions. In Sri Lanka, the main problem
is that that is not there, more decisions have to be centralised. [sic]”
For the Rajapaksas,
countervailing sources of democratic power are either obstacles to be overcome
or threats to be defeated. Thus, in 2010, the democratising (and home-grown)
17th Amendment – meant to establish an independent Constitutional Council that
would appoint commissions to run the police, public service, election
secretariat and judiciary – was replaced with the antipodal 18th Amendment,
which enhanced presidential powers and removed presidential term-limits.
Without the 18th Amendment, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have had to retire at the
end of his second term, as two of his predecessors did. Thanks to the 18th
Amendment he need never retire.
The 13th Amendment, which created
the provincial council system, is Sri Lanka’s sole existing political solution
to the ethnic problem. The regime would know that if the 13th Amendment is axed,
it will ignite a political firestorm in Tamil Nadu and compel India to react.
Therefore, a gradual undermining of the 13th Amendment would be the Rajapaksas’
preferred way of escaping the shackles of devolution. But this piecemeal
demolition cannot succeed without the full corporation of the judiciary. But in
the last few months, the judiciary has indicated clearly that it will be guided
by the constitution, and not by the Rajapaksas’ needs. In several landmark
rulings, the Supreme Court defended the constitution and resisted efforts at
further eroding power-devolution and power-separation.
The breaking point in the contest
between the Rajapaksas and the judiciary came when the Supreme Court refused to
provide free passage to the Divineguma Bill. Custom-made to transform Basil
Rajapaksa into an even more über-powerful minister than he is now, the
Divineguma Bill (Bill on Uplifting Lives) is being touted by the regime as a
measure of absolute national importance, a panacea for many economic ills, and
a bulwark against separatism. Prepared in secrecy, it seeks to create a
mega-entity titled the Divineguma Department under Basil Rajapaksa’s exclusive
control. The new department will have a gargantuan budget of SLR 80 billion –
this in a country which has allotted SLR 65.8 billion to education, SLR 1
billion to child development and women’s affairs, and just SLR 437 million to
post-conflict re-settlement.
Since the functions of the
Divineguma Department encroach on powers devolved to the provinces, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Bill must be approved by all nine of Sri Lanka’s
provincial councils. This court ruling angered the Rajapaksas beyond measure.
It also placed the newly elected Eastern Provincial Council on the centre stage
of national politics for one brief – and, as it transpired – inglorious moment.
The Eastern fiasco
Sri Lanka’s Eastern Province is
demographically unique; home to all three of the country’s major
ethno-religious groups in almost equal measure, the East is Sri Lanka’s real
Achilles’ heel. Mishandle the East and the outcome will not be a cleanly
bifurcated separatist war. Mishandle the East and the outcome might well be
multiple conflicts along fluid lines of demarcation – a bloody kaleidoscope
involving Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims (and by extension Buddhists, Christians
and Hindus), plus several foreign powers in supportive roles.
The Rajapaksas’ decision to hold
elections for the Eastern Provincial Council two years ahead of time may have
been made in anticipation of an easy victory. In reality, victory proved to be
difficult. The entry of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) into the electoral
fray presented the Rajapaksa-led ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
with an unfamiliar challenge. That challenge was made even harder when the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) – the country’s premier Muslim party and a member
of the UPFA – decided to contest the Eastern elections independently and on a
largely anti-government platform following its unhappiness with the electoral
deal offered by the Rajapaksas.
As the campaign heated up, the
UPFA resorted to rampant abuse of state power and resources. In a public letter
to President Rajapaksa, TNA leader R Sampanthan claimed that opposition
candidates were being attacked, ‘intelligence personnel’ were threatening
opposition activists, and members of the Blue Brigade – a shadowy organisation
controlled by Namal Rajapaksa, parliamentarian and eldest Presidential
Offspring – were harassing voters. Irrational appeals to primordial identities
and loyalties added new toxins to this already insalubrious atmosphere. “The
UPFA’s election strategy would only contribute to the strengthening of
separatist and fundamentalist sentiments not only in the multi-ethnic Eastern
Province, but also in the entire country,” cautioned D E W Gunasekara, a
government minister.
In the end, demographics decided
the election: most Sinhalese voted for the UPFA, most Tamils voted for the TNA,
and most Muslims voted for the SLMC. No single party gained enough seats to
form a council on its own. And despite its no-holds-barred campaign, the UPFA’s
share of the vote declined sharply compared to both the 2008 Provincial Council
poll and the 2011 Local Government election.
Table I – UPFA’s Eastern
performance
District
|
2008 PC poll (%)
|
2011 LG poll (%)
|
2012 PC poll (%)
|
Ampara
|
53.0
|
41.0
|
33.7
|
Batticaloa
|
52.0
|
58.8
|
31.2
|
Trincomalee
|
39.4
|
51.2
|
28.4
|
Eastern province
|
52.2
|
49.3
|
31.6
|
Only one Tamil running on the
UPFA ticket was elected. All Muslims elected from the UPFA, barring one, belong
to smaller Muslim parties. The Rajapaksas are still popular among the Sinhalese
majority, but they have very little minority support.
Had the Rajapaksas been sincerely
committed to a Lankan peace and national reconciliation, they would have
allowed the TNA and the SLMC to form the new Eastern PC. Such a democratic
modus vivendi would have sent a potent message about the regime’s commitment to
power-sharing, and would have bolstered the country’s international image. But
a provincial council outside its control was something the regime was unwilling
to countenance. So the UPFA bulldozed its way to power in the Eastern Province,
with scant regard for minority sentiments or voters’ preferences. The TNA
publicly accused the regime of attempting to cajole and browbeat its elected
members, stating that “suspected military intelligence personnel have
approached some newly elected TNA provincial councillors and exerted pressure
through a mixture of ‘carrot and stick’ methods to make them extend support to
President Rajapaksa and join the ranks of the UPFA.”
It is unknown why the SLMC
rejected the very generous offer made by the TNA, who had offered the post of
Chief Minister to the SLMC’s nominee, and instead opted for the meagre deal
offered by the UPFA – two provincial ministerships and the promise that its
nominee would only later be made Chief Minister. When the council was formed,
there was not a single Tamil among the new provincial ministers.
The first order of business of
this new Eastern PC was the vote on the Divineguma Bill. Since the southern
provincial councils are under total UPFA control, that the Bill would pass
there was a foregone conclusion. All eyes were focused on the East, where the
government needed SLMC consent to pass the Bill. Inexplicably, the SLMC opted
not to stand up for devolution. All seven SLMC councillors voted for a piece of
legislation which would denude the council of several economic powers and
render the minorities more powerless and insecure.
Witch-hunting, and the 13th
Amendment
Under Rajapaksa rule, there have
been two provincial council polls in the East, but none in the North.
Consequently Sri Lanka’s only Tamil-majority province has no elected council,
with just a retired Sinhala General as the presidentially appointed governor.
The regime argued that this governor’s approval would suffice to pass the
Divineguma Bill. Inevitably the matter came up for resolution before the
Supreme Court.
As the country’s apex court
pondered the constitutionality of the Divineguma Bill, events took a menacing
turn. On 7 October 2012, Manjula Tilakeratne, the Secretary of the Judicial
Services Commission (JSC) and a High Court judge, was pistol-whipped by four
unidentified men. A few weeks previously, Tilakeratne had issued a public
statement on behalf of the JSC warning about attempts to undermine judicial
independence. A few weeks after Tilakeratne was assaulted, a minister tabled an
‘anonymous letter’ in parliament casting vicious aspersions on top judicial
officers, including Chief Justice Shirani Bandaranayake. The state media raved
against the judiciary. Finally, 118 UPFA parliamentarians presented an
impeachment motion against the Chief Justice to the Speaker, Presidential
Sibling Chamal Rajapaksa.
The charges against the Chief
Justice will be heard by a Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) consisting of
seven parliamentarians from the UPFA and four from the opposition. Since the
Rajapaksas want to be rid of the Bandaranayake, the UPFA majority in the PSC
will find her guilty, and the UPFA majority in parliament will vote to remove
her. Once Bandaranaike is replaced with a more amenable chief justice, the
Rajapaksas will bring in the 19th Amendment, and the provincial councils will
either cease to exist or be rendered totally impotent. The 13th Amendment will
join the 17th Amendment in irrelevance and oblivion.
By pursuing their project of
absolute power with myopic obsession, the Rajapaksas are indulging in what Eric
Hobsbawm called “strategically blind maximalism”. Not only are they destroying
judicial independence and credibility, they are also sowing the seeds of new
ethnic and ethno-religious dissension.
Whatever its imperfections, the
13th Amendment is the only guarantee Sri Lanka’s minorities have of any modicum
of power. Decapitating it would prove conclusively that the Rajapaksas have no
intention of ensuring minority rights. Vellupillai Prabhakaran maintained that
in the absence of the LTTE, Colombo will render Tamils powerless and reduce
them to their pre-1987 status of second-class citizens. If the 13th Amendment
is axed – or becomes a dead letter – Prabhakaran’s warnings will resonate
amongst hapless Lankan Tamils, providing separatism with a new relevance and a
second life.
By bending the SLMC to their will
over the Divineguma Bill just days after forcing it to its knees over the
formation of the Eastern PC, the Rajapaksas sent an equally dangerous message
to Lankan Muslims. By succumbing to Rajapaksa pressure, the SLMC demonstrated a
worrying incapacity to defend the interests of Eastern Muslims. The situation
will become worse if the SLMC is compelled to back the 19th Amendment. Internal
schisms may result from the SLMC’s humiliating inability to defend its mandate,
propelling it along the path towards politico-electoral irrelevance.
For all its shortcomings, the
SLMC is a democratic party firmly committed to peaceful methods. What sort of
entity will inherit its place of political primacy among Eastern Muslims? The
SLMC’s inability to defend devolution will widen the Tamil-Muslim gulf in the
East. Do the Rajapaksas think that by setting Tamils and Muslims at
loggerheads, they can endlessly evade a political solution to the ethnic
question? An ethno-religious enemy may benefit the Rajapaksas – a ‘threat’ to
national security can be invaluable in justifying the despotism and tyranny
needed to bolster familial rule and ensure dynastic succession. Any whiff of
Islamic fundamentalism of the political variety may even get India and the West
off Colombo’s back. But while another alienated minority may suit the
Rajapaksas’ purposes, it is the last thing Sri Lanka needs.
Lankan history teaches us that
ethno-religious conflicts cannot be stage-managed. Once ignited, they assume a
life of their own, untameable by those who fathered them for political gain.
Because of the province’s complex demographics, an Eastern conflict will be a
labyrinthine one, involving both ethnicity and religion. Given the depths of
brutality, irrationality and degradation that religious fanaticism can reduce
humans to, a warring East might well come to make the Eelam War seem lukewarm
by comparison.
~ Tisaranee Gunasekara is a Sri
Lankan columnist based in Colombo.
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