Time for hard
decisions
| by G.
Parthasarathy
( December 20,
2012, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) On
December 6, Asadullah Khalid, Head of Afghanistan’s intelligence set-up, the
National Directorate of Security, was seriously injured in a bomb attack by a
Taliban suicide bomber posing as a peace envoy. President Karzai announced the
next day that the suicide bomber had come from Pakistan. While not directly
naming the ISI, President Karzai described the suicide bombing as a “very
sophisticated and complicated act by a professional intelligence service”.
 |
Pakistan’s strategy is to pretend that it supports an “Afghan-led” process of national reconciliation while ensuring that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, which has strong ties with Al-Qaeda and international Islamist causes, negotiate from a position of strength, so that Southern Afghanistan initially, and thereafter the entire Pashtun belt, come under the control of its “strategic assets”.
Asadullah Khalid
is one of President Karzai’s closest aides and has held crucial gubernatorial
appointments in Ghazni and Kandahar. He had escaped Taliban assassination
attempts in 2007 and 2011. He was playing a crucial role in attempts to wean
away Pashtun tribal support from the Taliban, as the American “end game” in
Afghanistan picks up momentum. Asadullah Khalid is seen as a dangerous
adversary in Pakistan. Unlike his Tajik predecessor, Amrollah Saleh, against
whom the ISI could whip up Pashtun nationalistic sentiments, he is a
blue-blooded Pashtun, who can better deal with Pakistani machinations, which
seek to unite Pashtuns under the tutelage of the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura
and their protégés in the North Waziristan-based Haqqani network.
In its quest for
“strategic depth,” the Pakistan military establishment has based its entire
political strategy on pretending to champion the cause of Pashtuns, who
constitute 40 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, with the Tajiks
constituting 33 per cent of the population and the Shia Hazaras and Uzbeks
comprising 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively. Interestingly, the
language which unites Afghanistan is not Pashtu, which is spoken by 35 per cent
of the population and almost exclusively by Pashtuns, but Dari, spoken by 50
per cent of the country’s people. Within the Pashtuns, the ruling class has
predominantly been drawn from the landowning Durrani clan. Apart from Nur
Mohammed Tarraki and his Soviet-backed successors, the only non-Durrani leader
of Afghanistan from the influential Ghilzai clan was Mullah Omar. Two-thirds of
all Pashtuns belong to the Durrani-Ghilzai confederacy. The Taliban, though led
by a Ghilzai, have drawn in a large number of Durrani fighters. In addition,
they enjoy the backing of the Haqqani network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani,
operating out of the tribal belt of Pakistan in North Waziristan. The Haqqani
network also exercises predominant control over the bordering Afghan provinces
Khost — Paktia and Paktika.
Pakistan’s
strategy is to pretend that it supports an “Afghan-led” process of national
reconciliation while ensuring that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network,
which has strong ties with Al-Qaeda and international Islamist causes,
negotiate from a position of strength, so that Southern Afghanistan initially,
and thereafter the entire Pashtun belt, come under the control of its
“strategic assets”. This would be a prelude to the Taliban obtaining a dominant
role across the entire country. It is primarily in pursuit of this objective
that the senior-most Taliban leader from the Durrani tribe, Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar, has been incarcerated and kept incommunicado in Pakistan. Mullah
Baradar, like Karzai, hails from the Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns and was
known to be close to and in touch with President Karzai. While championing the
cause of Pashtuns, Pakistan will not permit any Pashtun leader to undermine its
larger ambitions.
Pakistan has its
own Achilles’ heel. Firstly, no Pashtun worth his salt recognises the Durand
Line. Moreover, after the Pakistan army’s assault on the Lal Masjid in 2007,
the Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has made common cause with other jihadi outfits
in Pakistan to challenge the writ of the Pakistan army and the Pakistan state.
Unable to directly take on the TTP, the Pakistan army is fomenting tribal
animosities between the Mehsud and Waziri tribes in South Waziristan. It is
also clear that should a government led by either Imran Khan’s Tehriq-e-Insaf
or Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) assume office after the 2013 elections in Pakistan,
one can write off any prospect of the Pakistan army taking action whatsoever
against the Haqqani network or other Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, as the
American drawdown in Afghanistan proceeds.
Chinese
officials were among the only non-Muslims to meet Mullah Omar in Kandahar in
the 1990s, promising him diplomatic recognition and telecom projects. China has
maintained contacts with the Quetta Shura in the aftermath of Operation
Enduring Freedom. These contacts, with Pakistani facilitation, have reportedly
been increasing. Thus, while the Chinese may have misgivings and concerns about
a possible return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, they appear to
believe that their interests in Afghanistan would be protected by Pakistan.
In these
circumstances, there are now concerns that if not properly equipped, motivated
and backed, the Afghan National Army (ANA) could well lose control of the
entire Pashtun belt in the country. This could have serious consequences for
the very unity of Afghanistan. It is significant that influential Afghan
leaders like Mohammed Atta and Ismail Khan are preparing the ground to be able
to defend areas they control, in the event of the ANA being unable to
effectively deal with the Taliban challenge. There should also be no doubt that
the primary objective of the Taliban would be to seize control of Kandahar
because of its importance in Pashtun minds as the traditional and spiritual
capital of the country. There would also be efforts by the Taliban to block the
line of communications from Khyber to Jalalabad. India would have to work
closely with foreign partners, including the US, its NATO allies, Russia, Iran
and Saudi Arabia to ensure that the international community remains on course
to back the elected government in Afghanistan, economically and militarily.
While India has
already provided Afghanistan with substantial economic assistance and is
preparing the ground for large-scale investments in areas like iron ore, coal,
steel, copper and gold, the military cooperation envisaged in its strategic
partnership agreement with Afghanistan remains relatively modest. Indian
military analysts, with expertise on Afghanistan’s armed forces, note that in
order to ensure that the ANA can stand up to challenges from across the Durand
Line, India should readily supply 105 mm Mountain Artillery, armoured personnel
carriers, Vijayanta Tanks, apart from transportation, demining and
communications equipment. It remains to be seen whether an establishment wedded
to its “Aman Ki Asha” illusions will act decisively on major security
challenges emerging in our neighbourhood. Equally importantly, India and its
partner-states need to recognise that given Pashtun sentiments and historic
realities, we should agree that the Durand Line is a “disputed boundary”
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, while expressing the hope that the dispute
will be resolved peacefully, keeping in view the Pashtun sentiments.
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