| by B.Raman
( November 22, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka
Guardian) Public satisfaction over the execution of Ajmal Kasab, the Pakistani
terrorist belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), in a Pune jail on the morning
of November 21,2012, should not make us forget that no action has been taken so
far by the State of Pakistan against the
master-minds of the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai.
 |
Now that Kasab has been executed, efforts will be made to draw electoral mileage out of it during the next election by projecting it as an indicator of the Government’s determination to deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism.
2. Seven of them have supposedly been arrested
and are being tried before a special court in Rawalpindi, but their trial is
being frequently adjourned. No action has been taken by the Pakistani State
against the LET, the terrorist organisation associated with the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, which planned and carried out the terrorist
strikes.
3. Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed, the Amir of
the LET and its political wing called the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, who was the principal
conspirator of the terrorist strikes in Mumbai, is still a free man and his
anti-India terrorist infrastructure remains unimpaired. The officers of the ISI, who played a
role in helping the LET in the planning and execution of the terrorist strikes,
have escaped any consequences of their involvement.
4.The execution of Kasab has brought to
a closure the involvement of one individual in the terrorist strikes. There is
no closure as yet relating to the entire conspiracy and the State and the non-State
actors and their organisations involved in it. Unless they are brought to final
justice, the Government cannot claim success in its efforts to ensure that the
law takes its course in the conspiracy.
5. We were a soft State before 26/11 and
we continue to be a soft State after 26/11 and the execution of Kasab. The
failure of the Indian public and voters to exercise adequate pressure on our
Government to act effectively against the sponsorship of terrorism by Pakistan
against our citizens in our territory is responsible for the continuing
softness of our State in dealing with Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism.
6. Now that Kasab has been executed,
efforts will be made to draw electoral mileage out of it during the next
election by projecting it as an indicator of the Government’s determination to
deal with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. The voters should not let themselves be
misled by the Government claims and insist on more substantial results.
7. Kasab is no more, but the jihadi
terrorist threat posed by the State of Pakistan and its non-State creations
remain as serious as before. We need a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy
to deal this. We do not see any signs of it so far. It must be made clear to
our Government that it will be held accountable for its sins of commission and
omission if it does not take its actions to their logical conclusion against
the Pakistani perpetrators operating from Pakistani territory.
8. We should not be under any illusion
that the execution of Kasab would have any deterrent effect on the jihadi
terrorists operating from Pakistani territory and their State sponsors. Deaths
will not deter them from carrying on their irrational jihad. Only the
neutralisation of their ground capability once and for all will bring us
respite. How to neutralise their capability and infrastructure is a question
that should engage our continuous attention.
9. There will be attempts to avenge the
execution of Kasab. We should be prepared for retaliatory strikes in India,
including Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other foreign
countries. Our ability to prevent retaliatory attacks would depend on the
capabilities of our intelligence and physical security agencies.
10. Much has been done to strengthen
their capabilities and reflexes after 26/11. There will be a need for a review
of these capabilities in the wake of the execution of Kasab in order to
identify continuing deficiencies and take action to fill them.
11. Terrorist strikes in Pune, Mumbai
and Delhi after 26/11 and their unsatisfactory investigation have underlined
the deficiencies. We still have undetected sleeper cells in these places and
elsewhere constituted by the Indian Mujahideen. Since we have not been able to
arrest and interrogate all of them, we do not have a clear idea of the
continuing Pakistani involvement with the remnants of the IM. These remnants
are likely to play an active role in retaliatory action sought to be
mounted by the LET with the complicity
of the IM.
12. If the National Counter Terrorism
Centre (NCTC) had been set up in time and had it started functioning as it was supposed
to, we might have been in a better position to detect and neutralise
preparations for retaliatory action. The exercise to set up the NCTC has come
to a halt due to political mishandling. This exercise needs to be resumed and
completed vigorously.
( Written at the request of the Editor,
Economic Times)
( The writer is Additional Secretary
(retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India )
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