| by B.Raman
(November 6,
2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The 17th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China (CPC), which completed its term at Beijing on November 4,2012, did not throw much light on any
changes in nuances in the Chinese foreign policy that can be expected from the new party leadership headed by Mr.Xi
Jinping that will be taking over at the 18th Congress being held from November
8.
 |
| In this photo taken Sept. 1, and released by China's Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping addresses the opening ceremony of the autumn semester of the Party School of the Communist Party of China in Beijing. |
The first
indications of any changes in nuances will be available only after the Party
Congress is over and after Mr.Hu Jintao hands over as the State President to
Mr.Xi after the session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), the
Parliament, in March next year. There will also be a new Prime Minister from
March next when Mr.Wen Jiabao will be handing over to Mr.Le Kequiang. All one
say with certainty is there is unlikely to be any major changes in foreign
policy objectives at least till next March.
Speculation from
Beijing regarding the deliberations of the 17th Central Committee, which worked
for a consensus on the composition of the new party organs under Mr.Xi,
indicated that the new leadership under Mr.Xi may be more conservative and less
political reform minded and more cautious in domestic matters. Will this
domestic neo conservatism be reflected in external policy also and, if so, in
what manner? Will the new leadership be more assertive in territorial
sovereignty matters or more accommodating? Will it be more or less rigid in
non-territorial matters having an impact on foreign policy such as charges of
currency manipulation, action to reduce trade imbalances, charges of economic
espionage emanating from US Congressional circles etc? Clear-cut answers to
these questions should be available only after next March.
However, one can
study important foreign policy statements made during the year to understand
the thinking of the new leadership and analysts, who write on foreign policy
matters in the Government and party-controlled media. The most important
statement of the year came from Mr.Xi himself during a visit he made to the US
in February last after it became clear that he would be taking over as the
Party General Secretary and the State President from Mr.Hu.
While
addressing a luncheon hosted by the
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the U.S.-China Business Council
at Washington DC on Feb. 15, 2012, Mr.
Xi said
that China and the US should
increase strategic trust and respect the
core interests and major concerns of each other. He added:
"Without
trust, one can achieve nothing. China and the US have important interwoven interests.
Strategic trust is the foundation for
mutually beneficial cooperation, and greater trust will lead to broader
cooperation. The two sides should increase mutual understanding and trust, and
reduce misunderstanding and suspicion.
“We
in China hope to work with the U.S. side to maintain close high-level
exchanges. We hope to increase dialogue and exchange of views with the United
States by making full use of our channels of communication, including the
Strategic and Economic Dialogues, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and
military-to-military exchanges.
"By
doing so, we can better appreciate each other's strategic intentions and
development goals, avoid misinterpretation and misjudgement, build up mutual
understanding and strategic trust, and on that basis, fully tap our cooperation
potential.
“History
shows that when we properly handle each other's core and major interests,
China-U.S. relations will grow smoothly. Otherwise, they will be in trouble.
“
China hopes the US will adhere to the three Sino-U.S. Joint Communiques and the
one-China policy, oppose Taiwan independence and support the peaceful
development of relations across the Taiwan Straits with concrete actions.
“China
also hopes that the United States will truly honour its commitment of
recognizing Tibet as part of China and opposing Tibet independence, and handle
Tibet-related issues in a prudent and proper manner.
“It
is natural that some differences exist on human rights issues given the
differences in national conditions as well as historical and cultural
background between the two countries.
“China
and the US should continue dialogue and exchanges to implement the consensus
reached between Presidents of the two countries on respecting each other's
development paths chosen in light of their national conditions, and improve the
cause of human rights in both countries.
“China-U.S.
relations are now at a new historical starting point in the second decade of
the 21st century."
It was a
conciliatory statement and tried to play down the tensions and suspicions that had arisen during the last two years
following China’s reported characterisation of its sovereignty claims over the
islands of the South China Sea as of core interest in addition to Taiwan and
Tibet. Such a characterisation was not made in any official document or policy
statement of Beijing, but during its diplomatic interactions with the US in May
2010.
In his speech in
Washington DC, Mr.Xi remained silent on this characterisation and reverted to
the traditional Chinese position that Taiwan and Tibet are its core interests.
It did not refer to Xinjiang as a core interest. Chinese leaders are generally
more articulate in the expression of their concerns on the Tibetan issue during
their visits to the US than during their visits to India because they are
concerned over the support enjoyed by His Holiness the Dalai Lama in US
Congressional circles and by his access to the US President during his visits
to Washington DC. They do worry that an attempt might be made by the US to
promote the destabilisation of Tibet after the death of His Holiness.
Though Mr.Xi’s
formulations on the Tibet issue were made by him in Washington DC and with
specific reference to the likely impact of Tibet on China’s bilateral relations
with the US, they should be of interest to India too in view of the pending
border dispute between India and China which has defied a resolution.
Since 1985, the
Chinese have stopped expressing themselves in favour of a swap deal with India
under which in return for an Indian acceptance of the status quo in the Western
sector in the Ladakh area, Beijing will accept the status quo in the Eastern
sector by recognising Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory. This package
proposal was reportedly first made by the Chinese before the Sino-Indian war of
1962.It continued to be on the table even the war till 1985.
Since 1985, they
have been challenging the status quo in the Arunachal Pradesh area, describing
it as southern Tibet and as disputed territory over which they continue to have
sovereignty claims which need to be accommodated in their border negotiations
with India. Details of the border talks are not available, but the speculation
is they want a status quo minus solution in the Eastern sector under which
India will concede their sovereignty over at least the Tawang area in which one
of the previous Dalai Lamas was born, in return for their giving up their
sovereignty claims over the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.
It is in this
context that Mr.Xi’s reference to Tibet and “Tibet-related issues” as of core
interest to China is significant. What did he mean by “Tibet-related” issues?
Was he referring to China’s sovereignty claims over Arunachal Pradesh? It needs
to be noted that in their interactions with India, the Chinese have not
referred to their sovereignty claims over Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest
for them. The Chinese definition of a core interest is one in which no
concessions by them are possible.
Their border
talks with India are based on the principle of mutual accommodation which means
the possibility of some concessions by them. Not to exclude the possibility of
such concessions, they have refrained from describing Arunachal Pradesh as a
core issue in their interactions with India. Against this background, what did
Mr.Xi mean by talking of “Tibet-related issues” as a core interest while
speaking in the US? This needs to be
examined by Indian analysts in order
to look for possible signs of
Beijing deviating from its present policy of searching for a solution on the
Arunachal Pradesh issue based on mutual accommodation.
There were two
important statements indicating an inflexible line on territorial sovereignty
issues on September 20 and 21,2012. In a despatch from Brussels, the “People’s
Daily” quoted Prime Minister Wen Jiabao as stating on the sideline of a
China-EU summit that China would make no concession in affairs concerning the
country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The next day,
when addressing the opening ceremony of
the China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit and Forum in Nanning, capital
city of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, Mr.Xi said: "We are firm in
safeguarding China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity and are
committed to resolving differences with neighbours concerning territorial land,
territorial sea and maritime rights and interests peacefully through friendly
negotiations."
These two
statements indicated that the non-confrontational line projected by Mr.Xi in
the US did not apply to China’s sovereignty disputes with some ASEAN countries
in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea. While the
statements related to China’s territorial disputes with some ASEAN countries
and Japan, the formulations clearly showed that the inflexible line applied to
all territorial disputes with all neighbours. If China is not prepared to make
any concessions in territorial disputes as stated by Mr.Wen, where is the
question of mutual accommodation on the Arunachal Pradesh issue? This should be
a matter for added concern to India.
This hard line
was reflected in an article carried by the “People’s Daily” on November 2,2012,
a day after the final meeting of the 17th Central Committee started. The
article was written by Mr.Wang Yusheng, Executive Director of the Strategic
Research Centre of the China Institute
of International Research Foundation. It said: “The parties concerned know clearly
that China advocates building a harmonious neighbourhood, but has inviolable
“red lines.” If necessary, it will resort to force after trying peaceful means.
The United States is just bluffing, and Japan and some other Asian countries
are just taking advantage of U.S. influence to serve their own purposes. They
may muddy the water in the Pacific, but cannot make big waves.”
Interestingly,
news agency reports originating from Washington, on October 22,2012,quoting US
State Department sources, said:
“
Chinese leaders did not refer to the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands as a
'core national interest' during talks with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
in September in an apparent attempt to avoid a diplomatic clash with
Washington, State Department sources have said.
“While
discussing territorial issues with Clinton in China, Premier Wen Jiabao did not
make remarks suggesting that the disputed islands are part of its 'core
national interests', a term Beijing uses to refer to key territories it is
determined to hold onto or ultimately take control of, the sources said.
“The
talks with Clinton followed a meeting in Beijing with Japan in May in
which Jiabao told Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda that his country should respect
China's core interests and major concerns, the Japan Times reported.
“According
to the report, the US had made it clear
that the islands fall within the scope of the US-Japan security treaty, which
would oblige Washington to support Japan if the islands came under attack.
“The
uninhabited islands in the East China Sea also were not referred to as a core
interest in Clinton's separate meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao and
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, the sources said.
“While
Beijing is not expected to soften its position on the row with Tokyo, it
appears to be cautious about challenging Washington on security issues, the
report said.”
Thus, on the eve
of the 18th Party Congress, the over-all Chinese line seems to be as follows:
(a).It
looks upon its sovereignty claims over Taiwan, Tibet and “Tibet-related
issues” as of core interest and major
concern. It has made this clear in formal official statements and is prepared
for a military conflict if its interests are threatened, but it has not
clarified what it means by Tibet-related issues.
(b).
Since May,2010, it has informally indicated to the US its sovereignty claims in
the South China Sea as of core interest, thereby not ruling out the use of
force if its interests are threatened. However, there has been no formal
declaration on this subject.
(c
). While continuing to reiterate its sovereignty claims in the East China Sea,
it has refrained from characterising them as of core interest to avoid a
military conflict with Japan which enjoys the protection of the US-Japan
Security Treaty in the East China Sea.
This over-all
core interest doctrine of China which evolved under the outgoing leadership of
Mr.Hu is likely to continue after Mr.Xi takes over from Mr.Hu.
What impact this
will have on the ongoing border talks between India and China? There are so far
no indications to show that China might be contemplating to give up its
adherence to the principle of mutual accommodation in finding a solution to its
border dispute with India. The evolution of the Chinese thinking on this issue
needs to be closely monitored.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For
China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Twitter @SORBONNE75)
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