| by Seran
Senguttuvan
( October 22,
2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan
Constitution came by largely as a result of the Indo Lanka Agreement (1987)
after substantial and careful study by legal and other experts of both
countries. The Agreement came at a time
when the JR Jayawardena Government was under extreme pressure simultaneously
from the JVP in the South and the LTTE in the North - both having launched island-wide attacks on
State utilities as well as the Police and the armed forces. It is reported in a
crucial meeting called by President Jayawardena – in the presence of most of
the senior Cabinet Ministers the President asked the 4 chiefs of the forces
individually if they can hold the government’s writ in the event of attacks
both by the JVP and the LTTE. As the Forces chiefs answered in the
negative, Jayawardena had obtained the
sanction of his Cabinet (1) to call in the IPKF to use both their substantial
personnel and material resources to disarm the LTTE within a specified period (2) to concentrate using available Forces
personnel in the South to confront the JVP insurrection, which, by that time
had succeeded in its mis-information that the JRJ Govt was in the process of
handing over the country to India.
It may be
recalled from 1971 the JVP had structured their programme, including the
initial 5 lessons of Rohana Wijeweera,
on an anti-Indian platform. But, in fact, they aimed at the local Tamil
population – both indigenous and of recent Indian origin (Estate Tamils) to
create anarchy in the country. It was this hatred that was used, in a large
measure, to provide the venom for the attack on Tamils and their properties in
Colombo and the rest of the country in the pre-planned pogrom against them in
July 1983. JVP cadres are known to have created much of the mayhem. It is note-worthy many Indian-owned
businesses were also destroyed during this period – although the Sindhi,
Gujerati and Memon industrialists, who lost millions then, had nothing to do
with the Separatist Agenda - then successfully used to poison Sinhala minds.
While the
reality is JR Jayawardena used his considerable political experience and skills
to get the better of the younger Indian PM Shri Rajiv Gandhi to Sri Lanka’s
advantage to disarm LTTE using Indian
soldiers and material resources, the JVP
and Sinhala extremists – both lay and cleric - conspired here to project to the
Sinhala mind the Indian Govt used
coercion on the JRJ Govt to sign the Indo-Lanka Agreement. That mind-set has
fertile soil in the semi-educated and confused Sinhala mind in a generation
that is now over a quarter century old.
The impression then and now in India, among political leaders,
historians and academic circles is that India walked into a JRJ laid trap –
from which it never regained fully. This
is probably why when V.P. Singh took over as PM one of his first acts was to
recall the IPKF.
The object of
the I-L Accord was to help the alienated Tamils in the North Eastern Province
(then 2 Provinces) via the instrument of
the 13th Amendment to enable them to secure minimum rights in running their own
affairs. Both PM’s and their teams were of the view the Separate State option
should be discouraged at all costs.
Clearly, Prabakaran and the LTTE were against this line of thought
because by then Prabakaran had embarked on his “Eelam or bust” course. There is
reason to believe he would have been content with local rule by the Tamils in
the North and East, without prejudice to other minorities within, if Mrs Bandaranaike’s or JRJ’s governments had
wisely gone on a path to be accommodative to the Tamils. But both failed in
that they considered the Tamil struggle as insignificant and, they erre in the
belief this could otherwise be addressed by their numerically superior armed
forces. This is surely why both refused
to yield to the peaceful political agitation of the Tamil people between 1970
to the mid-1980s. This is not to mention the racially-inclined and anti-Indian
political forces within both governments which did its share in driving the
Tamils to the extra-Parliamentary route.
The Governments
of JRJ, Premadasa and CBK could not ignore the potent threat of the Buddhist
hierarchy - under the influence of the considerably powerful Sinhala extremist
wing - to ignore concessions to Tamils
in the NEP. Therefore, the benefits of the 13th Amendment did not go to where
it was originally intended. Instead - costly, ineffective, duplicatory and
corrupt Provincial Councils came into effect in all 7 Provinces and remain
there. Arguably, they are totally unpopular with the people in general. As to
the Tamils, Prabakaran and the LTTE have to accept the blame because they did
not allow the PCs to take root in the NEP. The merging of the 2 Provinces into
a singleNorth Eastern Province was aimed initially to address the two main
burning issues of the Tamil Nation viz:-
State-aided Colonisation and the engineered demographic change of the ethnic
ratio. These have been going on in full
force from 1956.
It needs to be
mentioned here the issue was further complicated by the emergence of an
important judicial officer around year 2000 – who hardly concealed his ultimate
aim of getting into Party politics. This
is unprecedented becausen all his illustrious predecessors shunned the thought
of politics and went into graceful retirement. The Sinhala extremist fringe was
to jump at the opportunity. They made certain the man was properly used by the
Sinhala supremacists to commit the sacrilege of violating a solemn Protocol
entered into between the Governments of both India and Sri Lanka. India cannot
be a silent witness to this deliberate act of
truancy. The post-2000 (year) period saw rapid increase in State-aided
Colonisation where the once majority community in the Eastern Province, the
Tamils, are now rendered to virtually the 3rd position.So much so, in the recently concluded PC Elections, for the first time in the history of
post-Independent Sri Lanka, Tamils no
longer are in the majority in the EP – a grotesque aberration that needs to be
addressed soon.
The story does
not end there. It is clear the Rajapakse
government is under pressure to allow PC Elections in the North. Not that they
want to. But India and the international community have given them sufficient
notice to get their act together. While he allows Elections hither and thither
Rajapakse finds flimsy excuses to allow the Tamil people to run their own
affairs in the North. With the UN/Geneve staring him at the face come November
2012, he is forced to yield to the
Northern PC Elections by late 2013. He knows the Tamils of the North will
reject him soundly – in spite of the intimidating and omnipresent armed forces
- working hand in glove with his band of “rejected” Tamil political goon squads and killer
outfits. Such a rejection, the extremist
and Sinhala supremacist groupings close to him will tell him, can increase the
chances of the Tamil NEP seeking (and perhaps succeeding soon) the status of a
Separate Nation. The example of South Sudan and Bandermoro is there for all to
see.
The Sinhala
extremists have, therefore, geared themselves not to take the chance of a NP PC
gamble.
The powerful
Defence Secretary Gothabaya Rajapakse –
a government servant and who should remain loudly silent on political
matters - has fired the first salvo in
calling for the repeat of the 13th Amendment. Lapdog Weerawansa is carrying the
baton, predictably. The ever obliging JHU is doing its bit - with
that man said to be a lawyer, Gammanpila,
calling also repeating Gothabaya's call abrogation. Gammanpila's clearly
lacks understanding how global diplomacy moves in matters of
violation of protocols between sovreign States.
Whatever mask
Mahinda Rajapakse wears here, it is unmistakeable he is behind every one of
these infantile moves.
When this
question was posed to TNA’s Sampanthan by the local media last week, he chose
his words carefully and exclaimed “there will be consequences to
pay” The Indian Govt – the other party
to the Accord - is unlikely to allow its
nose to be rubbed in public by what it privately considers a recalcitrant
neighbour. Certainly not when a crucial General Election is round the corner in
India. In the interest of all, it is best President Rajapakse review his
options with a group of trusted senior academics, analysts and policy-makers.
In the political column of a respected and savvy Sunday English newspaper the
subject is given much credence and described as "Indo-Lankan diplomatic
ties are tense and have reached the lowest levels in years" This is certainly not a compliment to
President Rajapakse's diplomatic acumen.
These are careful words that
should not be ignored.
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