| by B. Raman
( October 13, 2012, Chennai, Sri
Lanka Guardian) The ability to read and understand the adversary’s mind and
message is a vital component of strategic decision-making. When decisions that
could lead to military conflicts are made without such an ability, surprise and
possible disaster are often the outcome.
2. The truth of this was
illustrated during the Korean war of the late 1940s and the 1950s and the
Sino-Indian war of 1962.
3.During the initial months of
the Korean war, as the defeated North Korean Army was retreating towards the
Yalu river marking North Korea’s border with China, there were repeated
warnings from Beijing directly and indirectly that it would not be a silent
spectator of the UN troops commanded by the US reaching the river that could
pose a threat to China’s security and that the PLA might be forced to intervene
to prevent such an eventuality.
4. Gen.Douglas MacArthur of the
US Army, who then commanded the Far East Command, was so confident of final and
decisive victory over the North Korean Army and so dismissive of Beijing’s
warnings and its ability to have them executed on the ground that he kept up
the advance unmindful of the dangers of a Chinese intervention.
5. As the UN troops neared the
Yalu river, the PLA intervened massively and with determination and threw the
UN troops back with heavy casualties. Gen.MacArthur had underestimated the
strength and fighting capability of not only the PLA, but also the PLA (Air
Force).
6. Fifty years later, a study of
the lessons of the massive Chinese intervention carried out in the U.S. Army
Centre of Military History by Richard W. Stewart came to the following
conclusions regarding the Chinese intervention in the war:
“The period from early November
1950 to late January 1951 was in many ways the most heartbreaking of the Korean
War. During the previous summer the North Korean attack had been a total
surprise, and the disastrous retreat to the Pusan Perimeter was painful in the
extreme. However, the series of defeats could be explained by the necessarily
haphazard and slow reinforcement of the outnumbered U.S. and South Korean
forces. Moreover, these defeats were followed by elation as the Inchon landings
reversed the situation and the UN forces seemed on the verge not just of
victory in South Korea but of total victory, including the liberation of North
Korea and the reunification of the peninsula. All these dreams were swept away
by the massive intervention of the Chinese Army in late November 1950. There
would be no homecoming victory parade by Christmas.
“The initial warning attacks and
diplomatic hints by the Chinese were ignored by the overconfident Far Eastern
Command under General MacArthur. MacArthur’s failure to comprehend the reality
of the situation led the entire United Nations army to near disaster at the
Chongchon River and the Chosin Reservoir. Only the grit and determination of
the individual American soldiers and marines as they fought the three major
enemies of cold, fear, and isolation held the UN line together during the
retreats from North Korea. Once tied together into a coherent defensive line,
under new and dynamic leadership, these same soldiers and marines showed their
determination to continue the fight. Hard battles lay ahead, but the period of
headlong retreats from an attacking, unsuspected foe, was finally over.”
7.The mistakes committed by
Gen.MacArthur which led to the massive Chinese intervention could be summed up
as follows: Over-confidence and over-estimation of the strength of his own
forces, under-estimation of the strength and determination of the Chinese, an
inability to read the Chinese mind, and treating lightly and dismissively
Chinese warnings regarding the likely consequences of the UN forces reaching
the Yalu river, thereby posing a threat to China.
8. Similar mistakes were
committed---in a much larger measure--- by our political and military
leadership before the Sino-Indian war of 1962 leading to the humiliating defeat
of our Army at the hands of the PLA. There have been very few comprehensive
studies available to the public in India on the reasons for our defeat. As we
observe the 50th anniversary of the defeat, many articles have been appearing
in the media, but they are largely a collection of wishful thinking, unverified
assumptions, breast-beatings and claims unsupported by concrete facts. Such
studies do not serve any purpose in enabling us to learn the right lessons so
that such mistakes are not repeated.
9.One such unverifiable claim
made recently is that if we had used our Air Force our Army might not have
suffered a humiliating defeat. Such claims have not been supported by a factual
analysis of the state of the Air Force of the two countries in 1962. Many of
the analyses that have appeared recently have not brought out the fact that
barring the military conflict with Pakistan in Jammu & Kashmir in 1947-48,
our Armed Forces had not fought a major
war since we became independent in 1947 .
10. As against this, the Chinese
Armed Forces had fought a major war against the UN troops led by the US in
Korea, almost giving a bloody nose to them. And their Air Force had played a
very important and creditable role against the UN Air Force. No authentic
assessment of the Chinese air power and capability as exhibited during the
Korean war is available, but according
to one Chinese claim they managed to shoot down 320 UN aircraft and lost 220 of
their own. Their account of their losses indicate their already massive
aircraft holdings in the 1950s, thanks to the assistance from the USSR.
According to Western analysts as cited by GlobalSecurity.org, even in 1953, the
PLA ( Air Force) had a total holding of 1500 combat aircraft of different
types.
11. The 1962 war with India took
place long after the Korean war was over. Even if there was no need for the
Chinese to shift their Army units from the Korean border to the Indian border,
they were in a position to shift a large number of their aircraft to Sichuan
and Yunnan for possible use against India. Our Armed Forces with no experience
of having fought a major war since 1947 were forced by our political leadership
to confront the PLA whose self-confidence, experience and war-fighting
capabilities had been enhanced by the experiences gained by it against the UN
troops led by the US in Korea.
12. Our political leadership
forced our armed forces to engage in a confrontation with the PLA thinking that
the PLA of 1962 would be no different from the PLA of 1949 which had captured
control of China from the KMT. Before we embarked on our so-called forward
policy which led to a military confrontation, two intelligence assessments
should have been made----firstly, an assessment of the Chinese strength and
capabilities in Tibet and Xinjiang and secondly, an assessment of their
military and air power, fighting capabilities and generalship as exhibited
during the war in Korea.
13. Our Intelligence Bureau (IB)
did the first assessment, however inadequate it might have been. It was not in
a position to undertake the second since its area of focus was limited to the
peripheral countries. Thus, we went to war with China in 1962 largely unaware
of the advances made by the Chinese Armed Forces during the 1950s and of their
professional qualities as exhibited in Korea.
14. Fifty years after the 1962
war, we still have limited mental horizons in matters strategic. Our horizons
are largely limited by Pakistan, its ISI, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and its Amir
Hafiz Mohammad Sayeed. There is a huge panoply of threats arising from China
which have not received our attention. It is Pakistan, Pakistan and Pakistan
all the time.
15.As an example of how our
mental horizons in matters strategic continue to be limited, let me narrate the
following: We had a military conflict with Pakistan in the Kargil heights in
1999. After the conflict, the Government of Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, the then
Prime Minister, set up a committee
headed by the late K.Subrahmaniam to identify the inadequacies noticed
in the conduct of the war and to recommend
steps for removing them.
16. On the basis of its
recommendations, a number of Task Forces were set up to examine weaknesses in
our national security structure and recommend action for removing them. These
Task Forces dealt with Defence Management, Intelligence Revamp, Border
Management and Internal Security. Their reports were vetted by a Group of
Ministers nominated by the Prime Minister and the national security
architecture was modified.
17.Since the GOM and its Task
Forces were the outcome of the Kargil war with Pakistan, their terms of reference
mostly related to likely threats from Pakistan. Most of their recommendations
were Pakistan-centric. So was the modified national security architecture that
came into being. Some of their recommendations did collaterally strengthen our
capabilities with regard to China, but the focus of their study was not China.
18. Ten years later, Prime
Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh set up a blue ribbon Task Force on National Security
chaired by Shri Naresh Chandra, former Cabinet Secretary. Since it was not the
outcome of any war with Pakistan with restricted terms of reference, it was
expected to cover a much larger strategic depth, with a greater focus on the
examination of our capabilities vis-à-vis those of China.
19. “The Hindu” of October
9,2012, has carried a moving tribute to Shri Brajesh Mishra, the National
Security Adviser under Shri Vajpayee, who passed away recently, by Shri
Shivshankar Menon, the present NSA. He has said
that when the national security structures built up under Mishra ‘were
reviewed after 10 years by a Task Force, they actually suggested more of the
same, rather than a radical restructuring.” He is referring to the Task Force
chaired by Shri Naresh Chandra.
20. I interpret this as an
implied criticism of the report of the
Naresh Chandra Task Force submitted to the Prime Minister on May 24,2012, which
is presently under examination. The report went into greater details than the
reports of the GOM regarding likely concerns arising from China, but these
concerns have not been adequately reflected in suggesting a further
modification and modernisation of our national security architecture.
21.Attention on Pakistan
continues to be important. It continues to target our jugular vein. But in our
preoccupation with Pakistan, we should not lose sight of the fact that an
architecture created for dealing with Pakistan, will not be able to deal
satisfactorily with China. To deal with China we need a different mindset, a
different ability to read its mind and message, a different military and
intelligence capability etc. The focus of the Task Force should have been on
them.
22. Some other countries had in
the past undertaken comprehensive studies of the Sino-Indian war of 1962 in
order to see what lessons it has for them. A very useful study released in April 1984 was by Lt.Commander James Barnard Calvin of the US Navy on behalf
of the Marine Corps and Staff College of the US. His interesting conclusions are annexed. They
are quite valid even today (13-10-2012)
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd),
Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director,
Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For
China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com
Twitter @SORBONNE75)
ANNEXURE
CONCLUSIONS OF A STUDY ON THE
SINO-INDIAN WAR OF OCTOBER,1962, MADE IN 1984 BY THE US MARINE CORPS AND STAFF
COLLEGE
There may well have been room for
compromise, but stubbornness and India's aggressive forward policy resulted in
armed conflict. World leaders must heed other nations' stated vital strategic
objectives.
Assumptions are dangerous. Nehru's assumption that China would not
confront Indian troops and would passively retreat caused Nehru to pursue a
very assertive forward policy of thrusting troops and border patrols into-and
sometimes even beyond--disputed frontier areas.
His assumptions and resulting policy eventually brought retaliation from
China. Assumptions are still dangerous;
hypotheses about one's enemy must be validated by accurate intelligence.
Ignoring the advice of senior,
experienced army officers was disastrous for India. Many officers had warned Nehru that India was
poorly prepared for war with China: they were relieved or replaced, their
advice ignored. Leaders may believe what
they want to believe, but foolishly discounting the counsel of experts may lead
them to disaster.
Intelligence and appropriate
interpretation of intelligence is vital; only valid information--not
assumptions—is important to military planning.
India seemed almost totally unaware that she was heavily outnumbered along
the border and that China (unlike India) was well prepared logistically and
well versed in alpine warfare tactics.
Both sides used reconnaissance patrols, but battle results would
indicate that China had good intelligence and used it to good advantage. One
must "know your enemy."
Logistic readiness is vital to
any military operation. India was very poorly prepared logistically, especially
for cold weather and mountain operations.
On several occasions, India ran out of ammunition or was otherwise
unable to sustain herself. The Chinese
had stockpiled supplies in Tibet, and had the manpower to keep the front well
supplied. The Border War's mountain
operations were relatively slow moving.
Today, high mobility will make proper logistic support even more crucial.
Similarly, India was neither
trained nor prepared for alpine warfare.
Until Nehru's assertive forward policy was initiated, few Indian
soldiers had operated in mountain areas. Altitudes above 14,000 feet can be
frigid even in summer. In October and
November, many Indian soldiers had only summer uniforms and jackets to warm
them. Many Indians died not from combat,
but from exposure. Today's military
forces must be prepared for operations in any locale or climate, from hot arid
deserts to frozen mountain slopes.
Generalship, leadership, command
and control are always important. Even
though defeated in Aksai Chin, the Indian forces in Western Command always
deemed well organized and led. But in
NEFA, there was often confusion; numerous command changes resulted in
disorganization and poor combat readiness. Poor communications and control
resulted in troop movements which were totally inappropriate, such as sending
out Forces to positions which had already been overrun.
General Kaul often ignored or
disputed the advice of his junior generals; further, he was often indecisive,
changing orders minutes after they had been issued. Immediately after the
ceasefire, General Kaul was relieved; days later, he would resign from the
army.
Today's lethal firepower and high
mobility make command, control and communications more vital than ever.
Hopefully, future military and political leaders will study the causes and the
lessons learned from this Border War. And hopefully, they will learn.
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