Threat to ‘European Security Architecture’
| by Mathews George Chunakara
( May 29, 2012, Geneva, Sri Lanka Guardian) Russia launched an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) last week; a few days after the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) announced its capability for an interim ballistic missile defence capability in Europe. The ICBM launched by Russia from the Plesetsk facility in the north-western part of the country adds more tensions and gives a clear signal to the U.S and its NATO allies over the deployment of a missile shield in Europe. A Russian Defence Ministry spokesperson Vadim Koval stated, “Russia’s ICBM is intended to strengthen the capabilities of Strategic Missile Forces, including its higher capacity for overcoming anti-missile defences.”
NATO members’ arms sales to Russia
About ten days before the NATO summit in Chicago, the United States expressed its concern over a billion dollar arms sales to Russia by France, Germany and Italy, which was unprecedented in NATO members’ history. A report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the United States of America recently shared details on the sales to Russia by France of four Mistral-class Amphibious Assault Vessels. The CRS described it as "the first ever sale of a significant offensive military capability by a NATO member to Russia." Russia and France signed the contract for this sale in mid-2011. The ‘Mistral’, the second largest ship in the French Navy, is considered as a force projection vessel with huge facilities. It claims the capacity to transport up to 16 helicopters, four landing craft, 13 battle tanks, and hundreds of combat troops, and can field a 69-bed hospital. Russia will have to pay the total costs of Euro 1.17 billion for the first two vessels which will be delivered to Russia in 2014. A German company Rheinmetall also signed a deal with Russia in November last year to build a Euro 100 million army training centre in Russia's Volga region which the company described as "the most advanced system of its kind worldwide". Italy also has reached agreement with Russia's Defence Ministry for the sale of dozens of light ‘multi-role armoured vehicles’ manufactured by the famous Italian company Fiat’s subsidiary.
A senior Republican Senator Richard Lugar expressed concern that the arms sold by France could be used against US allies and that China might one day be another partner of this kind of arms sales from same NATO members. The sale of arms by certain NATO members to Russia also generated debates among NATO members which became a reason for obvious tensions within the alliance. Some members of the alliance see the possible deployment of the ‘Mistrals’ in the Baltic Sea might create growing tensions among Baltic and other NATO members. Few other NATO members have expressed concerns that arms sales by certain NATO members themselves to Russia could pose a threat to peace and security in the region. At the same time the counter argument put forth especially by France, Germany, and Italy is that, “recent military sales to Russia should be viewed as a logical step in advancing a broader political goal of strategic partnership with Russia" and the sales do not pose any military threat by Russia in Europe.
NATO-Russian Accord lacks conceptual clarity and common vision
Fifteen years after the signing of the NATO - Russian accord, there exists differing views in terms of their relations and flaws in their common vision for security. The NATO - Russian founding Act of 1997, which was signed by the Heads of States of NATO’s then sixteen Nations and President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, was a new stepping stone. The accord was expected to pave the way for "a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its people." Such an historic milestone in the modern history of international relations was described then as an effort by former foes of the Cold War era to “make NATO-Russia relations the centrepiece of the future ‘European Security Architecture’, creating an increasingly co-operative security structure, or it will result in a stumbling block, leading to new division lines in Europe”. It was also observed that both NATO and Russia will use the agreement of the Founding Act by constructively engaging each other over the major questions related to a new European Security Architecture for the 21st century. Today, fifteen years later, the accord has left both NATO and Russia at a crossroads as it still lacks conceptual clarity and determination and commitment to develop a common vision for sustained peace and security in Europe
There have been major improvements in certain areas of the practical cooperation between NATO and Russia since they signed the ‘NATO - Russian Founding Act’. NATO’s efforts to keep Russia engaged in dialogue helped initially to develop reasonably good relation between NATO and Russia. However, it has not been fully effective in subsequent years. NATO's decision to enlarge its membership, especially inviting countries from former Soviet allies’ countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Baltic States provoked Russia from time to time. The first incidence for tensions was precipitated when NATO offered membership to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – all countries sharing borders with Russia – as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Since the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO has enlarged its original membership more than twice; from 12 founding countries in 1949 to current membership of 28 countries. Russia has been watching this development and has serious questions about NATO’s policy to open its doors and its intentions for more political engagement around the globe.
Differing views of European security concepts became another major issue that has created tension in NATO- Russia relations. NATO emphasises its commitment and reassurance for its member states against conventional attack. The Research Advisor at the NATO Defence College in Rome, Andrew Monaghan says, this approach is “partly due to some member states' concerns about Russia's role in international affairs”. Moscow repeatedly emphasises that “it cannot accept the idea of NATO as a ‘global policeman’, and argues that NATO’s Article V and open door membership expansion policies fragment European security”. Differing views of NATO and Russia in their understandings of the indivisibility of the concept of security pose continued tensions among them. Monaghan identifies some of the most pertinent reasons for these opposing views by NATO and Russia. In NATO, the indivisibility of security is defined in terms of the comprehensive nature of security in its three dimensions (human, economic and political-military), security among states and the recognition that European and Eurasian security are embedded in global security. However, Russia has defined it differently, in terms of levels of security – one, at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) level of politically agreed security, but another at the NATO and EU level of legally binding commitments. As the European security architecture is currently divided along these lines, Russia is concerned, creating a two-tiered security space in which Russia has neither a vote nor any legal guarantees.
The on-going plans and discussions about further widening of NATO membership may hamper or even become a stumbling block for the development of good relations between NATO and Russia. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during the NATO summit in Chicago at a meeting with aspiring member countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, and Montenegro called for the enlargement of NATO membership. While Hilary Clinton emphasises that expansion should strengthen the alliance, the fact remains that the expansion plan also adds other problems to the alliance. For example, Macedonia is now closest to the process of NATO accession, but it is held back by a dispute with NATO-member Greece over the name of the country itself. Georgia has also made progress towards its membership in the alliance, but is expected to resolve differences with Russia. In 2008, Russia and Georgia fought a war, after which Russia recognized the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries. The Chicago declaration of NATO called on “Russia to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states”, and expressed concerns over the build-up of Russia’s military presence on Georgia’s territory. This is, in fact, another irritating factor in NATO-Russian relation.
Russia has another reason to register its major grievance against NATO, because of its unenthusiastic approach to Moscow’s European security treaty proposal to “replace outdated institutions such as NATO and the OSCE”. In 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev first formally raised the issue in a meeting in Berlin and said the new pact was necessary to finally update Cold War-era arrangements. He was of the opinion that “Europe's problems won't be solved until its unity is established, an organic wholeness of all its integral parts, including Russia." Medvedev called the United States, European Union, and Russia the "three branches of European civilization." But Western countries have largely ignored that proposal as it was considered unrealistic and chiefly aimed at boosting Moscow's role in international affairs by undermining NATO and the OSCE. Medvedev retorted later that NATO has been "unable to find a new meaning for its existence" since the end of the Cold War. Other reasons such as conceptual gaps and differing visions of security prevail among NATO and Russia and constantly pose problems in their relations. For example, NATO emphasises that missile defence cannot be truly collective since Russia is not a member of the Alliance. At the same time Russia emphasises that a new European security treaty is needed and should be based on the principle that "no nation or international organization is entitled to strengthen its own security at the cost of other nations or organizations."
Improved NATO- Russian relations: a strategic prerequisite for global security
The need has been repeatedly stated for a strategic plan to improve the estranged NATO-Russia relationship, which is an important step towards the objective of achieving the goal of European security. But a genuine effort to ensure such a qualitative relation has been absent in most actions by both parties – NATO and Russia. Since 1997, when NATO and Russia laid the foundation for future cooperation and security, the relation has been little more than fragile. Often opportunities for meaningful encounters are lost or missed whenever opportune time arrived. NATO summit meetings provide periodic opportunities for Heads of State and Government of member countries to evaluate and provide strategic direction for Alliance activities as well as important junctures in the Alliance’s decision-making processes. In that case, the NATO summit in Chicago should have been a venue for a constructive dialogue between NATO and Russia and developed a vision for strengthening a more meaningful NATO - Russian relation. The NATO summit in Chicago addressed a wide range of issues on its agenda– from local to global. But, the one issue that is fundamental to the future of the alliance and European security did not find any prominent place in its discussions: a meaningful dialogue on the NATO-Russia relationship. As usual, there was a mentioning of NATO-Russia cooperation in the declaration adopted at the end of the summit, which spoke of “strategic importance of the NATO-Russia relationship as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security”. The declaration stated: “We want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia”. However, it would have been much better to discuss these issues with the participation of Russian leaders, especially in the context that the Chicago summit coincided with the marking of the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) and the fifteenth anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.
The NATO-Russia Founding Act affirms the use of the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia. But, about six weeks prior to the Chicago summit, the NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced the cancellation of the NATO-Russia Council Summit, which was slated to be held in conjunction with the NATO Summit. The official statement only stated that the “timing is difficult...because Russia has a very busy domestic political calendar”. This shows an example for on-going tensions due to lack of trust and disagreement between NATO and Russia.
The NATO-Russia Act affirmed that “notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security”. Enhanced political consultations and practical cooperation of NATO with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence were identified as areas of cooperation for the promotion of wider international security. However, any constructive elements contained in the Founding Act may never be implemented. A truly cooperative approach to be embarked upon for a true spirit of collaboration and cooperation was also not initiated. As a result deep mistrust and tensions, renewed antagonism and confrontational behaviour as well as the creation of new division lines are the results.
NATO is so ambitious to continue its expansion and reach globally, but it lacks willingness and openness to collaborate and cooperate with the alliance’s most prominent and able neighbour Russia. NATO and EU have been treating Russia as an outsider, excluding it from the main institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community. One may argue that the policy of Russia itself is responsible for its isolation. Nonetheless, as Charles A Kupchan, professor of international affairs at the Georgetown University says, “the West is making a historic mistake in treating Russia as a strategic pariah”. As this trend continues, European security will continue to be in the shadow of growing insecurity. Russia cannot be so ignored as it could have been the case immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union or at a time when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The profile of Russia is different in every aspect these days. Russia’s economic advancement has brought the country back to limelight. Russia’s increasing role in international relations, possession of sophisticated military technology and military-industrial infrastructure, etc., cannot be underestimated. In a military doctrine released in 2010, Russia identified NATO’s expansion as a primary external threat. But, Russia is in a much more sophisticated situation to face any such threat from NATO. This is what Kupchan argues: “Russia now has the confidence and the capability to push back against NATO –just as the West urgently needs Moscow’s cooperation on a host of issues, including the containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, arms control and non-proliferation, the stabilization of Afghanistan, counterterrorism, and energy security”.
The question now before the NATO leaders is to how to engage Russia in the 21st century. They should seriously think about whether an expanded NATO with Russia or without Russia will be beneficial and practical when they envision a new European Security Architecture for a more peaceful and less stressful Europe. The time has come to enter into more serious discussions and constructive engagements between NATO and Russia. As Kennette Benedict , the executive director of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists says, “it is time to recognize how much Russia has accomplished in less than a generation, how much it could contribute to the military capacity of NATO, and how much its full cooperation could enhance global security” .
[*] Dr. Mathews George Chunakara is Director of International Affairs of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, Switzerland
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