by General GSC Fonseka (Retd)
RWP, RSP, rcds, psc - former Commander of the Sri Lanka Army
(June 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) 18. During Elam War IV offensive, operation command was exercised down to eight down level as against the accepted one down in offensive conventionally. Army Commander monitored even the platoon, section and four man team operations. This was the case even with GOC’s and Brigade Commanders. As a result, Army Commander downwards every one had to take responsibility for all Operational matters down to four-man team level. For example, when an Operation in Muhamalai Defence in Jaffna ended up with heavy casualties and the media criticized the operation heavily, The Army Commander took the total responsibility for the Operation but greedy politicians claiming credit for the war victory never came out to accept blame for bad results Army achieved in certain battles. Even in Defensive Operations, the deployment down to platoon level were always decided by the Army Commander and when he was No 5 in the Army and holding the appointment of Jaffna Commander and No2 as Chief of Staff of the Army used to go from bunker to bunker and even supervised the sighting of machine guns.
19. During last one year of the Elam War, as the Army was moving forward and capturing large new areas, the troop requirement to hold those areas were heavy and as all the new recruits were absorbed into offensive battalions Commander decided to raise Re inforcement Battalions with Battle Casualties for the holding role in newly captured areas. Some battle casualties still undergoing treatment as P3 casualties (priority 3) were used to raise Re-inforcement Battalions and about 10000 such soldiers willingly joined these Battalions as they realized that they had to support the Commanders Operation plan to ensure smooth progress of the offensive.
20. Although some Commanders believed in doing their own job and tasks, the Commander of the Army considered the whole war effort as the task of everyone. Therefore, whenever there were troop requirements in areas allocated to other Services or the Police and whenever they faced with any difficulties Army Commander undertook the their tasks voluntarily. Especially, when the Army was operating in the North and the terrorists tried to regroup in the East and started attacking the police in the area, the Army Commander on his own initiative sent troops and Commandos to the East. This was again an additional deployment for the Army amidst its heavy commitments in the North. However, it enabled the Security Forces to take control of the East again. Not only that, but during the Northern operations there were many instances where the terrorists launched attacks on civilians deep in the south to divert the attention of the Army elsewhere. In order to overcome this situation Army Commander had to raise two new Battalions with Army deserters who had surrendered including some Commando and Special Forces troops. After speaking to these deserters and motivating them, the Army was able to deploy them deep inside jungles in the South. In this manner, all the terrorists operating in the South were eliminated and the area was secured. These were difficult commitments which the Army under took amidst its main commitment in the North. These were the problems, which the Army overlooked in the past and which prevented success in the offensives as the terrorists were able to strike in the South when ever the Army gain any success in the North and not due to the lack of political leadership or political will. As the Army Commander on his own initiative addressed all these issues, politicians were able to enjoy life in the south as the Army was accomplishing its task. All these additional deployments were personally controlled by the Commander himself going down to Platoon level Operations and not leaving anything unattended. Normally in conventional deployments, the Army Commanders do only coordination of Operations, provide resources, and leave the battle and Operations to be commanded by the Formation Commanders. Nevertheless, the Sri Lanka Army Commander took the whole Elam war IV under his personal Operational Command and directed the Operation to Victory.
21. Although, the Army Commander had selected the best available Divisional Commanders to Command Divisions there were times where some showed their own weaknesses. Some were good in pushing troops but lacked ability to ensure the security of flanks or to stabilize the consolidation. Some led very well from the front but were poor in tactical planning. Some were very capable but lacked commitment. As per above situation, the Commander had to always be fully involved with what happens in the forward areas and fill the vacuum whenever it arose. There were occasions where Divisional Commanders failed to coordinate between Divisions. If one Division comes under a counter attack, some times the Commander had to intervene and direct the adjoining Divisional Commander to extend the necessary support to the Division under attack. Although, these are not normally done by the Army Commander, in the case Elam war IV the Commander willingly attended to these problem areas as past experiences have shown that any delays in taking appropriate remedial measures at the correct time frame could lead to major setbacks to the whole operation.
22. Lastly, although the President and Secretary Defence claim the credit for eradicating terrorism in Sri Lanka, in Mahinda Rajapaksha’s Presidential campaign manifesto in 2005 he stated that he will solve the North East terrorist problem by personally meeting and talking to the LTTE leader Prabahakaran and never left any room for the Military Option. When the terrorist leader commenced hostilities in July 2006 in the East, Mahainda Rajapaksha went behind various parties and requested them to negotiate with Prabahakaran to settle the Mavil Aru problem in the East. He was not willing to go for the Military option. Luckily the Army Commander who was hospitalized for three months after getting seriously injured after the suicide attempt on his life came out of the hospital the same day and decided to go on the offensive to recapture the Mavil Aru sluice. Major General N. Mallawarachchi who was the Chief of Staff and Acting Commander when the Commander was in hospital have said that he has no troops to go on any offensive. Army Commander having decided to go on the offensive decided to bring down the only Brigade, which was available in Jaffna as a reserve and commenced the offensive operations. This is how the offensive against the world’s most ruthless terrorist organization began and ended up at Nandikadal as per the Commanders strategy three months before he anticipated.
Please read previous parts of this series of articles,
CONCLUDED
 RWP, RSP, rcds, psc - former Commander of the Sri Lanka Army (June 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) 18. Dur...){kind=link}
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