Winning the War - Sri Lankan Experience – 3

Overall Strategy

by General GSC Fonseka (Retd) 

RWP, RSP, rcds, psc - former Commander of the Sri Lanka Army

(June 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) 12. Army Commander wanted to take the Eastern and the Northern theaters in peace meal and cleared eastern province in one year. In the eastern province, it was only an Infantry Brigade together with about two Commando or Special Forces battalions, which were deployed at any stage of the operation. The Commander of the Army personally drew out even the tactical plans of Batticaloa west and Thoppigala Operation and the Task Force Commander had only to execute it. Although the Eastern Province operations always found the troop levels below the real requirement, the Commander decided to deploy 57 Division in the North for offensive in the middle of the Eastern Province Operation to prevent terrorists moving reinforcements to the East. These were difficult decisions to take at the early stage of the war as Army had only a Brigade as reserve. Then, as the East was cleared after one year of fighting Army Commander kept on creating new Battalions as he had a very successful recruiting campaign. By the time the war ended, he had created and inducted three new Divisions and six Task Forces of Six Battalions in each into the Northern Theater. Induction of new Formations, their timings and locations of induction was purely done as per the Commander’s overall strategy. Commander’s Strategy was to open up more fronts as much as possible in wide frontages and to ensure that all the fronts contribute towards the each other’s tactical move forward as they move forward deep into enemy territory. Finally, the plan was to join up all fronts and form as encirclement on the worn off and withdrawing enemy. Commander aimed at engaging the terrorist where they were strong as against the Sun Tzu’s theory of attacking the enemy where he is weak because the aim was to draw the terrorist and get the maximum kills. Therefore, the General’s plan was to go for the kill during the first two years of the battle rather than capturing land as he new very well that the terrorists would pull out and vacate the ground little by little when they are worn off. This is what exactly happened at the end on the Eastern Coast, exactly according to the Commander’s overall plan. Commander wanted first to deny the Western Coast to the terrorist to ensure no movement of terrorists to take place between India and Sri Lanka and finally they can be eliminated on the Eastern Coast. When the Commander was inducting troops in a wide front especially facing difficult jungle terrain, the President and the Secretary Defence was never happy due to lack of knowledge on tactics adopted by the Infantry troops. In addition, during the first two years the President and the Secretary Defence used to become very impatient at times as troops were not moving forward fast but only concentrating on the kills. Secretary Defence had the habit of asking to induct Divisions from various places after talking to some junior officers in the field as if Commander could create Divisions over night. Commander had to handle these situations very patiently although their conduct was painful at times.

Personal Involvement of the Commander in Commanding the Operations down to Tactical Levels at All Times.

13. During this Operations, the Commander used to decide even down to Battalion deployments and Battalion Fronts. He directed Division and Brigade Commanders about the exact deployment on ground, down to Battalion level and monitored the progress of even four-man team deployments of all the front line Battalions. He also ensured that his Operation map had the entire deployment, including the deployment of four man teams are marked on his map, which was updated, twice daily in the morning and evening. Commander always directed the Division and Brigade Commanders about the Battalion maneuvers during the advance and consolidation phases. Especially during the times when Davison and Brigades were stuck unable, to breach the terrorists defences on ditches and bunds. During this time, the Commander used to direct and tell the GOC’s and Brigade Commanders where they should breach the bund /defences and how they should hold or consolidate to face the frequent daring counter attacks of the terrorists.

14. As the Commander personally got involved in the Command aspect the GOC’s, Brigade Commanders and Battalion Commanders used to take difficult and risky decisions and lead the troops from front with confidence. This involvement by the Commander directly with the field Commanders not only kept the Commander in the exact picture all the time but also ensured that there were no lapses or negligence in the part of the field Commanders who were also under pressure to complete the job given to them. During last stages of the war there were daring counter attacks launched by the terrorists on our front lines and there were occasions where they managed to breach our front lines and the GOC’s and Brigade Commanders were rendered unable to manage with their own resources. During such situations, the Army Commander used his personal influence, shifted Commander’s reserves of Commando and Special Forces troops and took appropriate action to take the situation under control. This system and relationship gave confidence to field commanders, as they knew that the Commander was right behind them to help during a crisis. Good example is the cease-fire granted by the president on 31st Jan and 01st Feb 2009 having succumbed to the external pressures and connived with the terrorist leaders like KP alias Kumaran Pathmanadan to grant a cease-fire at the height of the battle, against the advice of the Commander of the Army. Probably, this would have done to give respite for the terrorists to take their leaders away from the country. KP revealed this plan during a press interview lately and the terrorists launched a massive counter attack forcing the Army to pull back nearly four kilometers. At this stage, the Army lines began to fall and created a very disorganized situation with some GOC’s even loosing control. If the Army fell back another three kilo meters on that day it would not have been possible to hold on to our gains and it would have been the end of all what we have achieved after 2 1/2 years of fighting. Nevertheless, at this stage, the Army Commander managed to pullout the Commando and the Special Forces Troops who were operating deep inside the jungles and heli lift them to the area. Finally, the Commandos and the SF troops managed to block the terrorists counter attack almost at the last moment after fighting a bitter battle. Such was the involvement of the Commander of the Army who was virtually the Overall Operation Commander during the Elam War IV. It was hilarious that one day just one month before the Army finished the war, the Secretary Defence, asked the Army Commander why he was not getting Major General Jayasooriya who was only the holding Formation Commander in Vavunia to Command the overall offensive operation. This made the Secretary Defence’s dirty attempts clear to prevent any credit coming to the Army Commander for commanding the offensive personally. It was not only the offensive operation that the Commander had to personally monitor but even the holding operations in Vavunia, where regular terrorist activities were taking place had to be monitored by the Commander. As and when terrorist’s infiltrations and strikes took place in holding formations, especially in Vavunia, the Commander had to arrange Re-deployment of troops, as Jayasooriya lacked control and initiative to take control over any crisis situation. During the weekly visits by the Commander to Vavunia, all Offensive and Defensive Operations were reviewed; in addition to Commander’s daily Operation discussions with the Commanders of Offensive Formations, through the Operations Communication system and Operation maps. During this entire operation, the Commander of the Army did all Strategic and Operational level planning and the GOC’s and the Brigade Commanders did all tactical planning.

15. During the year 2008 and early months of 2009, the fighting was very heavy and use of support weapons by own troops were controlled largely to avoid civilian casualties where by rate of own casualties went up as a result. By this time, troops have been in heavy fighting in difficult terrain and weather conditions for nearly two years and due to unbearable strain, troops started deserting the Army leaving battalion strengths going down rapidly. At this stage, the Commander had to take the difficult decision of Court Marshaling the deserters and this prevented the troops deserting the Army. Subsequently, the ungrateful government after Court Martialing the Commander on spurious charges to take revenge from him for contesting for the Presidential Election, started saying that if the Army Commander could Court Martial 4000 soldiers, why the Commander cannot be Court Martialed. Such is the ungrateful behavior of the present Sri Lankan Government. The President and the Secretary Defence believes that Army need not to be credited for winning the war. Their conduct only indicated that they have no respect for those who won the war to save the country, but they are now honey mooning with the terrorist leaders.

16. In addition to the above, during the war Commander created a Mechanized Brigade for the Sri Lanka Army to get more mobility, mainly for the Infantry reserves. Armoured vehicles were operating giving intimate support to Infantry wherever the terrain permitted. Army Commander personally ensured that limited financial allocations for the Army were efficiently used and no corruption took place during the war. Ensuring that the logistics matters were attended to on time, made things easy for field Commanders and boosted the morale of the troops in the battlefield. As the troops realized that, the Commander was sincere and committed troops gave their best to the country and the Army with a sense of sacrifice.

17. The significant feature in the Ealam war IV that was personally directed by the Commander of the Army was it had no H-hrs and Start lines. However, it was continuous fighting day and night, 24 hrs in all weather in very difficult terrain for two years and nine months and all over in wide front lines, on flanks and in the rear without any respite. As much as the troops had no rest, the Commander and his Staff at AHQ also had no rest or breaks. Commander kept thmashas and other ceremonials to the minimum and followed all principles of efficient Command to the last letter. All in all, it was the new concepts and tactics along with hard work by every body, which paid devidence. Some politicians and officials in the Defence Ministry and even some in the Army, who were enjoying the booze and sex, never realized the stress on the Commander and field troops. Commander and the field troops had no private life for 3 years, Operations continued under tremendous constraints. At times in worst weather conditions and even with limitations on ammunition stock levels. Operations were totally launched as per the tactical requirements with least attention for auspicious timings or political agendas, etc. Finally, it was the soldier behind the weapon with dedication and ready to sacrifice with sound strategies, operation and tactical plans with exemplary leadership of the Commander of the Army, GOC’s and downward Commanders as well as the commitment of the Staff and Logistic troops made the victory a reality. 

To be continued ......