Winning the War - Sri Lankan Experience – 2

How we won the war in short.

 

by General GSC Fonseka (Retd) 

RWP, RSP, rcds, psc - former Commander of the Sri Lanka Army

(June 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) 8. The war was won mainly due to the strong command of the Commander at that time and the concept, tactics and training introduced by him in addition to his ability to identify and detail the correct people for the job, due to his very vast experience in offensive operations over a long time at various ranks. Commander not only selected the correct field commanders but also efficient staff officers who formed the backbone of his war machinery. Commander had to take the unpopular decision of side lining weak officers and create a Command Stream of selected officers, which was not a popular decision, which previous Commanders never wanted to take. This motivated the capable officers and the Army Commander streamlined this system after studying the existing systems in the Indian and the Pakistan Armies. These were the basic reasons for the reawakening of the Sri Lanka Army, which fought a loosing battle for over 30 years. Although the stupid political leadership and the Defence Secretary tries to claim the credit for the war victory and the cowardice present Army Commander has shown his willingness to give the credit to politicians, present President and the Secretary defence did not do anything more than previous heads of state did towards the war effort. It was nothing other than the Army Commander’s commitment and the dedication of troops under his command, which paved the way for the great victory.

9. The Sri Lanka Army’s contribution towards the war victory is unexplainable and may be about 90% of the total effort when compared with what the other services had to do. Nevertheless, the present cowardice Army Commander as he is ready to do anything to please politicians, will never be prepared to claim its due credit for the Army although the contributions of the Army could be highlighted as below.

     

	ARMY	NAVY	AF	POLICE	CIVIL DEF FORCE
OWN DEATHS	5,200	300 **	8	50	25
OWN WOUNDED	27,000	150	10	25	25
TERRORIST KILLED	23,000	200	1,500	50	20
TERRORIST CAPTURED	12,000	10	0	10	0

  **50% of the above Navy deaths were out of the battle area and was due to the suicide bomb explosion in Dambulla.

10. Even with above statistics the President or the Secretary Defence and even the present cowardice Army Commander will never want to say that the credit of the war victory should go to the Army because they know that General Fonseka directed the Army to Victory. The contribution of other services and all other citizens of the country, which helped the Army to achieve this victory against the LTTE, which was some years back, was only a dream to all Sri Lankans as well as the international community, which the Army always appreciates with gratitude.

Strategies, Tactics, Training and Command Techniques of the Sri Lanka Army

11. General Fonseka started preparing for the future battles when he was the Jaffna Commander in 2002. He knew one day when the war starts again he will be asked to Command the war the same way the authorities asked him to Command the Jaffna Defence, giving only two hours to take over when Jaffna was about to fall in 2000. As the Security Forces Commander Jaffna in 2002 and being No 5 in the overall Army seniority, the first thing the General did was ensuring that Jaffna defences are strengthened and kept ready for any future eventuality although, there was a cease fire in force. As the Chief of Staff (Army’s No 2) again in 2005, he visited Jaffna several occasions and every time he visited, he made it a point to walk along the defences, and to ensure that the defences are well prepared and could sustain any major terrorist attack. This readiness was the only reason, which helped the Army defences to sustain the massive terrorist assault at the beginning of Elam war IV in 2006. In 2002 as the Jaffna Commander, the General was trying to find out the tactics and strategies, which should be adopted by the Army if it had to go on the offensive again as against the previous tactics of the Army. The previous tactics adopted by the Army always confined them to the main road net work system and the terrorist had already worked out all the counter tactics, which they employed very successfully. General realized that if we are to avoid confining the movement of the Army astride main roads, the other alternative was to enter into the jungles and be prepared to do that in wide fronts to deny the enemy’s ability to use asymmetric tactics to hit the flanks and rear of the Army advance. In addition, the General realized that it was better to engage the terrorist’s strong points and to engage them in large numbers in many fronts to inflict more casualties on him rather than commit the Army for soft targets leaving the initiative to the terrorist. Therefore, the Army advance had to be prepared for jungle terrain in wider fronts and thin front lines. To meet this type of deployment according to the General’s thinking, the Army had to deploy in versatile small teams preferably of four man teams within the framework of eight man teams and platoons. As per this thinking of General, he introduced a new training concept for regular Infantry what he named as Special Infantry Operations Training. During this course of very strenuous and tough training, an Infantry soldier learned not only the Infantry skills within a four man team but also learned basic communications, field engineering, first aid, calling for air and artillery fire etc. At the end of the 6 1/2 months training course, the Infantry soldier was very confident of himself and became a fighting machine in the battlefield. With this advance training given to all Infantry soldiers, which even continued throughout Elam war IV, the Section Commanders and the Platoon Commanders became very confident to take on any difficult task in the battlefield. This included even going through enemy lines or fighting behind enemy lines and they really gave a tough time to the terrorists in the battlefield. The Infantry soldiers who had received this training together with a one month training leg in Commando and Special Forces Training Centres could even operate shoulder to shoulder with the Commando and Special Forces troops in the immediate distance beyond our own lines, up to about 5 km in to the enemy territory. This even gave a good back up for Commandos and SF operations and totally put the terrorist’s defensive deployment paralyzed.

To be continued ..... 

Part One : Winning the War - Sri Lankan Experience – I