Making the government’s victory more meaningful

by Jehan Perera


(March 22, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The extent of the government’s victory at the recently concluded local government elections would have surprised even its supporters. Prior to the elections there were voices even within the government leadership expressing their concerns about easing the economic burden on the masses of people. As a result there were anxieties about erosion in the government’s support base. The inability of the government to even fulfil its promises of a salary increase was believed to have shaken the confidence of the people in the government’s word.

However, the government won 205 of the 234 local authorities for which elections were held, making a virtual clean sweep, except in the north and parts of the east. The scale of the government’s victory belied the doubts expressed about the continuation of the government’s popularity a year into its latest term of office. These doubts motivated the government to take maximum precautions to ensure victory. These measures included postponing elections in the urban areas most affected by cost of living issues until later in the year.

The government left nothing to chance in achieving its victory. The state media was once again utilized to its maximum, drawing criticism from even the Election Commissioner, and also from the opposition parties and election monitors. Both during the election campaign and afterwards the Election Commissioner expressed his dissatisfaction at the manner in which state resources such as media and transport had been used and abused. In their post election statements, election monitors noted that even on the day of elections the state media had carried positive stories of the government’s development programmes in violation of election laws.

The government’s election campaign also made much use of the fact that it had prepared a massive development programme for the benefit of local level people. It also made the point that those local government bodies that were with the opposition would not be in a privileged position to obtain the plentitude of resources that the central government could make available for development purposes. They were also told that obtaining resources from the centre was contingent upon voting for the government. The electorate was left to draw their own conclusions from this state of affairs.

President’s populartiy

However, the misuse of state resources for election purposes is not a new phenomenon or one that is uniquely practiced by the present government. It has been practised by previous governments including those that lost despite their abuse. The threat to withhold state resources to opposition-controlled local bodies is also not a new phenomenon that can explain the government’s victory. Previous Sri Lankan experience has shown that once an electorate has decided to vote against a government there is little that can change that decision. On this occasion there were two other important factors at work in the victory notched up by the government.

One was the disunity and fragmentation of the opposition. The largest opposition party continues to be wracked internally by a leadership struggle. The inability of the UNP to resolve its leadership problem is a negative indication of its potential to win the confidence of the electorate in its ability to provide alternative leadership to the country. In addition, the opposition parties are also divided one against the other. This has prevented the opposition from having a leadership that is a rallying point to the electorate. In the absence of a single dominant leader, unified team leadership or even an interim leader, the opposition failed to make itself a viable alternative to the government.

By way of contrast, the most important reason behind the government’s repeated victories by large margins has undoubtedly the dominance and popularity of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. It was because the government was aware of this advantage that it utilized the President to its maximum in the campaign period. The President devoted the last fortnight of the election campaign to tirelessly conduct a whirlwind election campaign amongst the grassroots electorate. There are reports that he even defied the concerns of his security personnel in venturing forth to mingle amongst the people who came to attend his election meetings.

The President’s popularity with the general population is not only on accord of his considerable personal charm and imposing physical presence. It is not for nothing he has been compared to a king. The President’s popularity is also due to the popular conviction that it was his undaunted approach to carrying out the war against the LTTE that finally ensured the defeat of the forces of terrorism and separatism. Whether in urban areas, where people are more affected by the cost of living, or in the rural areas where people are more swayed by nationalist sentiment, there is a common feeling of gratitude and even reverence of the President’s war time leadership.

Government failure

The President’s leadership that ended the menace of the LTTE and its terrorism would be the determining factor in explaining the government’s ability to mobilize the ethnic majority electorate in particular. On the other hand, while the government virtually swept the board in electorates where the Sinhalese majority was dominant, it failed to win in the north of the country where the Tamil minority is dominant. In the Tamil majority areas of the north, the winner was the Tamil National Alliance and not the government or its allies. It is ironic that the TNA won more local government bodies than did the rest of the opposition parties combined.

The government’s failure to win in the north would point to the need to reconsider its political strategy with regard to the people living there. So far the government has been taking the position that it can win the political support of the northern electorate by concentrating on economic infrastructure that it hopes will lead to rapid economic development. In addition the government has sought to promote those Tamil politicians who are willing to cooperate with it, including crossovers from the opposition, former LTTE leaders and former Tamil militants. But the most recent election results, as well as previous electoral verdicts, suggest that these strategies are not successful ones.

Instead of focusing on economic development and trying to build up its own Tamil leadership for the north, the government needs to consider addressing issues of political rights of the Tamil people in consultation with the elected representatives of the Tamil people. This is the course of action urged by both the Indian government and civil society organizations active in peace building and reconciliation after the war. A few months ago, Indian leaders who visited Sri Lanka pushed for a Structured Dialogue between the government and TNA, which both parties agreed to do. But nothing seems to have come out of this dialogue.

The results of the local government elections, and the evidence of continuing polarization between north and south, is indicative of a problem that ought to be addressed sooner rather than later. The TNA has claimed that the victories it obtained at the local government election in the north demonstrate that the Tamil people continue to demand a federal system of government. Providing a leadership that heals the wounds of war and transforms the structures of governance into ones that meet the aspirations of both the ethnic majority and minorities is the continuing challenge for President Rajapaksa and his government.

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