Solution to Jaffna violence within reach

A roadside Hindu Temple in Jaffna, Sri Lanka

by Jehan Perera

(February 01, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The prevailing situation in Jaffna has received considerable attention in Parliament and the media. The debate has centered around the alleged increase in lawlessness and impunity in the peninsula. Some 24 killings have been reported in the past two months in addition to robberies, incidents of housebreaking and other crime. Most of these incidents have taken place outside of Jaffna town and in the more interior parts of the peninsula. Government spokespersons have by and large hotly denied that any situation of crisis exists and cited comparable statistics of crime in other parts of the country. Political analysts have also pointed to the forthcoming local government elections as being a possible factor in the sudden spiking of violence.

Those who visit Jaffna either for business, pilgrimage and tourism may be inclined to agree with the government description of Jaffna as a success story of post-war normalization. There have been a substantial number of visitors to Jaffna since the end of the war, surpassing the three million mark if government figures are correct, and hardly any incidents of violence with regard to them. There are visible signs of economic recovery in Jaffna, with new shops and shopping complexes, and several financial institutions competing with each other for the savings of the people. The visibly large presence of the Sri Lankan armed forces in Jaffna does not hinder the free movement of people and economic goods into and across the peninsula.

However, the situation in Jaffna is different from other parts of the country on at least two counts. No other part of the country has such a heavy concentration of military personnel. Jaffna was the most heavily defended part of the war-affected north and east during the three decade long war with the LTTE. This was both on account of its concentration of population and its status as the future capital of an independent state of Tamil Eelam. Even when the LTTE was at the height of its powers in the period following 1999 and expanded its territorial hold over vast tracts of the north and east, its inability to secure Jaffna was a major setback to its dream of a separate state. Nearly two years after the defeat and elimination of the LTTE, the size of the Sri Lankan security forces in Jaffna remains undiminished.

Armed Groups

The consolidation of the military presence in Jaffna after the war has been one of the more unexpected features of post-war Sri Lanka. There was a reasonable anticipation that in the aftermath of the war, the government would wish to downscale the armed forces in the former war zones, if only to save on the economic burden of maintaining them at full strength. The process of winning the hearts and minds of the people would also have led to the belief that the role of the armed forces would diminish in a time of peace and yield to the imperatives of democratic and civilian government. During the presidential election of January 2010, President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his rival former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka both appeared to be competing with each other in this regard.

One promise both presidential contestants made was to make major reductions in the presence of high security zones. This is a promise honoured in the breach. Little has changed on the ground in Jaffna although much changed in politics after the Presidential election. The other unchanging feature of Jaffna is the prevalence of armed groups associated with the government. The chief amongst these is the EPDP which also functions as a mainstream political party not only in Jaffna but in other parts of the north and east as well. EDPD leader Douglas Devananda survived numerous assassination attempts by the LTTE. During the years of the war, the EPDP played an invaluable role for successive governments in being their eyes and ears on the ground, in addition to undertaking tasks that the regular armed forces could not.

The thoroughness of the military conquest of the LTTE has been shown by the absence of any terrorist attack or violence in the post-war phase. The recent terrorist strike on an airport in the Russian capital highlights the Sri Lankan success. It is likely that the anti subversive and intelligence gathering role played by parties and armed Tamil groups has contributed in no small way to the prevention of similar attacks in Sri Lanka. The government can conceivably justify its security policy, including the deployment of vast numbers of military personnel in the north and east, and the use of armed Tamil groups, by referring to its success in preventing any post-war terrorist strike. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of those killed in recent days in Jaffna are those who have had some association with the LTTE or with Tamil nationalism.

Civilian Rule

The restoration of normal conditions to Jaffna after the war has therefore been accompanied by its continued militarization. The Sri Lankan armed forces continue to play the dominant role in governance to the exclusion of the civilian administration. The emergence of the issue of the national anthem being sung in Sinhala and not in Tamil in the north and east can be attributed to the militarization of government in those parts of the country. As the Sri Lankan armed forces are almost fully Sinhala in ethnic composition, it is natural that they would feel more comfortable having the national anthem sung in the Sinhala language even if most of the Tamil people they rule over do not know that language.

On the other hand, the conduct of the Sri Lankan military has been exemplary in the main. The higher ranks of the officer corps have earned praise from ordinary civilians and also from the international community. The Jaffna army commander Major General Mahinda Hathurusinghe has won an international peace award, the Gusi peace prize from the Philippines. Nevertheless it is a difficult prospect for the people of Jaffna to be satisfied with the present situation in the peninsula. In this democratic age, no group of people would wish to be governed by military personnel, especially those from a different ethnic nationality. Nor will they wish to be intimidated by armed personnel even if they are from their own community and working on behalf of the government.

It is necessary that the government should address the dilemma it faces. On the one hand, having gone through a war that lasted nearly three decades and almost divided the country, the government would not wish to relax its security measures too soon. Although two years may be a lot of time from the perspective of individuals who have suffered and seek to put the past behind them, two years is a short time in the history of a country. The absence of progress with regard to finalizing a political solution that would address the roots of the ethnic conflict is a sign that the government is still not prepared to trust the democratic process. The government’s apprehension is that the Tamil parties will demand too much which cannot be conceded at this time.

On the other hand, ensuring the security of the country by relying primarily on militarization of the Tamil-majority areas of the north and east is likely to hopelessly alienate the Tamil people. It will not win their hearts and minds. In this democratic age it is ultimately the willing consent of the people that is necessary for governance that is peaceful, successful and productive. In the case of the Tamil people of the north and east, and especially Jaffna which is the civilisational capital of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka, it requires ensuring that they are governed by those they willingly vote for, and not by those who coerce them with their guns.

LLRC Recommendation

In recent days there have been two positive developments in regard to fostering peace and reconciliation in the country. One is the dialogue between the government and TNA, which is the main Tamil political party. This dialogue has received encouragement from India. The visit to the United States by President Mahinda Rajapaksa last week may also have included a component relating to the government’s receptiveness to political engagement with the Tamil parties to ward off international pressures on it due to war crimes allegations. He other positive development is with regard to the government’s responsiveness to the recommendations of the Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation.

The interim recommendations of the Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation appointed by the President are significant in relation to the situation in Jaffna. There are some who see the LLRC as simply the government’s answer to the demands by sections of the international community for accountability on human rights issues during the war. However, the LLRC has a larger purpose. This is to chart out for the government and for Sri Lankan society a vision of what the future should be, based on the lessons of the past. The LLRC has been meeting a wider cross section of the people and intellectuals than any comparable body in recent times. It is composed of eminent persons with a range of expertise and representing all ethnic nationalities.

The government recently accepted one of the LLRC’s interim recommendations for implementation. This was with regard to the issue of investigating the cases against LTTE suspects without delaying them further. In a similar spirit the government needs to take on board the LLRC’s recommendation that all armed groups be disarmed. This could be the commencement of a new phase in the relationship between the government and the people of Jaffna. The forthcoming local government elections can also provide a political motivation to the government to do what is right and just and politically advantageous.