[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]
05. 23.10.2003: President demands removal of chief monitor, but it is not clear how far she wants to push matter
10/23/2003 14:07
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001845
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10-24-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PHSA, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: President demands removal of chief monitor,
but it is not clear how far she wants to push matter
Refs: (A) SA/INS-Colombo telecon 10/23/03
- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 231407Z Oct 03
- (C) Colombo 1826, and previous
(U) Classified by Charge´ d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga has requested
that Norway remove the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) chief. In making this demand, the president
complained that the SLMM had lost "objectivity." While
the GoN reviews next steps, the SLMM is continuing its
operations. The GSL is balking at removing the SLMM
chief and we are not sure how far Kumaratunga wants to
push the matter. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) PRESIDENT LASHES OUT: President Kumaratunga
has requested that Norway remove Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) chief Tryggve Teleffsen. The president
made this demand in a letter that was sent to the
Norwegian government. The full text of the letter was
not made public, but some of its contents have been
leaked to the press. In making her demand, the
president was cited as having "serious doubts" about
Teleffsen´s and his organization´s impartiality and
objectivity. The president went on to assert that the
continuation of the ceasefire "within acceptable levels
of national security requires effective, objective and
impartial monitoring of the truce," but that Teleffsen´s
conduct, when compared to his predecessor, had been
"quite unsatisfactory." Teleffsen, a retired Norwegian
major general, took over as chief monitor in March,
replacing Trond Furuhovde, another former Norwegian
military official.
3. (C) In her letter, the president also specifically
complained that the SLMM had recently acted to prevent
the navy from intercepting a reported Tiger arms
resupply ship operating off the northeast coast (see
Ref C). The president directly accused the SLMM of
either deliberately trying to tip off the Tigers via a
phone call so that their boat could escape, or acting in
a highly negligent manner. Per Ref C, Mission was told
by the Defense Minister that the SLMM´s actions in this
matter were inadvertent (see more below).
4. (C) GSL/NORWEGIAN RESPONSE: The Sri Lankan
government is balking at supporting the president´s
demand. Locked in a tense cohabitation situation with
the president and her party, unnamed members of the
United National Party (UNP) governing coalition have
been quoted in the press as warning the president that
her efforts to remove Tellefsen are putting the peace
process at risk.
5. (C) Mission´s understanding is that the Norwegian
government is reviewing next steps, and has not yet
responded to the president´s letter. Charge´ called
Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar early October 24.
Brattskar would not comment on the phone, but invited
Charge over to discuss the matter later in the day.
Timo Ekdahl, the SLMM´s acting spokesperson and chief of
operations, told polchief that the SLMM was waiting for
the Norwegian government to decide what to do in
response to the president´s demand. As far as the SLMM
was concerned, he added, it was "business as usual,"
however, with no changes in personnel for the group or
adjustment in its operations at this time.
6. (C) CONVERSATION WITH TELLEFSEN: At a recent
function, the Ambassador briefly spoke to Tellefsen
about the October 16 incident off the northeast coast.
(The conversation took place before the demand for his
ouster). Confirming what we were told by the Defense
Minister (see Ref C), Tellefsen admitted that his office
had made a mistake by contacting the Tigers and asking
them about the report that one of their ships was
operating off the northeast coast. There was no
intention to tip off the Tigers, he underscored. That
said, Tellefsen said the matter had been badly handled
and that the SLMM duty officer had failed to brief him
on the matter in time.
7. (C) COMMENT: We are not sure how far President
Kumaratunga wants to push this matter. She has a
propensity for making huge issues of matters and then
dropping them. Given her track record, it is very
possible that she is simply trying to score points with
her political base, which is significantly more
skeptical toward the peace process than the general
public (and happens to be gathering today in Colombo for
a big rally). If the president presses this matter, it
will become a real cohabitation donnybrook, however,
with the president pitted against the prime minister
over which of them has power over foreign policy. The
president legally does, but the prime minister has
effective day-to-day control and would be loath to give
into her on this issue. At the same time, disruptions
in the SLMM´s operations would be highly problematic for
the ceasefire and the larger peace process, especially
in light of the likely delivery of the LTTE
counterproposals in a week or so. There is no doubt
that it would be best for all concerned if the president
backs down and soon. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
06. 8.5.2003: Tigers meet Japanese envoy and are noncommittal about returning to talks
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000773 SIPDIS ISLAMABAD PLS PASS TO SA A/S ROCCA DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, INR/NESA NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-08-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers meet Japanese envoy and are noncommittal about returning to talks
Refs: (A) OpsCenter-Colombo 05/08/03 telecon - (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 070711z May 03 - (C) Colombo 764, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Japanese envoy Akashi met May 7 with Tiger leader Prabhakaran and pressed the LTTE to return to the peace talks. Akashi also gave the Tigers one week to make a final decision on whether they will attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. Prabhakaran was noncommittal, although he indicated the Tigers would be cooperative if the GSL met their long-standing demands re assistance and security. At this point, it´s not clear what the Tigers will do, but they seem to have climbed down somewhat from their previous hard-line positioning. END SUMMARY
2. (U) MEETING PRABHAKARAN: A Japanese government delegation led by Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran on May
7. The meeting took place in the LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi in northern Sri Lanka. A large Japanese team, which included Ambassador to Sri Lanka Seiichiro Otsuka, participated in the meeting. Visiting London-based LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham, political chief S.P. Thamilchelvam, and J. Maheswaran, an Australia-based LTTE official, also attended the meeting.
3. (C) JAPANESE READOUT: Ambassador Otsuka provided Ambassador Wills a readout of the Kilinochchi talks early May
8. Otsuka said the two-hour meeting was ""very cordial and not at all confrontational."" In terms of substance, he noted that while it was ""good"", it was not ""conclusive"" in that the LTTE had not agreed to return to the peace talks and to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. Otsuka noted that Akashi had pressed these issues twice and received essentially noncommittal responses both times. Akashi had also pressed Prabhakaran on other issues, such as human rights. In addition, he had urged the Tigers to return to the Sub-Committee for Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN). (Note: The Tigers pulled out of this joint committee late last month.)
4. (C) Otsuka said Prabhakaran, who rarely meets with foreigners, listened intently to all of Akashi´s points. In his comments, Prabhakaran stressed that progress had not been made in the delivery of humanitarian and developmental assistance because the SIHRN committee was ""not efficient."" He also complained that the North/East Reconstruction Fund (NERF) was not yet operating and funding projects. Prabhakaran went on to touch on long- standing LTTE concerns about Tamil displaced persons related to the issue of the military presence in Jaffna District (see more below in Para 8). Despite his noncommittal reaction, Prabhakaran did not fully discount the possibility that the Tigers would eventually come back to the talks and decide to attend the Tokyo meeting. He did, however, make very clear that there had to be progress on issues of Tiger concern before the group would do so. Akashi emphasized that the Tigers had one week to decide whether or not they were coming to Tokyo.
5. (C) Sharing a small vignette, Otsuka related that the Japanese side had brought along its own interpreter to the meeting. (Note: Most visitors in meetings with the LTTE rely on the group´s interpreter who is named ""George."" George has often been accused of spinning his translations.) After the meeting, the GoJ interpreter told Otsuka that at one point Balasingham had said, ""We suspended the peace talks to get concessions."" (Note: This statement tends to highlight the tactical nature of the LTTE´s recent moves.) In another vignette, Otsuka commented that Prabhakaran had told him during the more social atmosphere of the lunch following the meeting that his son, Charles Anthony, was studying martial arts. A lively discussion on the matter ensued when Otsuka noted that he had a brown belt in karate. (Note: Charles Anthony, who is believed to be in London, is approximately 17 years old. Prabhakaran is believed to have another son and one daughter with him at his key base in Mullaitivu in northeast Sri Lanka.)
6. (U) (((Note: In other peace process news: early May 8 the pro-LTTE website ""TamilNet"" posted an article on the Akashi-Prabhakaran meeting complete with several photos. The article was relatively upbeat and its substance largely jibed with Otsuka´s readout. The article noted that at the close of the meeting Prabhakaran had given Akashi a ""Tamil Eelam"" map and insignia.)))
7. (SBU) (((Note: Following up Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen´s recent visit and the latest efforts by the Japanese, Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim is slated to meet Balasingham in the Wanni on May
8. Solheim´s brief is believed to be identical to Helgesen´s and Akashi´s, i.e., try to convince the Tigers to come back to the talks and attend the June donors conference.)))
8. (C) (((Note: In another peace process development, Defense Minister Marapana announced May 7 that the GSL was planning a large-scale reorganization of its forces in Jaffna District. The idea behind the reorganization would be to amalgamate forces in Jaffna, and, thus, permit more civilian land use. The plan is clearly meant to appease the Tigers, who have long claimed that the military´s bases in Jaffna - especially the so- called ""high security zones"" there - are too large. See DATT´s Septel re the GSL proposal and the military´s reaction to it.)))
9. (C) COMMENT: The Norwegians and the Japanese have certainly been giving it their all in working to convince the Tigers to return to the negotiating track. There seems to be some movement by the Tigers in that they appear to have climbed down somewhat from their previous hard-line positioning. The group, for example, has re-opened lines of communication and adopted a less shrill tone. In fact, the U.S. can take some credit for this shift, as the Tigers´ move toward a more moderate posture dates from their response to the U.S. statement on their pullout from the talks. (Note: In other potentially positive news, we understand that FCO officials had a good give-and-take with Balasingham on May 4 just before he came to Sri Lanka. In their previous attempt to meet with him, Balasingham had rudely told them he did not want to talk.) All that said, it´s still not clear what the Tigers plan to do and whether they will be back in the ballgame soon. END COMMENT.
10. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
07. 23.6.2006: Norwegians running out of steam
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001047
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, NO
SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS RUNNING OUT OF STEAM, EU MONITORS TO
LEAVE IN 30 DAYS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.5 (d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Tigers insist monitors from
EU-members states must leave, give 30-day window
for transition. Future of the monitoring mission
now extremely problematic, Norwegians will discuss
it with other Nordics on June 28. Tigers upset
about their treatment at Colombo airport while
returning from Oslo, which Norwegians felt
violated personal promise from President Rajapakse.
Tigers warn Government to stop air and artillery
attacks or face offensive action. Norwegians
have no plans for future peace initiatives at
this point, will concentrate on future of SLMM.
Norwegians more depressed than we have ever seen
them. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed
Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission June 22. Brattskar had
been to LTTE headquarters in Kilinocchi the
previous day to discuss with the Tigers the future
of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM),
following the Tiger decision to no longer accept
monitors from EU nations after the EU listed the
LTTE as a terrorist organization. Brattskar said
that he had argued strenuously with the Tigers to
continue with the SLMM as currently constituted,
with nationals from non-EU Norway and Iceland, and
from EU members Sweden, Finland and Denmark.
Brattskar¥s interlocutor, LTTE Political Head
Tamilchelvan, adamantly refused, saying that the
"leadership had decided."
3. (C) Brattskar told the Tigers this would have
"immediate and dramatic consequences" for the work
of the SLMM. He asked for a six month transition
period. The Tigers would only agree to one month.
They agreed to start that one-month clock ticking
on June 28, when the SLMM contributor states will
meet in Oslo.
4. (C) Brattskar said that the next steps would
need to be discussed with the other SLMM members
and the Government of Sri Lanka. As mentioned
above, the Nordic countries would meet in Oslo on
June 28. He impressed upon the Tigers the need to
guarantee the safety and security of the monitors,
and also of their local Sri Lankan employees.
Brattskar said that the LTTE demand did not
require amending the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA),
since the relevant paragraph said only that SLMM
members would be "recruited from Nordic
countries." The two sides had agreed on which
countries in discussions after the CFA was signed.
5. (C) Brattskar said the future of the SLMM is
now uncertain. Norway and Iceland supply 20 of
the current 57 members. A 20-member mission would
simply not be able to do the job, placing the
ceasefire under greater strain. Recruiting new
countries acceptable to both parties to join the
mission would be problematic at best. "Who would
want to sign up?" in the current conditions,
Brattskar asked.
6. (C) Brattskar also said that the LTTE was very
upset about the way their team was treated at the
Colombo Airport when they returned from the recent
Oslo meeting. They were made to wait in the
public arrival hall for several hours while they
were processed through immigration and customs.
Brattskar said that this was a violation of a
promise that President Rajapaksa had made
personally to Minister Eric Solheim, which in turn
had persuaded the Tigers to attend the Oslo
COLOMBO 00001047 002 OF 002
meeting. (Note: where they refused to meet with
the Government.) It was acceptable to make the
Tigers go through normal entry procedures,
Brattskar said; what was not acceptable was to
jeopardize their security by having them standing
in the midst of a large crowd for several hours.
The GSL had also tried to back away from its
commitment to return the LTTE delegation to
Kilinocchi by helicopter, but had eventually given
in after intense Norwegian pressure. Brattskar
doubted that the Tigers would agree in the future
to travel through the airport, making the
logistics of any future meetings even more
troublesome.
7. (C) On other matters, Brattskar said that the
Tigers continue to deny that they were responsible
for the recent bus attack, but had asked him to
pass a message to the Government that if air and
artillery attacks continued, the Tigers would
"take offensive action."
8. (C) Brattskar concluded that Norway has to
continue as facilitator, but had no conclusions
for the coming months except that they have a big
problem with the SLMM. They don¥t see any
initiatives to pursue in the current climate.
Brattskar himself was leaving the next day for a
month¥s leave in Norway--the longest he had been
away from the island in his four-year stint as
Ambassador.
9. (C) COMMENT: The Norwegians or at least
Ambassador Brattskar, seem to have run out of
steam, and appear resigned to go into a passive
mode while they sort out the future of the SLMM.
This may be a short-term downturn while they
gather their breath, but we have never seen them
so negative in three years here.
LUNSTEAD
08. 20.12.2002: Import of radio equipment for Tamil Tigers sparks controversy for GSL
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 002337 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT, EUR/NB; NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 12-20-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, ECPS, CE, NO, External Relations, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Import of radio equipment for Tamil Tigers sparks controversy for GSL and Norwegian facilitators Ref: Colombo 1891 (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The recent import of radio equipment for the LTTE has stirred controversy, with critics asserting that the government and the Norwegian facilitators have gone too far in pleasing the Tigers. In response, the GSL says it assisted in the import of the equipment in exchange for the LTTE´s agreement to work within broadcasting regulations. The Norwegians underscore that they were working to further the peace process at GSL request. The incident has left a bad taste in everyone´s mouth. At the same time, it is important not to miss the fact that this was an instance where the Tigers paid heed to government regulations, something they never did in the past. END SUMMARY. Import of Radio Equipment -------------------------
2. (SBU) The recent import of radio equipment into Sri Lanka for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has stirred controversy. The equipment in question was brought into Colombo harbor last month in a shipping container. Because the consignment was for the Norwegian Embassy, no duty was paid. The Norwegian Embassy has confirmed that it turned the consignment over to the GSL´s Peace Secretariat, which then passed the items over to the LTTE with the assistance of the Defense Ministry. At some point in this process, the LTTE´s radio station, the ""Voice of the Tigers,"" was legalized by the GSL as a private entity and given permission to broadcast.
3. (SBU) (((Note: It is not exactly clear what sort of radio equipment the LTTE was importing, but it is believed to have consisted of items that would allow the Voice of the Tigers radio to upgrade its FM capability. At this time, the Voice of the Tigers has very limited FM and short-wave capabilities, allowing the station to be dimly heard in parts of the north and east -- See Reftel for additional background. Some press reports state that the FM-upgrade equipment cost about USD 90,000 and that the equipment was bought in Singapore. It is not clear what range the new equipment will allow the Voice of the Tigers to have. The Indian government reportedly has expressed concerns to the GSL that the equipment will allow LTTE broadcasts to reach Tamil Nadu. End Note.))) Controversy Erupts ------------------
4. (SBU) When word of the equipment import leaked out, critics pounced on the GSL and the Norwegians accusing them of going too far to please the Tigers. The radical, Sinhalese chauvinist Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party was particularly vociferous, asserting that the government was helping sponsor the LTTE´s ""propaganda"" campaign. (Note: Many Sri Lankans are allergic to the mere mention of the Voice of the Tigers: the station has broadcast some pretty bloodcurdling stuff in the past, including salutes to the LTTE´s terrorist acts.) Some newspapers criticized the government for undertaking the import effort in ""secret."" Norway was particularly hard hit, with critics asserting (in wildly inaccurate fashion -- see below) that the GoN -- acting of its volition -- was importing equipment for the LTTE in an effort to save the group from paying duties to the legitimate government. GSL, Norwegian Response -----------------------
5. (C) In response to the flak, the government stressed that it was allowing the import of the equipment because the LTTE had agreed to accede to GSL broadcasting regulations. Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, the chief of the Peace Secretariat, told us that this was an important concession by the LTTE because for the first time the group had conceded that its radio station should follow GSL-set procedures like all other stations in the country. In any case, Goonetilleke noted, the Tigers could have tried to import the equipment illegally, as they have done in the past. If they had done so successfully, the government would not have had any leverage over their broadcasting capabilities, which it now has to some degree.
6. (C) For their part, the Norwegians, who have largely kept mum in public, have told us that they were only working to further the peace process at GSL request. Norwegian Ambassador Westborg told us that the Sri Lankan government had specifically requested his Embassy´s assistance several months ago. The GoN only agreed to help if the equipment was provided to the Peace Secretariat -- and not directly to the LTTE. Press reporting to the effect that the Norwegian government was out to assist the LTTE by undermining GSL authority was an outright falsehood, he emphasized.
COMMENT -------
7. (C) The incident has left a bad taste in everyone´s mouth. The Norwegians, who have come under so much criticism from anti-peace process elements, feel particularly aggrieved at the charges. The GSL admits that it did a poor job of communicating what it was doing. This failure, in turn, helped set up the Norwegians for criticism. Overall, while the incident did not really do too much damage to the peace process, its handling provided skeptics of the process some ammunition. At the same time, it is important not to miss the fact that this was an instance where the Tigers paid heed to government regulations, something the group never did before the peace process was launched. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
09. 1.8.2002: GSL minister cautiously optimistic on direction of peace process based on meeting with Tiger spokesman
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001422 SIPDIS NOFORN DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL; NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 08-01-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, PREL, PARM, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: GSL minister cautiously optimistic on direction of peace process based on meeting with Tiger spokesman
Refs: (A) Oslo 1742; (B) Colombo 1391 (U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C/NF)
Summary: In a July 31 meeting, Milinda Moragoda, a senior GSL minister, provided the Ambassador a detailed readout of his recent talks with Anton Balasingham, the spokesman of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The atmospherics were excellent, he related. On substantive issues, productive discussions were held on many topics, including the scope and timing of proposed negotiations, and ceasefire pact implementation. The LTTE side also sounded out Moragoda about the PM´s recent visit to the U.S. Overall, the London meeting seems to have provided a solid foundation for next steps in the peace process. End Summary. ----------------- Meeting in London -----------------
2. (C/NF) In a July 31 meeting with the Ambassador, Milinda Moragoda, a senior GSL minister, provided a detailed readout of his July 27 talks with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE spokesman. The meeting took place at the Norwegian Embassy in London. Moragoda was the only GSL representative present. Balasingham and his (Australian) wife, Adele, represented the LTTE. Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, Special Envoy Erik Solheim, Norwegian Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jon Westborg, and Norwegian MFA official Lisa Golden were also present at the meeting as observers. (Note: Ref A contains Golden´s readout of the meeting. Her remarks track with Moragoda´s.) --------------------- Positive Atmospherics ---------------------
3. (C/NF) Moragoda said the atmospherics of the meeting were excellent. The Tigers had requested the meeting and they seemed to want to make it work. Balasingham gave the impression that he wanted to settle differences. Throughout the meeting, he seemed ""sincere, amiable, flexible."" He was much easier to deal with and less dogmatic than Moragoda had thought he would be. He was even ""disarming."" At one point in the discussion, for example, Balasingham jokingly (and accurately) used the term ""extortion"" in referring to his organization´s so-called ""taxation"" policies. It was possible, Moragoda allowed, that Balasingham was being ""duplicitous"" and ""putting on an act"" in order to gain some sort of advantage in the talks. If that was the case, Balasingham did his best to hide any such ulterior motives. ---------------------------- Discussion re Proposed Talks ----------------------------
4. (C/NF) On matters of substance, the talks were quite productive, according to Moragoda. He noted that there was a brief discussion of when proposed face-to-face high-level negotiations between the GSL and the LTTE might be held. Moragoda´s general impression was that the talks might kick off at some point in September or October, but it was still not clear and there had been no agreement on the issue. (Note: The two sides have already agreed that the venue of the proposed talks will be Thailand.)
5. (C/NF) The two sides also discussed the scope of possible negotiations. Balasingham seemed intent that the proposed talks focus primarily on the setting up of an interim council for the north and east, as opposed to focusing on a final settlement of the dispute. He specifically said the LTTE did not want ""countless lawyers"" being involved in the talks. That would only complicate matters. Moragoda replied that the GSL wanted all issues to be on the table. He also told Balasingham, however, that it would be possible for certain issues -- including the interim council -- to be dealt with more quickly than other, so-called ""core issues."" Balasingham seemed relieved to hear this. (Note: Moragoda told the Ambassador that Ambassador Westborg had mentioned to him the best way forward regarding an interim administration may be to revive the ""north-east council"" structure. The council -- a product of the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord -- is no longer active, but is already codified in the 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution. End Note.)
6. (C/NF) In an interesting aside on the LTTE´s long- term objectives, Balasingham told Moragoda that the Tigers were mulling over ideas such as ""internal autonomy, federalism and confederalism."" Moragoda thought that this was positive in that Balasingham had not mentioned the word ""separatism."" He admitted that he was not sure what the LTTE might mean by these terms, however, as they were all subject to various interpretations. -------------------- Other Issues Covered --------------------
7. (C/NF) Moragoda said there was also a constructive give-and-take on a wide variety of additional subjects related to the peace process, including: -- Ceasefire Accord Implementation: Balasingham stressed that it was important that the Sri Lankan government adhere to the terms of the February ceasefire accord. He indicated that the matter was not a ""deal breaker,"" however -- the LTTE just wanted to see more progress. In particular, the Sri Lankan military had to do a better job of vacating temples and schools. In addition, the LTTE was concerned about the ""high security zones,"" the large swaths of the north and east currently controlled by the Sri Lankan military. These areas should be made smaller, so that Tamil civilians had increased access to public lands. Moragoda replied that the government would look into the issue, although the zones were technically permitted under the ceasefire accord. -- Sea-related Issues: Balasingham told Moragoda that the LTTE was concerned that Sri Lanka Naval (SLN) vessels were transiting too close to LTTE shore-based positions off the Mullaitivu region on Sri Lanka´s northeast coast. LTTE guns had a range of up to 10 miles in that area. It was important that the SLN not spark an incident. The LTTE had also recently purchased trawlers in India and was using them to fish. The GSL should allow this activity. Moragoda replied that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) should look into these issues; that was what the group was there for. The issue of transit by LTTE boats was also discussed. The LTTE had backed off its formerly hard-line stand. It now seemed willing to accede to a compromise formulation developed by the SLMM that would allow less than fully armed LTTE cadre to travel via LTTE boats. LTTE boats could also carry a specified amount of ammunition for their fixed guns, per the SLMM proposal. -- LTTE Cadre Held Prisoner: Balasingham also requested that LTTE personnel held prisoner by the government be released as soon as possible. Moragoda said he would look into the matter. (Note: Balasingham estimated that the GSL held hundreds of its cadre prisoner. Moragoda said he had been told by GSL contacts that the number was less than a hundred.) -- LTTE request re Banking: On behalf of LTTE financial chief ""Thamil Enthy,"" Balasingham requested that the government open up banks that would provide loans to farmers and others living in Tiger-controlled areas. This would help increase economic activity in the area. Moragoda told Balasingham he would review this. He noted to the Ambassador that he was checking on whether a defunct GSL-backed micro-credit bank could be revived in order to focus on this matter. -- Muslim Issues: Balasingham complained that Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauf Hakeem had been asked by the LTTE to keep in touch with LTTE eastern commander Karuna. Hakeem, however, continued to demand that his only LTTE interlocutor be the group´s leader, V. Prabhakaran. This was a problem and was leading to a breakdown in LTTE-SLMC relations. In fact, the LTTE was increasingly avoiding the SLMC altogether and dealing directly with other Muslim groups. ------------------- Query re U.S. Visit -------------------
8. (C/NF) The LTTE side also wanted to know about Prime Minister Wickremesinghe´s July 21-25 visit to the U.S., with Adele Balasingham specifically asking about the PM´s meeting with President Bush. Moragoda replied that President Bush had given the PM his full vote of confidence and had expressed support for a negotiated solution of the conflict. (Anton) Balasingham commented that this was fine with the LTTE, as the group understood that the U.S. and India had key roles to play in the peace process. Moragoda briefly mentioned U.S. assistance on military matters, commenting that a more secure Sri Lankan military would only benefit the peace process. ---------------------- Balasingham´s Schedule ----------------------
9. (C/NF) The London meeting wrapped up with a brief discussion of Balasingham´s schedule. Balasingham said he would be in London until mid-August (apparently his mother-in-law was in town). He planned to travel to Oslo around August 15 to give a speech. He wanted to travel to Canada at some point, too, but it was not clear whether the Canadian government would permit him to visit. Around August 20, he planned to travel to Sri Lanka to visit the LTTE leadership in the north. Balasingham noted that in doing this he would like to transit India, but it was not clear whether India would allow him in the country. (Note: The Indian government has previously given Balasingham a firm ""no"" in reply to his pleas to enter the country.) Adele Balasingham noted that her husband´s health was poor and that India should be helpful and offer him medical treatment if he needed it while in northern Sri Lanka. (Note: India has said no to this before, too.)
10. (C/NF) Moragoda told the Ambassador that he had invited Balasingham to transit Colombo on his way to the north, but Balasingham had turned down the offer, saying ""not at this time."" Moragoda added that he had heard from the Norwegian side that Helgesen might make a trip to Sri Lanka in late August, around the same time as Balasingham´s planned trip. ------- Comment -------
11. (C/NF) Overall, the London meeting seems to have provided a solid foundation for next steps in the peace process. Moragoda, for one, appeared confident that the talks had gone well. That said, he made clear that he did not want to make too much of the meeting and that he remained cautious, given the difficulty of reading the LTTE´s true intentions. Certainly, the meeting -- the highest-level GSL-LTTE contact in years -- was an important benchmark. The notion of high-level representatives of the GSL and the LTTE discussing issues face-to-face in a productive give-and-take is a new and positive development. In addition, the fact that the talks took place at all was important for the GSL in underscoring to Sri Lankans that its peace initiative still maintains traction and is not sliding backwards. End Comment.
12. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
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