Wikileaks classified documents on Sri Lanka (Full Text ) Part Five

WikiLeaks on SRI LANKA
[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]

01. 18.8.2005: Norwegian facilitators send letter to LTTE leader Prabhakaran via London; GSL asks EU to list LTTE as terrorist organization

8/18/2005 9:13

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001453

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015

TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NO, CE, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO

LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN VIA LONDON, GSL ASKS EU TO LIST

LTTE AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

REF: COLOMBO 1440 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge´ d´Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In their August 17 meeting with LTTE

theoretician Anton Balasingham in London, Norwegian FM

Petersen and DFM Helgesen passed a letter to LTTE leader

Prabhakaran (text below). At GSL request, EU missions in

Colombo will recommend to Brussels that the EU designate

the LTTE as a terrorist organization. End Summary

2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar called on

Charge´ August 18 to follow up on Norwegian Deputy Foreign

Minister Helgesen´s August 16 meeting with Colombo co-chair

representatives. Brattskar confirmed that Norwegian

Foreign Minister Petersen and Helgesen had called on LTTE

theoretician Anton Balasingham August 17 in London and had

given Balasingham a letter to be passed to LTTE leader

Prabhakaran (text below).

3. (C) Brattskar noted that he was not sharing a copy of

the Prabhakaran letter with the GSL since that was not

normal practice. Moreover, the contents of Petersen and

Helgesen´s Monday night meeting with President Kumaratunga

had clearly been leaked to the Colombo press ("Vidar is

hopping mad!"), so passing a copy to the GSL would be "like

giving it to the Sunday papers," Brattskar mused. He asked

that the U.S. not share the letter.

4. (C) Brattskar said that Balasingham had promised

Petersen and Helgesen he would translate and transmit the

letter to Kilinochchi immediately. Balasingham had

expressed concern over recent LTTE actions in the North and

East but had danced around the question of responsibility

for Kadirgamar´s assassination (and disavowed any prior

knowledge). Balasingham, Brattskar said, had been pleased

at the prospect of receiving the Norwegian FM and at the

idea of more direct Norwegian contact with Prabhakaran

(although Balasingham said he would want to be present at

any such meetings as he usually has in the past - Brattskar

said the Norwegians have only met Prabhakaran once when

Balasingham was not present). Balasingham did not discuss

travel plans to Sri Lanka but Brattskar noted that when he

had seen Balasingham in London in July, the LTTE

theoretician had said he was thinking about travel to

Kilinochchi in October.

5. (C) Brattskar undertook to advise Charge´ as soon as the

Norwegians had some reaction to the Prabhakaran letter. He

noted that as far as he knew a Petersen/Rice conversation

was still scheduled to take place this week. The

Norwegians, Brattskar concluded, continue to like the idea

of a September co-chairs meeting in New York although,

given Japanese sensitivities about their standing

invitation to host the next meeting in October, the New

York meeting should perhaps be billed as something like a

preparatory meeting.

6. (C) On a related topic, the British DCM told Charge´

August 18 that the GSL had just convoked her High

Commissioner (as holder of the EU Presidency in Colombo)

and the EC Charge´ to ask that the European Union list the

LTTE as a terrorist organization (apparently there is a

mechanism through which the EU can designate terrorist

organizations on a union-wide basis in addition to whatever

procedures individual EU members states may have). The EU

missions in Colombo plan to endorse the idea strongly to

Brussels. The British DCM said she is familiarizing

herself on the details of the procedure and the potential

timeline for such listing.

7. (C) Text of Norwegian letter (please protect closely) to

Prabhakaran follows:

Begin text

Letter from Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister of Foreign Affairs

To

Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran

Leader

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

Oslo, 16 August 2005

Dear Mr. Prabhakaran

As I am sure you realize, the peace process is now in a

critical situation. The killings and counter-killings over

the last few months have been watched with mounting concern

by Norway and the international community. Along with the

continued recruitment of children to the LTTE, this has

created distrust about the LTTE´s intentions as regards the

peace process.

The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar

has exacerbated the situation. It is not up to Norway to

draw conclusions about the criminal investigations now

under way in Colombo, or on any other judicial matter in

relation with the killings. However, public perception

both in Sri Lanka and internationally is that the LTTE is

responsible. This public perception is a political

reality. The LTTE needs to respond to this situation in a

way that demonstrates continued commitment to the peace

process.

I see it as my obligation to make clear to you the

political choice now facing the LTTE. If the LTTE does not

take a positive step forward at this critical juncture, the

international reaction could be severe.

Against this backdrop I would ask you urgently to consider

the following steps:

1. To accept the Norwegian Government´s invitation to

participate in a review of the implementation of the

Ceasefire Agreement in order to find practical ways of

ensuring full compliance by both parties.

2. To establish direct communications between the LTTE and

the Sri Lankan Army in the east, in order to improve

security.

3. To accept without delay the Sri Lanka Monitoring

Mission proposal for transportation of LTTE cadres.

4. To collaborate in a practical way with government

initiatives to speed up reconstruction in the north and

east. The LTTE´s continued commitment to the P-TOMS

agreement is vital in this regard.

5. To take effective steps to halt killings and to cease

the recruitment of underage combatants.

I trust that you appreciate the gravity of the present

situation and will take steps to demonstrate to the

international community that the LTTE is committed to the

peace process.

Yours sincerely,

Jan Petersen

End Text

ENTWISTLE


02. 4.11.2003: Provoking political crisis, President fires three key ministers and suspends Parliament

11/4/2003 12:04

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001902

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA,

DS/IP/NEA/SA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-04-13

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, ASEC, MOPS, CASC, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Provoking political crisis, President fires

three key ministers and suspends Parliament

Refs: (A) Colombo-Ops Center 11/04/2003 telecons

- (B) Colombo 1893, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge´ d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: In a sudden move, President

Kumaratunga has fired the ministers of defense,

interior, and mass communications citing concerns

over the "deterioration of the security situation."

Late in the day, the President also suspended Parliament

until November 19. The PM is in Washington and his

office just sent us a statement strongly opposing her

moves. Colombo appears quiet as of late November 4.

The President´s action highlights her volatility and

sets the table for a serious political crisis with

unknown implications for the peace process. END

SUMMARY.

2. (C) PRESIDENT FIRES MINISTERS: In a sudden

announcement made mid-day November 4 while Prime

Minister Wickremesinghe was in Washington, President

Kumaratunga sacked the ministers of defense, interior,

and mass communications. The President also fired the

secretaries (second-in-commands) in the ministries of

SIPDIS

defense and mass communications, but spared the

secretary of the interior ministry. In a conversation

SIPDIS

with the Charge´, Harim Peiris, press spokesman for the

President, confirmed reports that the President would

personally take over the three ministerial portfolios

left vacant by the firings. Peiris, who has been named

by the President to be the new Secretary in the Mass

Communications Ministry, added that the ministers in

question could retain other portfolios that they had

had, e.g., John Amaratunga of the Interior Ministry was

still the Minister of Christian Affairs.

3. (C) SUSPENSION OF PARLIAMENT: Late in the day, the

President also suspended Parliament until November 19.

Harim Peiris told the Charge´ that rumors that the

President planned to declare a "State of Emergency" were

not true.

4. (C) PRESIDENT´S RATIONALE VAGUE: The President´s

rationale for the sudden firing of the ministers was

vague. In a brief written statement announcing her

move, the President´s Office commented: "This step has

been taken after careful consideration, in order to

prevent further deterioration of the security situation

in the country. The reasons for this action will be

made known to the public in due course." Dr. Sarath

Amunugama, a senior MP in the President´s People

Alliance (PA) party, told Pol FSN that the President

will issue a more detailed statement and perhaps go on

television late November 4 to explain her move. We

later heard that she might make a statement as late as

November 5.

5. (C) PM´S STATEMENT: The UNP government appears to

have been caught completely off guard by the President´s

sudden move, although there has been speculation that

the President might "try something" in conjunction with

the mid-November budget debate in Parliament (see Ref

B). For much of the day, there was no reaction by the

government to her move. Late November 4, however,

Mission received the following statement on official

stationery in the name of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe,

who is in Washington, rejecting the President´s move:

Begin text:

Prime Minister´s Office

Whilst being out of the country on an important visit to

the United States, a co-chair of the donor community, in

furtherance of Sri Lanka´s peace process and economic

development, I have learnt that the President, Her

Excellency Chandrika Kumaratunaga has precipitated a

national crisis in an attempt to subvert the mandate

given to my government by the people on December 5, 2001

and reinforced in March 2002 at the local authority

elections.

Your government will not be deviated from the mandate

given it by the people to pursue the path of peace,

security and economic prosperity due to the

irresponsible and precipitous actions of the President

aimed at plunging the country into chaos and anarchy.

I pledge to you the people, your government will not

allow this desperate and irresponsible attempt to

undermine the peace process and economic prosperity of

the people to succeed.

I remain resolute in implementing the mandate of the

people for peace, democracy and prosperity with the

fullest support and continued confidence of the

international community.

It is blatantly obvious that these opportunistic actions

are timed to deprive the people of the economic and

social benefits that they are on the verge of reaping as

a result of the solid foundations laid by your

government over the last two years.

Be rest assured I will continue my mission for the

people undeterred and conclude my crucial program in

Washington D.C., including the meeting with president

George W. Bush, which is part of the ongoing process of

consolidating the peace, unity and economic prosperity

of all our people.

I therefore call upon all of you, the people, the armed

forces, police and public service to remain calm and

vigilant in the face of this deliberate attempt of

endanger the peace process which we will together

overcome.

04th November 2003

End text.

6. (C) OBSERVERS PREDICT "COHABITATION WARFARE": In

discussions with polchief, two well-informed observers

of the local political scene said they thought the

President probably has the right to fire the ministers

per the Sri Lankan Constitution. Kethesh Loganathan, an

analyst at the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a

local think-tank, said the Constitution is written in

such a way that almost all executive powers reside in

the hands of the presidency, including membership in the

Cabinet. In any case, he noted, the President would

probably win if the issue is brought to the courts

because the Supreme Court and especially Chief Justice

Sarath Silva are allies of the PA and would probably

back her. All that said, Loganathan predicted that the

President´s action would spark "bitter cohabitation

warfare" because "the UNP will not take this lying

down." Jehan Perera, the media director at the National

Peace Council, another local think-tank, agreed,

remarking that the UNP might be so angry as to take the

matter to the streets.

7. (SBU) COLOMBO QUIET: Colombo appears quiet and

normal as of late November 4. RSO continues to monitor

the situation. Reportedly on the orders of the

President, the military has deployed around the

headquarters of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation

(SLBC) and the government´s printing press. We see no

need for a change to our consular travel advisory at

this point. The DATT is in touch with military

counterparts regarding the implications of the defense

ministry changes on a number of U.S. military

cooperation activities under way at the moment.

8. (C) COMMENT: The President´s action highlights her

increasing volatility. As reported (see Ref B), her

recent track record has involved lashing out routinely

at the PM and other targets of her displeasure. While

her previous outbursts were mere darts aimed at the GSL,

this latest step, unfortunately, sets the table for a

serious political crisis and seems timed to ensure

maximum embarrassment for the PM in Washington on the

eve of his Oval Office meeting. It is not clear where

the epicenter of the crisis will be, but it seems that

the UNP might well take steps to try to impeach the

President and perhaps the Chief Justice (when Parliament

comes back into session). The UNP also appears to have

a significant amount of popular support due to its peace

process initiative and it could well bring out its

supporters in protest. Given the swirl of events, fresh

elections are also possible. The PM´s statement above

indicates that his government plans to fight back hard.

9. (C) COMMENT (Continued): Implications for the peace

process and the planned restart of talks focused on the

Tigers´ just released counterproposals are unknown. For

their part, the Tigers are very aware of what is

happening: their website, "TamilNet," is posting

regular updates on the situation in Colombo. In the

past, the group has cited concerns about the situation

in the south as a reason for not moving forward along

the peace track. END COMMENT.

10. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE


03. 6.12.2004: "Low key" Norwegian visit to Wanni

COLOMBO 001948

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS

NSC FOR DORMANDY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2014

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: "LOW KEY" NORWEGIAN VISIT TO WANNI; THREE

CO-CHAIRS TO DISCUSS JVP ANTI-NORWAY CAMPAIGN WITH PRESIDENT

REF: COLOMBO 1919

Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Norwegian Ambassador,s December 2 meeting

with Thamilchelvan produced no breakthroughs but kept lines

of communication open. Thamilchelvan told him Prabhakaran,s

recent policy speech had not been intended as a threat or

ultimatum; he also reiterated LTTE commitment to maintaining

the cease-fire. Norwegian envoy Solheim will visit

Kilinochchi December 15. Co-chair representatives agreed

that Japan, the EU and the U.S. would call on President

Kumaratunga to express concern over the JVP-orchestrated

anti-Norway campaign. End Summary.

2. (C) The Sri Lanka co-chairs met December 3 to discuss the

previous day,s Norwegian meeting with the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi and to coordinate

co-chair action in the face of a Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

(JVP)-orchestrated against Norwegian efforts here. DCM

represented the U.S.

"Low Key" Visit to Wanni

------------------------

3. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed on his

December 2 one-day trip to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi

which had been at his initiative. Brattskar had wanted one

last meeting with LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan before

Brattskar goes home for the holidays and for an Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM) conference in Copenhagen (he

departs December 11 and is scheduled to return to Colombo

January 10). Brattskar said he had intentionally kept the

visit "low key" by only informing the Government of Sri Lanka

(GSL) at the last minute to avoid leaks to the press. He had

also asked the LTTE not to discuss the visit with the press

although his presence in Kilinochchi inevitably "leaked out."

Asked by journalists if he was carrying a message from the

GSL, Brattskar had stated that he was not. Brattskar noted

that he had given GSL Peace Secretariat chief Jayantha

Dhanapala a readout on his trip earlier in the day.

Speech Analysis with Thamilchelvan

----------------------------------

4. (C) Brattskar said he had gone through LTTE chief

Prabhakaran,s Heroes, Day speech with Thamilchelvan "line

by line." During that discussion, Thamilchelvan reiterated

the LTTE,s commitment to maintaining the cease-fire

agreement (CFA) and told Brattskar the speech had not been

intended as a threat or as an ultimatum. Asked why the

speech had not included the usual LTTE references to

"internal or external self-determination," Thamilchelvan said

his boss had wanted to focus the speech instead on the

humanitarian needs of the Tamil people and how those needs

could be assuaged by implementation of the LTTE,s Interim

Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. Thamilchelvan used

the same line when Brattskar asked why the speech had

included no reference to the situation in the East or to

breakaway faction chief Karuna. Brattskar opined to the

other co-chair reps that Prabhakaran had not wanted to

dignify Karuna with a reference in the speech and was

reluctant to draw attention to the East where LTTE efforts to

regain control are mixed.

5. (C) Brattskar asked Thamilchelvan to explain the internal

inconsistency in the speech between the stated readiness to

resume negotiations and the stated lack of faith in the

GSL,s intentions and abilities to pursue a peace process.

Thamilchelvan responded by "launching into a history lesson"

on Sinhalese perfidy, concluding that in spite of it all the

LTTE was willing to move ahead and negotiate the ISGA. Asked

to clarify the speech reference to "advancing the freedom

struggle," Thamilchelvan "had no specific answer." Brattskar

told Thamilchelvan that it was important that Prabhakaran had

indicated in the speech a willingness to negotiate ISGA

details rather than taking a "take it or leave it" approach.

6. (C) Moving beyond the speech, Brattskar told

Thamilchelvan ("as I always do") that the LTTE needed to make

periodic public reaffirmations of its "commitment to Oslo and

to democratic principles." Thamilchelvan said he had made

these commitments during his recent travels in Europe.

Brattskar said that was fine but public reiterations are

necessary. Thamilchelvan "just smiled." Brattskar noted

that he had so far only had a very brief telephonic readout

from Eric Solheim on his meeting with Balasingham in London.

"It appears to have been along the same lines of my talk with

Thamilchelvan."

Norwegian Travels

-----------------

7. (C) Brattskar said Solheim will now arrive in Colombo

late on December 13 and will travel to Kilinochchi on

December 15. In the face of the current peace process

stasis, Brattskar said the Norwegians intend to send someone

out "every 4-6 weeks or so" just to keep lines of

communications open. Solheim is not expecting any

significant developments during his visit just as Brattskar

had not expected any in his December 2 trip to Kilinochchi.

Co-Chair Support of Norway

--------------------------

8. (C) Turning to the matter of the JVP-orchestrated

campaign against Norwegian facilitation efforts (reftel),

co-chair reps agreed on a meeting with President Kumaratunga

to express support for Norway and to seek an explanation of

how government coalition members could be allowed to behave

in such fashion. Brattskar said Helgesen strongly supported

the idea but felt it best that Norway not participate, "since

you,ll be talking about us." Thus, it was agreed that

Japan, the EU and the U.S. should call on the President.

Japanese Ambassador Suda will request an appointment. All

agreed it would be important to put out a brief press

statement immediately thereafter. DCM agreed to craft a

first draft for circulation.

9. (C) Brattskar laughingly noted that that morning he had

presented the Minister of Culture, a JVP member, with a GON

check to support the purchasing of books for cultural centers

across the country. "I gave a speech saying Norway supports

the masses." Brattskar noted the minister seemed to have no

qualms about taking Norwegian money. (The ceremony was

prominently featured on the front page of the December 4

English language Mirror newspaper.)

Comment

-------

10. (C) Despite the vituperative JVP-led campaign against

them and the current stalemate in the peace process, the

Norwegians intend to continue their methodical circuit ride

between the two sides. President Kumaratunga is reported to

be privately "furious" about the JVP anti-Norway campaign.

Her reaction to the presentation by "three legs" of the

co-chairs should indicate whether she plans to do anything

about it. End Comment.

LUNSTEAD

12/6/2004 5:29

04. 26.11.2002: Oslo meeting reaps lavish, upbeat press coverage

"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002195 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD FOR IRWIN; AND S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:

DECL: 11-26-12

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, KPAO, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties

SUBJECT: OSLO MEETING REAPS LAVISH, UPBEAT PRESS COVERAGE; DEPUTY SECRETARY´S REMARKS EARN PRAISE

Refs: Colombo 2184, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Charge d´Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: The Oslo meeting on the Sri Lankan peace process has received lavish, upbeat press coverage. Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks -- which were specifically highlighted in the press coverage -- earned special praise. President Kumaratunga has not yet issued a public statement on the meeting, but members of her party are planning a rally in Colombo today protesting the GSL´s peace initiative. Our preliminary assessment is that the Oslo meeting provided the peace process a solid boost. END SUMMARY. ------------------------------------ OSLO GARNERS LAVISH, UPBEAT COVERAGE ------------------------------------

2. (SBU) The November 25 Oslo ""Sri Lanka Peace Process Support Meeting"" received lavish and upbeat press coverage back home. In November 26 newspaper editions, coverage was front-page and above-the-fold, with large photo spreads. With most of the focus on Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks (see more in Para 6), representative headlines from the major papers included: -- ""Daily News"" (English): ""U.S. urges LTTE to Renounce Terrorism"" -- ""Daily Mirror"" (English): ""United States urges Tigers to Give Up Terror"" -- ""The Island"" (English): ""PM Calls on Global Community to Help Lanka Now"" -- ""Dinamina"" (Sinhala): ""America Says LTTE should Publicly Declare that they have Given Up Armed Confrontation"" -- ""Lankadeepa"" (Sinhala): ""Armitage -- LTTE should Give Up Idea of Separate State and Armed Struggle""

3. (SBU) Most editorials portrayed the Oslo meeting as a key boost for the peace process. The editorial in ""The Island,"" a paper that invariably takes a strongly anti-peace process tack, did not mention the Oslo meeting, however. (Note: ""The Island"" preferred to lambaste putative plans by the government to allow a re- broadcast on a government radio channel of LTTE leader´s V. Prabhakaran´s annual ""Heroes´ Day"" address on November 27 -- see Reftel.)

4. (U) Television and radio also provided significant coverage of the meeting. Opening remarks by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) special negotiator Anton Balasingham, and Deputy Secretary Armitage were given special attention.

5. (SBU) ""TamilNet,"" the pro-LTTE website, provided several stories on the Oslo meeting. Most of its reporting, predictably, focused on Balasingham´s remarks. Reflecting a newfound commitment to balanced reporting, however, TamilNet also provided a thorough review of Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks, including his call for the LTTE to renounce, terrorism, violence, and separatism. ------------------------------- SPECIAL PRAISE FOR U.S. REMARKS -------------------------------

6. (C) In discussions with a wide variety of contacts, Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks drew special praise. Most of the comments focused on that section of the remarks that referred to the LTTE. Reaction included: -- Kethesh Loganathan, an analyst at the Center of Policy Alternatives, a local think-tank, told us that the U.S. presence at the meeting was constructive in underscoring international support for the peace process. In addition, the Deputy Secretary´s remarks had set ""clear-cut boundaries"" (renounce terrorism and violence, etc.) that the LTTE needed to absorb fully if the group wanted increased international acceptance. -- Taranjit Sandhu, the polcouns at the Indian High Commission, also praised the Deputy Secretary´s remarks. He stressed that the comments re the LTTE should prove beneficial in convincing the group that it needed to do more to convince the international community that it had transformed itself. Sandhu went on to express some concern that the LTTE might get the wrong message from the meeting and believe that the fact that it was allowed to be present at all signified international acceptance. -- Harim Peiris, a spokesman for President Kumaratunga, told us that he thought that the Deputy Secretary´s remarks were positive and should prove ""bracing"" for the LTTE. It was important that the group not believe that it had already earned international acceptance. -- Joseph Pararajahsingham, a senior Tamil National Alliance MP, welcomed U.S. participation at the Oslo meeting. While not commenting directly on the Deputy Secretary´s remarks re the LTTE, Pararajahsingham was SIPDIS not critical of those remarks either. He said he thought Oslo was a great success for the peace process. (Note: Pararajahsingham is extremely pro-LTTE. He said he had just gotten back to Colombo from a LTTE ""Heroes´s Day"" celebration in his hometown of Batticaloa.) (Note: TamilNet cited Balasingham as welcoming U.S. participation in the Oslo meeting by stating: ""The American participation in this meeting is an extraordinarily important matter for us because it reinforces the point that the LTTE is a crucial partner in resolving the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka."") ---------------------- OPPOSITION PLANS RALLY ----------------------

7. (C) President Kumaratunga, who has long been at odds with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, has not yet come out with a public statement in reaction to the Oslo meeting. Her assistant, Harim Peiris, said he would hold a press conference tomorrow to review the president´s stance. Peiris seemed to indicate that the president would not be taking a negative position, but that her reaction would be positive-themed.

8. (C) In the meantime, members of Kumaratunga´s People´s Alliance (PA) party are planning a rally in Colombo today (November 26) protesting the GSL´s handling of the peace process. Several senior PA MPs reportedly plan to participate in the rally, including Anura Bandaranaike (the president´s brother), Mangala Samaraweera, and Dinesh Gunarwardena. MPs from the radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) will also participate. (Note: Judging from previous anti-peace process rallies, most of the crowd will consist of JVP supporters.) Queried about the rally, Peiris separated the president´s office from it, asserting that the rally did not involve President Kumaratunga. -------

COMMENT -------

9. (C) It is still early, but our preliminary assessment is that the Oslo meeting provided the peace process a solid boost. Per expectations (see Reftels), most of the focus at the meeting reportedly was on the message that the international community supports the peace process -- and not on pledging by donors. That political message was well received and was amplified significantly by U.S. participation. In addition, based on the press coverage, our message re the LTTE was also broadcast loud-and-clear. Whether the LTTE picked up on our message -- aside from Balasingham´s publicized comments to the effect that the LTTE could not totally forswear violence at this time -- will be tested in the first instance on November 27 by the substance of Prabhakaran´s annual address (see Reftel). END COMMENT.

10. (U) Minimize considered. AMSELEM"

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