[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]
01. 18.8.2005: Norwegian facilitators send letter to LTTE leader Prabhakaran via London; GSL asks EU to list LTTE as terrorist organization
8/18/2005 9:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001453
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, NO, CE, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN FACILITATORS SEND LETTER TO
LTTE LEADER PRABHAKARAN VIA LONDON, GSL ASKS EU TO LIST
LTTE AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
REF: COLOMBO 1440 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Charge´ d´Affaires, a.i. James F. Entwistle for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. In their August 17 meeting with LTTE
theoretician Anton Balasingham in London, Norwegian FM
Petersen and DFM Helgesen passed a letter to LTTE leader
Prabhakaran (text below). At GSL request, EU missions in
Colombo will recommend to Brussels that the EU designate
the LTTE as a terrorist organization. End Summary
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar called on
Charge´ August 18 to follow up on Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister Helgesen´s August 16 meeting with Colombo co-chair
representatives. Brattskar confirmed that Norwegian
Foreign Minister Petersen and Helgesen had called on LTTE
theoretician Anton Balasingham August 17 in London and had
given Balasingham a letter to be passed to LTTE leader
Prabhakaran (text below).
3. (C) Brattskar noted that he was not sharing a copy of
the Prabhakaran letter with the GSL since that was not
normal practice. Moreover, the contents of Petersen and
Helgesen´s Monday night meeting with President Kumaratunga
had clearly been leaked to the Colombo press ("Vidar is
hopping mad!"), so passing a copy to the GSL would be "like
giving it to the Sunday papers," Brattskar mused. He asked
that the U.S. not share the letter.
4. (C) Brattskar said that Balasingham had promised
Petersen and Helgesen he would translate and transmit the
letter to Kilinochchi immediately. Balasingham had
expressed concern over recent LTTE actions in the North and
East but had danced around the question of responsibility
for Kadirgamar´s assassination (and disavowed any prior
knowledge). Balasingham, Brattskar said, had been pleased
at the prospect of receiving the Norwegian FM and at the
idea of more direct Norwegian contact with Prabhakaran
(although Balasingham said he would want to be present at
any such meetings as he usually has in the past - Brattskar
said the Norwegians have only met Prabhakaran once when
Balasingham was not present). Balasingham did not discuss
travel plans to Sri Lanka but Brattskar noted that when he
had seen Balasingham in London in July, the LTTE
theoretician had said he was thinking about travel to
Kilinochchi in October.
5. (C) Brattskar undertook to advise Charge´ as soon as the
Norwegians had some reaction to the Prabhakaran letter. He
noted that as far as he knew a Petersen/Rice conversation
was still scheduled to take place this week. The
Norwegians, Brattskar concluded, continue to like the idea
of a September co-chairs meeting in New York although,
given Japanese sensitivities about their standing
invitation to host the next meeting in October, the New
York meeting should perhaps be billed as something like a
preparatory meeting.
6. (C) On a related topic, the British DCM told Charge´
August 18 that the GSL had just convoked her High
Commissioner (as holder of the EU Presidency in Colombo)
and the EC Charge´ to ask that the European Union list the
LTTE as a terrorist organization (apparently there is a
mechanism through which the EU can designate terrorist
organizations on a union-wide basis in addition to whatever
procedures individual EU members states may have). The EU
missions in Colombo plan to endorse the idea strongly to
Brussels. The British DCM said she is familiarizing
herself on the details of the procedure and the potential
timeline for such listing.
7. (C) Text of Norwegian letter (please protect closely) to
Prabhakaran follows:
Begin text
Letter from Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Foreign Affairs
To
Mr. Velupillai Prabhakaran
Leader
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Oslo, 16 August 2005
Dear Mr. Prabhakaran
As I am sure you realize, the peace process is now in a
critical situation. The killings and counter-killings over
the last few months have been watched with mounting concern
by Norway and the international community. Along with the
continued recruitment of children to the LTTE, this has
created distrust about the LTTE´s intentions as regards the
peace process.
The assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar
has exacerbated the situation. It is not up to Norway to
draw conclusions about the criminal investigations now
under way in Colombo, or on any other judicial matter in
relation with the killings. However, public perception
both in Sri Lanka and internationally is that the LTTE is
responsible. This public perception is a political
reality. The LTTE needs to respond to this situation in a
way that demonstrates continued commitment to the peace
process.
I see it as my obligation to make clear to you the
political choice now facing the LTTE. If the LTTE does not
take a positive step forward at this critical juncture, the
international reaction could be severe.
Against this backdrop I would ask you urgently to consider
the following steps:
1. To accept the Norwegian Government´s invitation to
participate in a review of the implementation of the
Ceasefire Agreement in order to find practical ways of
ensuring full compliance by both parties.
2. To establish direct communications between the LTTE and
the Sri Lankan Army in the east, in order to improve
security.
3. To accept without delay the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission proposal for transportation of LTTE cadres.
4. To collaborate in a practical way with government
initiatives to speed up reconstruction in the north and
east. The LTTE´s continued commitment to the P-TOMS
agreement is vital in this regard.
5. To take effective steps to halt killings and to cease
the recruitment of underage combatants.
I trust that you appreciate the gravity of the present
situation and will take steps to demonstrate to the
international community that the LTTE is committed to the
peace process.
Yours sincerely,
Jan Petersen
End Text
ENTWISTLE
02. 4.11.2003: Provoking political crisis, President fires three key ministers and suspends Parliament
11/4/2003 12:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001902
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA,
DS/IP/NEA/SA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-04-13
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, ASEC, MOPS, CASC, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Provoking political crisis, President fires
three key ministers and suspends Parliament
Refs: (A) Colombo-Ops Center 11/04/2003 telecons
- (B) Colombo 1893, and previous
(U) Classified by Charge´ d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a sudden move, President
Kumaratunga has fired the ministers of defense,
interior, and mass communications citing concerns
over the "deterioration of the security situation."
Late in the day, the President also suspended Parliament
until November 19. The PM is in Washington and his
office just sent us a statement strongly opposing her
moves. Colombo appears quiet as of late November 4.
The President´s action highlights her volatility and
sets the table for a serious political crisis with
unknown implications for the peace process. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) PRESIDENT FIRES MINISTERS: In a sudden
announcement made mid-day November 4 while Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe was in Washington, President
Kumaratunga sacked the ministers of defense, interior,
and mass communications. The President also fired the
secretaries (second-in-commands) in the ministries of
SIPDIS
defense and mass communications, but spared the
secretary of the interior ministry. In a conversation
SIPDIS
with the Charge´, Harim Peiris, press spokesman for the
President, confirmed reports that the President would
personally take over the three ministerial portfolios
left vacant by the firings. Peiris, who has been named
by the President to be the new Secretary in the Mass
Communications Ministry, added that the ministers in
question could retain other portfolios that they had
had, e.g., John Amaratunga of the Interior Ministry was
still the Minister of Christian Affairs.
3. (C) SUSPENSION OF PARLIAMENT: Late in the day, the
President also suspended Parliament until November 19.
Harim Peiris told the Charge´ that rumors that the
President planned to declare a "State of Emergency" were
not true.
4. (C) PRESIDENT´S RATIONALE VAGUE: The President´s
rationale for the sudden firing of the ministers was
vague. In a brief written statement announcing her
move, the President´s Office commented: "This step has
been taken after careful consideration, in order to
prevent further deterioration of the security situation
in the country. The reasons for this action will be
made known to the public in due course." Dr. Sarath
Amunugama, a senior MP in the President´s People
Alliance (PA) party, told Pol FSN that the President
will issue a more detailed statement and perhaps go on
television late November 4 to explain her move. We
later heard that she might make a statement as late as
November 5.
5. (C) PM´S STATEMENT: The UNP government appears to
have been caught completely off guard by the President´s
sudden move, although there has been speculation that
the President might "try something" in conjunction with
the mid-November budget debate in Parliament (see Ref
B). For much of the day, there was no reaction by the
government to her move. Late November 4, however,
Mission received the following statement on official
stationery in the name of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe,
who is in Washington, rejecting the President´s move:
Begin text:
Prime Minister´s Office
Whilst being out of the country on an important visit to
the United States, a co-chair of the donor community, in
furtherance of Sri Lanka´s peace process and economic
development, I have learnt that the President, Her
Excellency Chandrika Kumaratunaga has precipitated a
national crisis in an attempt to subvert the mandate
given to my government by the people on December 5, 2001
and reinforced in March 2002 at the local authority
elections.
Your government will not be deviated from the mandate
given it by the people to pursue the path of peace,
security and economic prosperity due to the
irresponsible and precipitous actions of the President
aimed at plunging the country into chaos and anarchy.
I pledge to you the people, your government will not
allow this desperate and irresponsible attempt to
undermine the peace process and economic prosperity of
the people to succeed.
I remain resolute in implementing the mandate of the
people for peace, democracy and prosperity with the
fullest support and continued confidence of the
international community.
It is blatantly obvious that these opportunistic actions
are timed to deprive the people of the economic and
social benefits that they are on the verge of reaping as
a result of the solid foundations laid by your
government over the last two years.
Be rest assured I will continue my mission for the
people undeterred and conclude my crucial program in
Washington D.C., including the meeting with president
George W. Bush, which is part of the ongoing process of
consolidating the peace, unity and economic prosperity
of all our people.
I therefore call upon all of you, the people, the armed
forces, police and public service to remain calm and
vigilant in the face of this deliberate attempt of
endanger the peace process which we will together
overcome.
04th November 2003
End text.
6. (C) OBSERVERS PREDICT "COHABITATION WARFARE": In
discussions with polchief, two well-informed observers
of the local political scene said they thought the
President probably has the right to fire the ministers
per the Sri Lankan Constitution. Kethesh Loganathan, an
analyst at the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), a
local think-tank, said the Constitution is written in
such a way that almost all executive powers reside in
the hands of the presidency, including membership in the
Cabinet. In any case, he noted, the President would
probably win if the issue is brought to the courts
because the Supreme Court and especially Chief Justice
Sarath Silva are allies of the PA and would probably
back her. All that said, Loganathan predicted that the
President´s action would spark "bitter cohabitation
warfare" because "the UNP will not take this lying
down." Jehan Perera, the media director at the National
Peace Council, another local think-tank, agreed,
remarking that the UNP might be so angry as to take the
matter to the streets.
7. (SBU) COLOMBO QUIET: Colombo appears quiet and
normal as of late November 4. RSO continues to monitor
the situation. Reportedly on the orders of the
President, the military has deployed around the
headquarters of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation
(SLBC) and the government´s printing press. We see no
need for a change to our consular travel advisory at
this point. The DATT is in touch with military
counterparts regarding the implications of the defense
ministry changes on a number of U.S. military
cooperation activities under way at the moment.
8. (C) COMMENT: The President´s action highlights her
increasing volatility. As reported (see Ref B), her
recent track record has involved lashing out routinely
at the PM and other targets of her displeasure. While
her previous outbursts were mere darts aimed at the GSL,
this latest step, unfortunately, sets the table for a
serious political crisis and seems timed to ensure
maximum embarrassment for the PM in Washington on the
eve of his Oval Office meeting. It is not clear where
the epicenter of the crisis will be, but it seems that
the UNP might well take steps to try to impeach the
President and perhaps the Chief Justice (when Parliament
comes back into session). The UNP also appears to have
a significant amount of popular support due to its peace
process initiative and it could well bring out its
supporters in protest. Given the swirl of events, fresh
elections are also possible. The PM´s statement above
indicates that his government plans to fight back hard.
9. (C) COMMENT (Continued): Implications for the peace
process and the planned restart of talks focused on the
Tigers´ just released counterproposals are unknown. For
their part, the Tigers are very aware of what is
happening: their website, "TamilNet," is posting
regular updates on the situation in Colombo. In the
past, the group has cited concerns about the situation
in the south as a reason for not moving forward along
the peace track. END COMMENT.
10. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
03. 6.12.2004: "Low key" Norwegian visit to Wanni
COLOMBO 001948
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
NSC FOR DORMANDY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2014
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: "LOW KEY" NORWEGIAN VISIT TO WANNI; THREE
CO-CHAIRS TO DISCUSS JVP ANTI-NORWAY CAMPAIGN WITH PRESIDENT
REF: COLOMBO 1919
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary: Norwegian Ambassador,s December 2 meeting
with Thamilchelvan produced no breakthroughs but kept lines
of communication open. Thamilchelvan told him Prabhakaran,s
recent policy speech had not been intended as a threat or
ultimatum; he also reiterated LTTE commitment to maintaining
the cease-fire. Norwegian envoy Solheim will visit
Kilinochchi December 15. Co-chair representatives agreed
that Japan, the EU and the U.S. would call on President
Kumaratunga to express concern over the JVP-orchestrated
anti-Norway campaign. End Summary.
2. (C) The Sri Lanka co-chairs met December 3 to discuss the
previous day,s Norwegian meeting with the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi and to coordinate
co-chair action in the face of a Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP)-orchestrated against Norwegian efforts here. DCM
represented the U.S.
"Low Key" Visit to Wanni
------------------------
3. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed on his
December 2 one-day trip to LTTE headquarters in Kilinochchi
which had been at his initiative. Brattskar had wanted one
last meeting with LTTE political chief Thamilchelvan before
Brattskar goes home for the holidays and for an Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) conference in Copenhagen (he
departs December 11 and is scheduled to return to Colombo
January 10). Brattskar said he had intentionally kept the
visit "low key" by only informing the Government of Sri Lanka
(GSL) at the last minute to avoid leaks to the press. He had
also asked the LTTE not to discuss the visit with the press
although his presence in Kilinochchi inevitably "leaked out."
Asked by journalists if he was carrying a message from the
GSL, Brattskar had stated that he was not. Brattskar noted
that he had given GSL Peace Secretariat chief Jayantha
Dhanapala a readout on his trip earlier in the day.
Speech Analysis with Thamilchelvan
----------------------------------
4. (C) Brattskar said he had gone through LTTE chief
Prabhakaran,s Heroes, Day speech with Thamilchelvan "line
by line." During that discussion, Thamilchelvan reiterated
the LTTE,s commitment to maintaining the cease-fire
agreement (CFA) and told Brattskar the speech had not been
intended as a threat or as an ultimatum. Asked why the
speech had not included the usual LTTE references to
"internal or external self-determination," Thamilchelvan said
his boss had wanted to focus the speech instead on the
humanitarian needs of the Tamil people and how those needs
could be assuaged by implementation of the LTTE,s Interim
Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal. Thamilchelvan used
the same line when Brattskar asked why the speech had
included no reference to the situation in the East or to
breakaway faction chief Karuna. Brattskar opined to the
other co-chair reps that Prabhakaran had not wanted to
dignify Karuna with a reference in the speech and was
reluctant to draw attention to the East where LTTE efforts to
regain control are mixed.
5. (C) Brattskar asked Thamilchelvan to explain the internal
inconsistency in the speech between the stated readiness to
resume negotiations and the stated lack of faith in the
GSL,s intentions and abilities to pursue a peace process.
Thamilchelvan responded by "launching into a history lesson"
on Sinhalese perfidy, concluding that in spite of it all the
LTTE was willing to move ahead and negotiate the ISGA. Asked
to clarify the speech reference to "advancing the freedom
struggle," Thamilchelvan "had no specific answer." Brattskar
told Thamilchelvan that it was important that Prabhakaran had
indicated in the speech a willingness to negotiate ISGA
details rather than taking a "take it or leave it" approach.
6. (C) Moving beyond the speech, Brattskar told
Thamilchelvan ("as I always do") that the LTTE needed to make
periodic public reaffirmations of its "commitment to Oslo and
to democratic principles." Thamilchelvan said he had made
these commitments during his recent travels in Europe.
Brattskar said that was fine but public reiterations are
necessary. Thamilchelvan "just smiled." Brattskar noted
that he had so far only had a very brief telephonic readout
from Eric Solheim on his meeting with Balasingham in London.
"It appears to have been along the same lines of my talk with
Thamilchelvan."
Norwegian Travels
-----------------
7. (C) Brattskar said Solheim will now arrive in Colombo
late on December 13 and will travel to Kilinochchi on
December 15. In the face of the current peace process
stasis, Brattskar said the Norwegians intend to send someone
out "every 4-6 weeks or so" just to keep lines of
communications open. Solheim is not expecting any
significant developments during his visit just as Brattskar
had not expected any in his December 2 trip to Kilinochchi.
Co-Chair Support of Norway
--------------------------
8. (C) Turning to the matter of the JVP-orchestrated
campaign against Norwegian facilitation efforts (reftel),
co-chair reps agreed on a meeting with President Kumaratunga
to express support for Norway and to seek an explanation of
how government coalition members could be allowed to behave
in such fashion. Brattskar said Helgesen strongly supported
the idea but felt it best that Norway not participate, "since
you,ll be talking about us." Thus, it was agreed that
Japan, the EU and the U.S. should call on the President.
Japanese Ambassador Suda will request an appointment. All
agreed it would be important to put out a brief press
statement immediately thereafter. DCM agreed to craft a
first draft for circulation.
9. (C) Brattskar laughingly noted that that morning he had
presented the Minister of Culture, a JVP member, with a GON
check to support the purchasing of books for cultural centers
across the country. "I gave a speech saying Norway supports
the masses." Brattskar noted the minister seemed to have no
qualms about taking Norwegian money. (The ceremony was
prominently featured on the front page of the December 4
English language Mirror newspaper.)
Comment
-------
10. (C) Despite the vituperative JVP-led campaign against
them and the current stalemate in the peace process, the
Norwegians intend to continue their methodical circuit ride
between the two sides. President Kumaratunga is reported to
be privately "furious" about the JVP anti-Norway campaign.
Her reaction to the presentation by "three legs" of the
co-chairs should indicate whether she plans to do anything
about it. End Comment.
LUNSTEAD
12/6/2004 5:29
04. 26.11.2002: Oslo meeting reaps lavish, upbeat press coverage
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 002195 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD FOR IRWIN; AND S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 11-26-12
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, EAID, KPAO, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties
SUBJECT: OSLO MEETING REAPS LAVISH, UPBEAT PRESS COVERAGE; DEPUTY SECRETARY´S REMARKS EARN PRAISE
Refs: Colombo 2184, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Charge d´Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Oslo meeting on the Sri Lankan peace process has received lavish, upbeat press coverage. Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks -- which were specifically highlighted in the press coverage -- earned special praise. President Kumaratunga has not yet issued a public statement on the meeting, but members of her party are planning a rally in Colombo today protesting the GSL´s peace initiative. Our preliminary assessment is that the Oslo meeting provided the peace process a solid boost. END SUMMARY. ------------------------------------ OSLO GARNERS LAVISH, UPBEAT COVERAGE ------------------------------------
2. (SBU) The November 25 Oslo ""Sri Lanka Peace Process Support Meeting"" received lavish and upbeat press coverage back home. In November 26 newspaper editions, coverage was front-page and above-the-fold, with large photo spreads. With most of the focus on Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks (see more in Para 6), representative headlines from the major papers included: -- ""Daily News"" (English): ""U.S. urges LTTE to Renounce Terrorism"" -- ""Daily Mirror"" (English): ""United States urges Tigers to Give Up Terror"" -- ""The Island"" (English): ""PM Calls on Global Community to Help Lanka Now"" -- ""Dinamina"" (Sinhala): ""America Says LTTE should Publicly Declare that they have Given Up Armed Confrontation"" -- ""Lankadeepa"" (Sinhala): ""Armitage -- LTTE should Give Up Idea of Separate State and Armed Struggle""
3. (SBU) Most editorials portrayed the Oslo meeting as a key boost for the peace process. The editorial in ""The Island,"" a paper that invariably takes a strongly anti-peace process tack, did not mention the Oslo meeting, however. (Note: ""The Island"" preferred to lambaste putative plans by the government to allow a re- broadcast on a government radio channel of LTTE leader´s V. Prabhakaran´s annual ""Heroes´ Day"" address on November 27 -- see Reftel.)
4. (U) Television and radio also provided significant coverage of the meeting. Opening remarks by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) special negotiator Anton Balasingham, and Deputy Secretary Armitage were given special attention.
5. (SBU) ""TamilNet,"" the pro-LTTE website, provided several stories on the Oslo meeting. Most of its reporting, predictably, focused on Balasingham´s remarks. Reflecting a newfound commitment to balanced reporting, however, TamilNet also provided a thorough review of Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks, including his call for the LTTE to renounce, terrorism, violence, and separatism. ------------------------------- SPECIAL PRAISE FOR U.S. REMARKS -------------------------------
6. (C) In discussions with a wide variety of contacts, Deputy Secretary Armitage´s remarks drew special praise. Most of the comments focused on that section of the remarks that referred to the LTTE. Reaction included: -- Kethesh Loganathan, an analyst at the Center of Policy Alternatives, a local think-tank, told us that the U.S. presence at the meeting was constructive in underscoring international support for the peace process. In addition, the Deputy Secretary´s remarks had set ""clear-cut boundaries"" (renounce terrorism and violence, etc.) that the LTTE needed to absorb fully if the group wanted increased international acceptance. -- Taranjit Sandhu, the polcouns at the Indian High Commission, also praised the Deputy Secretary´s remarks. He stressed that the comments re the LTTE should prove beneficial in convincing the group that it needed to do more to convince the international community that it had transformed itself. Sandhu went on to express some concern that the LTTE might get the wrong message from the meeting and believe that the fact that it was allowed to be present at all signified international acceptance. -- Harim Peiris, a spokesman for President Kumaratunga, told us that he thought that the Deputy Secretary´s remarks were positive and should prove ""bracing"" for the LTTE. It was important that the group not believe that it had already earned international acceptance. -- Joseph Pararajahsingham, a senior Tamil National Alliance MP, welcomed U.S. participation at the Oslo meeting. While not commenting directly on the Deputy Secretary´s remarks re the LTTE, Pararajahsingham was SIPDIS not critical of those remarks either. He said he thought Oslo was a great success for the peace process. (Note: Pararajahsingham is extremely pro-LTTE. He said he had just gotten back to Colombo from a LTTE ""Heroes´s Day"" celebration in his hometown of Batticaloa.) (Note: TamilNet cited Balasingham as welcoming U.S. participation in the Oslo meeting by stating: ""The American participation in this meeting is an extraordinarily important matter for us because it reinforces the point that the LTTE is a crucial partner in resolving the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka."") ---------------------- OPPOSITION PLANS RALLY ----------------------
7. (C) President Kumaratunga, who has long been at odds with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, has not yet come out with a public statement in reaction to the Oslo meeting. Her assistant, Harim Peiris, said he would hold a press conference tomorrow to review the president´s stance. Peiris seemed to indicate that the president would not be taking a negative position, but that her reaction would be positive-themed.
8. (C) In the meantime, members of Kumaratunga´s People´s Alliance (PA) party are planning a rally in Colombo today (November 26) protesting the GSL´s handling of the peace process. Several senior PA MPs reportedly plan to participate in the rally, including Anura Bandaranaike (the president´s brother), Mangala Samaraweera, and Dinesh Gunarwardena. MPs from the radical Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) will also participate. (Note: Judging from previous anti-peace process rallies, most of the crowd will consist of JVP supporters.) Queried about the rally, Peiris separated the president´s office from it, asserting that the rally did not involve President Kumaratunga. -------
COMMENT -------
9. (C) It is still early, but our preliminary assessment is that the Oslo meeting provided the peace process a solid boost. Per expectations (see Reftels), most of the focus at the meeting reportedly was on the message that the international community supports the peace process -- and not on pledging by donors. That political message was well received and was amplified significantly by U.S. participation. In addition, based on the press coverage, our message re the LTTE was also broadcast loud-and-clear. Whether the LTTE picked up on our message -- aside from Balasingham´s publicized comments to the effect that the LTTE could not totally forswear violence at this time -- will be tested in the first instance on November 27 by the substance of Prabhakaran´s annual address (see Reftel). END COMMENT.
10. (U) Minimize considered. AMSELEM"
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