[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]
10. 6.5.2003: Norwegians, Japanese press Tigers to return to talks and to attend donors conference
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000755 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-06-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Norwegians, Japanese press Tigers to return to talks and to attend donors conference
Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/06/03 fax - (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 050411Z May 03 - (C) Colombo 750, and previous (Notal) (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (b, d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian and Japanese representatives are urgently trying to convince the Tigers to get back to the peace table and to attend the June donors conference. So far, the Tigers are not playing ball. The next best chance to change their minds seems to be GoJ envoy Akashi´s May 7 meeting with Tiger leader Prabakharan. In other peace-related news, the PM was conciliatory toward the Tigers in an address to Parliament on May 6. At this point, it seems a fifty- fifty wager as to whether the Tigers will climb down from their hard-line stance. END SUMMARY
2. (C) NORWEGIANS MEET TIGERS: Norwegian and Japanese facilitators are urgently trying to convince the Tigers to get back to the peace table and to attend the June donors conference. In the latest of an increasingly tangled skein of tag team-type meetings, Norwegian facilitators met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief negotiator Anton Balasingham upon the latter´s arrival at Colombo´s international airport on May
5. (Note: The London-based Balasingham has returned to Sri Lanka for talks with his leadership in the LTTE-controlled Wanni region of northern Sri Lanka. Norwegian facilitators had met with LTTE Political Chief Thamilchelvam in the Wanni on April 30 -- see Ref C.)
3. (SBU) Commenting to the press about the May 5 meeting, GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, who is now in India, stated that ""I feel we have a good dialogue with the parties and we will work on that over the next week."" When pressed, Helgesen went on to admit that the Tigers had not committed to return to the peace table with the GSL, and had not agreed to come to the June donors conference. The Norwegians´ next meeting with the LTTE is planned for May 8 when special envoy Erik Solheim is slated to meet Balasingham in the Wanni.
4. (SBU) JAPANESE EFFORTS: In the meantime, a high- level Japanese envoy is also in country with the aim of pressing the LTTE to get back to the talks and to change its mind re the donors conference. The envoy, Yasushi Akashi, will be in Sri Lanka from May 3-9 on a wide- ranging visit, which will include talks with government and Opposition figures. Akashi is also expected to travel to eastern Sri Lanka, where communal tensions are high due to friction between the LTTE and the local Muslim community. (Note: These tensions intermittently flare into violence and did so most recently in the Trincomalee town of Mutur in mid-April. Akashi´s itinerary includes a stop in this town.)
5. (C) In a May 5 meeting with Ambassador Wills, Akashi confirmed that he planned to meet with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran on May 7 in the Wanni. Akashi said he hoped to use this meeting to press Prabhakaran hard to change his mind re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference. He allowed that he was not sure how much he could move Prabhakaran on these issues, but he said he would do his best.
6. (SBU) PM SPEAKS TO PARLIAMENT: In other peace- related news, the PM was conciliatory toward the Tigers in an address to Parliament on May
6. (Note: See Ref A for the text of his remarks.) The PM´s statement is expected to be the opening salvo of a debate in Parliament on the government´s handling of the peace process.
7. (SBU) In his long statement, the PM confirmed the government´s stance that it wanted the Tigers to return to the peace talks as soon as possible. Reacting to LTTE claims that the GSL was not doing enough in this key area, the PM added that the government was committed to taking steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the north and east. The PM went on to stress that the government was willing to examine the issue of how to handle the military security zones in Jaffna, which the Tigers want to see sharply reduced. One way to do this, he emphasized, was for the government and the LTTE to work closely with retired Indian general Satish Nambiar, who recently prepared a report with recommendations on how to handle the security zones issue (see Ref C for an analysis of this report).
8. (C) COMMENT: At this point based on our soundings, it seems a fifty-fifty wager as to whether the Tigers will climb down from their hard-line stance. Although they deal with the Tigers more than anyone else, the Norwegians, while not flummoxed per se, do not seem to have a solid grasp of where the Tigers are leaning at this time -- and nor does anyone else. In this regard, Akashi´s scheduled meeting with Prabhakaran could be very important. Akashi, who dealt with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge during his UN days in Cambodia, would seem well-positioned to size up Prabhakaran. In the process, hopefully, he will gain some insights into whether the Tigers want to stabilize the process or create more turbulence. END COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
11. 16.6.2003: Tensions notch up over sinking of Tamil Tigership and latest slaying of a Tiger opponent
6/16/2003 10:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001053
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-16-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PHUM, CE, JA, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tensions notch up over sinking of Tamil Tiger
ship and latest slaying of a Tiger opponent
Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 06/14/03 telecon
- (B) Colombo 1034, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Two violent incidents on June 14 have
sparked an increase in tension between the Tigers and
the GSL. In the first, a Tiger ship exploded off the
northeast coast after being intercepted by the navy. It
is unclear whether the crew detonated the ship or
whether it was destroyed by GSL gunfire. In the other
incident, a high-level opponent of the Tigers was
assassinated in Jaffna. The Tigers, in semi-threatening
tones, have complained about the sea incident and denied
involvement in the Jaffna slaying. The latest incidents
have placed added strain on the peace process. END
SUMMARY.
=====================
Sinking of Tiger Ship
=====================
2. (SBU) Two violent incidents on Saturday, June 14,
have sparked an increase in tension between the Tigers
and the Sri Lankan government. In the first incident,
according to the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), its vessels
intercepted two ships belonging to the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) approximately 110 nautical miles
off the northeast coast in the Bay of Bengal early
morning June 14. (Note: Some SLN sources have stated
that the incident took place closer to 175 miles off
shore; the LTTE has claimed it took place over 260 miles
off shore -- see below.) Based on what the SLN has
said, the two LTTE ships refused to return to port under
escort and began to fire at the SLN ships. In response,
the SLN, which had only fired some warning shots,
commenced firing at the ships, and, suddenly, one of
them exploded and subsequently sank. The other LTTE
ship escaped and has not been re-intercepted as of late
June 16. (Note: There are unconfirmed reports in the
Sri Lankan press that the Indian military is providing
the GSL intelligence and other assistance in locating
the ship that escaped.) Judging by the secondary
explosions on the boat that sank, the SLN believes that
the LTTE ship was an arms resupply vessel. According to
press reports, up to 12 cadre were on the vessel that
sank. They are all presumed dead (though the LTTE has
stated that the crew was abducted by the navy -- see
below).
3. (SBU) There is some confusion over the SLN´s version
of events, primarily over how the LTTE ship was sunk.
The president´s office, for example, announced that the
LTTE ship sank due to SLN firing, and had not self-
detonated as the navy has been claiming. The government
has not yet worked out this discrepancy. (Note: For
its part, the LTTE has asserted that the navy sank its
ship -- see below. There have been previous incidents
when LTTE sea cadre self-detonated their vessels after
being intercepted by the SLN, killing themselves in the
process. In the most recent sea incident, which took
place in March, however, a LTTE vessel was sunk off the
northeast coast by SLN gunnery, with the loss of its 11-
member LTTE crew. For additional details on the June 14
sea incident, please see DATT Septel.)
==========================
LTTE complains to Monitors
==========================
4. (SBU) The LTTE has bitterly complained to the
monitors over the June 14 sea incident. In a somewhat
confusing letter to the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Tiger political chief S.P.
Thamilchelvam asserted that the SLN had destroyed the
ship (which he said was an "oil tanker"), although it
was acting peaceably and following all the SLN´s orders.
(Note: The letter was posted on "TamilNet," a pro-LTTE
website, on June 15.) Thamilchelvam also claimed that
the LTTE´s ship had been intercepted in "international
waters" over 260 nautical miles off the northeast coast
(as opposed to the 110 or 175 miles variously claimed by
the SLN). Wrapping up, Thamilchelvam asked for the SLMM
to look into the matter, stating (menacingly):
"We hold the SLN fully responsible for the unlawful
destruction of our vessel and criminal abduction of our
cadre...We are afraid that the SLN is working hard on a
sabotage course of the entire peace process. We wish to
advise you that the SLN will have to bear responsibility
for any dire consequences that may arise as a result of
their action. Please favor us with an early report,
taking into consideration the seriousness of the
incident and our concern for the lives of our cadres."
(Note: The navy has denied the accusation made above by
Thamilchelvam that it has detained the LTTE personnel on
board the ship that sank.)
5. (C) The SLMM has confirmed that it is looking into
the matter. Agnes Bragadottir, the SLMM spokeswoman,
told us that her organization was in touch with both the
Tigers and the GSL over the incident. She allowed that
rough seas off the northeast coast were helping retard
efforts by SLMM sea monitors to investigate what
transpired, but said the SLMM would keep trying.
Bragadottir said it was not clear how many LTTE crew
members were on board the ship (she thought there were
about 12), but the SLMM was using its good offices to
account for them. (Note: Bragadottir confirmed that
the SLMM had also been in touch with the Tigers on
Friday, June 13, over the case of two police officers
being held by the Tigers in the east -- see Reftels.)
=======================
Assassination in Jaffna
=======================
6. (SBU) In the other violent incident taking place on
June 14, a high-level Tamil opponent of the Tigers was
assassinated in Jaffna town. From what Mission
understands, Kandiah Subathiran (FYI: Confusingly,
Subathiran went by several names with various
spellings), a high-ranking official in the anti-LTTE
Eelam People´s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF),
was shot and killed while exercising on the roof of his
house/office early June 14. The sniper, who escaped, is
believed to have been some distance away, perhaps hiding
in a nearby school, when he fired the shots.
Subathiran´s killing brings the number of anti-LTTE
Tamils who have been killed in the past several months
to almost 30 (See Ref B). (Note: Mission personnel had
met Subathiran on several occasions, but he was not a
close contact. Subathiran was a former elected
official, serving on Jaffna´s local council).
7. (C) Via the generally pro-LTTE elements of the Tamil
National Alliance political grouping, the Tamil Tigers
have denied any involvement in the June 14 killing.
This fits into the pattern of previous killings of anti-
LTTE Tamil opponents, all of which the Tigers have
denied they were responsible for (see Reftels).
(Note: In addition to the June 14 Jaffna killing,
another Tamil was gunned down on June 15, this time in
the Batticaloa area of the east. The victim is believed
to have defected from the LTTE several years ago.)
=======
COMMENT
=======
8. (C) The peace track has already been under
considerable strain due to the Tigers´ refusal to come
back to the face-to-face talks right away, as well as
their failure to show up at the Tokyo donors conference
(see Ref B). These latest incidents have only served to
increase the strain in two major ways. First, in regard
to the latest sea incident (such confrontations have
been a recurring problem for the ceasefire), it is
apparent that the LTTE is very angry over what happened
and it is reacting in a semi-threatening manner.
Second, the assassination in Jaffna -- which was almost
certainly perpetrated by the LTTE -- was brazen to say
the least and leads to more questions about the Tigers´
intentions. At this time, the government´s reaction to
this new load of problems is unclear. Trying to point
things back in the right direction after the highly
successful Tokyo conference is clearly proving a
challenge, however. (Note: In June 16 comments to the
press, G.L. Peiris, a key minister, said the government
was putting together new proposals for the LTTE´s review
regarding the formation of an interim structure to run
the north/east.) END COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
WILLS
12. 12.11.2003: Sri Lanka update: No resolution in "cordial" President-PM meeting; Norwegians here to meet all sides
11/12/2003 11:45
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001956
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT; NSC FOR E.
MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-12-13
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PINR, NO, CE, Political Parties
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka update: No resolution in "cordial"
President-PM meeting; Norwegians here to meet all sides
Refs: (A) Colombo 1943
- (B) Colombo 1942, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Wickremesinghe met with
President Kumaratunga on November 12 with no discernible
resolution to the political turmoil. A Norwegian
delegation arrived to meet with all parties regarding
recent political events and its effect on the peace
process. Separately, Tamils and Muslims expressed
concern over the President´s November 4-5 actions to the
visiting Norwegian peace facilitators. Buddhist monks
told the President she should have consulted with the PM
prior to taking action. As the various parties continue
discussions, the next week may be crucial to the
resolution of this political stalemate. END SUMMARY.
President meets with PM
-----------------------
2. (C) On November 12, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe
met with President Kumaratunga, in response to the
latter´s invitation to discuss her "grand alliance"
government proposal. While there has been no
substantial readout of the 2 and a half hour meeting,
Bradman Weerakoon, the PM´s secretary has been quoted as
saying it "went well," and characterized it as "cordial
and friendly." Reports indicate that, as no agreement
between the President and PM was reached, they have
agreed to further talks. A joint President/PM press
statement issued late on November 12 confirmed that
further talks would be planned for next week.
Norwegians arrive to hear all parties´ sides
--------------------------------------------
3. (C) Vidar Helgesen, Norwegian Deputy Foreign
Minister and special envoy Erik Solheim began their
visit on November 11 by meeting separately with Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) parliamentarians. (See below for TNA and SLMC
comments on the meetings with the Norwegians.) Tomas
Stangeland, Norwegian Embassy political officer, told
poloff on November 12 that the delegation remains
concerned about the peace process, but will not make any
public comments until it speaks with all parties. The
Norwegian delegation is scheduled to meet with President
Kumaratunga late afternoon on November 12, before going
to LTTE headquarters in the Wanni on November 13 for a
meeting with Tiger leader V. Prabakharan. According to
Stangeland, Helgesen intends to brief the diplomatic
community early on November 14 before returning to
Norway.
4. (C) Helgesen and Solheim, in a November 12 meeting
with Ambassador, said the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) told them that the military was conducting
themselves properly in recent days. Helgesen also said
that Norway would find it difficult, if not impossible,
to continue the facilitation role if it were not clear
who was in charge in the government. In additional
comments to poloff on November 12, Agnes Bragadottir,
SLMM spokeswoman, said that there "had been little
change in the functioning of the defense forces," in
response to the President´s takeover of the Defense
ministry.
Tamils express concern over President´s sincerity
--------------------------------------------- ----
5. (C) In a November 11 meeting, members of the pro-
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) TNA told
visiting Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim that
defense arrangements should "remain in the hands of one
party that is dedicated to take forward the current
peace process with sincerity," according to press
reports. Gajen Ponnambalam, TNA MP, told Pol FSN on
November 12 that it was "impossible" to work with the
President on the peace process while she held the
Defense portfolio, as there was no trust in the
President among the Tamil community. Echoing
Ponnambalam´s comments, Joseph Pararajasingham, another
TNA member, told poloff that the peace process should
continue under the PM, as Tamils could not have faith in
President Kumaratunga´s handling of the peace process,
given some of her past actions towards the LTTE, such as
her non-response to a unilateral ceasefire offered by
the group in 2000. In an effort to discuss their
concerns, a TNA delegation is scheduled to meet with the
Prime Minister late on November 12.
Muslims cite concerns in meeting with Norwegians
--------------------------------------------- ---
6. (C) For their part, eight Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
(SLMC) MPs expressed to the Norwegians their concern
that the GSL will not take responsibility for any peace
process negotiations without control of the defense and
interior ministries. A.M. Jaufer, Parliamentary
Secretary to senior Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem, told
SIPDIS
poloff on November 12 that the group further made clear
their demand for a separate Muslim delegation at future
GSL-LTTE peace talks. Jaufer, confirming that the SLMC
was formulating a response to the LTTE´s October 31
counterproposals to the GSL, anticipated another two
months before the response was finalized.
GSL: Determine responsibility before talks resume
--------------------------------------------- -----
7. (C) G.L. Peiris, a key government minister and the
United National Party (UNP) spokesman (not to mention
the lead negotiator with the LTTE), told press late on
November 10 that the government needed to determine who
would be responsible for the peace process before direct
negotiations with the Tigers could resume. Peiris
stated that it was "realistic to assume" that the
President´s actions of November 4-5 had placed the peace
process at "some risk," according to press reports.
Peiris reiterated the earlier UNP position that
responsibility for the peace process should reside in
one person, adding that if President Kumaratunga was not
willing to take responsibility for the peace process "in
total," then she should return control of the three key
ministries she had assumed.
Buddhist clergy negative on President´s actions
--------------------------------------------- --
8. (C) At the President´s invitation, Buddhist clergy
met with her on November 12 to hear the explanation of
her takeover of the defense, interior, and mass
communications ministries. Reverend Wimalaratana, a
well-respected, moderate Buddhist monk who attended the
meeting, told us that the President underscored that
current security situation combined with the PM´s
failure to listen to her advice led her to take action.
In response to the President´s actions, the clergy told
the President that she should have consulted with the PM
prior to taking over the ministries. According to
Wimalaratana, the President replied that she felt
compelled to act and had no time for discussions with
the PM. In speaking about the peace process, the
President told the clergy that she was not ready to
accept full responsibility for the peace process, but
wanted to work together through her proposal for a
"grand alliance" for all parties. The monks expressed
doubt about the future of the peace process, but stated
to the President that peace process efforts should
continue.
9. (C) In November 12 conversations with the political
section, two members of the Buddhist clergy from the
Malwatte and Asgiriya temples (the two leading monastic
orders) expressed their disappointment with the
President and her actions. Venerable Dehideniye
Ratanasara, deputy chief of the Malwatte temple, told
Pol FSN that the President´s actions were destabilizing
for the country. Ratanasara felt that the President
should support the PM in his government´s efforts to
negotiate a peaceful, durable solution with the Tigers.
Venerable Koshinne Dhammarama from the Asgirya temple
further mentioned that, in working with the government,
the President should return control of the ministries to
the GSL.
10. (C) COMMENT: As the various parties continue
discussions, the next weeks may be crucial to the
resolution of this political stalemate. The PM
continues to emphasize that he cannot continue the peace
process if there is split responsibility, i.e. if the
President continues to hold the Defense portfolio. As
for the President, various parties continue to speak out
against her actions of last week. The effort of
resolving the impasse between the PM and President is
likely to be lengthy, with the peace process on hold in
the meantime. We find it very encouraging, however,
that the first PM-President meeting lasted at least two
hours and that apparently agreement was reached to meet
again. END COMMENT.
11. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
13. 23.6.2004: Norwegian peregrinations for peace
6/23/2004 7:18
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001062
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E.MILLARD
PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2014
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, External Relations, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN PEREGRINATIONS FOR PEACE
REF: COLOMBO 1013 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d).
SUMMARY
-------
1. (C) Norwegian visit to Delhi was largely a briefing for
the Indians, who expressed support for Norway and its role in
the peace process. Both GSL and LTTE have asked Norway to
continue to try to find a formula to allow them to resume
talks. Norwegians may wait until after July 10 Provincial
elections before making a new proposal, but Solheim will
visit Sri Lanka next week for discussions. LTTE continues to
be upset about alleged GSL support for breakaway leader
Karuna. The GSL is taking some steps which "test the limits"
of the Cease Fire Agreement. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) Ambassador met with Norwegian Ambassador Hans
Brattskar June 22 to discuss recent Norwegian activities in
support of Sri Lankan Peace Process. These included meetings
last week between Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen
and Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga in London, between
Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) adviser Balasingham also in London, and
Helgesen,s visit to New Delhi. Solheim will return to Sri
Lanka next week.
BRIEFING THE INDIANS IN NEW DELHI
---------------------------------
3. (C) Brattskar traveled to New Delhi for Helgesen,s
meetings with the new Indian government June 19. Helgesen
met with Foreign Minister Singh, National Security Adviser
Dixit, and the Foreign Secretary. Brattskar described the
meetings as basically a briefing by Norway on the peace
process, with very little input by the Indians. The Indian
officials, he said, were supportive of Norway and its role,
and asked many questions. They said that India would play a
positive role, and that there would be "no surprises."
Brattskar did note that Dixit said that his own views on Sri
Lanka were naturally colored by his experiences there as High
Commissioner from 1985-87.
CBK AND BALASINGHAM IN LONDON
-----------------------------
4. (C) Brattskar said that Helgesen had a two hour
one-on-one meeting with President Kumaratunga in London last
week. (Kumaratunga was in London to attend her daughter´s
graduation from medical school.) They had a "good exchange."
Helgesen clarified for her that it is not Norway which is
insisting that the two sides agree on a statement before they
can meet again. Kumaratunga had suggested that the two sides
could proceed on the basis of an "understanding" if they
could not reach agreement on a statement. But, said
Brattskar, LTTE distrust is so deep that they will not move
forward without "something solid."
5. (C) The good news is that both sides have asked the
Norwegians to continue to work the issue. For the LTTE, this
was confirmed by both Balasingham in London and by
Thamilchelvam in his meeting with Brattskar on June 16
(Reftel). Brattskar noted that the two sides had been "very
very close" to an agreement several weeks ago, but that the
government had kept putting new things in. Norway would now
try to come up with a new, and simpler, text to which both
sides could agree. (Brattskar confirmed that the statement
would be one by Norway, not by the two sides.) The
Norwegians were considering what such a statement might look
like, and also what might be the right time to try to move
ahead. One school of thought is that the Government will not
be able to agree to anything until after the Provincial
Council Elections on July 10, so Norway might delay until
that point. Brattskar did say, however, that Special Envoy
Eric Solheim would return to Sri Lanka next week for talks
with both sides.
6. (C) Brattskar agreed with Ambassador that President
Kumaratunga had so far been much more flexible than the LTTE.
Her last offer -- to conclude negotiations on an interim
administration and then to begin negotiations on final issues
while the interim administration was being set up -- was
quite forward-leaning. The LTTE was so suspicious, however,
that they had not moved at all, said Brattskar. He noted
that Government actions tended to reinforce LTTE suspicions.
The LTTE was especially worked up about the situation in the
East and alleged Government support to Karuna. (See Septel
for more details.) Balasingham and Thamilchelvam had both
stressed the need to maintain the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA).
Unfortunately, Brattskar said, the Government was taking
some steps which were not good at this time. For instance,
the Sri Lankan Navy and the LTTE were now embroiled in a
dispute over movement of LTTE cadres by boat. The Navy was
attempting to unilaterally change the procedures which had
been followed until now. Brattskar described this as the
Navy &testing the limits,8 which was not good at this
sensitive time. He also said that Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission head General Furhovde was quite unhappy about this.
(Ambassador will see Furhovde, who is currently out of
Colombo, early next week.)
COMMENT
-------
7. (C) The current Norwegian tactic of stepping back for a
minute and then trying to come up with a fresh formulation
which could satisfy both sides seems a good one at the
moment. Ambassador will make points about all sides needing
to compromise and necessity to support the Cease Fire when he
holds an &on the record session8 with leading editors on
June 24. Importance of the cease fire and seeking
clarification on recent changes in naval procedures with the
LTTE would also be useful topics to raise during Deputy
Secretary,s upcoming meeting with Sri Lankan Navy chief
SIPDIS
Admiral Sandagiri. END COMMENT.
LUNSTEAD
14. 6.3.2004: Ignoring orders of LTTE leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east
3/6/2004 8:31
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000406
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT, SA/INS, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/14
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, CE, NO, Elections, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Ignoring orders of LTTE
leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east
Refs: (A) Ops Center - Colombo 03/08/2004 telecon
- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 060831Z Mar 04
- (C) Oslo 419
- (D) Colombo 387, and previous
(U) Classified by Charge´d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The main Tamil Tiger organization in
the north announced March 6 that it was replacing a
dissident commander. The commander, Karuna, has refused
to step down, however, and remains ensconced in his
eastern jungle base. No violence has been reported, but
the situation is becoming increasingly tense in the
east. The GSL has indicated that it has no plans to
deal directly with Karuna despite his requests that it
do so. In the meantime, the campaign for the April 2
parliamentary elections proceeds apace in the rest of
the country. Karuna´s split from the main LTTE
organization appears to be the most serious internal
crisis ever faced by the group. If there is no
resolution to the situation, there will almost certainly
be complications for the peace track down the road. END
SUMMARY.
====================================
LTTE Acts to replace Rebel Commander
====================================
2. (U) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have
reacted to eastern military commander Karuna´s recent
moves to separate his command from the main organization
(see Ref D). On March 6, LTTE Political chief S.P.
Thamilchelvam, speaking at a press conference held in
the northern LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi,
announced that Karuna had been removed from his
position. An official statement posted on the pro-Tiger
website "TamilNet" explained the decision in the
following (choppy) manner:
"Mr. Karuna, who was commander of Batticaloa-Ampara,
instigated by some malicious elements opposed to the
Tamil Eelam liberation struggle, acting traitorously to
the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national
leadership, has planned to secede himself from the
liberation organization. The commanders, divisional
heads and cadres under him unable to acquiesce with his
traitorous act have refused to comply with his orders
and met with the national leadership, and explained the
ground reality prevailing there. In accordance with
this, Karuna has been discharged from the Liberation
Tiger organization and relieved from official
responsibilities."
3. (U) The LTTE statement went on to name Ramesh
(formerly Karuna´s deputy) as "special commander" of the
Batticaloa/Ampara sector, Karuna´s former political
adviser Kaushlyan was retained as political head, and
two other cadre, Ram and Prabha, were named as commander
and deputy commander respectively. Speaking at the
press conference following the announcement of Karuna´s
expulsion from the Tigers, Ramesh stated "the decision
Karuna has made is his own. He has not discussed this
with the leadership. The commanders, officials, and
fighters do not accept the decisions he has made on his
own." Joining in the wave of criticism of Karuna was
former Batticaloa/Ampara Tiger political head Karikalan,
who was quoted by TamilNet as stating: "Karuna will be
seen as a Pol Pot if he continues to act irresponsibly
towards our people." Thamilchelvam was also quoted as
stating, "our leader is always ready to provide amnesty
to those who realize their mistakes and I have high
hopes that Karuna will be given amnesty." He also
indicated that the LTTE continues to support the peace
process, stating: "our leadership and our structures
remain firmly committed to peaceful negotiations and the
ceasefire agreement, and this isolated issue will not
affect the peace initiative."
======================
Karuna remains Defiant
======================
4. (SBU) For his part, Karuna remains defiant in the
face of his expulsion from the LTTE. Karuna, in an
interview with a local newspaper, was quoted as stating:
"We will not take orders from Prabhakaran." He also
asserted that the LTTE had sent out "killer squads" in
an effort to assassinate him. Karuna told the BBC that
he was willing to return to the main LTTE organization
if guarantees were given that eastern LTTE personnel
would receive the same treatment as northern elements
from now on. (Karuna has said his rebellion is based,
in part, on his view that northern LTTE members do not
respect members from the east.) Karuna also demanded
the removal of several high-level officials serving LTTE
leader V. Prabhakaran, including Intelligence Chief
Pottu Aman. Numerous media reports also carried
statements from Karuna´s spokesman, Varanthan, to the
effect that the breakaway faction of the LTTE controlled
by Karuna would function as an independent unit and
would continue to observe the ceasefire "even though we
are not a party to it." Varathan also said the LTTE´s
official statement of expulsion "lacked logic," as
Karuna had already made a decision to leave the group.
In a press report late on March 8, Varathan said the
dissident faction of the Tigers controlled by Karuna
would consider "a friendly partnership" with
Prabhakaran, but he did not provide further details.
5. (C) Estimates vary wildly, but there may be as many
as six thousand LTTE personnel in the eastern district
who remain loyal to Karuna. (There are unconfirmed
reports that the main LTTE organization may be
preventing up to 600 eastern cadre who have been based
in the north from returning to the east.) Karuna
himself is said to be ensconced deep in bases in the
Thoppigalla jungle located west of Batticaloa city.
These long-time LTTE bases are said to be well-
fortified. That said, it is not clear what financial
resources Karuna´s group has, and whether it has
significant supplies of food and ammunition for the long
haul.
===========================
Heightened Tensions in East
===========================
6. (SBU) While the majority of Mission´s contacts in
the east describe the situation there as calm for the
most part, an underlying mood of tension has been
developing since Karuna´s defection from the main
organization on March 3. Contacts at the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) confirm that at least two pro-
Karuna protests took place in Batticaloa district on
March 7. Effigies of Tiger leader V. Prabakharan and
newly appointed eastern commander Ramesh were burnt in
both demonstrations. Pro-Karuna elements also sponsored
a hartal (work stoppage) on March 8 in Tamil areas of
Batticaloa and Ampara Districts that was successful in
closing down some shops. In a related development,
examinations have been postponed at Eastern University,
located 20 kilometers south of Batticaloa city, and
student housing at the Tamil-dominated university has
been closed down and students told to leave.
7. (C) Although tensions are inching up, no violence
has been reported. Contacts indicate a significant
increase in the number of LTTE forces gathering in an
area dividing Trincomalee District from Batticaloa
District, however. Kurt Spur of the SLMM´s Trincomalee
office told poloff March 8 that there had been a "large
increase" in the number of LTTE cadre gathered near the
town of Verugal in this area. The forces in the Verugal
area appear to be loyal to the main LTTE organization.
It is not clear whether these forces plan to enter
Batticaloa District in an attempt to oust Karuna.
(There are reports that the main LTTE organization has
arrested Pathuman, the political chief for Trincomalee.
The reports are unconfirmed, but Pathuman may have been
arrested because he is considered pro-Karuna.)
============================
GSL Takes "Hands-off" Policy
============================
8. (C) The Sri Lankan government appears to be sticking
to a "hands off" policy regarding the LTTE crisis. Late
March 5, Defense Secretary Cyril Herath rejected the
idea of negotiating a separate ceasefire pact with
Karuna´s breakaway faction, stating in a press interview
"when there is one ceasefire agreement signed between
the Prime Minister and Prabhakaran, how can we have
another?" (Per Ref D, Karuna had approached the Sri
Lankan military last week and offered to negotiate a
separate ceasefire accord for the east.) Karuna was
reportedly not happy with this response from the GSL,
and was quoted as stating that if the government did not
deal with his faction "I will be forced to display my
strength." Despite reports to the contrary in the local
press, the Sri Lankan military has said it is not on
"high alert." Military spokesman Colonel Sumeda Perera
told poloff March 8 that the military was closely
monitoring the situation in the east, however.
9. (SBU) As of March 8, both President Kumaratunga´s
People´s Alliance (PA) party and Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe´s United National Party (UNP) continue to
remain virtually mum regarding the LTTE rift. In one of
the few instances of comment on the Tiger situation by a
political entity in the south, the Patriotic National
Movement (PNM), an extremist Sinhalese group linked to
the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party,
issued a statement on March 7. The statement alleged
that the split in the LTTE presented an opportunity for
the south to undermine the LTTE and perhaps destroy the
group. The PNM asserted that the SLMM should not get in
the middle of the situation and criticized the PM for
not using the situation in a way that would break up the
LTTE organization.
=========================================
Parliamentary Election Campaign continues
=========================================
10. (SBU) Against the backdrop of the recent
developments in the Tiger organization, the campaign for
Sri Lanka´s upcoming April 2 parliamentary elections
continues apace. President Kumaratunga and PM
Wickremesinghe have been speaking in front of large
rallies in various parts of the country. Candidates
have also been engaged in canvassing in a normal
fashion. Based on what Mission is hearing, campaigning
continues in LTTE-influenced areas like Jaffna and
Trincomalee. Some canvassing is reportedly even taking
place in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, though at a
lower level than before the LTTE crisis. In other
election-related developments, a team of election
monitors from the European Union arrived in Sri Lanka on
March 7. The leader of the EU´s monitors, John
Cushnahan, a senior European parliamentarian, is slated
to arrive on March 10. The EU team will consist of
roughly sixty monitors when it is fully on the ground
(twenty are expected to arrive this coming weekend).
=======
COMMENT
=======
11. (C) The exact dimensions of Karuna´s split from the
main LTTE organization are as yet unclear. As touched
on above, there are conflicting reports, for example,
over whether the bulk of LTTE forces in the east remain
loyal to Karuna, or to the main LTTE organization.
Moreover, although it took the step to fire Karuna in a
very public manner, it remains unclear whether the LTTE
plans to move quickly to try to oust him (or worse), or
to proceed more cautiously, perhaps because it does not
yet have enough forces in place in the east to take
action against him. In any case, Karuna´s split from
the main LTTE organization appears to be the most
serious internal crisis ever faced by the group.
12. (C) If the situation is not resolved quickly, there
will be implications for the peace process. In the
near-term, there does not appear to be any serious
threat to the informal peace process, though out-and-out
warfare between rival LTTE factions could lead to
serious complications in affected areas. In the longer
term, however, the Norwegian facilitators will have
their hands full monitoring the ceasefire accord and
trying to resume peace talks if there are two de facto
LTTE groups, one in the north and the other in the east.
END COMMENT.
13. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
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