Wikileaks classified documents on Sri Lanka (Full Text ) Part Three

WikiLeaks on SRI LANKA
[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]

10. 6.5.2003: Norwegians, Japanese press Tigers to return to talks and to attend donors conference

"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000755 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:

DECL: 05-06-13

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Norwegians, Japanese press Tigers to return to talks and to attend donors conference

Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/06/03 fax - (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 050411Z May 03 - (C) Colombo 750, and previous (Notal) (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.

Reasons: 1.5 (b, d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian and Japanese representatives are urgently trying to convince the Tigers to get back to the peace table and to attend the June donors conference. So far, the Tigers are not playing ball. The next best chance to change their minds seems to be GoJ envoy Akashi´s May 7 meeting with Tiger leader Prabakharan. In other peace-related news, the PM was conciliatory toward the Tigers in an address to Parliament on May 6. At this point, it seems a fifty- fifty wager as to whether the Tigers will climb down from their hard-line stance. END SUMMARY

2. (C) NORWEGIANS MEET TIGERS: Norwegian and Japanese facilitators are urgently trying to convince the Tigers to get back to the peace table and to attend the June donors conference. In the latest of an increasingly tangled skein of tag team-type meetings, Norwegian facilitators met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief negotiator Anton Balasingham upon the latter´s arrival at Colombo´s international airport on May

5. (Note: The London-based Balasingham has returned to Sri Lanka for talks with his leadership in the LTTE-controlled Wanni region of northern Sri Lanka. Norwegian facilitators had met with LTTE Political Chief Thamilchelvam in the Wanni on April 30 -- see Ref C.)

3. (SBU) Commenting to the press about the May 5 meeting, GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, who is now in India, stated that ""I feel we have a good dialogue with the parties and we will work on that over the next week."" When pressed, Helgesen went on to admit that the Tigers had not committed to return to the peace table with the GSL, and had not agreed to come to the June donors conference. The Norwegians´ next meeting with the LTTE is planned for May 8 when special envoy Erik Solheim is slated to meet Balasingham in the Wanni.

4. (SBU) JAPANESE EFFORTS: In the meantime, a high- level Japanese envoy is also in country with the aim of pressing the LTTE to get back to the talks and to change its mind re the donors conference. The envoy, Yasushi Akashi, will be in Sri Lanka from May 3-9 on a wide- ranging visit, which will include talks with government and Opposition figures. Akashi is also expected to travel to eastern Sri Lanka, where communal tensions are high due to friction between the LTTE and the local Muslim community. (Note: These tensions intermittently flare into violence and did so most recently in the Trincomalee town of Mutur in mid-April. Akashi´s itinerary includes a stop in this town.)

5. (C) In a May 5 meeting with Ambassador Wills, Akashi confirmed that he planned to meet with LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran on May 7 in the Wanni. Akashi said he hoped to use this meeting to press Prabhakaran hard to change his mind re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference. He allowed that he was not sure how much he could move Prabhakaran on these issues, but he said he would do his best.

6. (SBU) PM SPEAKS TO PARLIAMENT: In other peace- related news, the PM was conciliatory toward the Tigers in an address to Parliament on May

6. (Note: See Ref A for the text of his remarks.) The PM´s statement is expected to be the opening salvo of a debate in Parliament on the government´s handling of the peace process.

7. (SBU) In his long statement, the PM confirmed the government´s stance that it wanted the Tigers to return to the peace talks as soon as possible. Reacting to LTTE claims that the GSL was not doing enough in this key area, the PM added that the government was committed to taking steps to improve the humanitarian situation in the north and east. The PM went on to stress that the government was willing to examine the issue of how to handle the military security zones in Jaffna, which the Tigers want to see sharply reduced. One way to do this, he emphasized, was for the government and the LTTE to work closely with retired Indian general Satish Nambiar, who recently prepared a report with recommendations on how to handle the security zones issue (see Ref C for an analysis of this report).

8. (C) COMMENT: At this point based on our soundings, it seems a fifty-fifty wager as to whether the Tigers will climb down from their hard-line stance. Although they deal with the Tigers more than anyone else, the Norwegians, while not flummoxed per se, do not seem to have a solid grasp of where the Tigers are leaning at this time -- and nor does anyone else. In this regard, Akashi´s scheduled meeting with Prabhakaran could be very important. Akashi, who dealt with the remnants of the Khmer Rouge during his UN days in Cambodia, would seem well-positioned to size up Prabhakaran. In the process, hopefully, he will gain some insights into whether the Tigers want to stabilize the process or create more turbulence. END COMMENT.

9. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"

11. 16.6.2003: Tensions notch up over sinking of Tamil Tigership and latest slaying of a Tiger opponent

6/16/2003 10:46

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001053

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-16-13

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PHUM, CE, JA, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Tensions notch up over sinking of Tamil Tiger

ship and latest slaying of a Tiger opponent

Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 06/14/03 telecon

- (B) Colombo 1034, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.

Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Two violent incidents on June 14 have

sparked an increase in tension between the Tigers and

the GSL. In the first, a Tiger ship exploded off the

northeast coast after being intercepted by the navy. It

is unclear whether the crew detonated the ship or

whether it was destroyed by GSL gunfire. In the other

incident, a high-level opponent of the Tigers was

assassinated in Jaffna. The Tigers, in semi-threatening

tones, have complained about the sea incident and denied

involvement in the Jaffna slaying. The latest incidents

have placed added strain on the peace process. END

SUMMARY.

=====================

Sinking of Tiger Ship

=====================

2. (SBU) Two violent incidents on Saturday, June 14,

have sparked an increase in tension between the Tigers

and the Sri Lankan government. In the first incident,

according to the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN), its vessels

intercepted two ships belonging to the Liberation Tigers

of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) approximately 110 nautical miles

off the northeast coast in the Bay of Bengal early

morning June 14. (Note: Some SLN sources have stated

that the incident took place closer to 175 miles off

shore; the LTTE has claimed it took place over 260 miles

off shore -- see below.) Based on what the SLN has

said, the two LTTE ships refused to return to port under

escort and began to fire at the SLN ships. In response,

the SLN, which had only fired some warning shots,

commenced firing at the ships, and, suddenly, one of

them exploded and subsequently sank. The other LTTE

ship escaped and has not been re-intercepted as of late

June 16. (Note: There are unconfirmed reports in the

Sri Lankan press that the Indian military is providing

the GSL intelligence and other assistance in locating

the ship that escaped.) Judging by the secondary

explosions on the boat that sank, the SLN believes that

the LTTE ship was an arms resupply vessel. According to

press reports, up to 12 cadre were on the vessel that

sank. They are all presumed dead (though the LTTE has

stated that the crew was abducted by the navy -- see

below).

3. (SBU) There is some confusion over the SLN´s version

of events, primarily over how the LTTE ship was sunk.

The president´s office, for example, announced that the

LTTE ship sank due to SLN firing, and had not self-

detonated as the navy has been claiming. The government

has not yet worked out this discrepancy. (Note: For

its part, the LTTE has asserted that the navy sank its

ship -- see below. There have been previous incidents

when LTTE sea cadre self-detonated their vessels after

being intercepted by the SLN, killing themselves in the

process. In the most recent sea incident, which took

place in March, however, a LTTE vessel was sunk off the

northeast coast by SLN gunnery, with the loss of its 11-

member LTTE crew. For additional details on the June 14

sea incident, please see DATT Septel.)

==========================

LTTE complains to Monitors

==========================

4. (SBU) The LTTE has bitterly complained to the

monitors over the June 14 sea incident. In a somewhat

confusing letter to the Norwegian-run Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Tiger political chief S.P.

Thamilchelvam asserted that the SLN had destroyed the

ship (which he said was an "oil tanker"), although it

was acting peaceably and following all the SLN´s orders.

(Note: The letter was posted on "TamilNet," a pro-LTTE

website, on June 15.) Thamilchelvam also claimed that

the LTTE´s ship had been intercepted in "international

waters" over 260 nautical miles off the northeast coast

(as opposed to the 110 or 175 miles variously claimed by

the SLN). Wrapping up, Thamilchelvam asked for the SLMM

to look into the matter, stating (menacingly):

"We hold the SLN fully responsible for the unlawful

destruction of our vessel and criminal abduction of our

cadre...We are afraid that the SLN is working hard on a

sabotage course of the entire peace process. We wish to

advise you that the SLN will have to bear responsibility

for any dire consequences that may arise as a result of

their action. Please favor us with an early report,

taking into consideration the seriousness of the

incident and our concern for the lives of our cadres."

(Note: The navy has denied the accusation made above by

Thamilchelvam that it has detained the LTTE personnel on

board the ship that sank.)

5. (C) The SLMM has confirmed that it is looking into

the matter. Agnes Bragadottir, the SLMM spokeswoman,

told us that her organization was in touch with both the

Tigers and the GSL over the incident. She allowed that

rough seas off the northeast coast were helping retard

efforts by SLMM sea monitors to investigate what

transpired, but said the SLMM would keep trying.

Bragadottir said it was not clear how many LTTE crew

members were on board the ship (she thought there were

about 12), but the SLMM was using its good offices to

account for them. (Note: Bragadottir confirmed that

the SLMM had also been in touch with the Tigers on

Friday, June 13, over the case of two police officers

being held by the Tigers in the east -- see Reftels.)

=======================

Assassination in Jaffna

=======================

6. (SBU) In the other violent incident taking place on

June 14, a high-level Tamil opponent of the Tigers was

assassinated in Jaffna town. From what Mission

understands, Kandiah Subathiran (FYI: Confusingly,

Subathiran went by several names with various

spellings), a high-ranking official in the anti-LTTE

Eelam People´s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF),

was shot and killed while exercising on the roof of his

house/office early June 14. The sniper, who escaped, is

believed to have been some distance away, perhaps hiding

in a nearby school, when he fired the shots.

Subathiran´s killing brings the number of anti-LTTE

Tamils who have been killed in the past several months

to almost 30 (See Ref B). (Note: Mission personnel had

met Subathiran on several occasions, but he was not a

close contact. Subathiran was a former elected

official, serving on Jaffna´s local council).

7. (C) Via the generally pro-LTTE elements of the Tamil

National Alliance political grouping, the Tamil Tigers

have denied any involvement in the June 14 killing.

This fits into the pattern of previous killings of anti-

LTTE Tamil opponents, all of which the Tigers have

denied they were responsible for (see Reftels).

(Note: In addition to the June 14 Jaffna killing,

another Tamil was gunned down on June 15, this time in

the Batticaloa area of the east. The victim is believed

to have defected from the LTTE several years ago.)

=======

COMMENT

=======

8. (C) The peace track has already been under

considerable strain due to the Tigers´ refusal to come

back to the face-to-face talks right away, as well as

their failure to show up at the Tokyo donors conference

(see Ref B). These latest incidents have only served to

increase the strain in two major ways. First, in regard

to the latest sea incident (such confrontations have

been a recurring problem for the ceasefire), it is

apparent that the LTTE is very angry over what happened

and it is reacting in a semi-threatening manner.

Second, the assassination in Jaffna -- which was almost

certainly perpetrated by the LTTE -- was brazen to say

the least and leads to more questions about the Tigers´

intentions. At this time, the government´s reaction to

this new load of problems is unclear. Trying to point

things back in the right direction after the highly

successful Tokyo conference is clearly proving a

challenge, however. (Note: In June 16 comments to the

press, G.L. Peiris, a key minister, said the government

was putting together new proposals for the LTTE´s review

regarding the formation of an interim structure to run

the north/east.) END COMMENT.

9. (U) Minimize considered.

WILLS

12. 12.11.2003: Sri Lanka update: No resolution in "cordial" President-PM meeting; Norwegians here to meet all sides

11/12/2003 11:45

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001956

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT; NSC FOR E.

MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-12-13

TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PTER, PINR, NO, CE, Political Parties

SUBJECT: Sri Lanka update: No resolution in "cordial"

President-PM meeting; Norwegians here to meet all sides

Refs: (A) Colombo 1943

- (B) Colombo 1942, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Prime Minister Wickremesinghe met with

President Kumaratunga on November 12 with no discernible

resolution to the political turmoil. A Norwegian

delegation arrived to meet with all parties regarding

recent political events and its effect on the peace

process. Separately, Tamils and Muslims expressed

concern over the President´s November 4-5 actions to the

visiting Norwegian peace facilitators. Buddhist monks

told the President she should have consulted with the PM

prior to taking action. As the various parties continue

discussions, the next week may be crucial to the

resolution of this political stalemate. END SUMMARY.

President meets with PM

-----------------------

2. (C) On November 12, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe

met with President Kumaratunga, in response to the

latter´s invitation to discuss her "grand alliance"

government proposal. While there has been no

substantial readout of the 2 and a half hour meeting,

Bradman Weerakoon, the PM´s secretary has been quoted as

saying it "went well," and characterized it as "cordial

and friendly." Reports indicate that, as no agreement

between the President and PM was reached, they have

agreed to further talks. A joint President/PM press

statement issued late on November 12 confirmed that

further talks would be planned for next week.

Norwegians arrive to hear all parties´ sides

--------------------------------------------

3. (C) Vidar Helgesen, Norwegian Deputy Foreign

Minister and special envoy Erik Solheim began their

visit on November 11 by meeting separately with Tamil

National Alliance (TNA) and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress

(SLMC) parliamentarians. (See below for TNA and SLMC

comments on the meetings with the Norwegians.) Tomas

Stangeland, Norwegian Embassy political officer, told

poloff on November 12 that the delegation remains

concerned about the peace process, but will not make any

public comments until it speaks with all parties. The

Norwegian delegation is scheduled to meet with President

Kumaratunga late afternoon on November 12, before going

to LTTE headquarters in the Wanni on November 13 for a

meeting with Tiger leader V. Prabakharan. According to

Stangeland, Helgesen intends to brief the diplomatic

community early on November 14 before returning to

Norway.

4. (C) Helgesen and Solheim, in a November 12 meeting

with Ambassador, said the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

(SLMM) told them that the military was conducting

themselves properly in recent days. Helgesen also said

that Norway would find it difficult, if not impossible,

to continue the facilitation role if it were not clear

who was in charge in the government. In additional

comments to poloff on November 12, Agnes Bragadottir,

SLMM spokeswoman, said that there "had been little

change in the functioning of the defense forces," in

response to the President´s takeover of the Defense

ministry.

Tamils express concern over President´s sincerity

--------------------------------------------- ----

5. (C) In a November 11 meeting, members of the pro-

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) TNA told

visiting Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim that

defense arrangements should "remain in the hands of one

party that is dedicated to take forward the current

peace process with sincerity," according to press

reports. Gajen Ponnambalam, TNA MP, told Pol FSN on

November 12 that it was "impossible" to work with the

President on the peace process while she held the

Defense portfolio, as there was no trust in the

President among the Tamil community. Echoing

Ponnambalam´s comments, Joseph Pararajasingham, another

TNA member, told poloff that the peace process should

continue under the PM, as Tamils could not have faith in

President Kumaratunga´s handling of the peace process,

given some of her past actions towards the LTTE, such as

her non-response to a unilateral ceasefire offered by

the group in 2000. In an effort to discuss their

concerns, a TNA delegation is scheduled to meet with the

Prime Minister late on November 12.

Muslims cite concerns in meeting with Norwegians

--------------------------------------------- ---

6. (C) For their part, eight Sri Lanka Muslim Congress

(SLMC) MPs expressed to the Norwegians their concern

that the GSL will not take responsibility for any peace

process negotiations without control of the defense and

interior ministries. A.M. Jaufer, Parliamentary

Secretary to senior Muslim leader Rauf Hakeem, told

SIPDIS

poloff on November 12 that the group further made clear

their demand for a separate Muslim delegation at future

GSL-LTTE peace talks. Jaufer, confirming that the SLMC

was formulating a response to the LTTE´s October 31

counterproposals to the GSL, anticipated another two

months before the response was finalized.

GSL: Determine responsibility before talks resume

--------------------------------------------- -----

7. (C) G.L. Peiris, a key government minister and the

United National Party (UNP) spokesman (not to mention

the lead negotiator with the LTTE), told press late on

November 10 that the government needed to determine who

would be responsible for the peace process before direct

negotiations with the Tigers could resume. Peiris

stated that it was "realistic to assume" that the

President´s actions of November 4-5 had placed the peace

process at "some risk," according to press reports.

Peiris reiterated the earlier UNP position that

responsibility for the peace process should reside in

one person, adding that if President Kumaratunga was not

willing to take responsibility for the peace process "in

total," then she should return control of the three key

ministries she had assumed.

Buddhist clergy negative on President´s actions

--------------------------------------------- --

8. (C) At the President´s invitation, Buddhist clergy

met with her on November 12 to hear the explanation of

her takeover of the defense, interior, and mass

communications ministries. Reverend Wimalaratana, a

well-respected, moderate Buddhist monk who attended the

meeting, told us that the President underscored that

current security situation combined with the PM´s

failure to listen to her advice led her to take action.

In response to the President´s actions, the clergy told

the President that she should have consulted with the PM

prior to taking over the ministries. According to

Wimalaratana, the President replied that she felt

compelled to act and had no time for discussions with

the PM. In speaking about the peace process, the

President told the clergy that she was not ready to

accept full responsibility for the peace process, but

wanted to work together through her proposal for a

"grand alliance" for all parties. The monks expressed

doubt about the future of the peace process, but stated

to the President that peace process efforts should

continue.

9. (C) In November 12 conversations with the political

section, two members of the Buddhist clergy from the

Malwatte and Asgiriya temples (the two leading monastic

orders) expressed their disappointment with the

President and her actions. Venerable Dehideniye

Ratanasara, deputy chief of the Malwatte temple, told

Pol FSN that the President´s actions were destabilizing

for the country. Ratanasara felt that the President

should support the PM in his government´s efforts to

negotiate a peaceful, durable solution with the Tigers.

Venerable Koshinne Dhammarama from the Asgirya temple

further mentioned that, in working with the government,

the President should return control of the ministries to

the GSL.

10. (C) COMMENT: As the various parties continue

discussions, the next weeks may be crucial to the

resolution of this political stalemate. The PM

continues to emphasize that he cannot continue the peace

process if there is split responsibility, i.e. if the

President continues to hold the Defense portfolio. As

for the President, various parties continue to speak out

against her actions of last week. The effort of

resolving the impasse between the PM and President is

likely to be lengthy, with the peace process on hold in

the meantime. We find it very encouraging, however,

that the first PM-President meeting lasted at least two

hours and that apparently agreement was reached to meet

again. END COMMENT.

11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD

13. 23.6.2004: Norwegian peregrinations for peace

6/23/2004 7:18

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001062

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E.MILLARD

PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, External Relations, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN PEREGRINATIONS FOR PEACE

REF: COLOMBO 1013 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead. Reason 1.5 (b,d).

SUMMARY

-------

1. (C) Norwegian visit to Delhi was largely a briefing for

the Indians, who expressed support for Norway and its role in

the peace process. Both GSL and LTTE have asked Norway to

continue to try to find a formula to allow them to resume

talks. Norwegians may wait until after July 10 Provincial

elections before making a new proposal, but Solheim will

visit Sri Lanka next week for discussions. LTTE continues to

be upset about alleged GSL support for breakaway leader

Karuna. The GSL is taking some steps which "test the limits"

of the Cease Fire Agreement. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) Ambassador met with Norwegian Ambassador Hans

Brattskar June 22 to discuss recent Norwegian activities in

support of Sri Lankan Peace Process. These included meetings

last week between Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen

and Sri Lankan President Kumaratunga in London, between

Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim and Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) adviser Balasingham also in London, and

Helgesen,s visit to New Delhi. Solheim will return to Sri

Lanka next week.

BRIEFING THE INDIANS IN NEW DELHI

---------------------------------

3. (C) Brattskar traveled to New Delhi for Helgesen,s

meetings with the new Indian government June 19. Helgesen

met with Foreign Minister Singh, National Security Adviser

Dixit, and the Foreign Secretary. Brattskar described the

meetings as basically a briefing by Norway on the peace

process, with very little input by the Indians. The Indian

officials, he said, were supportive of Norway and its role,

and asked many questions. They said that India would play a

positive role, and that there would be "no surprises."

Brattskar did note that Dixit said that his own views on Sri

Lanka were naturally colored by his experiences there as High

Commissioner from 1985-87.

CBK AND BALASINGHAM IN LONDON

-----------------------------

4. (C) Brattskar said that Helgesen had a two hour

one-on-one meeting with President Kumaratunga in London last

week. (Kumaratunga was in London to attend her daughter´s

graduation from medical school.) They had a "good exchange."

Helgesen clarified for her that it is not Norway which is

insisting that the two sides agree on a statement before they

can meet again. Kumaratunga had suggested that the two sides

could proceed on the basis of an "understanding" if they

could not reach agreement on a statement. But, said

Brattskar, LTTE distrust is so deep that they will not move

forward without "something solid."

5. (C) The good news is that both sides have asked the

Norwegians to continue to work the issue. For the LTTE, this

was confirmed by both Balasingham in London and by

Thamilchelvam in his meeting with Brattskar on June 16

(Reftel). Brattskar noted that the two sides had been "very

very close" to an agreement several weeks ago, but that the

government had kept putting new things in. Norway would now

try to come up with a new, and simpler, text to which both

sides could agree. (Brattskar confirmed that the statement

would be one by Norway, not by the two sides.) The

Norwegians were considering what such a statement might look

like, and also what might be the right time to try to move

ahead. One school of thought is that the Government will not

be able to agree to anything until after the Provincial

Council Elections on July 10, so Norway might delay until

that point. Brattskar did say, however, that Special Envoy

Eric Solheim would return to Sri Lanka next week for talks

with both sides.

6. (C) Brattskar agreed with Ambassador that President

Kumaratunga had so far been much more flexible than the LTTE.

Her last offer -- to conclude negotiations on an interim

administration and then to begin negotiations on final issues

while the interim administration was being set up -- was

quite forward-leaning. The LTTE was so suspicious, however,

that they had not moved at all, said Brattskar. He noted

that Government actions tended to reinforce LTTE suspicions.

The LTTE was especially worked up about the situation in the

East and alleged Government support to Karuna. (See Septel

for more details.) Balasingham and Thamilchelvam had both

stressed the need to maintain the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA).

Unfortunately, Brattskar said, the Government was taking

some steps which were not good at this time. For instance,

the Sri Lankan Navy and the LTTE were now embroiled in a

dispute over movement of LTTE cadres by boat. The Navy was

attempting to unilaterally change the procedures which had

been followed until now. Brattskar described this as the

Navy &testing the limits,8 which was not good at this

sensitive time. He also said that Sri Lanka Monitoring

Mission head General Furhovde was quite unhappy about this.

(Ambassador will see Furhovde, who is currently out of

Colombo, early next week.)

COMMENT

-------

7. (C) The current Norwegian tactic of stepping back for a

minute and then trying to come up with a fresh formulation

which could satisfy both sides seems a good one at the

moment. Ambassador will make points about all sides needing

to compromise and necessity to support the Cease Fire when he

holds an &on the record session8 with leading editors on

June 24. Importance of the cease fire and seeking

clarification on recent changes in naval procedures with the

LTTE would also be useful topics to raise during Deputy

Secretary,s upcoming meeting with Sri Lankan Navy chief

SIPDIS

Admiral Sandagiri. END COMMENT.

LUNSTEAD


14. 6.3.2004: Ignoring orders of LTTE leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east

3/6/2004 8:31

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000406

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, S/CT, SA/INS, INR/NESA

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/14

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, MOPS, CE, NO, Elections, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Sri Lanka: Ignoring orders of LTTE

leadership, rebel commander remains ensconced in east

Refs: (A) Ops Center - Colombo 03/08/2004 telecon

- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 060831Z Mar 04

- (C) Oslo 419

- (D) Colombo 387, and previous

(U) Classified by Charge´d´Affaires James F. Entwistle.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: The main Tamil Tiger organization in

the north announced March 6 that it was replacing a

dissident commander. The commander, Karuna, has refused

to step down, however, and remains ensconced in his

eastern jungle base. No violence has been reported, but

the situation is becoming increasingly tense in the

east. The GSL has indicated that it has no plans to

deal directly with Karuna despite his requests that it

do so. In the meantime, the campaign for the April 2

parliamentary elections proceeds apace in the rest of

the country. Karuna´s split from the main LTTE

organization appears to be the most serious internal

crisis ever faced by the group. If there is no

resolution to the situation, there will almost certainly

be complications for the peace track down the road. END

SUMMARY.

====================================

LTTE Acts to replace Rebel Commander

====================================

2. (U) The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have

reacted to eastern military commander Karuna´s recent

moves to separate his command from the main organization

(see Ref D). On March 6, LTTE Political chief S.P.

Thamilchelvam, speaking at a press conference held in

the northern LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi,

announced that Karuna had been removed from his

position. An official statement posted on the pro-Tiger

website "TamilNet" explained the decision in the

following (choppy) manner:

"Mr. Karuna, who was commander of Batticaloa-Ampara,

instigated by some malicious elements opposed to the

Tamil Eelam liberation struggle, acting traitorously to

the Tamil people and the Tamil Eelam national

leadership, has planned to secede himself from the

liberation organization. The commanders, divisional

heads and cadres under him unable to acquiesce with his

traitorous act have refused to comply with his orders

and met with the national leadership, and explained the

ground reality prevailing there. In accordance with

this, Karuna has been discharged from the Liberation

Tiger organization and relieved from official

responsibilities."

3. (U) The LTTE statement went on to name Ramesh

(formerly Karuna´s deputy) as "special commander" of the

Batticaloa/Ampara sector, Karuna´s former political

adviser Kaushlyan was retained as political head, and

two other cadre, Ram and Prabha, were named as commander

and deputy commander respectively. Speaking at the

press conference following the announcement of Karuna´s

expulsion from the Tigers, Ramesh stated "the decision

Karuna has made is his own. He has not discussed this

with the leadership. The commanders, officials, and

fighters do not accept the decisions he has made on his

own." Joining in the wave of criticism of Karuna was

former Batticaloa/Ampara Tiger political head Karikalan,

who was quoted by TamilNet as stating: "Karuna will be

seen as a Pol Pot if he continues to act irresponsibly

towards our people." Thamilchelvam was also quoted as

stating, "our leader is always ready to provide amnesty

to those who realize their mistakes and I have high

hopes that Karuna will be given amnesty." He also

indicated that the LTTE continues to support the peace

process, stating: "our leadership and our structures

remain firmly committed to peaceful negotiations and the

ceasefire agreement, and this isolated issue will not

affect the peace initiative."

======================

Karuna remains Defiant

======================

4. (SBU) For his part, Karuna remains defiant in the

face of his expulsion from the LTTE. Karuna, in an

interview with a local newspaper, was quoted as stating:

"We will not take orders from Prabhakaran." He also

asserted that the LTTE had sent out "killer squads" in

an effort to assassinate him. Karuna told the BBC that

he was willing to return to the main LTTE organization

if guarantees were given that eastern LTTE personnel

would receive the same treatment as northern elements

from now on. (Karuna has said his rebellion is based,

in part, on his view that northern LTTE members do not

respect members from the east.) Karuna also demanded

the removal of several high-level officials serving LTTE

leader V. Prabhakaran, including Intelligence Chief

Pottu Aman. Numerous media reports also carried

statements from Karuna´s spokesman, Varanthan, to the

effect that the breakaway faction of the LTTE controlled

by Karuna would function as an independent unit and

would continue to observe the ceasefire "even though we

are not a party to it." Varathan also said the LTTE´s

official statement of expulsion "lacked logic," as

Karuna had already made a decision to leave the group.

In a press report late on March 8, Varathan said the

dissident faction of the Tigers controlled by Karuna

would consider "a friendly partnership" with

Prabhakaran, but he did not provide further details.

5. (C) Estimates vary wildly, but there may be as many

as six thousand LTTE personnel in the eastern district

who remain loyal to Karuna. (There are unconfirmed

reports that the main LTTE organization may be

preventing up to 600 eastern cadre who have been based

in the north from returning to the east.) Karuna

himself is said to be ensconced deep in bases in the

Thoppigalla jungle located west of Batticaloa city.

These long-time LTTE bases are said to be well-

fortified. That said, it is not clear what financial

resources Karuna´s group has, and whether it has

significant supplies of food and ammunition for the long

haul.

===========================

Heightened Tensions in East

===========================

6. (SBU) While the majority of Mission´s contacts in

the east describe the situation there as calm for the

most part, an underlying mood of tension has been

developing since Karuna´s defection from the main

organization on March 3. Contacts at the Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM) confirm that at least two pro-

Karuna protests took place in Batticaloa district on

March 7. Effigies of Tiger leader V. Prabakharan and

newly appointed eastern commander Ramesh were burnt in

both demonstrations. Pro-Karuna elements also sponsored

a hartal (work stoppage) on March 8 in Tamil areas of

Batticaloa and Ampara Districts that was successful in

closing down some shops. In a related development,

examinations have been postponed at Eastern University,

located 20 kilometers south of Batticaloa city, and

student housing at the Tamil-dominated university has

been closed down and students told to leave.

7. (C) Although tensions are inching up, no violence

has been reported. Contacts indicate a significant

increase in the number of LTTE forces gathering in an

area dividing Trincomalee District from Batticaloa

District, however. Kurt Spur of the SLMM´s Trincomalee

office told poloff March 8 that there had been a "large

increase" in the number of LTTE cadre gathered near the

town of Verugal in this area. The forces in the Verugal

area appear to be loyal to the main LTTE organization.

It is not clear whether these forces plan to enter

Batticaloa District in an attempt to oust Karuna.

(There are reports that the main LTTE organization has

arrested Pathuman, the political chief for Trincomalee.

The reports are unconfirmed, but Pathuman may have been

arrested because he is considered pro-Karuna.)

============================

GSL Takes "Hands-off" Policy

============================

8. (C) The Sri Lankan government appears to be sticking

to a "hands off" policy regarding the LTTE crisis. Late

March 5, Defense Secretary Cyril Herath rejected the

idea of negotiating a separate ceasefire pact with

Karuna´s breakaway faction, stating in a press interview

"when there is one ceasefire agreement signed between

the Prime Minister and Prabhakaran, how can we have

another?" (Per Ref D, Karuna had approached the Sri

Lankan military last week and offered to negotiate a

separate ceasefire accord for the east.) Karuna was

reportedly not happy with this response from the GSL,

and was quoted as stating that if the government did not

deal with his faction "I will be forced to display my

strength." Despite reports to the contrary in the local

press, the Sri Lankan military has said it is not on

"high alert." Military spokesman Colonel Sumeda Perera

told poloff March 8 that the military was closely

monitoring the situation in the east, however.

9. (SBU) As of March 8, both President Kumaratunga´s

People´s Alliance (PA) party and Prime Minister

Wickremesinghe´s United National Party (UNP) continue to

remain virtually mum regarding the LTTE rift. In one of

the few instances of comment on the Tiger situation by a

political entity in the south, the Patriotic National

Movement (PNM), an extremist Sinhalese group linked to

the radical Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party,

issued a statement on March 7. The statement alleged

that the split in the LTTE presented an opportunity for

the south to undermine the LTTE and perhaps destroy the

group. The PNM asserted that the SLMM should not get in

the middle of the situation and criticized the PM for

not using the situation in a way that would break up the

LTTE organization.

=========================================

Parliamentary Election Campaign continues

=========================================

10. (SBU) Against the backdrop of the recent

developments in the Tiger organization, the campaign for

Sri Lanka´s upcoming April 2 parliamentary elections

continues apace. President Kumaratunga and PM

Wickremesinghe have been speaking in front of large

rallies in various parts of the country. Candidates

have also been engaged in canvassing in a normal

fashion. Based on what Mission is hearing, campaigning

continues in LTTE-influenced areas like Jaffna and

Trincomalee. Some canvassing is reportedly even taking

place in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts, though at a

lower level than before the LTTE crisis. In other

election-related developments, a team of election

monitors from the European Union arrived in Sri Lanka on

March 7. The leader of the EU´s monitors, John

Cushnahan, a senior European parliamentarian, is slated

to arrive on March 10. The EU team will consist of

roughly sixty monitors when it is fully on the ground

(twenty are expected to arrive this coming weekend).

=======

COMMENT

=======

11. (C) The exact dimensions of Karuna´s split from the

main LTTE organization are as yet unclear. As touched

on above, there are conflicting reports, for example,

over whether the bulk of LTTE forces in the east remain

loyal to Karuna, or to the main LTTE organization.

Moreover, although it took the step to fire Karuna in a

very public manner, it remains unclear whether the LTTE

plans to move quickly to try to oust him (or worse), or

to proceed more cautiously, perhaps because it does not

yet have enough forces in place in the east to take

action against him. In any case, Karuna´s split from

the main LTTE organization appears to be the most

serious internal crisis ever faced by the group.

12. (C) If the situation is not resolved quickly, there

will be implications for the peace process. In the

near-term, there does not appear to be any serious

threat to the informal peace process, though out-and-out

warfare between rival LTTE factions could lead to

serious complications in affected areas. In the longer

term, however, the Norwegian facilitators will have

their hands full monitoring the ceasefire accord and

trying to resume peace talks if there are two de facto

LTTE groups, one in the north and the other in the east.

END COMMENT.

13. (U) Minimize considered.

ENTWISTLE

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