[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]
15. 29.11.2004: Norwegians concerned by JVP-orcheastrated campaign against them
11/29/2004 10:36
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001919
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR DORMANDY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2014
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: NORWEGIANS CONCERNED BY JVP-ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN
AGAINST THEM
REF: COLOMBO 1862
Classified By: James F. Entwistle, Deputy Chief of Mission. 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) Summary. The Norwegians are increasingly concerned
by an ugly JVP-orchestrated campaign against their role in
the peace process. The situation is exacerbated by President
Kumaratunga,s reluctance to pull the JVP into line. The
Co-Chair consensus here is that a group call on the Foreign
Minister and/or the President to make clear our support for
Norway and to urge that the JVP,s role in the government be
clarified would be appropriate. End Summary.
2. (C) The Tokyo co-chair chiefs of mission were convened
November 29 by Japanese Ambassador Akio Suda. Norwegian
Ambassador Hans Brattskar and Dutch Ambassador Susan
Blankhart attended. DCM represented the U.S. Suda said he
had felt it wise for the co-chairs to meet and discuss the
increasingly ugly anti-Norwegian campaign being orchestrated
by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and turned the floor
over to Brattskar.
UGLY CAMPAIGN
-------------
3. (C) Brattskar said he and Oslo were becoming increasingly
concerned about and exasperated with the escalating
anti-Norwegian rhetoric (also directed against the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission, "SLMM") which is clearly being
orchestrated by the JVP. Oslo is also "fed up" with the
GSL´s "lukewarm" response to the JVP campaign. Brattskar
shared copies of two documents. The first was a petition
handed over during a November 24 demonstration at the
Norwegian Embassy. The contents, Brattskar noted, were
fairly predictable: Norwegians too &friendly8 with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the SLMM &does
nothing8 to prevent LTTE murders, etc. The interesting
parts, Brattskar noted, were the letterhead and signatories.
The petition from the &Forum of Political Parties and Civil
Organizations against Political Killings and Abductions8 was
signed by the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s Democratic Party
(EPDP), the JVP, the anti-LTTE Tamil Eelam People´s
Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the JVP-aligned
National Bhikku Front, the National University Teachers,
Alliance and a few other small groups. There was also a
signature line for breakaway LTTE faction leader Karuna,s
party (the TIVM), although there was no signature. Brattskar
said he had no doubt that the exercise had been organized by
the JVP. He took a dim view of the fact that two member
parties (the EPDP and the JVP) of the ruling coalition had
signed the document.
4. (C) The second document was a letter (which the
Norwegians do not intend to make public) to Brattskar from
JVP Secretary General Tilvin Silva in response to Bratskar,s
efforts to meet with the JVP leadership in order to explain
the Norwegian role and the activities of the SLMM. (As noted
in reftel, Brattskar has seen several JVP personalities in
their ministerial roles but has not been able to obtain a
meeting with the political leadership.) The letter is indeed
insulting. It refers to Norway as &a relatively
insignificant country8 (Brattskar laughingly commented,
&They,re right about that!8) It accuses Norway of active
support and training for the LTTE Sea Tigers (an old canard
that resurfaces periodically in the media), of pursuing an
agenda of active support for the LTTE against the GSL
(&aiding and abetting Tiger terrorism in devious ways in the
name of facilitating peace and thus white washing crimes
against humanity including forced conscription of children8)
and participating in LTTE propaganda efforts. The letter
says, due to these &examples8 of Norwegian connivance with
the LTTE, &The Norwegian Government has thus openly
contravened the United Nations Resolution 1373 of 2001
relating to the suppression of terrorism.8 The letter
concludes with the statement that Norwegian actions
&demonstrate the total lack of our Government,s confidence
in you. In these circumstances, a meeting with you at this
stage will serve no useful purpose.8
ACTIVE CAMPAIGN AROUND THE COUNTRY
----------------------------------
5. (C) Brattskar stated that the JVP clearly is
orchestrating a campaign around the country. He had recently
taken separate trips to Hambantota in the deep south and to
Kandy and the &cultural triangle.8 On both trips, there
had been clear indications of such efforts and, Brattskar
said, many of those with whom he met described the JVP
campaign in detail. He also noted that the JVP member of
Parliament in Trincomalee had publicly stated he was
organizing a campaign against the SLMM office there, which
Brattskar described as &worrying.8
GOVERNMENT,S POSITION UNCLEAR
-----------------------------
6. (C) Brattskar said, after noting the reference to &the
Government,s8 loss of confidence in the Norwegians, he had
written to Foreign Minister Kadirgamar stating that he would
assume that the JVP assertion in this regard was in error
unless he was advised otherwise by the GSL. There has been
no response. Brattskar noted that &we,ve all heard8
Kadirgamar,s now-standard view that the JVP is not cause for
concern since he is &bringing the boys along8 and slowly
turning them to a more centrist position. Brattskar said he
could certainly understand the need for the JVP to &blow off
steam8 if the party was slowly headed in the right direction
on the peace process. That is not the case. Rather, the JVP
is engaging in ugly rhetoric while heading in absolutely the
wrong direction on the peace front. Brattskar noted that
LTTE leader Prabhakaran, in his November 27 &Hero,s Day8
speech (septel) had commented extensively on how the JVP
position was, in the LTTE view, a major stumbling block on
the road back to the peace table. Brattskar commented that
he finds it increasingly difficult to explain the JVP´s
activities and the southern political situation in general to
the LTTE. &They think I´m a fool.8
7. (C) Brattskar said he will continue to seek clarity from
and make his frustration known to the GSL. He opined,
however, that President Kumaratunga will be unwilling to make
the JVP toe the line (although, according to what Brattskar
had heard, she is privately &furious8 with the JVP,s
actions) since her highest preoccupation these days is with
ensuring her political and parliamentary future. She
apparently has not talked to the JVP for over a month.
Exacerbating the situation, Brattskar said, are opposition
leader Ranil Wickremesinghe,s public comments over the
weekend that his UNP party will no longer support the
President in the peace process. This stems from UNP pique
over the recent financially induced defection of a party
member to the President,s coalition (with more such
defections rumored to be in the offing).
CO-CHAIR ACTION DISCUSSED
-------------------------
8. (C) Ambassador Suda said he thought that the co-chairs
needed to make clear to the government that the JVP-led
anti-Norwegian campaign is unacceptable. Co-chair reps
debated whether it made more sense to first see FM Kadirgamar
as a group or to seek a co-chair meeting directly with
President Kumaratunga (since the FM,s response would be
predictable). Brattskar said he wanted to talk quietly with
the GSL first and also needed more time to talk to Oslo. He
also said he wanted to get a readout on Norwegian peace envoy
Solheim,s December 1 meeting with LTTE luminary Balasingham
in London before undertaking any new initiatives here. All
agreed that they would consult with capitals with an eye
toward some sort of joint co-chair activity here in Colombo
towards the end of the week. Brattskar said he might not
join since Norway would be the topic of discussion.
COMMENT
-------
9. (C) Brattskar is right. The tone of the JVP-orchestrated
campaign is ugly and beyond the pale. We agree with him that
it is much more than &blowing off steam.8 With the
Department,s concurrence, we will be ready to participate in
a co-chair call on either the Foreign Minister or the
President later in the week (we think going directly to CBK,
who is just back from Iran, makes the most sense). We
believe the theme of the co-chair presentation should be that
Norway and the SLMM have our full support, that the GSL needs
to make clear that the JVP does not speak for the entire
government, that it is extremely confusing when two coalition
parties sign a petition condemning the Norwegian role in the
peace process (in direct contradiction of the President,s
public statements) and that the current situation of the JVP
being &in8 the coalition on some issues but &out8 on
others is having a deleterious effect on the peace process.
The unknown, of course, is whether the President is willing
to bring the JVP to heel when the party is crucial to her
ongoing political machinations regarding her political future
which, we fear, are at present a higher priority than the
peace process. End Comment.
LUNSTEAD
16. 23.1.2006: U/S Burns reviews Sri Lankan peace process with Norwegian facilitator Erik Solheim
1/23/2006 16:10
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000137
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR SA/INS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: PREL, PINS, CE, NO
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS REVIEWS SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS WITH
NORWEGIAN FACILITATOR ERIK SOLHEIM
Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4, B AND D
1. (C) Summary. Norwegian peace facilitator Solheim told
U/S Burns that the Sri Lankan peace process is at a
crossroads and that a "major step forward" is essential.
Burns expressed U.S. support for the Norwegian facilitation
effort and compared notes with Solheim on the efficacy and
vision of various Sri Lanka politicians. Solheim will
consider his visit a success if he gets agreement on dates
and locations for several rounds of ceasefire talks but does
not expect a lessening of LTTE violence even if talks begin.
Solheim and Burns agreed a late February/early March
co-chairs meeting in Colombo might make sense if there is
some tangible progress in the peace process before then.
Burns noted that President Bush´s early March trip to India
would be an opportunity for a public U.S. statement of
support for the process. Solheim and Burns held a short
"photo op" after their meeting and made joint statements on
the need to avoid a civil war and re-start peace talks. End
Summary
2. (C) U/S Nicholas Burns met with Norwegian Minister of
International Development and peace facilitator Erik Solheim
January 23 at the Ambassador´s residence. SA DAS Gastright,
Ambassador Lunstead and DCM (notetaker) sat in. Solheim was
accompanied by Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar and
several Norwegian emboffs/staffers.
Process At a Crossroads
-----------------------------
3. (C) Asked by Burns for his overall sense of the
situation, Solheim said "it is clear we are at a crossroads.
We must make a major step forward or it will go down the
drain." The status quo was no longer tenable. Solheim
continued that his impression is that the GSL needs to
develop a strategy for war or a strategy for peace but right
now it has neither. He hoped to help the GSL develop a
strategy for peace during this visit. Burns commented that
in his meeting with President Rajapaksa (septel) earlier in
the day, the President had expressed concern that his
military was too weak to take on the Tigers (Solheim will see
the President January 24). Burns noted that his message to
the President and other senior Sri Lankans had been
threefold: the U.S. supports Norway and the Sri Lankan
Monitoring Mission (SLMM), the GSL should not rise to LTTE
provocations and the GSL should take and keep the moral high
ground by being flexible on issues such as the venue for
cease-fire talks. As Secretary Rice had noted
to Foreign Minister Samaraweera several weeks ago in
Washington, the GSL should not give the LTTE an excuse to go
back to war by being stubborn on the venue issue.
Both Sides Obsessed with Venue Issue
--------------------------------------------- -
4. (C) Solheim said the U.S. position as outlined by Burns
was very helpful to Norwegian efforts. On the venue issue,
Solheim said it would have to be Oslo or Geneva in order to
bring the LTTE on board. In his view, however, the venue
issue has assumed too much importance and drawn attention
from the fact that the GSL has no real plan on how to proceed
towards peace once the short-term venue issue is settled.
Solheim confirmed that he will see reclusive LTTE supremo
Prabhakaran when he goes to Kilinochchi January 25 and noted
that it is good that LTTE theoretician Balasingham ("the
heavyweight thinker") will be there as well since Prabhakaran
is completely isolated and has no understanding of "the
South," much less the broader world. Solheim speculated that
Prabhakaran has not spoken to a Sinhalese in ten years.
Solheim´s objective is to get Prabhakaran (and Balasingham)
to agree to both the venue and principle of ceasefire talks.
Ideally, he would agree to a series of talks ("since the
COLOMBO 00000137 002 OF 002
first one will consist of a long recitation of Tamil
grievances!")
5. (C) Burns and Solheim agreed that is it imperative that
the GSL develop a strategy for peace and not leave the
initiative to the LTTE. The GSL right now, Solheim observed,
is focused on "domestic problems, but the LTTE couldn´t care
less." Burns agreed with Solheim´s observation that
President Rajapaksa means well and wants peace but has a
"shallow understanding" of the ethnic issue. Moreover, the
LTTE had given him absolutely no breathing space after his
inauguration before beginning to take out convoys and
soldiers. Burns observed that both the Foreign Minister and
the opposition leader conveyed a better sense of longterm
strategy and tactics than the President who came across as
"vague and indirect."
6. (C) Asked by Burns what would constitute a successful
result to his visit, Solheim said he would be pleased if he
left with a commitment to several rounds of ceasefire talks
with agreed dates and venues. He estimated that with
willingness and commitment from both sides, the first round
conceivably could be in 2-3 weeks. Solheim cautioned,
however, that even with such an agreement, he would have no
hope that the LTTE would scale back its campaign of violence
until the talks actually started, if then.
7. (C) Turning to the co-chair process, Solheim said it
made sense to hold the next meeting in Sri Lanka if there is
enough progress to justify a meeting. That will depend on
the success of his efforts over the next few days. Late
February or early March could make sense. Burns noted that
he could come to a Colombo co-chairs meeting at that time.
Moreover, if there is progress on the ceasefire talks,
President Bush could make a supportive public statement while
in South Asia.
8. (SBU) After their conversation, Burns and Solheim had a
"photo op" at which Burns made clear U.S. support for the
Norwegian facilitation effort and the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM). Solheim expressed his appreciation for the
support for his efforts by the U.S., the other co-chair
countries and the rest of the international community.
(Burns and Solheim each held individual press conferences
later in the day.)
9. (U) U/S Burns has cleared this message.
LUNSTEAD
17. 5.11.2003: President Affirms Commitment to Negotiated Settlement and Cease-fire
11/5/2003 14:04
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001918
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA/SA
DEPT ALSO PLEASE PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-05-13
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, PTER, ASEC, MOPS, ECON, CASC, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process, PLO
SUBJECT: President Affirms Commitment to Negotiated
Settlement and Cease-fire
REFS: (A) COLOMBO 1916 (B) COLOMBO 1917
(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE´ D´AFFAIRES JAMES F. ENTWISTLE.
REASONS 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) Summary. President Kumaratunga called in the
Charge´ November 5 to clarify her actions. She said she is
committed to maintaining the ceasefire with the LTTE and to
reaching a "negotiated settlement" with the Tigers. She
wishes the Prime Minister success in this regard but felt
she had no choice but to take over the Defense and Interior
portfolios after what she sees as a two-year history of the
LTTE being allowed to "run wild." She told the Charge´ that
her imposition of a state of emergency is a preemptive
action to be used in case the Prime Minister´s supporters
take to the streets. The Charge´ told the President that
the U.S. is paying close attention to the safety and
security of American citizens. The President assured the
Charge´ that American citizens should go about their
business and should not change travel plans. In particular,
she said U.S. military cooperation activities already under
way should continue. The President seemed self-confident
and composed but unable to avoid veering into lengthy
historical accounts of the Prime Minister´s alleged perfidy
over the years. This clearly is personal. End Summary.
2. (C) President Chandrika Bandanaraike Kumaratunga called
in the Charge´ late on November 5. With her foreign affairs
advisor Lakshman Kadirgarmar sitting in, the President told
the Charge´ that she wanted to make sure that Washington got
the "full story" on the actions she had taken to "ensure the
integrity of the nation," especially in light of the "lies"
that are being spread against her.
3. (C) The President said that she had originally intended
to keep the defense portfolio, as Presidents historically
have. PM Wickremasinghe had "whined so much" about how he
needed to put his own defense minister in to move forward on
the peace process that "I gave it to him and have regretted
it ever since." The President then went through an
exhaustive review of various "failings" by the Prime
Minister in his dealings with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), in particular, according to her, repeated
instances in which he had turned a "blind eye" to the Tigers
efforts to rearm and re-equip, in order to not damage the
"peace process." The President said she had had enough and,
after the latest flap with General Tellefsen, the head of
the Scandinavian monitoring mission, and after two years of
"being ignored" by the PM on defense matters, decided that
she had to act to take back control. The President stressed
her commitment to a "negotiated settlement" ("I like that
term better than ´peace process.´") but said the PM´s
efforts had allowed the LTTE to "run wild" since "they
realized that Ranil would allow anything to keep the peace
process going." "I will be gently firm with the Tigers but
they can´t be allowed to dance a jig whenever they want."
4. (C) In the same vein, the President said, she had taken
over the Interior Ministry to ensure that the police
function (which historically had resided in Defense,
according to her) would also be used "for the benefit of the
nation." It had been necessary to take back the Mass
Communications Ministry in order to ensure that the "PM´s
boys don´t twist things." Asked why she had taken back the
Finance Ministry (which had been "confirmed" to us shortly
before the meeting), President Kumaratunga looked at the
Charge´ blankly and said she had done no such thing and had
never even considered it.
5. (C) Turning to the suspension of Parliament, the
President said that was necessary to "let things cool down"
for two weeks and allow people to adjust to the steps she
had taken. She acknowledged that the suspension would delay
the budget debate by a week, but she said that was not a
significant consideration in light of the other "grave
matters" facing the country.
6. (C) Asked about the state of emergency, the President
said this was a preemptive action so that the military would
have the necessary powers in hand in case the Prime
Minister´s party loyalists tried to take to the streets.
She asked that Washington be informed that she is not
imposing a "state of siege" and that the "jackboots are not
marching down the street." "I fervently hope I will not
have to use any emergency powers." Rumors to the contrary,
she said, no curfew has been imposed.
7. (C) The Charge´ told the President that the primary
concern in Washington was whether her actions were intended
to scuttle the peace process at a key, delicate moment. The
President said that nothing could be further from the truth.
The Charge´ also told the President that the U.S. was
following the situation on the ground very closely in terms
of the security and safety of American citizens. So far, we
see no cause for alarm but we would continue to pay close
attention, especially now that terms like "state of
emergency" were in play. In particular, he noted, the U.S.
by coincidence had a number of military cooperation
activities under way. We intended to continue with these
unless the situation became unsafe or we were told to stand
down. The President said that safety and security were her
highest priorities. She asked that Washington be informed
that the "situation on the streets" is fine and that there
is no reason that Americans should not continue to go about
their business and to travel to Sri Lanka as planned. The
President said she plans to "address the nation in greater
detail" on November 6 and would underline those points in
those remarks. She also noted that, "as the new Defense
Minister," she was very pleased to hear about ongoing
military cooperation activities and that these should
proceed as planned.
8. (C) In conclusion, the President asked that the Charge´
convey the following points to Washington:
--she is well aware of and grateful for the positive role
the U.S. is playing in trying to end the conflict in Sri
Lanka. She asked that her warm regards be conveyed to
President Bush and said she hoped to meet him soon.
--she is fully committed to maintaining the cease-fire
agreement with the LTTE.
--she has no intention of "chasing out" the Norwegians from
their facilitation role or the Scandinavian monitors from
their "important work."
--"My commitment to a negotiated settlement is unwavering."
9. (C) Comment. The President appeared self-confident and
composed (as did her pet dog which wandered in and out of
the room). That said, she constantly detoured into long,
angry rants against the Prime Minister for his alleged
personal slights and insults over the years and historical
accounts of the myriad ways in which the PM has "betrayed"
the country. This is clearly a strongly felt personal issue
for her although she seemed sincere when she spoke about how
she is acting in the interests of the country. The
President listened closely as the Charge´ outlined the U.S.
concern for the peace process and for the welfare of U.S.
citizens. We will see what she says to the public tomorrow
but she is clearly determined and hunkered down for a long
haul. End Comment.
10. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
18. 21.5.2003: Tigers issue hard-edged letter demandinginterim structure in north/east
5/21/2003 11:46
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000851
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DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINR, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers issue hard-edged letter demanding
interim structure in north/east
Refs: (A) Colombo-SA/INS 05/21/03 unclass e-mail
- (B) Colombo 838, and previous
(U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of
Mission. Reasons: 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Tamil Tigers have sent the
Norwegian facilitators a tough letter demanding the
setting up of an "interim administrative structure" in
the north/east, which the group would control. The
Tigers say they might restart peace talks and come to
the Tokyo conference if the government reacts positively
to their proposal. With contacts telling us the group
is in an increasingly hard-line mode, the sudden
recrudescense of the interim structure idea raises real
questions regarding the Tigers´ commitment to the
process. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) TOUGH TIGER LETTER: Late May 21, the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sent the
Norwegian government facilitators a tough letter
demanding the setting up of an interim structure in the
north and east. (Note: The text of the letter was
posted on the pro-LTTE website "TamilNet" and has been
sent to SA/INS in Ref A.) In the long, complicated, and
somewhat convoluted letter, which was addressed to
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen, LTTE spokesman
Anton Balasingham makes clear that the Tigers believe
that previous agreements on structures/modalities of
funneling humanitarian/development assistance to the
north and east are not working. On this point,
Balasingham states flatly:
"Unfortunately, SIHRN (see note below) failed to
function effectively and no progress has been made
toward alleviating the hardships and suffering of the
displaced population...This lack of performance and the
failure to produce tangible results on urgent
humanitarian issues has eroded all confidence of the
Tamil people in SIHRN."
(Note: "SIHRN" stands for Sub-Committee on Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs for the North and
East, which was formed earlier this year as a joint GSL-
LTTE committee working on assistance issues. Since the
committee was set up, the Tigers have basically argued
that they wanted watertight acknowledgement of their
right to control funds allotted for the north/east. End
Note.)
3. (U) In light of this characterization of SIHRN´s
performance and rejecting recent GSL proposals to reform
assistance implementation, Balasingham goes on to state
that the LTTE has no choice but to return to its long-
standing demand that an "interim administrative
structure" be set up for the north and east. (Note:
The letter is not clear, but the LTTE seems to be
envisaging that the interim structure would mainly focus
on economic matters, but would also have a dominant
political role.) In making this demand, Balasingham
notes that during the December 2001 national election
campaign the governing United National Party (UNP)
advocated the setting up of an interim structure to
govern the north and east. Although the idea of forming
such a body was left off the peace process´ agenda up to
now, Balasingham says the LTTE believes it is now time
to revive it because the proposal is the only way
forward given the failure of SIHRN and given that "a
permanent political settlement is not feasible in the
immediate future." While couching his public comments
carefully, Balasingham also leaves little doubt that the
LTTE should control this interim structure. He notes,
for example, that the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan accord
provided the "LTTE a dominant participatory role" in a
proposed interim council to govern the north/east.
(Note: Aside from this one mention of the Indo-Sri
Lankan accord, the letter is otherwise vague on
potential constitutional implications.)
4. (U) Balasingham also addresses the issue of the
peace talks, which the Tigers recently pulled out of,
and the upcoming donors conference in Tokyo, which the
Tigers have said they will not attend. He indicates
that a positive response to the LTTE´s demands might
lead the LTTE to change its mind on these matters,
stating:
"A positive and constructive response from the prime
minister setting out his ideas and proposals in clear
and concrete terms will certainly help our leadership to
take a crucial decision on the resumption of peace talks
and participation at the donor conference in Japan."
5. (C) TAMIL CONTACTS ON LTTE MINDSET: The LTTE letter
came out too late on May 21 for contacts to provide us a
considered response. In discussions with poloffs held
early May 21, however, Tamil political contacts who had
met with the LTTE on May 20, indicated that the group
was increasingly in a hard-line, uncompromising mode.
Echoing the comments of other Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) figures, Suresh Premachandran, told us that
political chief S.P. Thamilchelvam, who led the Tiger
side at the meeting, made clear that the LTTE was fed up
with the GSL. The LTTE felt that the government --
while basically well intentioned -- was not strong and
could not carry through on its plans because it was too
afraid of Sinhalese chauvinists. In making these
comments, Premachandran said Thamilchelvam asserted in
very strong terms that the Sinhalese south could not be
trusted because it had broken agreements with Tamils so
many times in the past. (Note: In a May 19 meeting,
Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen told us that LTTE
leaders had made this same point in vivid terms during
recent interactions with the Norwegians.) At this
point, Premachandran added, the LTTE wanted written,
ironclad assurances from the GSL on the way forward, or
they would continue to stall the process.
6. (C) Despite their hardline positioning,
Premachandran still thought that the Tigers "were
committed to the peace process and would listen to
reason." He allowed that he was not sure the government
could meet in short order all of the LTTE´s demands and
thus ensure the group´s participation in the Tokyo
conference. He thought, however, that the LTTE had not
totally discounted the possibility of participating in
Tokyo.
7. (U) (((Note: Before Balasingham´s letter was
issued, we had heard that the LTTE´s S.P. Thamilchelvam
was planning to hold a press conference on May 22 in the
LTTE-controlled town of Kilinochchi in northern Sri
Lanka. This press conference had been originally slated
to take place on May 21, but had been postponed. In
light of Balasingham´s letter, which quite clearly
enunciates LTTE thinking at this point, it is not clear
whether the May 22 press conference is still on and what
it might add if it is. End Note.)))
8. (C) COMMENT: While respectful in tone, the LTTE
letter is hard-edged and clearly to be taken very
seriously. Balasingham, for example, at several points
in the letter underscores that he is transmitting the
views of V. Prabhakaran, the LTTE´s supreme leader.
The sudden recrudescence of the interim structure idea,
which had basically dropped from sight for months,
raises real questions re the Tigers´ commitment to the
process. The group almost certainly knows that the
issue is a very tricky one for the government and would
-- under normal circumstances -- take months to
negotiate. That said, the Tigers are pressing the
government for a response right now. This degree of
impatience does not appear to bode well for LTTE
agreement to resume the peace talks and reconsider its
decision not to participate in Tokyo. END COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
WILLS
19. 17.11.2004: Possible ways forward in political standoff between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister
11/17/2003 11:13
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001982
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, EUR/NB, INR/NESA
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11-17-13
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINS, PTER, PINR, CE, NO, Political Parties
SUBJECT: Possible ways forward in political standoff
between Sri Lankan President and Prime Minister
Refs: (A) Colombo 1974
- (B) Colombo 1971, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Kumaratunga and Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe continue to consult to find a
workable solution to the current political struggle.
The PM has remained focused on the peace process
throughout the crisis. Reaction from international as
well as domestic parties has been focused on possible
repercussions for the peace process. Several options
remain available to resolve the imbroglio, and attention
is now focused on which will play out. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- --
President remains steadfast on Defense Ministry
--------------------------------------------- --
2. (C) As previously reported, following her November 4
takeover of three key ministries and prorogation of
Parliament, President Kumaratunga has publicly called
for a national government of reconciliation, invited the
PM for talks, and met with Norwegian peace facilitators.
Throughout these past two weeks, the President has
repeatedly stated that she supports the peace process
and ceasefire accord. However, the President has
remained steadfast that she retain the Defense Ministry,
a key component in the peace process. While the initial
round of talks with the PM did not break the impasse
between the two, there are some signs that a workable
compromise might be possible. The President and Prime
Minister will meet again on November 18.
---------------------------
PM focused on peace process
---------------------------
3. (C) Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, for his part,
has remained focused on the peace process throughout his
efforts to bring resolution to the current political
crisis. Avoiding direct criticism of the President, the
PM has worked to provide leadership to his United
National Front (UNF) party, to temper UNF hardliners
advocating retaliation against the President, and to
appeal to the international community for support. He
has let key party politicians, such as peace process
negotiator G.L. Peiris and chief whip Mahinda
Samarasinghe, garner domestic support and argue the
GSL´s position in the public arena. He maintains that,
without control of the defense portfolio, he can not be
in charge of the peace process, and thus has offered the
President this responsibility. While the Prime Minister
publicly says he is willing to work with the President,
privately he is skeptical of such cohabitational
success.
--------------------------------
Concern over President´s actions
--------------------------------
4. (C) Reaction to the President´s November 4-5 actions
has centered mainly on the possible effect on the peace
process. (Septel addresses the economic ramifications.)
Support for the PM has been especially strong, with 130
MPs signing a letter expressing their full confidence,
and thousands of supporters rallying in support upon his
return. While several political parties have expressed
admiration and support for the President, she has also
come under criticism -- by segments of the Buddhist
clergy, for example -- for causing complications in the
peace process at an extremely crucial time. Members of
the international community, including the U.S., UK, EU,
India and Japan have issued statements and/or publicly
expressed concern over the situation, stressing the need
for the peace process to continue. Tamil political
parties and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
have also voiced their concern over the effects that the
President-PM wrangling might have on the peace process,
but all in all, the Tigers seem to be appraising the
situation in the south judiciously.
------------------------
Effects on Peace Process
------------------------
5. (C) Even with the Defense Ministry now under the
President, there has been no short-term impact to the
peace process vis-a-vis the military and the ceasefire.
The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) continues to
report a high degree of cooperation with the military,
and statements made by defense officials (see Ref B)
indicate that the military will continue to act with
prudence while civilians sort out the political
situation. Both the President and the Tigers have
stressed the importance of the ceasefire continuing.
At a November 14 press conference, however, Norwegian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen emphasized the
need for clarity in the south in order for real progress
in the peace track, and stated that until such clarity
existed, there was no space to assist the GSL and the
Tigers in peace negotiations. Helgesen has made clear
he believes the ceasefire could come undone if the
situation drags on unresolved too long.
------------------
Ways to Go Forward
------------------
6. (C) As the Prime Minister and President propose ways
to create a workable solution to the events of the past
two weeks, there is much speculation regarding the
ultimate way forward. Depending on the current mood of
the President or PM, several options appear likely.
They include:
-- Returning the Ministries: In this scenario, the
President would return control to the government of the
defense, interior and mass communications ministries.
The government would presumably provide some face-saving
method for the President to do so. While this would
restore the GSL´s control of the peace process, the
situation would not resolve the President´s cohabitation
disagreements that precipitated her November 4 actions.
There is talk she might give back Interior and Mass
Communication but keep Defense and/or that a Defense
Secretary palatable to both the PM and the President
SIPDIS
might be appointed.
-- Cohabitational Committee: According to the PM´s
idea, a committee comprising representation by the GSL
and the Opposition would advise the government on the
peace process. This would formalize an arrangement for
the President to provide her input on the GSL´s peace
process decisions and possibly address her contention
(which has some merit) that the PM does not "consult"
with her regarding negotiations with the Tigers. This
is also sometimes referred to as a "council of
concilitation."
-- Elections: From the President´s perspective, her
hope in calling elections would be for her People´s
Alliance (PA) party to increase its number of seats,
and, in coalition with other parties, regain the
majority in Parliament. This would put the President in
control of the peace process. The PM believes that
parliamentary elections would result in more seats for
his UNF coalition, serving to strengthen his mandate to
lead the peace process. Even if the UNF were to
increase its majority, a resolution to the current
crisis could still be elusive: the government would
still have to cohabitate with the President, who remains
in her position regardless of the electoral outcome.
Moreover, there is a palpable sense of dread at the
prospect of elections which historically are violent and
corrupt.
-- Standoff: If neither the PM or President agree on
the ministerial or committee option and elections are
not called, it is possible that the current standoff
could continue. The government would continue its
business, with Parliament meeting to work on the budget.
Negotiations with the LTTE, however, would likely remain
on hold with neither the PM or President in clear
control of the peace process. As noted above, this
poses a danger to the peace process.
7. (C) COMMENT: Mission´s position so far has been to
emphasize to all parties the need for the peace process
to be supported, while not becoming embroiled in the
internecine political struggle between the President and
PM. The first test of the changed political landscape
and a marker of the PM´s and President´s willingness to
resolve this comes on Wednesday, November 19 when
Parliament is set to reconvene and the GSL presents the
budget after the two week prorogation. While fresh
elections are possible, they would likely be expensive
and violent, and result in a situation not that much
different from the current stalemate. Mature
cooperation between the PM and President to take the
peace process forward would be the best possible
outcome, but the two have a long history of rivalry,
which they would have to put behind them. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
20. 11.8.2003: LTTE base issue; Tigers get ready for Paris meeting
8/11/2003 11:05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001399
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08-11-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, PREF, CE, NO, FR, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Norwegian facilitator set to arrive to work on
LTTE base issue; Tigers get ready for Paris meeting
Refs: Colombo 1387, and previous
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle,
Charge´ d´Affaires. Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian Special Envoy Erik Solheim
is slated to arrive in Sri Lanka on August 12. One key
purpose of his visit is to try to convince the Tigers to
vacate an unauthorized camp they have set up in the
east. In other peace process news, the Tigers are
getting ready for a seminar in Paris scheduled to begin
August 20. Solheim is known to have good links with the
Tigers, but settling the camp issue will be a tough sell
given the group´s hard-line stance on the matter. END
SUMMARY.
========================
Solheim due in Sri Lanka
========================
2. (SBU) The Norwegian Embassy has confirmed that
Special Envoy Erik Solheim, a key player on the GoN
peace facilitation team, is due to arrive in Sri Lanka
on August 12. One key purpose of his visit, which is
slated to last several days, is to try to convince the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization to
vacate an unauthorized camp it has set up in Trincomalee
District in the east. In July, the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission (SLMM) had ruled that the "Wan Ela" camp was an
encroachment on GSL-controlled areas and thus a
violation of the February 2002 ceasefire accord. With
the LTTE adamantly refusing to vacate the site, the SLMM
washed its hands of the matter last week and referred it
to the Norwegian facilitators to resolve, thus setting
the stage for Solheim´s visit. During his time in Sri
Lanka, Solheim is tentatively scheduled to travel to the
LTTE-controlled Vanni region in the north to meet with
S.P. Thamilchelvam, the group´s political chief.
Solheim has met with Thamilchelvam on many occasions and
is said to have good rapport with him.
======================
More info on LTTE Camp
======================
3. (C) Regarding the camp, Mission checked with the
SLMM office in Trincomalee, which confirmed that as of
earlier today (August 11) the LTTE was still at the
site. SLMM Trincomalee chief Abdel Burkan confirmed
that his office will continue to run daily patrols in
the vicinity of the camp to check on the situation. Per
earlier remarks he has made to us (See Reftels), Burkan
said the roughly 15 LTTE inhabitants of the camp
remained friendly with the monitors. The camp was
small, about two soccer fields in size, and very
ramshackle with some huts, a tent, and a communications
antenna. Burkan estimated that the camp could be
dismantled quickly if the Tigers wanted to do so.
4. (C) Queried on whether he had heard of any other
LTTE camps encroaching on government areas, Burkan said
the monitors were examining one LTTE-occupied site which
seemed to be new. The site was located one/two
kilometers away from Wan Ela at a place called Uparu.
Whether the camp violated the ceasefire accord had not
yet been determined, he added. (Note: The Sri Lankan
military has told us that it thinks that, in addition to
Wan Ela, the LTTE may have established at least four
additional bases in the east in past months.)
==========================
Tigers get ready for Paris
==========================
5. (C) In other peace process developments, the Tigers
are getting ready for a seminar in Paris scheduled to
begin on August 20. The seminar, which is slated to
last approximately a week, will focus on
constitutional/legal issues. The seminar is also being
structured to help the LTTE decide on the nature of its
response to the GSL´s recent proposal setting out
modalities of forming a Tiger-dominated interim
administration for the the north/east. Contacts in the
Tamil community have confirmed that the LTTE´s
delegation will consist of approximately 20 people, 10
from the group and 10 representing pro-LTTE Tamils who
live in other countries. Thamilchelvam will lead the
delegation. The following names are also reportedly on
the delegation list:
-- Pulithevan (one name only), chief of the LTTE´s Peace
Secretariat
SIPDIS
-- V. Rudrakumar, a pro-LTTE lawyer living in the U.S.
-- Dr. V.T. Thamilmaran, a law lecturer at Colombo
University with close LTTE links
-- J. Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil based in Australia
with significant experience on humanitarian assistance
issues
6. (SBU) There are reports that Thamilchelvam may meet
with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE´s London-based chief
negotiator, somewhere in Europe before the Paris meeting
takes place. Balasingham, who has serious health
problems, apparently will not attend the Paris event
himself. In the meantime, the pro-LTTE website
"TamilNet" reported that Thamilchelvam spoke to a rally
in the Vanni on August 10. In his wide-ranging remarks,
Thamilchelvam made clear that the group was intent on
preparing a response to the GSL´s north/east proposal,
indicating that the peace talks could resume if the
group´s (as yet unidentified) counter-proposals were
accepted. He stated, in part:
"We would be ready to resume negotiations if the Sinhala
nation accepts our proposal for the interim
administration and follows the path of peace. We will
prepare and submit a proposal for an interim
administration that would essentially reflect the
aspirations and expectations of our
people...International legal experts and senior
academics will discuss the proposal before it is given
in final form. An interim administration is
indispensable to mend the war-shattered lives of our
people."
Aside from these basically upbeat remarks, Thamilchelvam
also made semi-threatening comments to the effect that
Tamils should be allowed to choose their own "destiny"
if the LTTE´s counter-proposals were rejected by the
GSL. He also took the opportunity to get his licks in
against two long-standing targets of Tiger vituperation,
President Kumaratunga and the Sri Lankan military.
Dredging up the history of past military campaigns,
Thamilchelvam basically accused the president and the
army of being warmongers and anti-Tamil in intent.
=======
COMMENT
=======
7. (C) Of all of the Norwegian facilitators, Solheim is
known to have the best links with the Tigers. He has
dealt with them for years and knows the topmost LTTE
leaders as well as any outsider. Even with these
advantages, settling the camp issue will be a tough sell
for Solheim. The group has taken an increasingly hard-
line stance on the issue. Solheim will have to use all
of his many wiles to convince them that their stance is
self-defeating. As for Paris, the Tigers seem to want
to use the meeting in a genuine way to review legal
issues. Thamilchelvam, for one, appears to be going out
of his way to flag that the Tigers are taking the
government´s proposal very seriously. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
ENTWISTLE
21. 21.10.2009: SRI LANKA DENIES NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCURE LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000968
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENTS FOR ISN/CATR. EAP/K AND SCA/INS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PREF, PHUM, PTER, EAID, MOPS, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA DENIES NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCURE LETHAL
MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM IRAN
REF: A. SECSTATE 46946
B. COLOMBO 710
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)
1. (S) In a much-delayed response to our Ref A demarche on
possible Sri Lankan procurement of lethal military equipment
from North Korea and Iran, Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Director General (DG) Americas Division
Kshenuka Senewiratne on October 16 said they appreciated U.S.
concerns and stated that the GSL seriously considered the
information. According to Senewiratne, there was no evidence
backing the information we earlier provided in our demarche.
According to the DG, to stop speculation regarding possible
procurements of arms and ammunition from Iran, the GSL
conducted internal investigations and had found no records
that supported the allegations. DG stressed that the GSL
abided by the UN Security Council resolutions and ensured
that all guidelines were met. DG reiterated that post war,
the GSL did not envisage a need for additional military
hardware and hinted that the U.S. was receiving such
information from sources that sought to sour U.S.-Sri Lanka
relations. DG made no comments on procurements or
negotiations of lethal military equipment from North Korea.
2. (S) Comment: Notwithstanding the DG,s vehement denial of
GSL procurements and negotiations from Iran, the GSL,s
recent interactions with Iranian military officials raise
questions. At an October 6th meeting with SL,s Army
Commander, the Iranian Defense Attach Brigadier Asghary
Nekah discussed an upcoming military delegation led by
Iranian Army Brigadier Mahnoud Amini Ranjabar that suggested
future strengthening of the Iranian-Sri Lanka military
relationship. In a meeting with PolOff, the Japanese Defense
Advisor discussed his deep concerns of possible talks of
purchases and negotiations of arms and nuclear technology
during the upcoming Iranian visit.
BUTENIS
22. 24.4.2003: In another negative signal, Tigers postpone meeting
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000705 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 04-24-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: In another negative signal, Tigers postpone meeting of key assistance committee
Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 240442Z 03 - (B) Colombo 696, and previous - (C) Oslo 803 (Notal) (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (B, D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Late April 23, the Tamil Tigers postponed the next meeting of a key committee focused on humanitarian assistance issues. Admitting to being caught off guard, the Norwegian facilitators are reviewing next steps. The Indian polcouns told us he thought the decision was another tactical step. Coupled with their recent withdrawal from the peace talks, the latest Tiger move places added pressure on the whole process. END SUMMARY. ================================ Tiger Statement re Key Committee ================================
2. (U) In a statement issued late April 23, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced that it was postponing the next meeting of a key committee focused on humanitarian assistance issues (see Para 3 for information on this committee). The statement came in the form of a letter from S.P. Thamilchelvam, the head of the LTTE´s Political Section, to Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke, the head of the GSL´s Peace Secretariat. SIPDIS
3. (U) (((Note: Before the LTTE´s April 23 announcement, the next meeting of the Sub-Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rebilitation Needs in the North and the East, ""SIHRN,"" had been scheduled to take place April 25-26 in Kilinochchi in the LTTE-controlled Wanni region. SIHRN, which began operations earlier this year as agreed in the peace talks, is a joint committee made up of GSL and LTTE representatives. Norwegian facilitators and Japanese advisers guide the process. SIHRN had been holding semi-regular meetings up to this point.)))
4. (U) The LTTE´s statement attributes the decision to postpone the meeting to ""our leadership´s wish to await action and implementation on urgent matters"" raised in its April 21 announcement that it was pulling out of the peace talks (see Ref B). The statement, the text of which is contained in Para 8, goes on to complain that: ""As you (the GSL) are aware, urgent action is required on resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced people and of refugees. We wish to implore the government of Sri Lanka to act on matters...enabling the return to normal life to people"" in the north and east. The statement wraps up by saying: ""We wish to reiterate that mutual trust and cooperation can be restored through decisive and urgent action"" by the government ""to alleviate the hardships of the people in the northeast."" ============================= Norwegian and Indian Reaction =============================
5. (C) When queried, Norwegian government facilitators admitted to being caught off guard by the LTTE´s latest action. In an April 24 conversation, Norwegian embassy polchief Tomas Stangeland told us the first indication the GoN had that the meeting was being postponed was a LTTE fax containing Thamilchelvam´s letter that came in April
23. Up to that time, the Norwegians, convinced the meeting was on, were preparing to send their team to Kilinochchi. In response to the unfolding events, Stangeland said Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar planned to meet with GSL officials led by chief negotiator G.L. Peiris to discuss next steps soon. The GoN has also forwarded a request to Kilinochchi to meet with Thamilchelvam within the next week (as of late April 24, there had been no response to this request from the LTTE). Stangeland added that he thought the decision by the LTTE to postpone the meeting was completely counter-productive. He said the Norwegian facilitation effort would keep plugging away, hoping that the Tigers´ recent decisions were mere posturing.
6. (C) In an April 24 meeting, Indian High Commission polchief Taranjit Sandhu told us the Tigers´ decision was another ""unfortunate"" move by the group. He said he thought it was a ""tactical"" step by the Tigers, who wanted to put pressure on the GSL to cave in on various issues, including by reducing the security zones in Jaffna. India, he commented, had no indication that the group was intending to leave the peace process altogether. The GoI would continue to monitor the situation, however.
======= COMMENT =======
7. (C) Coupled with their withdrawal from the peace talks, the latest Tiger move places added pressure on the whole process. At this point, the government and the Norwegians seem to be scrambling a bit to find a way to respond to the LTTE and, by doing so, try to prevent further unraveling. While the LTTE is broadcasting its views, it seems to have turned off the receive mode, however. Despite all the bad news, there is still not a sense of panic regarding the state of the peace process. That said, skepticism regarding the LTTE is steadily rising. END COMMENT. ====================== Text of LTTE Statement ======================
8. (U) The text of the LTTE statement issued late April 23 follows: Begin text: Mr. Goonetilleke: In accordance with the decision of our organization´s leadership to suspend our participation in the negotiations, we regretfully wish to postpone the next meeting of the sub committee on immediate humanitarian rehabilitation needs (SIHRN). It is our leadership´s wish to await action and implementation on urgent matters raised by Mr. A. Balasingham in his letter to the prime minister, Hon. Mr. Ranil Wickremsinghe, prior to setting a date for the next meeting. As you are aware, urgent action is required on resettlement and rehabilitation of internally displaced people and of refugees. We also wish to implore the government of Sri Lanka to take immediate steps to act on matters already agreed at previous meetings of the sub-committee and ensure humanitarian and rehabilitation projects in the northeast are implemented enabling the return of normal life to the people living there. In the meantime, we are also hopeful that all efforts will be made by your government to urgently seek the funds from pledges made by several international donors at the Oslo conference on 25th November last year to be targeted for identified projects through the northeast reconstruction fund (NERF). In the last few months, from announcements made at our meetings, expectations among the people of the northeast have been raised to a high level. Therefore it would be meaningless for the sub-committee to continue to meet regularly without any tangible action on the ground. While we regret that we are compelled to postpone the next meeting of the SIHRN, we wish to reiterate that mutual trust and cooperation can be restored through decisive and urgent action from the government of Sri Lanka to alleviate the hardships of the people in the northeast. Yours Truly, S.P. Thamilchelvam Head, Political Section Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam End text.
9. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
23. 22.4.2003: Tigers announce they are suspending peace talks
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 COLOMBO 000688 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, SA, SA/INS, SA/PD, S/CT NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 04-22-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, KPAO, EAID, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers announce they are suspending peace talks; GSL, most observers see move as tactical
Refs: Colombo 685, and previous (Notal) (U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.
Reasons: 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a press release dated April 21, the Tamil Tigers suspended their participation in the peace talks and said they will not attend the June donors conference. The GSL has not yet reacted in public to the statement (short of a very brief letter to the Tigers taking note of their statement). Minister Moragoda told us that he thought the move was tactical, ""shock therapy"" by the Tigers, as he put it. Other observers agree with this perspective. While the Tigers are always hard to read, we tend to agree that they still see the peace process as a going concern. A suggested press statement for Washington´s immediate review is contained in Para
10. END SUMMARY. --------------- Tiger Statement ---------------
2. (U) In a long press release dated April 21, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) suspended its participation in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and said the group will not attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. (Note: Per the statement, the seventh round of GSL-LTTE talks, which had been set to take place in Thailand from April 29 - May 2, is now off.) The press release came in the form of a letter from the LTTE´s London-based spokesman and senior negotiator Anton Balasingham to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. (Note: The text of the statement, as carried by pro-LTTE websites, is contained in Para 11.)
3. (U) The statement begins by tipping its hat to the peace process, noting that the prior rounds of talks and other interactions among the LTTE, government, and Norwegian government facilitators had ""fostered trust and confidence."" After this brief introduction, the statement hits it stride when it makes the following three major complaints about the peace process: -- April 14 Seminar: The statement asserts that the GSL and the Norwegian facilitators should have ensured the LTTE´s participation in all meetings on international assistance issues. Instead, the GSL and GoN allowed Washington to be the venue of the April 14 seminar on Sri Lanka despite being ""fully aware of the fact that the United States has legal constraints in inviting representatives of a proscribed organization"" to the U.S. The statement goes on to claim that the LTTE´s ""exclusion"" from the conference ""has seriously eroded the confidence of our people in the peace process."" (Note: The LTTE could not attend the seminar because the group is on our Foreign Terrorist Organization, ""FTO,"" list. This part of the statement is the only place where the U.S. is mentioned.) -- Ceasefire Accord Implementation: In its second key section, the statement asserts that the government has not done enough to implement the February 2002 ceasefire accord (a.k.a., ""the Ceasefire Memorandum of Understanding""). The LTTE asserts that ""tens of thousands of government troops continue to occupy our towns, cities and residential areas, suffocating the freedom of mobility of our people."" The statement goes on to claim that the GSL´s ""repeated assurances that the resettlement of displaced people would be expedited have proven futile."" (Note: About 300,000 displaced persons have, in fact, returned to their homes in the north and east since the peace process began. About 500,000 people remain displaced.) A specific reference is made to Jaffna District, where the LTTE has long complained that the GSL has not done enough to reduce the size of its ""high security zones."" -- Focus of Assistance: The third major section involves a long, rambling, vague claim that the government should not be asking for international assistance for all of Sri Lanka, but only for the war- torn north and east. According to the LTTE, ""(T)he poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous policies of past governments in dealing with the Tamil national conflict...This approach grossly understates the severity of the problems faced by the people in the northeast.""
4. (U) Briefly reciting these complaints, the statement wraps up by saying: ""Under these circumstances, the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. We will not be attending the donor conference in Japan in June. While we regret that we are compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to the ethnic question."" ------------ GSL Reaction ------------
5. (C) The government has not yet issued an official public reaction to the LTTE statement. (Note: Late April 22, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe sent a very brief letter to the LTTE´s Balasingham stating that the GSL had taken note of the Tigers´ concerns and planned to respond to them in full. A copy of this letter is being faxed to SA/INS.) In an April 22 conversation, Minister Milinda Moragoda, who had just returned from Europe, told the Ambassador that he thought the LTTE´s announcement was basically tactical in nature, ""a way to regain control of the agenda by the Tigers,"" as he put it. It was positive that the Tigers had made clear they were not pulling out of the talks on a permanent basis and had not pulled out of the ceasefire accord, for example. On this point, Moragoda related he had met J. Maheswaran, a pro-LTTE Tamil of Australian nationality, on his plane trip back from Europe. Moragoda said Maheswaran had told him he (Maheswaran) still intended to participate (as a LTTE representative) in ceasefire- related meetings. (Note: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission has also told us that the LTTE has given no indication that it intends to cancel its participation in ceasefire-related meetings, including in the Sub- Committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and the East, ""SIHRN."")
6. (C) In making the statement, Moragoda said the LTTE seemed to be using ""shock therapy"" because it felt a bit cornered, as many of the easy steps regarding the peace process had already been taken, leaving only tough decisions. In addition to being upset about the April 14 seminar, Moragoda remarked that he thought the group was also disturbed by political happenings in the south, including a possible linkup between the Opposition People´s Alliance (PA) and the radical, anti- peace process Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Noting that he had met with Norwegian envoy Solheim while in Europe, Moragoda said he and other GSL officials involved with peace process issues planned to meet with the Prime Minister late April 22 to formulate next steps. Ambassador Wills commented that the government would be wise to be restrained in what it says, but it should be firm with the LTTE. Moragoda said he agreed with that posture, and based on an earlier conversation, he thought the PM was on board for that sort of approach. He confided that he had spoken with G.L. Peiris, the GSL´s chief negotiator, who seemed a bit ""frazzled"" by the LTTE´s announcement, however. (Note: Peiris is also the government´s chief spokesman.)
7. (U) (((Note: Shortly after her return from an official visit to Bangladesh, President Kumaratunga issued a statement critical of the LTTE´s announcement. The president´s statement called the LTTE´s rationale for pulling out of the talks ""feeble"" and called for the group to reconsider its decision. In a rare joint meeting of the two political adversaries, the president and the Prime Minister are scheduled to discuss the situation on April 22.))) -------------- Other Reaction --------------
8. (C) Most observers we have spoken to agree with Moragoda that the Tigers´ statement was tactical in nature and not an indication that the group plans to end the peace process. Comments we have picked up included the following: -- N. Raviraj, a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MP who has expressed concerns about the LTTE in the past, commented that he had ""full confidence"" that the current problems could be worked out. He said he believed that the Tigers´ non-invitation to the April 14 seminar was the ""spark"" that led to the LTTE´s releasing the statement, but he thought the group could be convinced to re-enter the talks. -- Joseph Pararajasingham, a Tamil MP with very close LTTE links, told us that Tiger officials had recently assured him that the group would not scrap the ceasefire accord. He was also confident that if the Norwegians took part in ""shuttle diplomacy"" they could get the LTTE to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. He said he thought the LTTE truly was angered over the Sri Lankan military´s continuing large-scale presence in Jaffna, as well as its ""exclusion"" from the April 14 conference in the U.S. Notwithstanding the hard feelings, he predicted that these issues could be ""overcome,"" allowing the peace process to move forward. -- M.L.A.M. Hizbullah, a National Unity Alliance MP and a Muslim, said he was convinced that the suspension of talks would have little long-term impact on the peace process. He said the GSL should respond to the LTTE in good faith with proposals re the security zones in Jaffna and in other areas to assuage LTTE concerns. He also expressed doubts that the LTTE would not, in the end, attend the donors conference in Tokyo, as ""it was in their interest to be there."" -- Taking a somewhat different tack, V. Thevaraj, the editor of a Tamil-language daily newspaper, expressed some concern over what he described as ""deep anger"" within the LTTE. He stated that some in the LTTE remained furious over the deaths of 11 of its sea cadre in a confrontation with the Sri Lankan navy off the northeast coast in March (see Reftels). The LTTE´s statement, he averred, was an effort by its leadership to appease Tiger hard-liners, who remained bitter over this incident. -------
COMMENT -------
9. (C) While the Tigers are always hard to read, we tend to agree that that their statement seems basically tactical in nature and that they still see the peace process as a going concern. It was positive, for example, that the group did not permanently pull out of the peace talks; nor, based on what we are hearing, is it ending cooperation on ceasefire-related matters. Our guess is that Moragoda is right and that the group is trying to regain control of the agenda via some ""shock therapy."" The LTTE´s decision, as it happens, also appears to fit into its seeming long-term desire to slow down the pace of the peace process. (Note: Some observers say, for example, that the LTTE wants to wait until arch-foe President Kumaratunga´s term ends in late 2005 before it agrees to a negotiated settlement.) In issuing the statement, however, the LTTE is exposing itself to a lot of flak that it is undermining the peace track. We think that pressure on the group to remain a part of the process will not only come from the south, but also from many Tamils, who know that a return to war would be devastating for their community. END COMMENT. --------------------- Draft Press Statement ---------------------
10. (C) Attached below is a draft press statement for Washington´s immediate review. We would like Washington´s clearance by April 23 morning (local), so that the statement can be issued that day. We have received many press inquiries and would like to get a U.S. statement out right away. As an alternative to the attached statement, Washington may wish to consider issuance of a ""minimalist"" statement that simply regrets the LTTE´s decision, and urges it to reconsider, so as not to endanger the gains made by the peace process. We think it is important to be up-front and direct with the LTTE about its action, which is why we recommend the attached statement. Either way, we would appreciate Washington´s guidance ASAP. Begin text: We regret the decisions by the LTTE to suspend its participation in the Sri Lankan peace talks and not to attend the Tokyo donor´s conference scheduled for June. We reviewed carefully the ostensible reasons for these decisions cited in Mr. Balasingham´s letter to the Prime Minister dated April
21. We do not find them convincing. A well-intentioned party that truly wants a peaceful, political settlement to Sri Lanka´s conflict could deal with such grievances at the negotiating table. We call on the Tigers to reconsider and to return to the negotiating track. We also call on the LTTE and the Government of Sri Lanka to honor the terms of the ceasefire even while the talks are suspended. In the meantime, this interregnum in the talks could prove useful by giving both parties the opportunity to recommit themselves to negotiations. We have long supported the MOU even though we have also acknowledged it has not been implemented perfectly. Blame for this does not fall exclusively on the side of the Government of Sri Lanka, however, as the LTTE´s statement suggests. The Tigers, too, bear heavy responsibility for numerous breaches of the MOU. While the talks are suspended, we urge the LTTE to reflect carefully on its own transgressions. Assassinations of opponents, intimidation of Muslims, taxation without representation, aggressive Sea Tiger behavior and continued child recruitment do not build trust in the LTTE´s intentions. We continue to believe that the way out of Sri Lanka´s ethnic conflict is through negotiations facilitated by the Government of Norway. In this regard, we remain willing to do whatever we can to assist Sri Lanka as it tries to bring an end to this ugly war. End text. ---------------------- Text of LTTE Statement ----------------------
11. (U) The following is the text of the LTTE statement made by LTTE spokesman Anton Balasingham and issued late April 21: Begin text. Dear Prime Minister, In accordance with the decision of our leadership I am advised to bring to your urgent attention the deep displeasure and dismay felt by our organization on some critical issues relating to the on-going peace process. You are well aware that the Ceasefire Agreement that has been in force for more than one year and the six rounds of peace negotiations between the principal parties has been successful, irrespective of the occurrence of some violent incidents that endangered the peace process. The stability of the ceasefire and the progress of the peace talks, you will certainly appreciate, are the positive outcome of the sincere and firm determination of the parties to seek a permanent resolution to the ethnic conflict through peaceful means. The cordial inter-relationship, frank and open discussions and the able and wise guidance of the facilitators fostered trust and confidence between the negotiators and helped to advance the talks on substantial levels. The negotiating teams were able to form important sub- committees on the basis of equal and joint partnership. During the early negotiating sessions it was agreed that the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE should work together and approach the international community in partnership. The Oslo Donor Conference held on 25 November 2002 turned out to be an ideal forum for such joint endeavor. The LTTE has acted sincerely and in good faith extending its full cooperation to the government of Sri Lanka to seek international assistance to restore normalcy and to rehabilitate the war affected people of the northeast. The LTTE to date has joined hands with the government and participated in the preparation of joint appeals and programs. In spite of our goodwill and trust, your government has opted to marginalize our organization in approaching the international community for economic assistance. We refer to the exclusion of the LTTE from the crucial international donor conference held in Washington on 14 April 2003 in preparation for the major donor conference to be held in Japan in June. We view the exclusion of the LTTE, the principle partner to peace and the authentic representatives of the Tamil people from discussions on critical matters affecting the economic and social welfare of the Tamil nation, as a grave breach of good faith. Your government, as well as our facilitator Norway, are fully aware of the fact that the United States has legal constraints to invite representatives of a proscribed organization to their country. In these circumstances an appropriate venue could have been selected to facilitate the LTTE to participate in this important preparatory aid conference. But the failure on the part of your government to do so gives cause for suspicion that this omission was deliberate. The exclusion of the LTTE from this conference has severely eroded the confidence of our people. As you are aware, considerable optimism and hopes were raised among the people when your government, shortly after assuming power, entered into a ceasefire agreement with our organization, bringing to an end twenty years of savage and bloody conflict. Expectations were further raised when both sides began direct negotiations with Norwegian facilitation. In particular, there was a justifiable expectation that the peace process would address the urgent and immediate existential problems facing the people of the north and east, particularly the million people who are internally displaced by the conflict and are languishing in welfare centers and refugee camps. As such, the Ceasefire Agreement included crucial conditions of restoring normalcy which required the vacation, by occupying Sri Lankan troops, of Tamil homes, schools, places of worship and public buildings. Despite the agreed timeframe for this evacuation of troops, which has since passed, there has been no change in the ground situation. We have repeatedly raised the issue of continuing suffering of our people at every round of talks with your government. Your negotiators´ repeated assurances that the resettlement of the displaced people would be expedited have proven futile. The negotiations have been successful in so far as significant progress has been made in key areas, such as the agreement to explore federalism on the basis of the right to self-determination of our people. But this progress has not been matched by any improvement in the continuing hardships being faced by our people as a result of your government´s refusal to implement the normalization aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent agreements reached at the talks. As a result, considerable disillusionment has set in amongst the Tamil people, and in particular the displaced, who have lost all hope the peace process will alleviate their immense suffering. Through there is peace due to the silencing of the guns, normalcy has not returned to Tamil areas. Tens of thousands of government troops continue to occupy our towns, cities and residential areas suffocating the freedom of mobility or our people. Such a massive military occupation of Tamil lands, particularly in Jaffna - a densely populated district - during peace times denying the right of our displaced people to return to their homes, is unfair and unjust. Your government, in international forums, continues to place poverty as the common phenomenon affecting the entire country. The Poverty Reduction Strategy forms the essence of the document Regaining Sri Lanka´ which defines the macro-economic policy of your government. Though poverty and poverty alleviation constitute the centrality of the new economic vision of your government as exemplified in `Regaining Sri Lanka´ the document fails to examine the causality of the phenomenon of poverty, the effects of ethnic war and the unique conditions of devastation prevailing in the northeast. In our view, the conditions of reality prevailing in Tamil areas are qualitatively different from southern Sri Lanka. The Tamils faced the brunt of the brutal war. Twenty years of intense and incessant war has caused irreparable destruction to the infrastructure in the northeast. This colossal destruction augmented by continued displacement of the people and their inability to pursue their livelihoods due to military restrictions and activities have caused untold misery and extreme poverty among the people of the northeast. Continued displacement has also depleted all forms of savings of these people disabling them from regaining their lives on their own. The war-affected people need immediate help to regain their dignity. They need restoration of essential services to re-establish their lives. Reconstruction of infrastructures such as roads, hospitals, schools and houses are essential for them to return to normal life. The poverty that is prevailing in southern Sri Lanka is a self-inflicted phenomenon, caused by the disastrous policies of the past governments (both the UNP and the SLFP) in dealing with the Tamil national conflict. In its fanatical drive to prosecute an unjust war against the Tamil people, the Sinhala state wasted all national wealth to a futile cause. The massive borrowings to sustain an absurd policy of `war for peace´ by the former government caused huge international indebtedness. The economic situation of the south has been further worsened by the mismanagement of state funds, bad governance and institutional corruption. Therefore, the conditions prevailing in the south are distinctly different from the northeast where the scale and magnitude of the infra-structural destruction is monumental and the poverty is acute. Ignoring this distinctive reality, your government posits poverty as a common phenomenon across the country and attempts to seek a solution with a common approach. This approach grossly under states the severity of the problems faced by the people in the northeast. The government´s `Regaining Sri Lanka´ document completely lacks any form of identified goals for the northeast. Statistics presented for substantiating the policy totally ignore the northeast and solely concentrate on southern Sri Lanka. However, this has been promoted as the national strategy to the international community to seek aid. It is evident from this that the government lacks any comprehensive strategy for serious development of the northeast. The poverty reduction strategy fails to address the poverty of the northeast as distinct from the rest. In seeking international assistance your government disingenuously speaks of reconstruction being needed in all areas, thereby masking the total destruction of the infrastructure of the northeast which has resulted from the militarist policies of the past three decades. As we pointed out above, the exclusion of the LTTE from critical aid conference in Washington, the non- implementation of the terms and conditions enunciated in the truce document, the continuous suffering and hardship experienced by hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamils, the aggressive Sinhala military occupation of Tamil cities and civilian settlements, the distortion and marginalization of the extreme conditions of poverty and deprivation of the Tamils of the northeast in the macro-economic policies and strategies of the government have seriously undermined the confidence of the Tamil people and the LTTE leadership in the negotiating process. Under these circumstances the LTTE leadership has decided to suspend its participation in the negotiations for the time being. We will not be attending the donor conference in Japan in June. While we regret that we were compelled to make this painful decision, we wish to reiterate our commitment to seek a negotiated political solution to the ethnic question. We also urge the government of Sri Lanka to restore confidence in the peace process amongst the Tamil people by fully implementing, without further delay, the normalization aspects of the ceasefire agreement and permit the immediate resettlement of the internally displaced people of the northeast. We also request the government to re-evaluate its economic development strategy to reconstruct the Tamil nation destroyed by war. End text.
12. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
24. 16.5.2003: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000824 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-16-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, Human Rights
SUBJECT: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet; Latest re cohabitation stresses
Refs: Colombo 805, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian FM Petersen met with the Tigers on May15. Despite his best efforts, the Tigers did not say they will return to the talks, nor did they commit to attend the Tokyo donors conference. The Japanese Embassy has confirmed that it has received no further word from the Tigers re Tokyo. In other news, the cohabitation situation remains tense as the president and the PM continue to bicker. Until these snarls are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a bind. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) NORWEGIAN FM PRESSES TIGERS: Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran and other key LTTE officials on May 15. GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and Ambassador Hans Brattskar also participated in the meeting, which took place in the town of Kilinochchi in the Tiger-controlled Wanni area of north-central Sri Lanka. Petersen reportedly used the meeting to press the LTTE to return to the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and to commit to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. In response, the Tigers reiterated their position that unless immediate action was taken to address the humanitarian situation in the north, they would not go to Tokyo or resume participation in the peace talks. Voicing another of their long-standing demands, the Tigers also said that the GSL must take immediate steps to reduce the size of its security zones in Jaffna.
3. (C) JAPANESE MULL OVER TOKYO: In additional news re the peace process, Koji Yagi, Japanese Embassy poloff, told us May 16 that his government had not received any word from the Tigers re their attendance at the Tokyo conference. (Note: Per Reftels, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi had set May 14 as the deadline for the Tigers to reconsider their previous statements that they would not attend the Tokyo meeting.) Yagi said his embassy had heard that the LTTE might be planning to send Japan a letter requesting a postponement in the Tokyo conference so the GSL had ""time"" to meet Tiger demands. Queried as to what the GoJ´s plans were re the conference at this point, Yagi allowed that the issue was very problematic for his government. He said the GoJ continued to review what to do next.
4. (SBU) TAMIL POLITICIANS MEET THE LTTE: In other news re the peace track, a group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians met with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni on May13. After the meeting, a joint LTTE-TNA statement was issued that stressed the LTTE´s continued support of a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. Re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference, Mission has heard that the Tigers used the meeting with the TNA to reiterate their well-known stance that the GSL had to meet their demands before they agreed to cooperate.
5. (C) COHABITATION BICKERING CONTINUES: The latest news re Sri Lanka´s tense cohabitation situation is that President Kumaratunga has sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on May 14 stating that she would not change her decision re the takeover of the Development Lotteries Board. (Note: Late last week, per Reftels, the president announced that she was taking over the lotteries board. The GSL has refused to implement her decision.) Further, she rejected the PM´s allegation that the takeover violated the Sri Lankan Constitution, asserting that she had acted in full conformity with the law. In terms of next moves in the tense situation, the PM is reportedly drafting a response to Kumaratunga´s latest missive. There are also reports that President Kumaratunga, in a bid to show she has control of the agency, is planning to call for an emergency meeting of the directors of the lotteries board soon.
6. (C) COMMENT: Until the snarls over the peace process and cohabitation are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a serious bind. The LTTE is clearly not in the mood to make things easy for it in terms of the peace track. In the meantime, the president is causing the GSL serious problems with respect to politics in the south. Even when things were going more smoothly, the GSL was overloaded enough. The weight of these added problems makes the overall challenge for the GSL that much larger. END COMMENT.
7. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
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