Wikileaks classified documents on Sri Lanka ( Full Text ) Part One

 WikiLeaks on SRI LANKA 
[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]

25. 16.5.2003: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet

"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000824 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:

DECL: 05-16-13

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, Human Rights

SUBJECT: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet; Latest re cohabitation stresses

Refs: Colombo 805, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.

Reasons: 1.5 (b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian FM Petersen met with the Tigers on May15. Despite his best efforts, the Tigers did not say they will return to the talks, nor did they commit to attend the Tokyo donors conference. The Japanese Embassy has confirmed that it has received no further word from the Tigers re Tokyo. In other news, the cohabitation situation remains tense as the president and the PM continue to bicker. Until these snarls are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a bind. END SUMMARY.

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2. (C) NORWEGIAN FM PRESSES TIGERS: Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran and other key LTTE officials on May 15. GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and Ambassador Hans Brattskar also participated in the meeting, which took place in the town of Kilinochchi in the Tiger-controlled Wanni area of north-central Sri Lanka. Petersen reportedly used the meeting to press the LTTE to return to the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and to commit to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. In response, the Tigers reiterated their position that unless immediate action was taken to address the humanitarian situation in the north, they would not go to Tokyo or resume participation in the peace talks. Voicing another of their long-standing demands, the Tigers also said that the GSL must take immediate steps to reduce the size of its security zones in Jaffna.

3. (C) JAPANESE MULL OVER TOKYO: In additional news re the peace process, Koji Yagi, Japanese Embassy poloff, told us May 16 that his government had not received any word from the Tigers re their attendance at the Tokyo conference. (Note: Per Reftels, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi had set May 14 as the deadline for the Tigers to reconsider their previous statements that they would not attend the Tokyo meeting.) Yagi said his embassy had heard that the LTTE might be planning to send Japan a letter requesting a postponement in the Tokyo conference so the GSL had ""time"" to meet Tiger demands. Queried as to what the GoJ´s plans were re the conference at this point, Yagi allowed that the issue was very problematic for his government. He said the GoJ continued to review what to do next.

4. (SBU) TAMIL POLITICIANS MEET THE LTTE: In other news re the peace track, a group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians met with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni on May13. After the meeting, a joint LTTE-TNA statement was issued that stressed the LTTE´s continued support of a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. Re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference, Mission has heard that the Tigers used the meeting with the TNA to reiterate their well-known stance that the GSL had to meet their demands before they agreed to cooperate.

5. (C) COHABITATION BICKERING CONTINUES: The latest news re Sri Lanka´s tense cohabitation situation is that President Kumaratunga has sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on May 14 stating that she would not change her decision re the takeover of the Development Lotteries Board. (Note: Late last week, per Reftels, the president announced that she was taking over the lotteries board. The GSL has refused to implement her decision.) Further, she rejected the PM´s allegation that the takeover violated the Sri Lankan Constitution, asserting that she had acted in full conformity with the law. In terms of next moves in the tense situation, the PM is reportedly drafting a response to Kumaratunga´s latest missive. There are also reports that President Kumaratunga, in a bid to show she has control of the agency, is planning to call for an emergency meeting of the directors of the lotteries board soon.

6. (C) COMMENT: Until the snarls over the peace process and cohabitation are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a serious bind. The LTTE is clearly not in the mood to make things easy for it in terms of the peace track. In the meantime, the president is causing the GSL serious problems with respect to politics in the south. Even when things were going more smoothly, the GSL was overloaded enough. The weight of these added problems makes the overall challenge for the GSL that much larger. END COMMENT.

7. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"

26. 15.3.2004: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election

3/15/2004 11:33

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-15-14

TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest

on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election

Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous

- (B) Oslo 419

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.

Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four

local co-chairs (Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and

again to a wider donor group on March 15, Norwegian

Special Envoy Erik Solheim discussed his latest visit to

Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead participated in the

meetings. Most of Solheim´s comments focused on the

recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka´s April 2

parliamentary election. Solheim´s visit appears to have

been mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new

complexities and uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan

situation. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and

March 15 meetings, which were attended by Ambassador

Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P.

Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, during a March

11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region.

During the discussion, which centered around rebel

eastern commander Karuna´s recent break with the main

LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam

had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to

"peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting

that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern

cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim

that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from

within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging

defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed

Karuna for the two recent election-related

assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has

placed blame for these killings on the LTTE´s

intelligence apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim

of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna

situation. The group was steadfast that it was an

"internal matter" for the LTTE alone. (Separately,

during two meetings, Solheim said PM Wickremesinghe made

clear that the GSL would not get involved in the

situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said

that the government would avoid taking advantage of the

situation.)

3. (C) While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he

had met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander

from Trincomalee District. According to Solheim,

Pathuman looked "okay" and stated that he (Pathuman)

was still in command of the Trincomalee district.

(Solheim´s meeting with Pathuman effectively rebutted

recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed"

Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna --

see Ref A.)

4. (C) In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of

Trincomalee, Solheim said that he had had a positive

meeting with Sri Lanka Army Major General Sunil

Tennekoon, the general in charge (GOC) of the

district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in

Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports

to the contrary. Local Tigers officials in

Trincomalee, for their part, told Solheim they were

happy that the Norwegian delegation was visiting

Trincomalee. According to the Tigers, the visit was

an important signal that the international community

remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim

added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)

was continuing its work in the east, despite press

reports to the contrary. The only change was that

the SLMM was not entering the eastern areas held by

Karuna.

5. (C) Solheim told the co-chairs that the

Norwegians saw three possible outcomes to the Karuna

situation:

-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills

Karuna;

-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with

Karuna, giving the rebel commander autonomy over the

eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;

-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."

(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most

unsettling for the peace process if it came to

fruition.)

6. (C) Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed

donor assistance and the need to resolve the issue of

an assistance funds delivery mechanism. To the co-

chairs, Solheim stated that the Norwegians were

considering a model similar to the Afghan Fund.

7. (C) PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the

April 2 parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that

the LTTE hoped the government would approve polling

sites either at the GSL´s crossing points into Tiger-

controlled area, or in the "no-man´s land" between

GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On this point, it

was not clear which alternative had been agreed to,

although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army

will not honor election plans and, in a repeat of the

December 2001 parliamentary elections, would largely

bar Tamils in Tiger-controlled areas from reaching

polling sites. If polling sites were approved for

either of these areas, the LTTE expected that the

Army would not be present, with the Sri Lanka police

instead providing security. According to Solheim,

Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated

that the Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the

GSL´s crossing points. (Mission has heard reports

that the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner will

support holding the polling in "no-man´s land"

areas.)

8. (C) COMMENT: Solheim´s visit appears to have been

mainly devoted to fact gathering. Karuna´s decision to

separate himself from the main LTTE organization has

clearly made the overall situation that much more

complex. Moreover, there is great uncertainty over how

the Karuna matter will play out and over the upcoming

election. That said, the Norwegians still appear firmly

engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle

is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile

period, however. END SUMMARY.

9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD

27. 15.4.2004: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews recent discussion with President on peace process

4/15/2004 10:24

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-15-14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews

recent discussion with President on peace process

Refs: Colombo 637, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway expects a formal request from

the GSL to continue its role as peace facilitator.

Norwegians think the new Sri Lankan Government needs to

realize it cannot make unilateral decisions on the

course of the peace process. No "Peace Team" in place

yet. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed

Ambassador April 14 on the conversation he and Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Furuhovde had with

President Chandrika Kumaratunga late evening of April

10, following the delayed swearing-in of the new

cabinet. The meeting also took place as fighting

between forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) chief Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was

ongoing, before the collapse of Karuna´s rebellion (see

Reftels). Brattskar said that the President complained

that LTTE actions were a violation of the Ceasefire

Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want the SLMM to do

something immediately. Brattskar explained that the CFA

set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to make

a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then

investigate and make a judgment.

3. (C) The President said that she desired to restart

the peace talks as soon as possible. Brattskar said

that he told the President that when the previous

government took power, it had formally requested the

Norwegians to continue their facilitation role. Norway

expected to receive such a request from the new

government, with a description of what it expected

Norway to do. The President was surprised at this.

Brattskar then said that he explained to the President

that neither the GSL nor the LTTE could make unilateral

decisions about the talks. The two sides would have to

agree to any decisions. Brattskar told Ambassador (but

not the President) that the Norwegians, and Deputy

Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed

by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar

had given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which

he had made several categorical statements, such as that

any new rounds of talks would be held only in Sri Lanka,

not in foreign locations, and also laying out what he

thought Norway´s role would be. Brattskar said that any

such decisions would have to be agreed by both sides and

should be discussed privately, not in the press. He

also expressed unease about statements by both

Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India

would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the

peace process. Again, this was something both sides

would need to agree on.

4. (C) Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting,

the President told Brattskar that she thought peace

talks only succeeded when one side negotiated from a

clear position of strength. (This position is probably

made moot by Karuna´s collapse.) Brattskar discussed

with her a number of different peace processes, but said

he did not think the LTTE could be pressurized in that

way. He told Ambassador that it reminded him of the

strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s of

"War for Peace," which had ended disastrously.

5. (C) Brattskar said it was also clear that the

President had not yet put together a "Peace Team" to

conduct the negotiations. She told him she would keep

the current Peace Secretariat, but change some of its

personnel. She did say that current Foreign Secretary

and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke

would be removed from both jobs.

6. (C) COMMENT: The charitable view of this is that

the new Government was unaware of the ways in which the

Peace Process has changed and become formalized over the

past two years, and will adjust to new realities. If it

does not, and tries to make unilateral changes and

decisions, there could be a rough road ahead. The

Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by criticism

of their role during the election campaign, are perhaps

being over-sensitive. Nonetheless, they have made a

useful point to the President that their role cannot

just be taken for granted.

7. (C) COMMENT (Continued): No one doubts the

President´s commitment to peace. What remains

questionable are: (1) whether she has the vision to

understand what changes a peace settlement will entail

for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the

Process in a systematic, disciplined manner. The weak

nature of her government, beset on peace from within by

its JVP partners and from without by the Buddhist monks,

will make it all the harder. END COMMENT.

8. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD

28. 9.6.2004: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri Lanka peace process is troubled

6/9/2004 9:35

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000953

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-09-14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri

Lanka peace process is troubled

Refs: (A) Colombo 915, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe

thought the Co-Chairs statement was good, but that the

President and her government do not understand the

psychology of the LTTE, and are determined to begin

talks on the final ("hard") issues. He also thinks the

military is using LTTE rebel Karuna to attack the LTTE.

When pressed to support the peace process, he said that

the Government needs to make a statement laying out its

policy.

2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Norwegian Ambassador

Brattskar says that the two sides are moving further

apart, rather than closer. The LTTE will meet with its

diaspora experts in Switzerland in mid-July. President

Kumaratunga called the Norwegian Foreign Minister to

complain that she had already made many concessions. No

one expects any movement until after the July 10

Provincial Council elections. END SUMMARY.

Ranil: She just does not understand.

------------------------------------

3. (C) Ambassador met with Opposition Leader (and

former Prime Minister) Ranil Wickremesinghe the evening

of June 7 to discuss the recent Co-Chairs meeting in

Brussels. Ranil said that he had read the Co-chairs´

statement and thought it was "good." At the moment, he

did not plan any action on the peace process: "She has

the mandate, not me." President Kumaratunga and Foreign

Minister Kadirgamar, he said, did not understand the

psychology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE). "They only want to discuss an interim

administration. They will never agree to discuss final

issues now." He had discussed this with Kadirgamar, but

Kadirgamar had insisted that he wanted to take up hard

issues now. Ranil said that he had ignored some

transgressions by the LTTE because it was the only way

to keep negotiations going. The President did not

understand this.

4. (C) Ranil said that the Government was playing a

dangerous game because the Sri Lanka Army (Department of

Military Intelligence, "DMI") was using the breakaway

LTTE rebel Karuna to get back at the LTTE. Ranil said

he "knew" this was the case -- he had sources in the

military who told him so. This was another example of

the Government´s dangerous game.

5. (C) Ambassador said that the Co-Chairs statement was

directed at all parties in Sri Lanka. If the

international community were to keep its interest alive,

we expected everyone to support peace. Pressing the

point, Ambassador said that he thought comments such as

recent remarks by UNP spokesman G.L. Peiris that the

President´s efforts were a "sham" peace process were not

helpful. One could criticize what the President wanted

to do, Ambassador said, but should not imply that she

was not interested in peace. Ranil said that the

President and her ruling coalition needed to make a

clear policy statement on the peace process. (Comment:

The President is avoiding this because she could never

get her JVP coalition partners to go along with anything

reasonable.)

Norwegians: Getting worse, not better

-------------------------------------

6. (C) Ambassador met with Indian High Commissioner Sen

and Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar mid-day on June 8,

along with EU and Canadian Chiefs of Mission.

(Brattskar had arrived back from Oslo, where he had

stopped after Brussels, only that same morning.)

Brattskar said that the Norwegians were trying to put

together a statement which would allow talks to resume.

The Norwegians were in constant touch with both sides,

receiving messages from both, but unfortunately the

sides were moving farther apart. Each side was sending

"unhelpful clarifications." The Government insistence

on holding "parallel" talks on final settlement issues

was, Brattskar said, just a non-starter.

7. (C) Each side was afraid that giving in would

prejudice the final outcome. The LTTE had rejected the

plan to resurrect a NERF-like mechanism to disburse aid

because they felt if they did so, the Government would

never seriously discuss the LTTE´s Interim Self-

Governing Administration (ISGA). The Government did not

want to discuss the ISGA alone because it feared that if

an ISGA were set up, the LTTE would have no incentive to

discuss final issues. Brattskar said that President

Kumaratunga had called the Norwegian Foreign Minister

the day before to complain that she had made many

compromises, but the Tigers had not made any.

LTTE issues

-----------

8. (C) Sen said that he had heard that the GSL had been

using Karuna and his faction to get back at the LTTE,

but that the military had now been given orders to stop

providing assistance to Karuna. Brattskar said that the

LTTE was now preparing for a week-long meeting they

would hold in Switzerland beginning July 20. The

meeting would include the legal and constitutional

experts from the Tamil diaspora who had helped the LTTE

prepare their ISGA proposal.

Messy Political Situation

-------------------------

9. (C) All agreed that the current political situation

makes it particularly difficult to make progress:

-- The Government still does not have enough votes to

show a majority in Parliament. (See Septel for report

on June 8 altercation in parliament.)

-- The JVP faction within the government continues to

snipe at the peace process (see Reftels).

-- Pending Provincial Council elections on July 10, no

one wants to make a dramatic move.

10. (C) COMMENT: We believe that Ranil Wickremesinghe

heard the Ambassador´s message about not trying to take

political advantage by attacking the peace process.

Wickremesinghe made it clear, however, that he is not

about to lend support to the President. Ranil´s

analysis of the psychology of the Tigers, and the need

to induce them to participate in the talks may be

accurate. The President´s problem is that she directed

the electoral campaign against Ranil on the basis that

he gave in too easily to the Tigers -- now she has to

show that she is harder to budge. Combined with

Kadirgamar´s insistence on discussing final issues, the

result is a poisonous atmosphere.

11. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD


29. 15.7.2003: Tigers still refusing request from monitors tovacate forward base

7/15/2003 2:48

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001262

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT

NSC FOR E. MILLARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07-18-13

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PINS, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Tigers still refusing request from monitors to

vacate forward base; Another military informant killed

Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 170326Z Jul 03

- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 150248Z Jul 03

- (C) Colombo 1256, and previous

(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge d´Affaires.

Reasons 1.5 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission

(SLMM) has not yet been able to convince the Tamil

Tigers to vacate a base the group has established in the

east. The Tigers say the base is within their zone and

not in a GSL-demarcated area. In other peace process

developments, another military informant was killed late

July 17. The Tigers are almost certainly to blame. The

controversy over the base is causing strains in the

SLMM´s relationship with the Tigers. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) CONTROVERSY OVER TIGER BASE: The Norwegian-run

SLMM is becoming increasingly concerned over the

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization´s

refusal to vacate a forward base the group has

established in the east. The base, which is variously

referred to as the "Wan Ela" or "Manrasakulam" camp, is

near Kinniya, a town located roughly 15 kilometers to

the southwest of Trincomalee city. It is not clear when

the LTTE established the base, but the group apparently

did so in the past year. The LTTE has reportedly taken

steps to enlarge the base in recent weeks. The base is

believed to contain several bunkers which are possibly

filled with arms and ammunition.

3. (C) Reacting to complaints from the GSL and local

Muslims, the SLMM began to investigate the LTTE´s

establishment of the base several weeks ago. (Note:

Kinniya has a large population of Muslims. Muslims, in

general, are very worried about any indications of

increased Tiger influence in the east -- see Ref C.)

According to Hagrup Haukland, the Deputy Chief of the

SLMM, the basic rule the monitors are using in examining

the dispute comes from the February 2002 ceasefire

agreement. Haukland said the agreement makes clear that

the military forces of the LTTE and the government

cannot expand their zones of control during the

ceasefire. After examining records and completing a

site survey of the base on July 16, the SLMM ruled that

the Tigers´ base was built after the ceasefire agreement

came into force and that it encroaches on government-

controlled territory.

4. (C) For their part, the Tigers have vociferously

denied that the base is in a government-controlled area.

In recent meetings with SLMM officials, including Chief

Tryggve Tellefsen, the LTTE´s political chief S.P.

Thamilchelvam has underscored that the Tigers have no

plans to vacate the area. Exasperated by the Tigers´

hard-line stance, Haukland has given several interviews

to the press in which he has lashed out at the LTTE,

asserting that the group must vacate the site as soon as

possible (see Refs A-B). Among other concerns, Haukland

has also complained that the LTTE is not allowing the

monitors access to sites in all the areas it controls.

In recent conversations with polchief Haukland asserted

that the monitors´ relationship with the Tigers is not

approaching the breakdown stage despite his harsh

comments. When asked about next steps, Haukland said

the SLMM would continue to try to convince the Tigers to

withdraw from the area through private and public

communications. (Note: The SLMM´s Tellefsen briefed

Prime Minister Wickremesinghe about the dispute in a

July 17 meeting.)

5. (C) ANOTHER INFORMANT SLAIN: In other peace process

developments, another military informant was killed late

July 17. The informant, a Muslim named Abdul Baheer

Fowzie, 38, was gunned down by two men at a site north

of Trincomalee city. The slaying of Fowzie appears to

be part of the spate of killings of military informants

and Tamil Tiger opponents that has gained pace in recent

months (see Ref C). The Tigers have not taken

responsibility for any of the killings, including that

of Fowzie. Given the seemingly organized nature of the

killings and the victims´ occupations and/or political

leanings, there is little doubt that the Tigers are

responsible, however.

6. (C) COMMENT: The controversy over the base near

Kinniya is sparking strains in the SLMM´s relationship

with the Tigers. In their public comments, there is

little doubt that the monitors are getting increasingly

exasperated with the Tigers. The SLMM essentially feels

that the LTTE is not living up to its part of the

ceasefire agreement bargain by acceding to the monitors´

rulings. The SLMM has made the Tiger leadership aware

of its concerns, and it is now up to Thamilchelvam and

others to react in a constructive manner. If the Tigers

do not play ball, the SLMM´s mandate will become

increasingly difficult to fulfill. END COMMENT.

ENTWISTLE

30. 17.6.2004: Talks about Talks in Stasis while Norwegians Ponder Next Moves

6/17/2004 10:51

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001013

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD

PLEASE PASS TOPEC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-17-14

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, IN, LTTE - Peace Process

SUBJECT: Talks about Talks in Stasis while Norwegians

Ponder Next Moves

Refs: (A) Colombo 983, and previous

(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.

Reasons 1.5 (b,d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: The LTTE showed no flexibility on

negotiation issues during Norwegian Ambassador´s June 16

visit to Kilinochchi. Both sides have rejected a

Norwegian compromise formulation on the negotiating

agenda. The situation in the East is somewhat improved

but remains troubled. The LTTE has postponed its

European meeting. The Tigers told NGOs and UN agencies

they want to coordinate assistance better. Norwegians

will hold discussions in India this week. Norwegians

will decide optimum time to resume their shuttle

efforts. END SUMMARY.

No Progress for Norwegians in Kilinochchi

----------------------------------------

2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed

fellow Co-Chair Ambassadors June 17 on his previous

day´s discussions with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi and on Norwegian peace

efforts in general. Brattskar said he had a 90 minute

meeting with LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilchelvam.

Briefing Thamilchelvam on the Brussels meeting,

Brattskar told him that the Co-Chairs were afraid of

drift in the peace process and were concerned about the

situation in the East. The positive side was that there

was great interest in Sri Lanka at a high political

level; the negative side was the impatience at lack of

progress. Thamilchelvam had spent considerable time

discussing the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which he

claimed the Government was violating in the East by

supporting Karuna´s forces. Thamilchelvam repeated the

familiar LTTE plaint that the Tamil people have

benefited from peace for the last two years but have

gained little else.

3. (C) Brattskar said he responded that both sides were

responsible for supporting the CFA. Sri Lanka

Monitoring Mission (SLMM) head Trond Furuhovde would

travel to Kilinochchi next week for discussions on this

issue with the LTTE. (Brattskar commented that the

situation in the East was better than a few weeks ago,

but was still unstable.) In the meantime, the LTTE had

postponed its planned leadership trip to Geneva next

week for meetings with Tamil expatriate legal experts.

With no date yet set for talks, the LTTE saw no reason

to hold the discussions at this time.

4. (C) Ambassador asked Brattskar where the back and

forth on the talks stood, and described his own talk

last Friday with President Kumaratunga and her

description of the situation (see Reftel). Brattskar

said that both sides want Norway to continue its shuttle

diplomacy, but that right now nothing is happening. The

LTTE´s "seemingly inflexible position" of discussions

only on its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)

proposal had not allowed them to accept a Norwegian

proposal that the two sides sit down without any agenda

at all. At the request of both sides, the Norwegians

had tried to come up with a proposal for an agenda

bridging the positions of both sides, but neither had

agreed to their suggestion. At the moment, therefore,

the peace talks were in stasis. The Norwegians would

need to decide when to come up with a new proposal.

Brattskar noted that some people thought there would be

no movement until after the July 10 Provincial Council

elections. (Comment: We do not see a connection.) At

any rate, it was unlikely there could be any movement

until President Kumaratunga returned from her private

visit to the UK.

5. (C) Brattskar said that the deadlock came down to

the same old issues: lack of trust (especially by the

LTTE), and a feeling by the LTTE that agreement to

discuss final issues before an ISGA was agreed upon and

implemented would mean there would never be an ISGA.

LTTE Meets NGOs and UN Agencies

-------------------------------

6. (C) The LTTE had invited major NGOs and UN agencies

to Kilinochchi June 15 to meet with the Tiger´s Planning

and Development Secretariat (PDS). According to

participants in the meeting, the LTTE predictably asked

for direct funding, and were predictably turned down.

The Tigers described the PDS as a "focal point," not as

a proposed implementation agency. The Tigers wanted the

NGOs to "coordinate" with the PDS -- the NGOs said

coordination was fine as long as it did not mean

control. The Tigers said that they did not want any

type of joint development work with the Central

Government, but that they had no objection to projects

being implemented through the North East Provincial

Council, as is currently being done. The repeated their

opposition, however, to a revival of the North East

Reconstruction Fund (NERF) or a "NERF-like" structure,

which they see as a tactic to delay or permanently

replace an ISGA.

Norwegians to Delhi

-------------------

7. (U) Brattskar himself is leaving afternoon of June

17 to meet Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen in

New Delhi for talks with the new Indian government.

Brattskar said that reports in both Indian and Sri

Lankan press that current High Commissioner to Sri Lanka

Nirupam Sen would leave to become Perm Rep in New York,

and that Sen would be replaced by MFA Additional

Secretary for Administration Mrs. Nirupama Menon Rao

SIPDIS

were true.

COMMENT

-------

8. (C) The Norwegians are clearly feeling a bit

frustrated. Brattskar expressed (unusually) some

impatience with the LTTE and conceded that it was not

unreasonable for the GSL to expect some give from the

Tigers, who so far have not budged an inch from their

position on the negotiating agenda. The Norwegians seem

to feel now that it is best to take a breather before

getting back into the shuttle business. In the

meantime, Ambassador is planning an on-the-record

session with major newspaper editors next week to push

the message of Brussels: all sides need to move on

peace or risk losing donor attention and funding. END

COMMENT.

9. (U) Minimize considered.

LUNSTEAD

31.12.05.2009: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

S E C R E T COLOMBO 000516

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CATR LOU GANEM, EAP/K, AND SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019

TAGS: ETTC, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, CE

SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY

EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

REF: SECSTATE 46946

Classified By: Charge d´Affaires James R. Moore Reasons 1.5(b)(d)

1. (S) Charge raised reftel points concerning possible GSL

purchase of lethal military equipment (LME) from North Korea

and Iran with Foreign Minister Bogollagama on May 11.

Bogollagama categorically denied that the GSL is attempting

to procure weapons or arms from either country. He also

underscored that the GSL is aware of international

restrictions concerning weapons sales from North Korea and

Iran, as well as the consequences for doing so. Bogollagama

stated that, at one point in the past, the GSL suspected

North Korea of supplying weapons to the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As a result, the GSL contacted the

Government of North Korea to discuss the issue. Bogollagama

did not further elaborate on the outcome of those discussions.

MOORE

32. 25.5.2006: Tokyo co-chairs pre-meetings

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000872

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, NO

SUBJECT: TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS

Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).

1. (C) Summary: GSL representatives admit that at

least some elements of armed forces may be

cooperating with irregular armed groups.

Government is trying to crack down on this, and is

also trying to develop a proposal for a political

settlement. EU will likely designate LTTE as

terrorist group on May 29 or 30, but there are

still internal divisions on how to handle this

issue, and this may affect discussions in Tokyo.

Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is pushing

the GSL hard to examine its assumptions and is

looking for new ways to get the parties to talk to

each other. END SUMMARY

2. (U) Ambassador met May 24-25 with Peace

Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona, Defense Secretary

SIPDIS

Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Foreign Secretary

Palihakkara to discuss the upcoming Tokyo Co-

Chairs meeting. In addition, Co-Chairs Chiefs of

Mission met May 24 with visiting Norwegian Special

Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer, and Ambassador had

follow-on meeting next day with Netherlands

Ambassador Van Dijk.

3. (C) In all meetings, Ambassador began by noting

the importance of the Tokyo meeting. The Co-

Chairs had been formed in a different environment

with a specific task--to monitor the parties¥

compliance with the Tokyo Declaration which linked

development assistance with progress on the peace

process. That task no longer existed, and the Co-

Chairs should consider what their role should now

be. They would discuss in Tokyo what their

expectations were from both parties if they were

to continue successfully. He noted that the US

was developing further its proposal for two

international groups to crack down on Tiger

fundraising and weapons procurement.

Kohona: "Some Bad Things Happening"

-----------------------------------

4. (C) Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona said

that the GSL strongly supported the proposed

initiatives on fundraising and weapons

procurement, and he believed that Japan did also.

Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi had told him

that Japan wanted to modify the role of Norway as

facilitator. Norway (and by extension the Co-

Chairs) should be "neutral but not impartial."

Ambassador said that in addition to stating that

the Tigers needed to give up violence and enter

the political process, the Co-Chairs would likely

repeat the recent statements by PDAS Camp that the

Government needed to find ways to address long-

term Tamil grievances and to protect the rights of

Tamils in the short-term. Kohona agreed that

"some bad things are happening" which the

Government needed to control. Some elements of the

security forces, he said, might be colluding with

Karuna and others.

5. (C) On the political front, Kohona said, he had

just spent two days in a retreat with Hanssen-

Bauer in Barcelona to go over the basics of the

peace process. Hanssen-Bauer had pushed him hard,

Kohona said, which was good. Regarding the Sri

Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which has been

very forthright recently in its statements, Kohona

said that it was fair for the SLMM to criticize

the GSL when it did something wrong, but it should

not equate the Government and the Tigers.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Indians Pushing Hard

----------------------------------------

6. (C) Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapajksa

admitted to Ambassador that some elements of the

armed forces might be colluding with Karuna, and

that this had to stop. He said that the President

was adamant on this point and had made it strongly

to the service chiefs at a National Security

Council meeting that same morning. Gotabaya said

that Indian officials had pushed him hard during

his recent visit to New Delhi. National Security

Adviser Narayanan was very familiar with the

issue, since he had spent "over 500 hours" with

LTTE head Prabhakaran when Narayanan was working

in RAW. Naryanan and others had recommended

strongly that Sri Lanka adopt something like the

Indian model of governance, which had defused

India¥s own ethnic crises. The Indians also told

him that the GSL had to curb abuses against

Tamils, and had to offer the Tamils something

positive to work towards.

Palihakkara: GSL Serious about Human Rights

-------------------------------------------

7. (C) In a May 25 conversation with the

Ambassador and DCM, Foreign Secretary H.G.M.S.

Palihakkara said that President Rajapaksa is "very

keen" in mounting serious investigations into

possible security force human rights violations.

To that end, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera

and Minister of Disaster Management and Human

Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe would later on May 25

hold the first meeting of a revived inter-

ministerial committee on human rights which would

provide oversight of security force conduct. "We

want to prevent security force misconduct while

investigating any that has already taken place,"

Palihakkara said. There would be a standing

working group under the committee, chaired by

Samarasinghe, which would include the service

commanders, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa,

the Attorney General and others. At the same

time, the President¥s Secretary, Lalith Wiratunga,

would be meeting with the governor of the

Northeast Province and UNHCR to deal with those

who have been displaced by disturbances in the

Trincomalee area. That situation, Palihakkara

stated, is "still manageable" but needs to be

handled carefully, he said.

8. (C) Looking longer term, Palihakkara agreed

with the Ambassador that the GSL needs to take

steps to spell out a political future for the

country which would give a sense of belonging and

security to Tamils and Muslims. To that end, the

President has initiated a working group to put

flesh on the bones of his presidential campaign

commitment to "maximum devolution." Palihakkara

commented that it would be important to not get

caught up in labels like devolution or federalism.

"We should label it after we¥ve put it together."

9. (C) Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador that

the May 30 co-chairs meeting in Tokyo would be an

important opportunity for the co-chairs to

determine what useful role they could play given

that their initial raison d¥etre really did not

exist anymore. "New thinking is needed."

Palihakkara commented that the "ancillary ideas"

of forming working groups to crack down on money

and weapons flows were welcomed by the government

which looked forward to feeding information to the

groups once they were formed. He said he hoped

the co-chairs would come out strongly against the

current violence and discuss ways to lessen it,

commenting that the cease-fire agreement is

intended to mean "no violence not regulated

violence."

10. (C) Palihakkara reiterated that the GSL

remains committed, despite the current

difficulties, to getting the Tigers "back to the

table" not just to discuss the cease-fire

agreement but also to talk about long-term

solutions (which made a public presentation on

"maximum devolution" all the more important). He

thanked the Ambassador for Secretary Rice¥s

response to Foreign Minister Samaraweera¥s letter

on the all-party congress and commented that while

it was easy to be dismissive of such exercises,

the congress had been very important in getting

the radical JVP to commit publicly to a number of

steps.

Hanssen-Bauer: Looking for Ways Forward

---------------------------------------

11. (C) Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (US, Japan,

Norway, Netherlands representing EU Presidency,

and EC) met with visiting Norwegian Special Envoy

Jon Hanssen-Bauer evening of May 24. Hanssen-Bauer

said that his Barcelona meeting with Kohona was

intended to help the GSL think through its

strategy, and to push the GSL on what it could

offer for a political deal. Hanssen-Bauer would

see President Rajapaksa on Friday (after visiting

the Tigers in Kilinocchi on Thursday) and would

try to take these ideas further then.

12. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said that as an interim

confidence building measure, he was considering

inviting the parties to come to Oslo to discuss

the role of the SLMM, something they both seemed

interested in. This was especially important in

view of recent Tiger statements that the SLMM sea

wing should no longer ride on Sri Lankan Navy

vessels, and that land travel was now also

dangerous.

13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer asked COM¥s what they

thought should come out of the Tokyo meeting.

There was general consensus that the Co-Chairs

should state that they wanted to help the peace

process but could only do so successfully if the

parties were serious and took certain actions.

The LTTE would need to give up violence and

terrorism and enter the political process. The

Government would need to show that it recognized

Tamil grievances and was willing to take the

dramatic political steps needed to address them.

It would also need to ensure that Tamils were

protected. Unexpectedly, Netherlands Ambassador

Van Dijk said that a Co-Chairs statement should

not mention "terrorism," especially since EU

designation of LTTE as a terrorist group was

liable to be announced simultaneously with Tokyo

meeting on May 29 or 30. Van Dijk¥s position

seemed to surprise everyone, and Ambassador

strongly refuted it.

EU Inside Baseball

------------------

14. (C) Van Dijk called Ambassador May 25 and

asked to get together to talk the issue through.

Van Dijk (please protect) told Ambassador that

there were still deep divisions within EU on this

subject. France and Italy had objected to the

listing on procedural grounds, because they

thought they were being pushed into it by the US.

When that objection was dealt with, the Nordics

still objected on substantive grounds. They

insisted that a listing be accompanied by a

statement which mentioned the failings of both the

Government and the LTTE. He also said that EC

Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and her colleague

Herve Jouanjean (who will represent the EC at

Tokyo) had pushed for a lesser action than

listing--some type of targeted sanctions--but had

lost. As a result, Van Dijk predicted, Jouanjean

could be difficult at Tokyo. Ambassador said he

believed there was no way we could accept a Tokyo

statement which did not mention the need for the

Tigers to give up terrorism, and van Dijk

eventually agreed there should be some way to do

that.

COMMENT

-------

15. Several things strike us from these meetings.

For one, the GSL seems to have gotten the message

that it must do something to prevent abuse of

Tamils, and also to think seriously about what a

long-term solution would look like. We were

particularly struck by the turnaround in Gotabaya

Rajapaksa. Previously he would strenuously deny

any connection between the GSL and the Karuna

group--now he admits it is probably occurring. We

are favorably impressed by Hanssen-Bauer, who is

bringing both imagination and structure to the

peace process and the work of the Co-Chairs. It

seems certain that the EU will designate the LTTE,

but it is still in disarray internally. Van Dijk

is excitable and not always accurate in his

predictions, but we may have to work hard on the

EU in Tokyo to make any statement meaningful. In

the end, Kohona is right: we can and should

criticize both sides, but we should not equate

them.

LUNSTEAD

33. 23.01.2006: AMBASSADORS CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000072

SIPDIS

FOR D AND P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, SU, NO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR´S CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM

Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney, Reason 1.4 b and d.

1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador made his introductory call on International Development Minister Erik Solheim January 19 and discussed Solheims upcoming trip to Sri Lanka, the state of play in Sudan, and the Ministers development priorities. Solheim stressed that he is eager to cooperate with the United States, noting that there is only so much Norway can do to promote peace around the world. Ultimately, U.S. pressure is usually needed to consolidate any process, Solheim commented. Essentially, Solheim envisions Norway having a "complementary role" to U.S. efforts. Solheim spoke highly of Deputy Secretary Zoellicks in-depth knowledge of Sudan and praised the United States for achieving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Solheim welcomed the Ambassadors suggestion that we not only continue the close cooperation on Sri Lanka and Sudan but also identify new areas where we can work together to advance peace and development, although he did not see an increased Norwegian role in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly explained that Norway needs to be cautious in its approach to the Caucasus given that it is Russias backyard. End summary.

Sri Lanka: Expectations for Solheim Trip "Too High" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

2. (C) Solheim, who is traveling to Colombo January 23-26 (with a planned stop in New Delhi on his way back to Oslo), commented that expectations in the Sri Lankan press have gotten way out of hand -- as if his visit would "save" the country. Solheim remarked that ironically, the same people who only two months ago were bad mouthing Norway and wanted to end the Norwegian mediation role were now counting on Solheim to get the peace process back on track. The Minister outlined two basic objectives for his visit: 1) "stabilize the ceasefire" and 2) meet the President in his new capacity with a view to getting him to fully understand how he can advance talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Solheim explained that he wants to get a recommitment to the cease-fire, reduce violations, and move the country away from the brink of war. He added, that while he knows the President well and thinks highly of him, Rajapaksa in his view is unfamiliar with the complexities of the ethnic issues and needs to learn how to best move the peace process forward. Solheim intends to provide Rajapaksa the "LTTE perspective." On the question of getting the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to the table, Solheim said that he hoped the parties would agree soon to a venue in Europe. While not ruling out Oslo, Solheim said that places like Sweden, Finland or Switzerland would be better. Solheim noted that he looked forward to comparing notes and discussing how best to advance the peace process with U/S Burns when they meet in Colombo.

Sudan: Norway Appreciates U.S. Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3. (C) Solheim was effusive in his praise for Deputy Secretary Zoellick. Not only was Solheim impressed with the

SIPDIS Deputys knowledge of Sudan but also that it was evident that he follows the issue day-to-day -- clearly reflecting the high priority the U.S. puts on Sudan. Solheim commented that without the United States, there would not have been a CPA and that now the U.S. and Norway need to continue to coax both parties, Khartoum and the SPLM, to continue to make progress. He remarked on the desperate state of the South, no roads, no infrastructure; noting that it was important that peace yield dividends. With the loss of Dr. Garang, the SPLM needs to consolidate its power and that is where Norway will focus its efforts. Solheim remains concerned about what he referred to as the "spoilers," i.e., paramilitary groups such as the Lords Resistance Army, and the situation in Darfur. Solheim added that the situation in Sudan remains "dangerous," stressing that it will require continued intense attention. Solheim thanked us for supporting Tom Vraalsen for leader of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, remarking that without the U.S. it would not have happened. Vraalsen is a good man, he added, and an expert on Sudan.

4. (C) On Darfur, Solheim believes the humanitarian situation has improved but that security remains a difficult problem. Solheim praised Deputy Secretary Zoellick for his efforts to force the various guerrilla groups to adopt serious positions in peace negotiations, noting that the situation will not improve until people feel safe to return to their homes.

No Global Strategy - - - - - - - - - -

5. (C) Responding to the Ambassadors question as to where Solheim saw Norway concentrating its development efforts under the new Stoltenberg government, Solheim readily acknowledged that he did not have a global strategy. In fact, Solheim said Norway was prepared to help anywhere where parties in conflict would want Norwegian participation. The Ambassador suggested that perhaps Norway could do more to advance democracy and stability in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly replied that Norway had to be careful about getting involved in the Caucasus for fear of upsetting the Russians. Solheim noted that as a neighbor to Russia, Norway needs to proceed carefully in the Russian sphere of influence and all but ruled out any significant engagement in the Caucasus. That said, the rest of the world is game and we should consider where we can do more together.

Comment - - - -

6. (C) It is a ironic that despite being a minister from the far-left Socialist Left Party, Solheim (after FM Stoere), is the cabinet member most interested in working with us. One big reason for this is that his experience working with us on Sri Lanka has been extremely positive; another is that he realizes that he can do more as a peace broker if he has the U.S. as a closer. We believe Solheim can continue to be a good partner and that we should seize opportunities to engage him in areas where we think he can contribute, particularly given Norways deep aid pockets. It is clear that Solheim sees himself more as someone who will push peace initiatives than run development assistance programs.

7. (C) We have been pushing Norway to do more in the Caucasus for some time but to no avail. Solheims direct reply on concerns over alienating Russia is the first time we have been told the real reason. Norwegian officials are always quick to point to their excellent ties to Russia but rarely come out and say that they want to be careful not to irritate the bear. Privately, however, Norwegians acknowledge that they remain concerned over Russia and worry about some day returning to having an unfriendly neighbor -- hence the importance they place on NATO and their interest in making sure the United States becomes engaged on High North issues. Norways objective is to ensure that the U.S. is available and ready to help reign in any Russian aggressiveness/misbehavior in the Barents region. WHITNEY

34. 11.4.2006: : "Grim" prospects for Sri Lanka peace talks

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000467

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016

TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CE, NO

SUBJECT: "GRIM" PROSPECTS FOR SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS

Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Doug Apostol, Reasons 1.4(b) and (

d)


1.(U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.

Summary and Action Request

--------------------------

2.(C) Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer hosted a Sri

Lankan Co-Chair representative meeting at the MFA on April

11. Hanssen-Bauer outlined the current situation in advance

of the scheduled April 19 Geneva conference (so-called

"Geneva Two") between representatives of the Sri Lankan

Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Calling prospects of the conference occurring as "grim,"

Hanssen-Bauer noted issues (and internal pressures) dividing

both parties. In addition, he believes recent explosions

(likely the work of the LTTE) and the assassination of a Sri

Lankan official by the rival LTTE faction Karuna further

fueled existing tensions which would forestall the

forthcoming conference. After the Co-Chair representative

meeting, Hanssen-Bauer met alone with Pol/Econ Officer and

candidly revealed that Geneva Two will likely be postponed,

if not canceled. He questioned the Sri Lankan President¥s

grasp of the situation and/or his intentions. The Special

Envoy voiced apprehension about the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna

(JVP) efforts to demonize Norway through negative propaganda,

which he felt would increase should Geneva Two not take

place, as planned. Finally, he noted the LTTE political

leadership faced internal military pressures, which could

affect Geneva Two moving forward.

3.(C) Hanssen-Bauer plans on releasing a statement

encouraging the parties to continue honoring existing Geneva

commitments and move forward with the Geneva Two meeting. He

is encouraging other Co-Chairs to release similar messages as

soon as possible. Post therefore requests the Department

consider issuing a statement urging the parties to attend the

planned Geneva Two meeting and recognize existing cease-fire

obligations.

Sri Lankan President in Delicate Balancing Act

--------------------------------------------- -

4.(C) Hanssen-Bauer believes that GSL President Rajapaksa

must balance internal political pressures (in addition to

those from rival parties) in any determination to continue

the peace process. Successful Geneva Two talks would improve

the President¥s southern power base (and may influence him

pushing for early elections).

LTTE Sending Mixed Messages

---------------------------

5.(C) Hanssen-Bauer finds mixed messages from the LTTE.

Although the LTTE indicates it wants to go beyond cease-fire

talks and eventually discuss other issues with the GSL (e.g.

economic development and democracy building), the first LTTE

issue is a guaranty of security for the Geneva-bound LTTE

delegation, which Rajapaksa has given. Hanssen-Bauer finds

the LTTE¥s greatest issue is for the GSL to disarm/disband

the Karuna faction. The LTTE feels that the GSL is "shutting

its eyes" to Karuna¥s operations, and speculates that Karuna

may be used by the GSL as a weapon in a war against the LTTE.

The LTTE concludes that the GSL armed forces, in addition to

the Karuna paramilitary forces, could defeat the LTTE

militarily.

6.(C) In addition, the LTTE asserts that the government¥s

failure to disarm/disband military groups (particularly

Karuna in the east) is a direct violation of the first Geneva

talks. According to Hanssen-Bauer, nothing has been done by

the GSL to address this LTTE issue. The Special Envoy feels

that the LTTE would accept the containment of the Karuna

faction (and not press for disbanding Karuna) as a

precondition for the LTTE proceeding with Geneva Two.

7.(C) Finally, the LTTE Central Committee seeks the GSL¥s

assistance in arranging a LTTE pre-Geneva "strategy meeting"

to be held in Kilinochichi. Rajapaksa has refused to offer

military transport to bring LTTE forces to Kilinochichi,

which Hanssen-Bauer suspects is a result of the President¥s

perceived need to show that he is not "soft" to political

rivals. Earlier GSL governements have provided such military

transport. Hanssen-Bauer noted that the LTTE could be asked

to go to Geneva Two without the Central Committee meeting,

but the result will create a "negative" atmosphere in Geneva.

Norway supports the Central Committee meeting, viewed as a

means of preventing the LTTE¥s isolation (and resort to

violence).

8. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke at length about his concern of

increased violence by the LTTE, specifically three incidents

of claymore mine attacks (most recently today). The

LTTE-sponsored attacks are apparently retaliation for the

Karuna-sponsored assassination of Vanniasingham Vigneswaran,

a moderate Tamil politician in Trimcomalee.

Frustrated Norwegians Resolved to Move Forward

--------------------------------------------- -

9.(C) Although Hanssen-Bauer is concerned with the recent

acts of violence, he impressed upon Co-Chair representatives

the need to move forward. Prior to the recent claymore

attacks, the LTTE advocated postponing Geneva Two. In his

view, the GSL now thinks the LTTE must go to Geneva,

particularly given Canada¥s listing of the LTTE as a

terrorist organization. Norway will issue a statement today

urging the parties to go to Geneva, and welcomes similar

statements form Co-Chair countries. The statement will

essentially provide that Norway encourages the parties to

meet face-to-face and halt tensions, but such decision must

be that of the GSL and LTTE themselves.

10.(C) The Norwegians view a constructive conversation at

Geneva Two as a means to defuse the charged climate. He

viewed any LTTE postponement of Geneva Two as likely leading

to the LTTE being recognized by the EU as a terrorist group.

Most importantly, he restated that the LTTE must cease its

violence. He informed the GSL that it must comply with its

existing Geneva obligations (including honoring the

cease-fire).

11.(C) Admittedly frustrated by both the GSL and LTTE demands

on Norway, Hanssen-Bauer has reminded them that Norway¥s role

is limited as a facilitator and, if "they are serious," both

the parties should enable each other to attend Geneva Two.

He noted that "Norway cannot make the meeting happen if the

GSL and LTTE do not want it to happen." Hanssen-Bauer,

stating that the atmosphere was "grim today, and hopefully

positive tomorrow" felt that if the parties do not meet on

April 19, he will advocate for a postponement, and not a

cancellation.

"Low-key Statements" Requested from Co-Chairs

---------------------------------------------

12.(C) When pressed by the Japanese Ambassador, Hanssen-Bauer

envisioned any supportive statements from the Co-Chairs as

being both "low-key" and "outside the public eye." These

statements would be directed only to the parties involved,

and should stress the importance of Geneva Two. The parties

should thus meet to defuse violence and further implement the

existing cease-fire agreement.

Parties Need to Get Their Acts Together

----------------------------------------

13.(C) Following the Co-Chairs representative meeting,

Hanssen-Bauer met privately with Pol/Econ Officer. The

Special Envoy started the meeting by praising Ambassador

Lunstead¥s efforts in Colombo (particularly regarding the

LTTE¥s military transportation requests). The Special Envoy

is troubled that President Rajapaksa is either consistently

uninformed or not forthcoming. He also voiced concerns that

the LTTE political leadership is facing increasing pressures

from the LTTE military leadership. Hanssen-Bauer seemed

particularly concerned about the JVP, despite its recent

election losses. He believes that postponing or canceling

Geneva Two will be seen as a JVP victory, which has stepped

up its anti-Norwegian propaganda efforts. With the recent

elections, Hanssen-Bauer states that the parties have not had

time to "get their acts together" and focus on issues leading

up to Geneva Two. He concludes that Geneva Two will be

postponed, or even perhaps canceled. The question remains as

to which party will actually cancel/postpone the conference.

Visit Oslo¥s Classified website:

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/oslo/index.cf m

WEBSTER


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