[ January 08, London, Sri Lnaka Guardian]
25. 16.5.2003: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet
"C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000824 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT; NSC FOR E. MILLARD LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL E.O. 12958:
DECL: 05-16-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PINS, CE, NO, JA, Human Rights
SUBJECT: Norwegian FM presses Tigers, but no sign of give yet; Latest re cohabitation stresses
Refs: Colombo 805, and previous (U) Classified by Lewis Amselem, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Reasons: 1.5 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norwegian FM Petersen met with the Tigers on May15. Despite his best efforts, the Tigers did not say they will return to the talks, nor did they commit to attend the Tokyo donors conference. The Japanese Embassy has confirmed that it has received no further word from the Tigers re Tokyo. In other news, the cohabitation situation remains tense as the president and the PM continue to bicker. Until these snarls are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a bind. END SUMMARY.
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2. (C) NORWEGIAN FM PRESSES TIGERS: Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen met with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader V. Prabhakaran and other key LTTE officials on May 15. GoN Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesen and Ambassador Hans Brattskar also participated in the meeting, which took place in the town of Kilinochchi in the Tiger-controlled Wanni area of north-central Sri Lanka. Petersen reportedly used the meeting to press the LTTE to return to the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government and to commit to attend the June donors conference in Tokyo. In response, the Tigers reiterated their position that unless immediate action was taken to address the humanitarian situation in the north, they would not go to Tokyo or resume participation in the peace talks. Voicing another of their long-standing demands, the Tigers also said that the GSL must take immediate steps to reduce the size of its security zones in Jaffna.
3. (C) JAPANESE MULL OVER TOKYO: In additional news re the peace process, Koji Yagi, Japanese Embassy poloff, told us May 16 that his government had not received any word from the Tigers re their attendance at the Tokyo conference. (Note: Per Reftels, Japanese Special Envoy Akashi had set May 14 as the deadline for the Tigers to reconsider their previous statements that they would not attend the Tokyo meeting.) Yagi said his embassy had heard that the LTTE might be planning to send Japan a letter requesting a postponement in the Tokyo conference so the GSL had ""time"" to meet Tiger demands. Queried as to what the GoJ´s plans were re the conference at this point, Yagi allowed that the issue was very problematic for his government. He said the GoJ continued to review what to do next.
4. (SBU) TAMIL POLITICIANS MEET THE LTTE: In other news re the peace track, a group of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) politicians met with the LTTE leadership in the Wanni on May13. After the meeting, a joint LTTE-TNA statement was issued that stressed the LTTE´s continued support of a negotiated political settlement of the dispute. Re the peace talks and the Tokyo conference, Mission has heard that the Tigers used the meeting with the TNA to reiterate their well-known stance that the GSL had to meet their demands before they agreed to cooperate.
5. (C) COHABITATION BICKERING CONTINUES: The latest news re Sri Lanka´s tense cohabitation situation is that President Kumaratunga has sent a letter to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on May 14 stating that she would not change her decision re the takeover of the Development Lotteries Board. (Note: Late last week, per Reftels, the president announced that she was taking over the lotteries board. The GSL has refused to implement her decision.) Further, she rejected the PM´s allegation that the takeover violated the Sri Lankan Constitution, asserting that she had acted in full conformity with the law. In terms of next moves in the tense situation, the PM is reportedly drafting a response to Kumaratunga´s latest missive. There are also reports that President Kumaratunga, in a bid to show she has control of the agency, is planning to call for an emergency meeting of the directors of the lotteries board soon.
6. (C) COMMENT: Until the snarls over the peace process and cohabitation are cleared up, the GSL will continue to be in a serious bind. The LTTE is clearly not in the mood to make things easy for it in terms of the peace track. In the meantime, the president is causing the GSL serious problems with respect to politics in the south. Even when things were going more smoothly, the GSL was overloaded enough. The weight of these added problems makes the overall challenge for the GSL that much larger. END COMMENT.
7. (U) Minimize considered. WILLS"
26. 15.3.2004: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
3/15/2004 11:33
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000456
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE ALSO PASS TOPEC
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03-15-14
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Norwegian Special Envoy Solheim reviews latest
on LTTE split and discusses upcoming election
Refs: (A) Colombo 446, and previous
- (B) Oslo 419
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: In a March 13 meeting with the four
local co-chairs (Japan, Norway, U.S. and the EU) and
again to a wider donor group on March 15, Norwegian
Special Envoy Erik Solheim discussed his latest visit to
Sri Lanka. Ambassador Lunstead participated in the
meetings. Most of Solheim´s comments focused on the
recent split in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) organization and Sri Lanka´s April 2
parliamentary election. Solheim´s visit appears to have
been mainly devoted to fact gathering on the new
complexities and uncertainties affecting the Sri Lankan
situation. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) MEETING WITH LTTE OFFICIALS: In March 13 and
March 15 meetings, which were attended by Ambassador
Lunstead, Solheim said he had met with S.P.
Thamilchelvam, the Tiger political chief, during a March
11 trip to LTTE headquarters in the Vanni region.
During the discussion, which centered around rebel
eastern commander Karuna´s recent break with the main
LTTE leadership (see Ref A), Solheim said Thamilchelvam
had emphasized repeatedly that the group wanted to
"peacefully" resolve the dispute with Karuna. Asserting
that Karuna was operating alone and that most eastern
cadre were "against" him, Thamilchelvam told Solheim
that the Tigers would try to undermine Karuna from
within by starving Karuna financially and encouraging
defections from his ranks. Thamilchelvam also blamed
Karuna for the two recent election-related
assassinations in the east (see Ref A). (Karuna has
placed blame for these killings on the LTTE´s
intelligence apparatus.) The Tigers also told Solheim
of their concern that no one interfere in the Karuna
situation. The group was steadfast that it was an
"internal matter" for the LTTE alone. (Separately,
during two meetings, Solheim said PM Wickremesinghe made
clear that the GSL would not get involved in the
situation between the LTTE and Karuna. The PM also said
that the government would avoid taking advantage of the
situation.)
3. (C) While in the Vanni, Solheim also said that he
had met with Pathuman, a high-ranking LTTE commander
from Trincomalee District. According to Solheim,
Pathuman looked "okay" and stated that he (Pathuman)
was still in command of the Trincomalee district.
(Solheim´s meeting with Pathuman effectively rebutted
recent press reports that the LTTE had "executed"
Pathuman because he was allegedly close to Karuna --
see Ref A.)
4. (C) In a March 11 visit to the eastern area of
Trincomalee, Solheim said that he had had a positive
meeting with Sri Lanka Army Major General Sunil
Tennekoon, the general in charge (GOC) of the
district. Tennekoon stated that the situation in
Trincomalee remained calm, despite newspaper reports
to the contrary. Local Tigers officials in
Trincomalee, for their part, told Solheim they were
happy that the Norwegian delegation was visiting
Trincomalee. According to the Tigers, the visit was
an important signal that the international community
remained engaged in Sri Lanka. Separately, Solheim
added that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)
was continuing its work in the east, despite press
reports to the contrary. The only change was that
the SLMM was not entering the eastern areas held by
Karuna.
5. (C) Solheim told the co-chairs that the
Norwegians saw three possible outcomes to the Karuna
situation:
-- (1) the LTTE leadership undermines or kills
Karuna;
-- (2) the LTTE leadership strikes a deal with
Karuna, giving the rebel commander autonomy over the
eastern districts of Batticaloa and Ampara;
-- (3) Karuna becomes a GSL-supported "warlord."
(Solheim said this last possibility would be the most
unsettling for the peace process if it came to
fruition.)
6. (C) Solheim said Thamilchelvam also had discussed
donor assistance and the need to resolve the issue of
an assistance funds delivery mechanism. To the co-
chairs, Solheim stated that the Norwegians were
considering a model similar to the Afghan Fund.
7. (C) PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN: In discussing the
April 2 parliamentary elections, Solheim noted that
the LTTE hoped the government would approve polling
sites either at the GSL´s crossing points into Tiger-
controlled area, or in the "no-man´s land" between
GSL- and LTTE-controlled areas. On this point, it
was not clear which alternative had been agreed to,
although the LTTE remains concerned that the Army
will not honor election plans and, in a repeat of the
December 2001 parliamentary elections, would largely
bar Tamils in Tiger-controlled areas from reaching
polling sites. If polling sites were approved for
either of these areas, the LTTE expected that the
Army would not be present, with the Sri Lanka police
instead providing security. According to Solheim,
Army officials in Jaffna and Trincomalee had stated
that the Tigers had agreed to polling sites at the
GSL´s crossing points. (Mission has heard reports
that the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner will
support holding the polling in "no-man´s land"
areas.)
8. (C) COMMENT: Solheim´s visit appears to have been
mainly devoted to fact gathering. Karuna´s decision to
separate himself from the main LTTE organization has
clearly made the overall situation that much more
complex. Moreover, there is great uncertainty over how
the Karuna matter will play out and over the upcoming
election. That said, the Norwegians still appear firmly
engaged, which is a significant positive. Their mettle
is clearly being tested in this confusing, volatile
period, however. END SUMMARY.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
27. 15.4.2004: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews recent discussion with President on peace process
4/15/2004 10:24
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000644
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, INR/NESA; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04-15-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: In meeting, Norwegian Ambassador reviews
recent discussion with President on peace process
Refs: Colombo 637, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway expects a formal request from
the GSL to continue its role as peace facilitator.
Norwegians think the new Sri Lankan Government needs to
realize it cannot make unilateral decisions on the
course of the peace process. No "Peace Team" in place
yet. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar briefed
Ambassador April 14 on the conversation he and Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Chief Furuhovde had with
President Chandrika Kumaratunga late evening of April
10, following the delayed swearing-in of the new
cabinet. The meeting also took place as fighting
between forces of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) chief Prabhakaran and breakaway leader Karuna was
ongoing, before the collapse of Karuna´s rebellion (see
Reftels). Brattskar said that the President complained
that LTTE actions were a violation of the Ceasefire
Agreement (CFA) and seemed to want the SLMM to do
something immediately. Brattskar explained that the CFA
set out a procedure, and that the GSL would have to make
a formal complaint to the SLMM, which would then
investigate and make a judgment.
3. (C) The President said that she desired to restart
the peace talks as soon as possible. Brattskar said
that he told the President that when the previous
government took power, it had formally requested the
Norwegians to continue their facilitation role. Norway
expected to receive such a request from the new
government, with a description of what it expected
Norway to do. The President was surprised at this.
Brattskar then said that he explained to the President
that neither the GSL nor the LTTE could make unilateral
decisions about the talks. The two sides would have to
agree to any decisions. Brattskar told Ambassador (but
not the President) that the Norwegians, and Deputy
Foreign Minister Helgesen in particular, were disturbed
by an interview which new Foreign Minister Kadirgamar
had given to a local newspaper a few days ago in which
he had made several categorical statements, such as that
any new rounds of talks would be held only in Sri Lanka,
not in foreign locations, and also laying out what he
thought Norway´s role would be. Brattskar said that any
such decisions would have to be agreed by both sides and
should be discussed privately, not in the press. He
also expressed unease about statements by both
Kadirgamar and new Prime Minister Rajapakse that India
would have a new, and prominent, role to play in the
peace process. Again, this was something both sides
would need to agree on.
4. (C) Alluding to the then-ongoing LTTE infighting,
the President told Brattskar that she thought peace
talks only succeeded when one side negotiated from a
clear position of strength. (This position is probably
made moot by Karuna´s collapse.) Brattskar discussed
with her a number of different peace processes, but said
he did not think the LTTE could be pressurized in that
way. He told Ambassador that it reminded him of the
strategy the President had followed in the mid-90s of
"War for Peace," which had ended disastrously.
5. (C) Brattskar said it was also clear that the
President had not yet put together a "Peace Team" to
conduct the negotiations. She told him she would keep
the current Peace Secretariat, but change some of its
personnel. She did say that current Foreign Secretary
and also Peace Secretariat Head Bernard Goonetilleke
would be removed from both jobs.
6. (C) COMMENT: The charitable view of this is that
the new Government was unaware of the ways in which the
Peace Process has changed and become formalized over the
past two years, and will adjust to new realities. If it
does not, and tries to make unilateral changes and
decisions, there could be a rough road ahead. The
Norwegians, no doubt feeling a bit buffeted by criticism
of their role during the election campaign, are perhaps
being over-sensitive. Nonetheless, they have made a
useful point to the President that their role cannot
just be taken for granted.
7. (C) COMMENT (Continued): No one doubts the
President´s commitment to peace. What remains
questionable are: (1) whether she has the vision to
understand what changes a peace settlement will entail
for Sri Lanka and (2) whether she can deal with the
Process in a systematic, disciplined manner. The weak
nature of her government, beset on peace from within by
its JVP partners and from without by the Buddhist monks,
will make it all the harder. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
28. 9.6.2004: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri Lanka peace process is troubled
6/9/2004 9:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000953
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-09-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, Political Parties, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Recent meetings show the way forward for Sri
Lanka peace process is troubled
Refs: (A) Colombo 915, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition Leader Wickremesinghe
thought the Co-Chairs statement was good, but that the
President and her government do not understand the
psychology of the LTTE, and are determined to begin
talks on the final ("hard") issues. He also thinks the
military is using LTTE rebel Karuna to attack the LTTE.
When pressed to support the peace process, he said that
the Government needs to make a statement laying out its
policy.
2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Norwegian Ambassador
Brattskar says that the two sides are moving further
apart, rather than closer. The LTTE will meet with its
diaspora experts in Switzerland in mid-July. President
Kumaratunga called the Norwegian Foreign Minister to
complain that she had already made many concessions. No
one expects any movement until after the July 10
Provincial Council elections. END SUMMARY.
Ranil: She just does not understand.
------------------------------------
3. (C) Ambassador met with Opposition Leader (and
former Prime Minister) Ranil Wickremesinghe the evening
of June 7 to discuss the recent Co-Chairs meeting in
Brussels. Ranil said that he had read the Co-chairs´
statement and thought it was "good." At the moment, he
did not plan any action on the peace process: "She has
the mandate, not me." President Kumaratunga and Foreign
Minister Kadirgamar, he said, did not understand the
psychology of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE). "They only want to discuss an interim
administration. They will never agree to discuss final
issues now." He had discussed this with Kadirgamar, but
Kadirgamar had insisted that he wanted to take up hard
issues now. Ranil said that he had ignored some
transgressions by the LTTE because it was the only way
to keep negotiations going. The President did not
understand this.
4. (C) Ranil said that the Government was playing a
dangerous game because the Sri Lanka Army (Department of
Military Intelligence, "DMI") was using the breakaway
LTTE rebel Karuna to get back at the LTTE. Ranil said
he "knew" this was the case -- he had sources in the
military who told him so. This was another example of
the Government´s dangerous game.
5. (C) Ambassador said that the Co-Chairs statement was
directed at all parties in Sri Lanka. If the
international community were to keep its interest alive,
we expected everyone to support peace. Pressing the
point, Ambassador said that he thought comments such as
recent remarks by UNP spokesman G.L. Peiris that the
President´s efforts were a "sham" peace process were not
helpful. One could criticize what the President wanted
to do, Ambassador said, but should not imply that she
was not interested in peace. Ranil said that the
President and her ruling coalition needed to make a
clear policy statement on the peace process. (Comment:
The President is avoiding this because she could never
get her JVP coalition partners to go along with anything
reasonable.)
Norwegians: Getting worse, not better
-------------------------------------
6. (C) Ambassador met with Indian High Commissioner Sen
and Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar mid-day on June 8,
along with EU and Canadian Chiefs of Mission.
(Brattskar had arrived back from Oslo, where he had
stopped after Brussels, only that same morning.)
Brattskar said that the Norwegians were trying to put
together a statement which would allow talks to resume.
The Norwegians were in constant touch with both sides,
receiving messages from both, but unfortunately the
sides were moving farther apart. Each side was sending
"unhelpful clarifications." The Government insistence
on holding "parallel" talks on final settlement issues
was, Brattskar said, just a non-starter.
7. (C) Each side was afraid that giving in would
prejudice the final outcome. The LTTE had rejected the
plan to resurrect a NERF-like mechanism to disburse aid
because they felt if they did so, the Government would
never seriously discuss the LTTE´s Interim Self-
Governing Administration (ISGA). The Government did not
want to discuss the ISGA alone because it feared that if
an ISGA were set up, the LTTE would have no incentive to
discuss final issues. Brattskar said that President
Kumaratunga had called the Norwegian Foreign Minister
the day before to complain that she had made many
compromises, but the Tigers had not made any.
LTTE issues
-----------
8. (C) Sen said that he had heard that the GSL had been
using Karuna and his faction to get back at the LTTE,
but that the military had now been given orders to stop
providing assistance to Karuna. Brattskar said that the
LTTE was now preparing for a week-long meeting they
would hold in Switzerland beginning July 20. The
meeting would include the legal and constitutional
experts from the Tamil diaspora who had helped the LTTE
prepare their ISGA proposal.
Messy Political Situation
-------------------------
9. (C) All agreed that the current political situation
makes it particularly difficult to make progress:
-- The Government still does not have enough votes to
show a majority in Parliament. (See Septel for report
on June 8 altercation in parliament.)
-- The JVP faction within the government continues to
snipe at the peace process (see Reftels).
-- Pending Provincial Council elections on July 10, no
one wants to make a dramatic move.
10. (C) COMMENT: We believe that Ranil Wickremesinghe
heard the Ambassador´s message about not trying to take
political advantage by attacking the peace process.
Wickremesinghe made it clear, however, that he is not
about to lend support to the President. Ranil´s
analysis of the psychology of the Tigers, and the need
to induce them to participate in the talks may be
accurate. The President´s problem is that she directed
the electoral campaign against Ranil on the basis that
he gave in too easily to the Tigers -- now she has to
show that she is harder to budge. Combined with
Kadirgamar´s insistence on discussing final issues, the
result is a poisonous atmosphere.
11. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
29. 15.7.2003: Tigers still refusing request from monitors tovacate forward base
7/15/2003 2:48
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001262
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, S/CT
NSC FOR E. MILLARD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07-18-13
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, PINS, CE, NO, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Tigers still refusing request from monitors to
vacate forward base; Another military informant killed
Refs: (A) FBIS Reston Va DTG 170326Z Jul 03
- (B) FBIS Reston Va DTG 150248Z Jul 03
- (C) Colombo 1256, and previous
(U) Classified by James F. Entwistle, Charge d´Affaires.
Reasons 1.5 (b, d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) has not yet been able to convince the Tamil
Tigers to vacate a base the group has established in the
east. The Tigers say the base is within their zone and
not in a GSL-demarcated area. In other peace process
developments, another military informant was killed late
July 17. The Tigers are almost certainly to blame. The
controversy over the base is causing strains in the
SLMM´s relationship with the Tigers. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) CONTROVERSY OVER TIGER BASE: The Norwegian-run
SLMM is becoming increasingly concerned over the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organization´s
refusal to vacate a forward base the group has
established in the east. The base, which is variously
referred to as the "Wan Ela" or "Manrasakulam" camp, is
near Kinniya, a town located roughly 15 kilometers to
the southwest of Trincomalee city. It is not clear when
the LTTE established the base, but the group apparently
did so in the past year. The LTTE has reportedly taken
steps to enlarge the base in recent weeks. The base is
believed to contain several bunkers which are possibly
filled with arms and ammunition.
3. (C) Reacting to complaints from the GSL and local
Muslims, the SLMM began to investigate the LTTE´s
establishment of the base several weeks ago. (Note:
Kinniya has a large population of Muslims. Muslims, in
general, are very worried about any indications of
increased Tiger influence in the east -- see Ref C.)
According to Hagrup Haukland, the Deputy Chief of the
SLMM, the basic rule the monitors are using in examining
the dispute comes from the February 2002 ceasefire
agreement. Haukland said the agreement makes clear that
the military forces of the LTTE and the government
cannot expand their zones of control during the
ceasefire. After examining records and completing a
site survey of the base on July 16, the SLMM ruled that
the Tigers´ base was built after the ceasefire agreement
came into force and that it encroaches on government-
controlled territory.
4. (C) For their part, the Tigers have vociferously
denied that the base is in a government-controlled area.
In recent meetings with SLMM officials, including Chief
Tryggve Tellefsen, the LTTE´s political chief S.P.
Thamilchelvam has underscored that the Tigers have no
plans to vacate the area. Exasperated by the Tigers´
hard-line stance, Haukland has given several interviews
to the press in which he has lashed out at the LTTE,
asserting that the group must vacate the site as soon as
possible (see Refs A-B). Among other concerns, Haukland
has also complained that the LTTE is not allowing the
monitors access to sites in all the areas it controls.
In recent conversations with polchief Haukland asserted
that the monitors´ relationship with the Tigers is not
approaching the breakdown stage despite his harsh
comments. When asked about next steps, Haukland said
the SLMM would continue to try to convince the Tigers to
withdraw from the area through private and public
communications. (Note: The SLMM´s Tellefsen briefed
Prime Minister Wickremesinghe about the dispute in a
July 17 meeting.)
5. (C) ANOTHER INFORMANT SLAIN: In other peace process
developments, another military informant was killed late
July 17. The informant, a Muslim named Abdul Baheer
Fowzie, 38, was gunned down by two men at a site north
of Trincomalee city. The slaying of Fowzie appears to
be part of the spate of killings of military informants
and Tamil Tiger opponents that has gained pace in recent
months (see Ref C). The Tigers have not taken
responsibility for any of the killings, including that
of Fowzie. Given the seemingly organized nature of the
killings and the victims´ occupations and/or political
leanings, there is little doubt that the Tigers are
responsible, however.
6. (C) COMMENT: The controversy over the base near
Kinniya is sparking strains in the SLMM´s relationship
with the Tigers. In their public comments, there is
little doubt that the monitors are getting increasingly
exasperated with the Tigers. The SLMM essentially feels
that the LTTE is not living up to its part of the
ceasefire agreement bargain by acceding to the monitors´
rulings. The SLMM has made the Tiger leadership aware
of its concerns, and it is now up to Thamilchelvam and
others to react in a constructive manner. If the Tigers
do not play ball, the SLMM´s mandate will become
increasingly difficult to fulfill. END COMMENT.
ENTWISTLE
30. 17.6.2004: Talks about Talks in Stasis while Norwegians Ponder Next Moves
6/17/2004 10:51
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 001013
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS; NSC FOR E. MILLARD
PLEASE PASS TOPEC
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06-17-14
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, CE, NO, IN, LTTE - Peace Process
SUBJECT: Talks about Talks in Stasis while Norwegians
Ponder Next Moves
Refs: (A) Colombo 983, and previous
(U) Classified by Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.
Reasons 1.5 (b,d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: The LTTE showed no flexibility on
negotiation issues during Norwegian Ambassador´s June 16
visit to Kilinochchi. Both sides have rejected a
Norwegian compromise formulation on the negotiating
agenda. The situation in the East is somewhat improved
but remains troubled. The LTTE has postponed its
European meeting. The Tigers told NGOs and UN agencies
they want to coordinate assistance better. Norwegians
will hold discussions in India this week. Norwegians
will decide optimum time to resume their shuttle
efforts. END SUMMARY.
No Progress for Norwegians in Kilinochchi
----------------------------------------
2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar briefed
fellow Co-Chair Ambassadors June 17 on his previous
day´s discussions with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) in Kilinochchi and on Norwegian peace
efforts in general. Brattskar said he had a 90 minute
meeting with LTTE political leader S.P. Thamilchelvam.
Briefing Thamilchelvam on the Brussels meeting,
Brattskar told him that the Co-Chairs were afraid of
drift in the peace process and were concerned about the
situation in the East. The positive side was that there
was great interest in Sri Lanka at a high political
level; the negative side was the impatience at lack of
progress. Thamilchelvam had spent considerable time
discussing the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA), which he
claimed the Government was violating in the East by
supporting Karuna´s forces. Thamilchelvam repeated the
familiar LTTE plaint that the Tamil people have
benefited from peace for the last two years but have
gained little else.
3. (C) Brattskar said he responded that both sides were
responsible for supporting the CFA. Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) head Trond Furuhovde would
travel to Kilinochchi next week for discussions on this
issue with the LTTE. (Brattskar commented that the
situation in the East was better than a few weeks ago,
but was still unstable.) In the meantime, the LTTE had
postponed its planned leadership trip to Geneva next
week for meetings with Tamil expatriate legal experts.
With no date yet set for talks, the LTTE saw no reason
to hold the discussions at this time.
4. (C) Ambassador asked Brattskar where the back and
forth on the talks stood, and described his own talk
last Friday with President Kumaratunga and her
description of the situation (see Reftel). Brattskar
said that both sides want Norway to continue its shuttle
diplomacy, but that right now nothing is happening. The
LTTE´s "seemingly inflexible position" of discussions
only on its Interim Self Governing Authority (ISGA)
proposal had not allowed them to accept a Norwegian
proposal that the two sides sit down without any agenda
at all. At the request of both sides, the Norwegians
had tried to come up with a proposal for an agenda
bridging the positions of both sides, but neither had
agreed to their suggestion. At the moment, therefore,
the peace talks were in stasis. The Norwegians would
need to decide when to come up with a new proposal.
Brattskar noted that some people thought there would be
no movement until after the July 10 Provincial Council
elections. (Comment: We do not see a connection.) At
any rate, it was unlikely there could be any movement
until President Kumaratunga returned from her private
visit to the UK.
5. (C) Brattskar said that the deadlock came down to
the same old issues: lack of trust (especially by the
LTTE), and a feeling by the LTTE that agreement to
discuss final issues before an ISGA was agreed upon and
implemented would mean there would never be an ISGA.
LTTE Meets NGOs and UN Agencies
-------------------------------
6. (C) The LTTE had invited major NGOs and UN agencies
to Kilinochchi June 15 to meet with the Tiger´s Planning
and Development Secretariat (PDS). According to
participants in the meeting, the LTTE predictably asked
for direct funding, and were predictably turned down.
The Tigers described the PDS as a "focal point," not as
a proposed implementation agency. The Tigers wanted the
NGOs to "coordinate" with the PDS -- the NGOs said
coordination was fine as long as it did not mean
control. The Tigers said that they did not want any
type of joint development work with the Central
Government, but that they had no objection to projects
being implemented through the North East Provincial
Council, as is currently being done. The repeated their
opposition, however, to a revival of the North East
Reconstruction Fund (NERF) or a "NERF-like" structure,
which they see as a tactic to delay or permanently
replace an ISGA.
Norwegians to Delhi
-------------------
7. (U) Brattskar himself is leaving afternoon of June
17 to meet Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesen in
New Delhi for talks with the new Indian government.
Brattskar said that reports in both Indian and Sri
Lankan press that current High Commissioner to Sri Lanka
Nirupam Sen would leave to become Perm Rep in New York,
and that Sen would be replaced by MFA Additional
Secretary for Administration Mrs. Nirupama Menon Rao
SIPDIS
were true.
COMMENT
-------
8. (C) The Norwegians are clearly feeling a bit
frustrated. Brattskar expressed (unusually) some
impatience with the LTTE and conceded that it was not
unreasonable for the GSL to expect some give from the
Tigers, who so far have not budged an inch from their
position on the negotiating agenda. The Norwegians seem
to feel now that it is best to take a breather before
getting back into the shuttle business. In the
meantime, Ambassador is planning an on-the-record
session with major newspaper editors next week to push
the message of Brussels: all sides need to move on
peace or risk losing donor attention and funding. END
COMMENT.
9. (U) Minimize considered.
LUNSTEAD
31.12.05.2009: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
S E C R E T COLOMBO 000516
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CATR LOU GANEM, EAP/K, AND SCA/INSB
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2019
TAGS: ETTC, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, PARM, PINR, PREL, KNNP, CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PROCUREMENT OF LETHAL MILITARY
EQUIPMENT FROM NORTH KOREA AND IRAN
REF: SECSTATE 46946
Classified By: Charge d´Affaires James R. Moore Reasons 1.5(b)(d)
1. (S) Charge raised reftel points concerning possible GSL
purchase of lethal military equipment (LME) from North Korea
and Iran with Foreign Minister Bogollagama on May 11.
Bogollagama categorically denied that the GSL is attempting
to procure weapons or arms from either country. He also
underscored that the GSL is aware of international
restrictions concerning weapons sales from North Korea and
Iran, as well as the consequences for doing so. Bogollagama
stated that, at one point in the past, the GSL suspected
North Korea of supplying weapons to the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). As a result, the GSL contacted the
Government of North Korea to discuss the issue. Bogollagama
did not further elaborate on the outcome of those discussions.
MOORE
32. 25.5.2006: Tokyo co-chairs pre-meetings
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000872
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, PHUM, CE, NO
SUBJECT: TOKYO CO-CHAIRS PRE-MEETINGS
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead for reason 1.4 (d).
1. (C) Summary: GSL representatives admit that at
least some elements of armed forces may be
cooperating with irregular armed groups.
Government is trying to crack down on this, and is
also trying to develop a proposal for a political
settlement. EU will likely designate LTTE as
terrorist group on May 29 or 30, but there are
still internal divisions on how to handle this
issue, and this may affect discussions in Tokyo.
Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer is pushing
the GSL hard to examine its assumptions and is
looking for new ways to get the parties to talk to
each other. END SUMMARY
2. (U) Ambassador met May 24-25 with Peace
Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona, Defense Secretary
SIPDIS
Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Foreign Secretary
Palihakkara to discuss the upcoming Tokyo Co-
Chairs meeting. In addition, Co-Chairs Chiefs of
Mission met May 24 with visiting Norwegian Special
Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer, and Ambassador had
follow-on meeting next day with Netherlands
Ambassador Van Dijk.
3. (C) In all meetings, Ambassador began by noting
the importance of the Tokyo meeting. The Co-
Chairs had been formed in a different environment
with a specific task--to monitor the parties¥
compliance with the Tokyo Declaration which linked
development assistance with progress on the peace
process. That task no longer existed, and the Co-
Chairs should consider what their role should now
be. They would discuss in Tokyo what their
expectations were from both parties if they were
to continue successfully. He noted that the US
was developing further its proposal for two
international groups to crack down on Tiger
fundraising and weapons procurement.
Kohona: "Some Bad Things Happening"
-----------------------------------
4. (C) Peace Secretariat Head Palitha Kohona said
that the GSL strongly supported the proposed
initiatives on fundraising and weapons
procurement, and he believed that Japan did also.
Japanese Special Envoy Yasushi Akashi had told him
that Japan wanted to modify the role of Norway as
facilitator. Norway (and by extension the Co-
Chairs) should be "neutral but not impartial."
Ambassador said that in addition to stating that
the Tigers needed to give up violence and enter
the political process, the Co-Chairs would likely
repeat the recent statements by PDAS Camp that the
Government needed to find ways to address long-
term Tamil grievances and to protect the rights of
Tamils in the short-term. Kohona agreed that
"some bad things are happening" which the
Government needed to control. Some elements of the
security forces, he said, might be colluding with
Karuna and others.
5. (C) On the political front, Kohona said, he had
just spent two days in a retreat with Hanssen-
Bauer in Barcelona to go over the basics of the
peace process. Hanssen-Bauer had pushed him hard,
Kohona said, which was good. Regarding the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which has been
very forthright recently in its statements, Kohona
said that it was fair for the SLMM to criticize
the GSL when it did something wrong, but it should
not equate the Government and the Tigers.
Gotabaya Rajapaksa: Indians Pushing Hard
----------------------------------------
6. (C) Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapajksa
admitted to Ambassador that some elements of the
armed forces might be colluding with Karuna, and
that this had to stop. He said that the President
was adamant on this point and had made it strongly
to the service chiefs at a National Security
Council meeting that same morning. Gotabaya said
that Indian officials had pushed him hard during
his recent visit to New Delhi. National Security
Adviser Narayanan was very familiar with the
issue, since he had spent "over 500 hours" with
LTTE head Prabhakaran when Narayanan was working
in RAW. Naryanan and others had recommended
strongly that Sri Lanka adopt something like the
Indian model of governance, which had defused
India¥s own ethnic crises. The Indians also told
him that the GSL had to curb abuses against
Tamils, and had to offer the Tamils something
positive to work towards.
Palihakkara: GSL Serious about Human Rights
-------------------------------------------
7. (C) In a May 25 conversation with the
Ambassador and DCM, Foreign Secretary H.G.M.S.
Palihakkara said that President Rajapaksa is "very
keen" in mounting serious investigations into
possible security force human rights violations.
To that end, Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera
and Minister of Disaster Management and Human
Rights Mahinda Samarasinghe would later on May 25
hold the first meeting of a revived inter-
ministerial committee on human rights which would
provide oversight of security force conduct. "We
want to prevent security force misconduct while
investigating any that has already taken place,"
Palihakkara said. There would be a standing
working group under the committee, chaired by
Samarasinghe, which would include the service
commanders, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
the Attorney General and others. At the same
time, the President¥s Secretary, Lalith Wiratunga,
would be meeting with the governor of the
Northeast Province and UNHCR to deal with those
who have been displaced by disturbances in the
Trincomalee area. That situation, Palihakkara
stated, is "still manageable" but needs to be
handled carefully, he said.
8. (C) Looking longer term, Palihakkara agreed
with the Ambassador that the GSL needs to take
steps to spell out a political future for the
country which would give a sense of belonging and
security to Tamils and Muslims. To that end, the
President has initiated a working group to put
flesh on the bones of his presidential campaign
commitment to "maximum devolution." Palihakkara
commented that it would be important to not get
caught up in labels like devolution or federalism.
"We should label it after we¥ve put it together."
9. (C) Palihakkara agreed with the Ambassador that
the May 30 co-chairs meeting in Tokyo would be an
important opportunity for the co-chairs to
determine what useful role they could play given
that their initial raison d¥etre really did not
exist anymore. "New thinking is needed."
Palihakkara commented that the "ancillary ideas"
of forming working groups to crack down on money
and weapons flows were welcomed by the government
which looked forward to feeding information to the
groups once they were formed. He said he hoped
the co-chairs would come out strongly against the
current violence and discuss ways to lessen it,
commenting that the cease-fire agreement is
intended to mean "no violence not regulated
violence."
10. (C) Palihakkara reiterated that the GSL
remains committed, despite the current
difficulties, to getting the Tigers "back to the
table" not just to discuss the cease-fire
agreement but also to talk about long-term
solutions (which made a public presentation on
"maximum devolution" all the more important). He
thanked the Ambassador for Secretary Rice¥s
response to Foreign Minister Samaraweera¥s letter
on the all-party congress and commented that while
it was easy to be dismissive of such exercises,
the congress had been very important in getting
the radical JVP to commit publicly to a number of
steps.
Hanssen-Bauer: Looking for Ways Forward
---------------------------------------
11. (C) Co-Chair Chiefs of Mission (US, Japan,
Norway, Netherlands representing EU Presidency,
and EC) met with visiting Norwegian Special Envoy
Jon Hanssen-Bauer evening of May 24. Hanssen-Bauer
said that his Barcelona meeting with Kohona was
intended to help the GSL think through its
strategy, and to push the GSL on what it could
offer for a political deal. Hanssen-Bauer would
see President Rajapaksa on Friday (after visiting
the Tigers in Kilinocchi on Thursday) and would
try to take these ideas further then.
12. (C) Hanssen-Bauer said that as an interim
confidence building measure, he was considering
inviting the parties to come to Oslo to discuss
the role of the SLMM, something they both seemed
interested in. This was especially important in
view of recent Tiger statements that the SLMM sea
wing should no longer ride on Sri Lankan Navy
vessels, and that land travel was now also
dangerous.
13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer asked COM¥s what they
thought should come out of the Tokyo meeting.
There was general consensus that the Co-Chairs
should state that they wanted to help the peace
process but could only do so successfully if the
parties were serious and took certain actions.
The LTTE would need to give up violence and
terrorism and enter the political process. The
Government would need to show that it recognized
Tamil grievances and was willing to take the
dramatic political steps needed to address them.
It would also need to ensure that Tamils were
protected. Unexpectedly, Netherlands Ambassador
Van Dijk said that a Co-Chairs statement should
not mention "terrorism," especially since EU
designation of LTTE as a terrorist group was
liable to be announced simultaneously with Tokyo
meeting on May 29 or 30. Van Dijk¥s position
seemed to surprise everyone, and Ambassador
strongly refuted it.
EU Inside Baseball
------------------
14. (C) Van Dijk called Ambassador May 25 and
asked to get together to talk the issue through.
Van Dijk (please protect) told Ambassador that
there were still deep divisions within EU on this
subject. France and Italy had objected to the
listing on procedural grounds, because they
thought they were being pushed into it by the US.
When that objection was dealt with, the Nordics
still objected on substantive grounds. They
insisted that a listing be accompanied by a
statement which mentioned the failings of both the
Government and the LTTE. He also said that EC
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner and her colleague
Herve Jouanjean (who will represent the EC at
Tokyo) had pushed for a lesser action than
listing--some type of targeted sanctions--but had
lost. As a result, Van Dijk predicted, Jouanjean
could be difficult at Tokyo. Ambassador said he
believed there was no way we could accept a Tokyo
statement which did not mention the need for the
Tigers to give up terrorism, and van Dijk
eventually agreed there should be some way to do
that.
COMMENT
-------
15. Several things strike us from these meetings.
For one, the GSL seems to have gotten the message
that it must do something to prevent abuse of
Tamils, and also to think seriously about what a
long-term solution would look like. We were
particularly struck by the turnaround in Gotabaya
Rajapaksa. Previously he would strenuously deny
any connection between the GSL and the Karuna
group--now he admits it is probably occurring. We
are favorably impressed by Hanssen-Bauer, who is
bringing both imagination and structure to the
peace process and the work of the Co-Chairs. It
seems certain that the EU will designate the LTTE,
but it is still in disarray internally. Van Dijk
is excitable and not always accurate in his
predictions, but we may have to work hard on the
EU in Tokyo to make any statement meaningful. In
the end, Kohona is right: we can and should
criticize both sides, but we should not equate
them.
LUNSTEAD
33. 23.01.2006: AMBASSADORS CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000072
SIPDIS
FOR D AND P
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2016
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, CE, SU, NO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR´S CALL ON DEVELOPMENT MINISTER SOLHEIM
Classified By: Ambassador Benson K. Whitney, Reason 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador made his introductory call on International Development Minister Erik Solheim January 19 and discussed Solheims upcoming trip to Sri Lanka, the state of play in Sudan, and the Ministers development priorities. Solheim stressed that he is eager to cooperate with the United States, noting that there is only so much Norway can do to promote peace around the world. Ultimately, U.S. pressure is usually needed to consolidate any process, Solheim commented. Essentially, Solheim envisions Norway having a "complementary role" to U.S. efforts. Solheim spoke highly of Deputy Secretary Zoellicks in-depth knowledge of Sudan and praised the United States for achieving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Solheim welcomed the Ambassadors suggestion that we not only continue the close cooperation on Sri Lanka and Sudan but also identify new areas where we can work together to advance peace and development, although he did not see an increased Norwegian role in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly explained that Norway needs to be cautious in its approach to the Caucasus given that it is Russias backyard. End summary.
Sri Lanka: Expectations for Solheim Trip "Too High" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) Solheim, who is traveling to Colombo January 23-26 (with a planned stop in New Delhi on his way back to Oslo), commented that expectations in the Sri Lankan press have gotten way out of hand -- as if his visit would "save" the country. Solheim remarked that ironically, the same people who only two months ago were bad mouthing Norway and wanted to end the Norwegian mediation role were now counting on Solheim to get the peace process back on track. The Minister outlined two basic objectives for his visit: 1) "stabilize the ceasefire" and 2) meet the President in his new capacity with a view to getting him to fully understand how he can advance talks with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Solheim explained that he wants to get a recommitment to the cease-fire, reduce violations, and move the country away from the brink of war. He added, that while he knows the President well and thinks highly of him, Rajapaksa in his view is unfamiliar with the complexities of the ethnic issues and needs to learn how to best move the peace process forward. Solheim intends to provide Rajapaksa the "LTTE perspective." On the question of getting the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to the table, Solheim said that he hoped the parties would agree soon to a venue in Europe. While not ruling out Oslo, Solheim said that places like Sweden, Finland or Switzerland would be better. Solheim noted that he looked forward to comparing notes and discussing how best to advance the peace process with U/S Burns when they meet in Colombo.
Sudan: Norway Appreciates U.S. Role - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. (C) Solheim was effusive in his praise for Deputy Secretary Zoellick. Not only was Solheim impressed with the
SIPDIS Deputys knowledge of Sudan but also that it was evident that he follows the issue day-to-day -- clearly reflecting the high priority the U.S. puts on Sudan. Solheim commented that without the United States, there would not have been a CPA and that now the U.S. and Norway need to continue to coax both parties, Khartoum and the SPLM, to continue to make progress. He remarked on the desperate state of the South, no roads, no infrastructure; noting that it was important that peace yield dividends. With the loss of Dr. Garang, the SPLM needs to consolidate its power and that is where Norway will focus its efforts. Solheim remains concerned about what he referred to as the "spoilers," i.e., paramilitary groups such as the Lords Resistance Army, and the situation in Darfur. Solheim added that the situation in Sudan remains "dangerous," stressing that it will require continued intense attention. Solheim thanked us for supporting Tom Vraalsen for leader of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, remarking that without the U.S. it would not have happened. Vraalsen is a good man, he added, and an expert on Sudan.
4. (C) On Darfur, Solheim believes the humanitarian situation has improved but that security remains a difficult problem. Solheim praised Deputy Secretary Zoellick for his efforts to force the various guerrilla groups to adopt serious positions in peace negotiations, noting that the situation will not improve until people feel safe to return to their homes.
No Global Strategy - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Responding to the Ambassadors question as to where Solheim saw Norway concentrating its development efforts under the new Stoltenberg government, Solheim readily acknowledged that he did not have a global strategy. In fact, Solheim said Norway was prepared to help anywhere where parties in conflict would want Norwegian participation. The Ambassador suggested that perhaps Norway could do more to advance democracy and stability in the Caucasus. Solheim bluntly replied that Norway had to be careful about getting involved in the Caucasus for fear of upsetting the Russians. Solheim noted that as a neighbor to Russia, Norway needs to proceed carefully in the Russian sphere of influence and all but ruled out any significant engagement in the Caucasus. That said, the rest of the world is game and we should consider where we can do more together.
Comment - - - -
6. (C) It is a ironic that despite being a minister from the far-left Socialist Left Party, Solheim (after FM Stoere), is the cabinet member most interested in working with us. One big reason for this is that his experience working with us on Sri Lanka has been extremely positive; another is that he realizes that he can do more as a peace broker if he has the U.S. as a closer. We believe Solheim can continue to be a good partner and that we should seize opportunities to engage him in areas where we think he can contribute, particularly given Norways deep aid pockets. It is clear that Solheim sees himself more as someone who will push peace initiatives than run development assistance programs.
7. (C) We have been pushing Norway to do more in the Caucasus for some time but to no avail. Solheims direct reply on concerns over alienating Russia is the first time we have been told the real reason. Norwegian officials are always quick to point to their excellent ties to Russia but rarely come out and say that they want to be careful not to irritate the bear. Privately, however, Norwegians acknowledge that they remain concerned over Russia and worry about some day returning to having an unfriendly neighbor -- hence the importance they place on NATO and their interest in making sure the United States becomes engaged on High North issues. Norways objective is to ensure that the U.S. is available and ready to help reign in any Russian aggressiveness/misbehavior in the Barents region. WHITNEY
34. 11.4.2006: : "Grim" prospects for Sri Lanka peace talks
C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000467
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, CE, NO
SUBJECT: "GRIM" PROSPECTS FOR SRI LANKA PEACE TALKS
Classified By: Acting Pol/Econ Chief Doug Apostol, Reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)
1.(U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 3.
Summary and Action Request
--------------------------
2.(C) Norwegian Special Envoy Jon Hanssen-Bauer hosted a Sri
Lankan Co-Chair representative meeting at the MFA on April
11. Hanssen-Bauer outlined the current situation in advance
of the scheduled April 19 Geneva conference (so-called
"Geneva Two") between representatives of the Sri Lankan
Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Calling prospects of the conference occurring as "grim,"
Hanssen-Bauer noted issues (and internal pressures) dividing
both parties. In addition, he believes recent explosions
(likely the work of the LTTE) and the assassination of a Sri
Lankan official by the rival LTTE faction Karuna further
fueled existing tensions which would forestall the
forthcoming conference. After the Co-Chair representative
meeting, Hanssen-Bauer met alone with Pol/Econ Officer and
candidly revealed that Geneva Two will likely be postponed,
if not canceled. He questioned the Sri Lankan President¥s
grasp of the situation and/or his intentions. The Special
Envoy voiced apprehension about the Janatha Vimukthi Peremuna
(JVP) efforts to demonize Norway through negative propaganda,
which he felt would increase should Geneva Two not take
place, as planned. Finally, he noted the LTTE political
leadership faced internal military pressures, which could
affect Geneva Two moving forward.
3.(C) Hanssen-Bauer plans on releasing a statement
encouraging the parties to continue honoring existing Geneva
commitments and move forward with the Geneva Two meeting. He
is encouraging other Co-Chairs to release similar messages as
soon as possible. Post therefore requests the Department
consider issuing a statement urging the parties to attend the
planned Geneva Two meeting and recognize existing cease-fire
obligations.
Sri Lankan President in Delicate Balancing Act
--------------------------------------------- -
4.(C) Hanssen-Bauer believes that GSL President Rajapaksa
must balance internal political pressures (in addition to
those from rival parties) in any determination to continue
the peace process. Successful Geneva Two talks would improve
the President¥s southern power base (and may influence him
pushing for early elections).
LTTE Sending Mixed Messages
---------------------------
5.(C) Hanssen-Bauer finds mixed messages from the LTTE.
Although the LTTE indicates it wants to go beyond cease-fire
talks and eventually discuss other issues with the GSL (e.g.
economic development and democracy building), the first LTTE
issue is a guaranty of security for the Geneva-bound LTTE
delegation, which Rajapaksa has given. Hanssen-Bauer finds
the LTTE¥s greatest issue is for the GSL to disarm/disband
the Karuna faction. The LTTE feels that the GSL is "shutting
its eyes" to Karuna¥s operations, and speculates that Karuna
may be used by the GSL as a weapon in a war against the LTTE.
The LTTE concludes that the GSL armed forces, in addition to
the Karuna paramilitary forces, could defeat the LTTE
militarily.
6.(C) In addition, the LTTE asserts that the government¥s
failure to disarm/disband military groups (particularly
Karuna in the east) is a direct violation of the first Geneva
talks. According to Hanssen-Bauer, nothing has been done by
the GSL to address this LTTE issue. The Special Envoy feels
that the LTTE would accept the containment of the Karuna
faction (and not press for disbanding Karuna) as a
precondition for the LTTE proceeding with Geneva Two.
7.(C) Finally, the LTTE Central Committee seeks the GSL¥s
assistance in arranging a LTTE pre-Geneva "strategy meeting"
to be held in Kilinochichi. Rajapaksa has refused to offer
military transport to bring LTTE forces to Kilinochichi,
which Hanssen-Bauer suspects is a result of the President¥s
perceived need to show that he is not "soft" to political
rivals. Earlier GSL governements have provided such military
transport. Hanssen-Bauer noted that the LTTE could be asked
to go to Geneva Two without the Central Committee meeting,
but the result will create a "negative" atmosphere in Geneva.
Norway supports the Central Committee meeting, viewed as a
means of preventing the LTTE¥s isolation (and resort to
violence).
8. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke at length about his concern of
increased violence by the LTTE, specifically three incidents
of claymore mine attacks (most recently today). The
LTTE-sponsored attacks are apparently retaliation for the
Karuna-sponsored assassination of Vanniasingham Vigneswaran,
a moderate Tamil politician in Trimcomalee.
Frustrated Norwegians Resolved to Move Forward
--------------------------------------------- -
9.(C) Although Hanssen-Bauer is concerned with the recent
acts of violence, he impressed upon Co-Chair representatives
the need to move forward. Prior to the recent claymore
attacks, the LTTE advocated postponing Geneva Two. In his
view, the GSL now thinks the LTTE must go to Geneva,
particularly given Canada¥s listing of the LTTE as a
terrorist organization. Norway will issue a statement today
urging the parties to go to Geneva, and welcomes similar
statements form Co-Chair countries. The statement will
essentially provide that Norway encourages the parties to
meet face-to-face and halt tensions, but such decision must
be that of the GSL and LTTE themselves.
10.(C) The Norwegians view a constructive conversation at
Geneva Two as a means to defuse the charged climate. He
viewed any LTTE postponement of Geneva Two as likely leading
to the LTTE being recognized by the EU as a terrorist group.
Most importantly, he restated that the LTTE must cease its
violence. He informed the GSL that it must comply with its
existing Geneva obligations (including honoring the
cease-fire).
11.(C) Admittedly frustrated by both the GSL and LTTE demands
on Norway, Hanssen-Bauer has reminded them that Norway¥s role
is limited as a facilitator and, if "they are serious," both
the parties should enable each other to attend Geneva Two.
He noted that "Norway cannot make the meeting happen if the
GSL and LTTE do not want it to happen." Hanssen-Bauer,
stating that the atmosphere was "grim today, and hopefully
positive tomorrow" felt that if the parties do not meet on
April 19, he will advocate for a postponement, and not a
cancellation.
"Low-key Statements" Requested from Co-Chairs
---------------------------------------------
12.(C) When pressed by the Japanese Ambassador, Hanssen-Bauer
envisioned any supportive statements from the Co-Chairs as
being both "low-key" and "outside the public eye." These
statements would be directed only to the parties involved,
and should stress the importance of Geneva Two. The parties
should thus meet to defuse violence and further implement the
existing cease-fire agreement.
Parties Need to Get Their Acts Together
----------------------------------------
13.(C) Following the Co-Chairs representative meeting,
Hanssen-Bauer met privately with Pol/Econ Officer. The
Special Envoy started the meeting by praising Ambassador
Lunstead¥s efforts in Colombo (particularly regarding the
LTTE¥s military transportation requests). The Special Envoy
is troubled that President Rajapaksa is either consistently
uninformed or not forthcoming. He also voiced concerns that
the LTTE political leadership is facing increasing pressures
from the LTTE military leadership. Hanssen-Bauer seemed
particularly concerned about the JVP, despite its recent
election losses. He believes that postponing or canceling
Geneva Two will be seen as a JVP victory, which has stepped
up its anti-Norwegian propaganda efforts. With the recent
elections, Hanssen-Bauer states that the parties have not had
time to "get their acts together" and focus on issues leading
up to Geneva Two. He concludes that Geneva Two will be
postponed, or even perhaps canceled. The question remains as
to which party will actually cancel/postpone the conference.
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