by Austin Fernando
Possible outcomes of the UN Panel’s visit
(January 10, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Assume Farhan Haq’s quotes are right, and the UN Panel visits Sri Lanka. Then the meeting is not limited to just ‘chatting’. It will be serious talking. What could be the outcome of such dialogue?
(1) The UN Panel may request the LLRC for more specific information and if the LLRC obliges (if it is within the so-called dialogue framework) sharing may include the evidence given and petitions submitted to the LLRC which have been critical of the security forces and the GOSL hierarchies. Will not UN use such evidence, especially because the identities and other details of witnesses will be in the possession of the UN Panel, thus making GOSL to face adversity of sharing?
(2) In reciprocation LLRC may request the UN Panel for specific information and the latter may share them (e.g. 1,100 affidavits), the so-called dialogue framework permitting. These must be detrimental to the security forces and the GOSL hierarchies and will naturally preclude investigation by LLRC, but there is all possibility that UN Panel would inquire them. Hence, UN gains by sharing. Does GOSL wish it to happen that way?
(3) However, such transaction will assist the GOSL finding the authors of representations and it will violate the UN SG’s announcement of confidentiality of representations. Will the UN let down who relied on their advertisement and create self embarrassment? Or else, will the UN refuse sharing on such ground? In that event the parity status will be lost and stall the dialogue. What does GOSL prefer?
(4) As observed, when Panel mandates differ, what is the need for and advantage GOSL enjoys by sharing ideas and information?
(5) More importantly the following negative scenarios may emerge as the final outcomes of such visit.
(a) What can UN SG do on receipt of a Panel Report, assumed adverse to GOSL? It is rightly or wrongly believed (subject to correction by diplomatic conventions and law) that he can follow suit with the Security Council or any other relevant international fora, which may be detrimental and embarrassing to Sri Lanka,
(b) If the report divulges sensitive adverse conclusions (written even with bias as suspected by critics of UN/SG) the Diaspora will immediately haul those allegedly responsible at all possible fora and undertake canvassing issues as they have already done with Hilary Clinton, US Senate, European Union, and British Prime Minster, UN Human Rights Council, for example. This will prevail on foreign direct investments and foreign financial assistance to Sri Lanka.
(c) Similarly, if the report divulges adverse conclusions against the LTTE what could be the outcome when all responsible are no more among living? What does GOSL gain in that event because equity for ‘penalizing’ will be absent as government personnel will be liable for ‘penalizing’, if found guilty?
(d) If there were to be conflicting outcomes from the reports even after sharing information who is the adjudicator of ‘truth’ when the UN has intervened in the process of finding truth? In case of such eventuality what will the world believe- GOSL’s or UN’s point of view?
If the report is favourable to the GOSL it enjoys the option of fearlessly defending its actions during the latter period of the war and win over the critics and benefit economically and politically, while weakening the Diaspora and LTTE remnants. This is a plus point for GOSL, but what is the assurance for such, especially taking Holmes- Arbour- Pillai Combo’s past responses?
However, as it is, if the GOSL demands the UN Panel to meet only the LLRC it can be presumed that UN Panel’s visit would not take place, unless higher level interventions from the UN happen. The potential conflicting interests too do not support meetings for sharing information here or abroad and for the present the UN Panel’s visit could be ruled out.
Possible way-forward
Due to academic and humanitarian interests I have been discussing with selected Tamil Diaspora members, who are academics and non-academics, the issue of reviving the original relationships between communities. I mention them in the hope of elucidating whether those are satisfied to some extent by Panel outcomes. Basically their stated interests could be summarized as follows:
(a) There is an immediate need for serious human security restoration which has been even echoed in the Parliament by Minister Devananada.
(b) People should feel that they are freed from terror and good governance has replaced terror where legitimacy and voice, accountability, transparency, Rule of Law and fairness / equity has regained as a Social Contract between the State and People.
(c) While eliminating hardships faced by post-LTTE status, the State should address the basic needs of the North East minorities- especially Tamils- to ensure a fair and equitable recovery process to regain the lost human and socio-economic capital, as well as rights during the long conflict.
(d) The delayed political opportunities have to be revamped with appropriate constitutional interventions.
(e) Wipe out ‘long standing political marginalization and exclusion of minorities’ from Sri Lankan polity. Create an environment to live in dignity that will stimulate a sense of belonging, that minorities are an integral part of the Sri Lankan society.
(f) There is a need to factor in the above considerations in a humane way. Basically, National Leaderships should have empathy with the current predicament of the affected people and be committed to address the needs and concerns in a systematic manner with sincerity of purpose.
(g) It is also important to consider parallel, simultaneous and sequential initiatives if one is serious about addressing the issues and challenges facing minorities. Looking for similar experiences around the world is recommended by respondents.
(h) The Diaspora contacts believe that these are difficult to attain as one quick package but needs policy and principled serious commitment as a package that should be monitored by a multi ethnic group, even with international multilateral participation.
There may be exhaustive lists if we really study this issue. Additionally non-Diaspora representation may even differ, optimistic, enhanced and supplement these. I wonder whether the two Panels address these issues if we accept these are collective needs of the minorities, inclusive of Muslims. Therefore, it may be advisable to establish the background to integrate the majority and minorities through addressing these and other needs. UN Panel has no mandate for this though one may interpret that the LLRC has this mandate, at least partially.
As the Panels are a creation due to international pressures, solutions also should suit the international environment, but not at the expense of the domestic environment. The latter will create adverse domestic political reactions. Since internationals are involved this has to be reviewed within international legal and diplomatic conventions, however much some domestic authorities and spokespersons yell otherwise. Other international experiences as mentioned (e.g. South Africa) show the possibility to get over the murderous past by pacifying legal, institutional, dialogue, psychological interventions that may suit most of the above mentioned interests. It will be necessary to prepare the country for such innovative interventions. UN Panel has no mandate for this though one may interpret that the LLRC has this mandate to an extent.
It is observed that the relationships building exercise is in many hands- i.e. the GOSL, internationals, humanitarians, Opposition and Diaspora. The latter is totally antagonistic towards the GOSL. Efforts to reconcile have not paid adequately, which is proved by the President’s Oxford visit. The GOSL does not publicly show any satisfactory interest to befriend these adversaries to reach consensual decisions, though ‘under the table’ actions may be taking place. Due to this large gap, it appears difficult for the GOSL to bend towards amicable solutions to the problems, in the suspicion of political fallout created locally by the Opposition. It is necessary for the GOSL to advance the Opposition, internationals and Diaspora genuinely, searching for a reasonable agreement. The UN Panel does not possess such exploratory interest in its mandate.
The country has observed rash moves and statements by Ministers, bureaucrats, media and political spokespersons from the Government and Opposition which have consolidated the impression in the internationals and Diaspora that the country is not genuine in solving the national crisis. There isn’t sufficient dialogue to find solutions, making the parties to pressure the opponent on the weakest point to crack. Hence it is up to the government to move first and fast towards other possible approaches like power sharing, compensation, proper restitution and reconciliation methodologies and endure on winning the affected and Diaspora to genuinely satisfy them. LLRC has some of these concerns in its mandate, but not the UN SG’s Panel’s.
Practical aspects of relationships building are practised elsewhere in the world as shown in the Preamble to South African Act No: 34 of 1995. Especially for Diaspora relation building I mentioned at the LLRC the experience of Liberia, as an example. Anyway, such approaches are limitedly seen in Si Lanka’s agenda, though we hear of rhetoric from the LLRC, politicians and Inter Agency Committee appointed by the GOSL. The missing two words, i.e. ‘human rights’ in the mandate of the LLRC- are sufficient to prove this weakness. UN SG’s Panel mandate limits to a focussed event and hence has no relevance to this aspect.
The failures have to be understood and addressed locally by the Presidential Secretariat and abroad by the Ministry of External Affairs and its Ambassadors and High Commissioners, who seem to have failed making the international trouble makers to compromise and cooperate with the GOSL.
The internationals, Diaspora leadership and LTTE remnants too should be mindful of the problems faced by the GOSL and approach issues in a proactive compromising manner, leaving hardened views aside, especially because the past is dead and the future is open. Unfortunately, the demise of the past is not registered in Diaspora actions as seen by demanding a Transnational Government; and, in the Government as seen in the implementation of human security challenges or devolution.
Therefore, rather than leaving the solution for the issue only in the hands of Minister Pieris or President Rajapaksa or Diaspora, it is necessary to create political consensus within the country and even to get the Diaspora to volunteer nation building, rather than to cudgel over petty issues. One may wonder whether sharing information or experiences alone is the priority that could achieve this end, especially when intentions are in conflict.
The GOSL, Opposition political leaders, bureaucrats, Diaspora and internationals must understand that there are limits for all actions and the main concern ought to be to pull out the country from an extremely vulnerable rut and not to be jubilant on narrow disagreements or gains. Unless these interventions are set for integrated implementation, depending on the outcomes of these Panels alone will not bring in sustainable peace and prosperity to Sri Lanka.
Please click here to read part one
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