India: Internal security challenges

Police needs a doctrine for effective functioning

by Gen V. P. Malik (retd)

(September 14, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) India’s internal security has become a major area of concern. Maoists’ activities have increased substantially. According to Home Minister P. Chidambaram, 223 districts across 20 states (out of a total of 636 districts in 28 states and seven Union Territories) are thus affected. A situation of “consistent violence” exists in about 400 police station areas of 90 districts in 13 states. The Maoists have threatened that they would “expand their activities to wider areas, mobilise wider masses, gather new momentum and get new dynamism” in the wake of multi-state counter-insurgency operations launched against them.In recent months, no week has passed without an armed encounter or a casualty. In 2009, there were 998 fatalities, 312 of them police personnel. The fatalities this year have already crossed 885, which include over 200 policemen. The number of policemen who have laid down their lives is very large when compared to the success achieved in such encounters.

In J & K, militant activities have been curtailed substantially although jihadi terrorists’ attempts to infiltrate from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir continue. More worrisome, however, is the public order, which has become extremely fragile on account of upsurge in street protests, stone pelting by mobs and casualties due to firing by security forces. According to available statistics, while terrorist attacks have been on the wane, 68 civilians have died in security forces’ action till date this year as compared to 11 in the whole of 2009.

At a time when the policemen in Kashmir are dealing with violent mobs on a regular basis and facing criticism over the large number of civilian deaths, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has acknowledged that “policing” in the country has become increasingly complex. While addressing a conference of senior police officers on August 26, he said, “Social tensions, religious disputes, economic disparities and regional, linguistic and ethnic differences have long been major challenges to effective ‘policing’ in India. But, of late, the growing presence of non-state actors, fundamentalist groups and Left-wing extremists has further complicated matters. The growing interlinking of the destabilising and criminal forces across states and across our borders call for far greater vigilance and coordination between the security agencies than ever before.”

The spectrum of law and order situations that police personnel face today has increased in quantity, intensity and complexity. Several organisational and systemic measures have been taken to revamp India’s internal security architecture in the wake of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack. These include transparent police recruitment, a crime and criminal tracking network, community policing, a national database grid, establishment of NSG hubs in Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata and Mumbai and a unified national counter-terrorism centre. A scheme of Rs 4185 crore is being implemented for the modernisation of Central police forces and their capabilities.

Large Central police organisations of over six lakh personnel having 354 battalions (of which 220 battalions are meant for border guarding duties) have been set up, and some more are in the offing. In that, the burden of electioneering duties and dealing with low and high-intensity internal security situations (from street protests and anti-terrorist actions in J&K to Maoist insurgencies) is mostly shouldered by the state armed police, the Central Reserve Police Force and other such forces. It is apparent that in their rapid expansion in recent years, adequate attention has not been paid to various aspects of human resource development, thus forgetting the famous statement that “the man behind the gun is always more important than the gun”.

It is common to see the Central police forces quite literally being flown from one operational situation to another. While switching roles and missions, they do not undergo any orientation and induction training and are placed under the command of the officers whom they do not know. Till date, we have not heard of any police doctrine (or standard operating procedures) which would organise, equip and prepare them for their different roles and missions. For example, the Army doctrine on providing assistance to the civilian authorities for the maintenance of law and order lays down clearly that troops must work on the well-established principles of “good faith”, “use of minimum force” and “prior warning to the people” when compelled to take action.

However disciplined and dedicated a police team may be, it cannot be expected to give its best if it is shifted so frequently from electioneering duties to maintaining law and order in J&K and handling counter-insurgency situations in the Maoist-affected areas without adequate induction briefing, training and orientation. Also, when working on different doctrinal missions, these forces have to be organised and equipped with appropriate weapons, including those of the non-lethal variety, to avoid civilian casualties due to panic or premature firing.

Yet another problem in law and order and insurgency situations being faced currently is due to policemen and Army personnel wearing similar combat uniforms and badges of rank and being clubbed as “security forces”. This has neutralised the impact of “appropriate and graduated response” in law and order situations as most people cannot differentiate between the police forces and the Army. While synergy is desirable, the Army must be used and be seen to be used as the “instrument of last resort” while dealing with such situations.

Strangely, it was not any professional but the Prime Minister who pointed out that “We cannot have an approach of one size fits all. For instance, I understand that instead of a single standard sequence for the use of force, other countries have put in place procedures that vary according to the specific needs in different situations.” The Prime Minister also lamented that most states were yet to adopt the template for a transparent and objective recruitment process circulated by the Home Ministry. Here, I may add that the states have also failed to implement the Supreme Court directives on essential police reforms such as the selection of the DGP from a panel, fixation of tenures and the establishment of an institutionalised system to make police transfers and postings immune from day-to-day political interference.

In conclusion, it must be stated that making police forces more efficient and effective is only a part of the holistic measures required to deal with insurgencies, large-scale street protests and other internal security problems. The states and the Centre need to provide dedicated and effective governance through good administration, a prompt and fair judiciary and a law and order machinery that inspires public confidence.

The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff, India.