Spying: Tradecrafts Of The Game

(Some parts of the essay have been adopted from author’s forthcoming book: Intelligence-Basics of Tradecraft)

by Maloy Krishna Dhar

(August 03, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The recent spy swap between the USA and Russia is reminiscent of the Cold War era intensified espionage game played by the Soviet regime and the USA, Britain and their allies in the so-called Free World.

The FBI and CIA were aware of the existence of a substantial sleeper spy cell in the suburbs of New York, planted with meticulous planning by the Russian foreign intelligence agency, SVR (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki).

Russian spies deported included:

“Richard Murphy” and “Cynthia Murphy” admitted they were Russians Vladimir Guryev (44) and Lydia Guryev (39)

“Donald Howard Heathfield” and “Tracey Lee Ann Foley” admitted they were Russians Andrei Bezrukov (49) and Elena Vavilova (47)

“Michael Zottoli” and “Patricia Mills” admitted they were Russians Mikhail Kutsik (49) and Natalia Pereverzeva (36)

“Juan Lazaro” admitted he was Russian Mikhail Vasenkov (66) – married to Vicky Pelaez (55), journalist born in Peru

Anna Chapman, 28 (maiden name Anya Kushchenko) – real estate entrepreneur, daughter of Russian diplomat

Mikhail Semenko – apparently operated under own name

MISSING – 11th suspect known as “Christopher Metsos”, disappeared while on bail in Cyprus

The Spies pardoned and deported to UK (2) and USA (2) are:

Igor Sutyagin, nuclear scientist jailed in 2004 for spying for CIA

Sergei Skripal, ex-military intelligence (GRU), jailed for spying for UK in 2006

Alexander Zaporozhsky, ex-agent of foreign intelligence service (SVR), jailed for thirty years.

Gennady Vasilenko, said to be former KGB agent, jailed in 2006 over illegal weapons, but actually for passing on secret intelligence to the West.

A White House official has revealed that the Obama administration was considering a spy swap well before the 10 were arrested on 27 June. White House officials were first briefed on the spy ring in February, while President Barrack Obama was made aware of the case on 11 June.

“The idea of a swap was discussed among the administration’s national security team before the arrests were made,” the source added. According to the White House, the US itself chose the names of the four men to be freed by Moscow. Its decision was based on “humanitarian concerns, health concerns, and other reasons”.

Peter Earnest, a former CIA officer, welcomed the release of the four. “This sends a powerful signal to people who co-operate with us that we will stay loyal to you,” he told the Associated Press news agency, “Even if you have been in jail for years, we will not forget you.”

The FBI was aware of the spy ring for nearly ten years. The agency followed their movements, mounted foot and mobile surveillance and monitored their phone calls. Leon Panetta, the CIA chief was kept informed. Taking into consideration the usual practice of the agencies neutralizing “sleeper spy ring” or Long-term Resident Agents at the earliest opportunity possible, it was expected that the Russian spy ring would be neutralized sooner than it was done.

According to reports, from the first detection-time, the president was told about the case on June 11 — 16 days before the Russian agents were actually arrested — a swap emerged as an option that could resolve a potentially volatile situation without undercutting Mr. Obama’s effort to rebuild Russian-American relations. The Russian spy ring would be broken, the Americans would secure the release of four Russian prisoners and both sides could then put the episode behind them. The arrest was also delayed because the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s State visit to Washington on June 24.

President Obama’s national security team spent weeks before the arrest of 10 Russian spies preparing for their takedown and assembling a list of prisoners Moscow might be willing to trade for the agents, senior administration officials said Friday.

U.S. officials began negotiating with their Russian counterparts shortly after the spies were arrested late last month. Before long, the both sides had reached an agreement that included pledges that neither would engage in any further “retaliatory steps,” such as a diplomatic freeze or expulsions, and that neither would harass each other’s officials or citizens. Officials concentrated on Friday on what they described as the smooth integration of the administration’s law enforcement, intelligence and diplomatic teams in tracking the Russian agents and turning the situation into a national security victory rather than a source of political and public concern and potential criticism. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because, they said, the undertaking had been a group effort, authorized by the president.

Some details of some of the Russian spies handed over to the West included For several years in the 1990s, Mr. Zaporozhsky, a colonel in Russian intelligence who became deputy chief of the American Department, was secretly working for the C.I.A., one of the highest-ranking American moles in history, Russian prosecutors say. After surprising his colleagues by retiring suddenly in 1997, he moved with his wife and three children to the United States and went into business. But in 2001, confident that his C.I.A. link was unsuspected, Mr. Zaporozhsky was lured back to Moscow by his former colleagues for what they promised would be a festive K.G.B. anniversary party. He was arrested at the airport, convicted of espionage and sentenced to 18 years in prison. On Friday, Mr. Zaporozhsky was flown to Vienna and then to the Washington area for the 10-for-4 spy exchange that promises to bring to a swift conclusion the saga of the Russian spy ring exposed by the F.B.I. early last week.

Another of the four, Sergei V. Skripal, seems to fit the classic cold war model, though without quite the roller-coaster intrigue of the Zaporozhsky case. A retired colonel in Russia’s military intelligence service, Mr. Skripal was convicted in 2006 of having passed classified information to British intelligence, MI6, for a decade, in return for $100,000 wired to a bank account in Spain.

But there is at least a little post-Communist ambiguity surrounding the two other men in the swap. Gennadi Vasilenko, a former K.G.B. major, was arrested in 1998 for contacts with a C.I.A officer but soon released, only to be arrested again in 2005 and imprisoned not for spying, but for illegal trafficking in weapons and explosives. And Igor V. Sutyagin, working at a Moscow think tank, did contract research for a British company, which may or may not have been a front for Western intelligence. He has maintained his innocence, and human rights activists have defended him. But, his swap prove that Sutyagin really worked for MI6 (Secret Service).

While the Russian media gave credible coverage to the spy swap some US commentators reacted severally. Simon Shuster of Time.com writes the US and Russia seem to have both avoided the topic of the 11th suspect: “Both sides also seem to have skirted the 11th alleged Russian spy named in the US indictment. He disappeared last week in Cyprus after authorities there granted him bail, and no public mention of his fate has been made amid the swap negotiations. On Thursday, Gennady Gudkov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliament’s security committee, said the most important part of the deal was damage control, not details.” Perhaps Russia avoided uncovering of its other intelligence operations by quickly agreeing to a swap.

Chris Stirewalt at the Washington Examiner feels that USA might be getting the bad end of the deal with Russia: “We are sending them 10 Russians accused of living under false identities and actively trying to get information about American defense, industry and government. We are getting in return Russian citizens who were found – some a generation ago – to have had contact with the CIA or suspected CIA front organizations.”

Such criticism in a free democracy is inevitable. But the tradecraft that Russia had applied in putting in place a large number of Long Term Resident Agents is worth appreciation. One of the spies was the daughter of a former Russian diplomat, another one was an artist married to a Peruvian lady. They spoke US accented English, studied American mannerism and social habits and had developed ostensible means of income. Their neighbours never suspected them for espionage activities. Intelligence agencies take meticulous care in targeting, training, infiltrating and embedding agents.

Agents are of different categories. Agents are recruited after assessing the task in a target area, organizations, and countries. HUMINT (human agents) are recruited after in depth study of the person, his adaptability, suitability and capability. This part of the intelligence tradecraft is applied by case officers under guidance of his superior operations directorate. All aspects are analysed by the experts and than a decision is taken to recruit a human asset and convert him/her to an agent. (Curious readers may like to read my book: Operation Triple X). An agent meant for locating in a foreign country has to undergo rigorous training. Take the cases of 10 Russian agents planted in the USA. They were given American names, were taught American social behavioral patterns, imparted training to speak in American accent and even adopt Catholic or Protestant religious rituals. Most Russians owe allegiance to Orthodox Church.

In case India intends to plant an agent in Pakistan the concerned agency is supposed to train him in similar fashion, make him a Muslim, teach all Islamic rituals, and teach Urdu and at least one dominant language (Punjabi).

All agents are not “sleeper” or Long Term Residents. There are varieties.

Casual Agents: are low level recruits/assets located in a target organisation with whom ‘case officers’ establish clandestine or open contacts for ferreting out information of topical interest through conscious or casual discussions. These categories of assets can be identified and cultivated after assignments are awarded by the analyst or desk officer to the ‘case officer.’ These low level assets are located in the media, peripheral locations of targeted organisations, and members of parliament, legislatures and even the mundane static or roving hawkers. Such casual contacts may also be cultivated amongst the relatives and friends of the main target for obtaining basic data, mapping movement pattern, personal habits, family details, friends and acquaintances etc. Often such contacts, say a media friend, are tasked to ferret out personal information about a government minister or highly placed bureaucrat. Casual contacts are listed assets and they are compensated by lavish entertainment, occasional payment and in certain cases on the basis of quid pro quo. The friend, say media people, may require some information from the government stores, which are not highly classified. Such minor give and take always takes place consciously. However, it is not uncommon to ferret out information from the casual contact during informal discussions. The contact may be reserved in nature and may also be garrulous. While ferreting out information through the unconscious or subconscious process it is advisable to gauze the mood of the contact. Such a task can be completed over a cup of coffee or a glass of wine.

Some casual contacts feel proud to establish rapport with a senior government officer. But some such contacts are also in the habit of advertising their connections to other friends and acquaintances. Secrecy often gets jeopardized. This practice is resorted to be the ‘case officers’ mostly during ‘secret enquiry’ as a shortcut method of obtaining fast information. It may happen that the consumer wants immediate information what is cooking up in a group of legislators, rebelling against the government. In such cases the urgency is great and the analyst or top boss may want immediate input. Information about such rebel groups are also collected through line telephone or cell phone monitoring. But the boss may be hungry for HUMINT. In such cases the controlling officer should brief the ‘case officer’ to be very discreet while activating the casual contact.

A serious fiasco had taken place in 1978. The than ruling faction wanted to have immediate feedback about certain political moves of a former PM. It was not a kid’s game to penetrate the inner circle of the leader located at the Willingdon Crescent home. The officer deputed to enquire into the development approached a close aide of Indira Gandhi, socially known to him. The aide’s loyalty was greater to his leader than to his social friend. The effort turned out to be counter effective. Indira Gandhi was alerted and she immediately amended her course of action and a section of the media was briefed about surreptitious efforts of the intelligence agency in penetrating her household. The enquiry soured up and the officer concerned was shunted out to a remote station. Such situations are not uncommon when political fluidity creates brinkmanship and political horse trading-so common to Indian democracy-occur. These are parts of the game. A few exposés create minor blisters and are taken as inevitable parts of the intelligence game. It must be mentioned that secret enquiry, unless done through embedded or high level agents may often misfire. From this point of view casual contacts are both assets and liabilities.

Embedded Agents: are very valued intelligence assets. This category of agents is regular members, functionaries and operators located inside the core areas of targeted organisation, party, institution, insurgent, terrorist and organised bodies about which the controlling authority, desk officers and analysts are keen to have authentic intelligence. It is not a correct perception that political decision makers always task the agency to penetrate a target which is rated important from the point of view of internal and external security threats.

There are soft areas as well as hard and hardest areas which are required to be penetrated for creating an Embedded Agent. Soft areas include political parties, social organisations, religious bodies / educational institutions, student, youth, trade unions, front organisations of militant underground parties and even NGOs.

Suppose Party X is in power in the Central or State government and Party Z is a close contender. Since the intelligence agencies are directly responsible to the executives of the ruling party it has become a regular feature in Indian democracy that the agencies serve the interest of the ruling faction. Decision making in respect of political strategy and likely reaction of the prominent opposition parties are assessed on the basis of intelligence gathered by the tasked intelligence agency from various sources. Embedded Agent is the most valuable HUMINT asset and his inputs allow the analyst to draw up his final report for which he may have inputs from various other open or secret sources. It is not incumbent on the policy maker to strictly follow the intelligence input drawn from Embedded Agents.

How to evaluate an Embedded Agent material? Preliminary identification is done by the desk officer, analyst or by the research branch (if there is one). Normally lists of people nearer to the top coterie are maintained by the desk and in some cases dockets on such individuals are regularly updated from open or secret data by the assigned research unit. Once a task is assigned the grassroots officers are directed to examine the existing data and collect penetrating information about each of them. From a presumed number of 12 such coterie members the targets are narrowed down to two or three after thorough study of their vulnerability. Finally, it may so happen that the controlling officer may assign 2 vulnerable targets to two different ‘case officers’ for cultivating them. One case officer is not allowed to know that another colleague has also been assigned target in the same area of coverage.

Evaluation of an Embedded Agent may take a long period. The case officer is required to sniff around, evaluate the target’s vulnerability and take into stock the softest spot through which the needle of approach can be inserted. In most cases approach is made through a common friend, family member and in some cases certain personal habits and vulnerabilities are exploited. Such targets are slyest fishes; they take time to bite the bait. Inducements are many; offer of money is one of the options. Other options are exploitation of personal requirements, family obligations and blackmailing.

In case of ideologically committed targets, as we have said earlier, the case officer is required to rise to the level of ideological comprehension of the target, sympathize with his cause and gradually arrange to bring two diaphragms closer to each other so that their psychological nearness converges. These are the toughest categories of assets. However, almost everything has a price. The case officer has to evaluate the price and consult his controlling officer. The price may be money, a suitable job of a dependent, subsidizing children’s education, putting money in the kitty of the target during a daughter’s marriage etc.

Initially the target is not treated as categorized agent, his reports are tried, compared and once the controlling officer is satisfied that the target’s productions are real meat and he is reliable than he is upgraded to B grade. Over periods of time, when the flow is regular and production is excellent that he is elevated to A grade. From a mere contact to reach the top grading, a target may take two to four years.

Let us examine the recent historical event of demolition of the disputed Babri mosque in Ayodhya. Around 1989 the controlling officer organized a brainstorming session to discuss the growing militancy among the Hindutwa organisations and their preparations to heighten the Hindu upsurge by focusing on the Ram Janambhumi aka Babri Masjid. The conclusion was clear; the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) etc were determined to take advantage of the death of two important Congress leaders and utter failure of the coalition government headed by V. P. Singh. It was emerging as a period of Hindu resurgence as opposed to emergence of acute Islamic jihadism in Pakistan and Bangladesh and their efforts to transplant Islamic jihad amongst the Indian Muslims. The Muslims, in the absence of Congress hegemony lost their political cohesiveness and started shifting loyalty to the regional and caste-based parties.

A few officers from the headquarters and in the States were briefed to target the Hindutwa organisations to create high quality HUMINT assets. Being soft ideological based entities it was not difficult to penetrate these organisations within three to five months. Thereafter avalanches of top grade reports about training the swayamsevaks in demolition methodologies, propaganda campaigns and other preparations started pouring in. The concerned agency shared all such information with the policy makers.

One particular target in the Parivar was very difficult to penetrate. However, this was achieved through a friend who belonged to the same State and was of same cast. After a period of six months the target was softened and he agreed to meet the top most policy maker in the government. The meeting was organized with utmost secrecy and the two agreed that necessary actions should be taken for preventing demolition of the mosque. The new friend agreed to brief his trusted aides to refrain from the final action of demolition. However, the psychological storm built up amongst sections of Hindus were so violent that on the destined day the top leaders either stood as muted witnesses or encouraged the volunteers to demolish the structure. The top policy making authority in the government also suffered from mental debility and failed the nation by not taking a tough stand. His vacillation could not be explained though failure of the top target in the Hindutwa organisation was explained away by the ferocity of the storm that defied his authority. Things were taken over by the politically ambitious leaders, who wanted to ride the crescent waves to capture political power. India is still divided on this issue. As a close observer I felt that both the ruling party and the belligerent opposition were equally responsible for the tragic incident. At the agency level there was no failure. Failure took place at the decision making level and at the level of enforcing the laws of the country. It was a competition between psychological madness and total inability at the decision making level.

Agent creation in the above mentioned targets was comparatively easier. But it is never a cakewalk. Toughest challenges often look starkly on the face of the case officers. A tougher illustration is necessary to convey to the readers the onerous task that agent creation is. Way back in 1970-75 it was very difficult to raise a reliable agent from the hardcore areas of the Naga Federal Government (NFG), Naga Nationalist Council (NNC) and underground Naga insurgent army factions. In 1970 it came to notice that in the October session of the Tatar Ho Ho (parliament) the Naga insurgents were to take certain key decisions about sending gangs to China and Pakistan for lifting weapons provided by the Chinese Special Bureau and the Inter Services Intelligence. Instructions were received from the controlling officer that all out efforts should be made to penetrate the Tatar Ho Ho and the top echelons of the NFG and the self styled Naga Army.

The agency covering the Naga insurgency affairs had no asset at the level that could attend the Tatar meeting and report back. The only way left was to get tidbit of information from government officers, either related or connected to the important office bearers like the Kilonsars (ministers), senior self-styled army officer and even an ordinary delegate to the Tatar Ho Ho.

An opportunity walked in. A Naga officer confided to his station chief that a school inspector of Ukhrul district (Manipur) was related to a Naga Kilonsar and he was in urgent need of some amount of money for his son’s education abroad. This was an encouraging input. The controlling officer initially did not believe that a Kilonsar could be approached. However, he nodded positively as that was the only window to enter the Naga higher echelon.

For over a month the school inspector was motivated with painstaking efforts and finally he agreed to arrange a discreet meeting with the Kilonsar on condition that the promised amount should be handed over to him once the meeting was organized. The catch was risky. Further bargain resulted in an agreement that he would receive payment only after the Kilonsar attended the meeting lasting three days and personally briefed the operations in charge (local station chief- case officer).

Discreet meeting with the Kilonsar was organized in a forested area skirting the ravine of Barak River. The place could be reached partly by river raft and partly on foot. The journey itself took 24 hours. The meeting was cordial and during discussions it transpired that the Kilonsar was suffering from chest disease and required immediate medication, including a chest X-Ray. As arranged the needful was done for his medical problem and in bargain he agreed to attend the Tatar meeting and report back to me as soon as he could explore out a safe place for meeting.

The case officer was not taken seriously by the controlling officer as the agency had not succeeded in raising an agent at that inner circle of the Naga underground movement. The suspense was over when the Kilonsar contacted the case officer through his relative and a meeting this time was organised in a jungle camp in Myanmar territory. For crossing the border the case officer required permission of the controlling officer and the government. However, exigencies of circumstances prompted him to be a guest of the Kilonsar in his jungle camp in Myanmar. After two days of verbal debriefing and collection of over thirty pieces documents the case officer returned to his base. It took 5 days to prepare a report of epic proportions which perplexed the agency. For the first time the agency made a breakthrough and in one shot two embedded agents were created that paid high dividends during peace negations with A. Z. Phizo faction of the Naga underground movement culminating in Shillong Accord between the NNC and the Government of India in 1975. This case study was recorded as an important land mark in the sphere of embedded Agent creation.

Semi-Converted Agent: Embedded Agents are the most precious human assets. The case officers are called upon to put their best, even at higher risks, to locate identity and cultivate an embedded HUMINT asset.

The next lower grade of human assets is the semi-converted agents, which are not completely won over and there exist some psychological gaps between the case officer and the target. Even after an asset has been located and identified and contacted through a direct contact or contact through a reliable intermediary the target may agree to meet and discuss certain matters bypassing the areas of core interest. Such agents try to ride two boats simultaneously. This tendency cannot be eliminated as some of the semi-converted agents are ideologically very firm, do not want to betray the organization totally but want to reap some harvest by sharing peripheral information. The case officers handling such agents are required to be very circumspect, cunning and should be able to gauge how far the agent is ready to walk with him. The desk officer and the analyst are required to be very discerning in evaluating reports from such human assets. Here is a situation that can be compared with a love affair that meets half the way and refuse to take the final plunge.

Why should the agencies prefer to cultivate partially won over agents? As commented earlier HUMINT is not freely available. The Mafia dons, underworld gangs, international terrorists, Maoists, other ideologically inspired separatist groups, insurgents and targets in the higher or highest crust of the system are most difficult areas to cultivate and win over. Looking forward to foreign agencies, about which enormous literature is available, it can be said that the CIA, MI6, Chinese Special Bureau and the KGB, FSB etc agencies did not and do not pick up agents in modern days either at the point of gun, through blackmail, allurement and ideological pretensions like picking up ripe apples from an abundant orchard. US failures in Bay of Pigs crisis with Soviet Union, CIA and MI6 failures in Iraq, 9/11 attacks and now in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan etc countries prove that the agencies mostly suffer from lack of HUMINT agents. An organisation like al Qaeda is very difficult to penetrate. India had failed with SIMI, Indian Mujahideens, and small organized modules of the HUJI, LeT and other trans-border jihad tanzeems. In such cases agencies depend on partially won over agents also and pad up reports of such agents with SIGINT, ELINT etc methodologies of gathering intelligence. The incident of killing of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan leader Baitullah Mehsood (August 2009) was achieved by the USA and Pakistan through a partially won over agent (Baitullah’s father-in-law) and interception of signal intelligence from the phone of Baitullah. The drone that fired the missile was assisted by IMAGEINT provided by the spy satellites of the USA. To achieve such spectacular success inter-agency cooperation and support from SIGINT and other modern technical aids are absolutely necessary. Therefore, the semi-converted agents are also valuable assets in intelligence parlance.

Embedding or Infiltrating an Agent: While we do not propose to talk in details about the tradecraft, it is necessary to highlight the importance of the technology of Embedding or Infiltrating an agent from outside to the outer core, and core areas of a target organization. This poses the highest challenge to the case officer and his pyramidal hierarchy. For intelligence agencies certain areas are grey and certain areas are absolutely dark. Such granite like organisations is difficult to penetrate and create an agent from existing insiders. In such cases agencies are left with no option but to recruit, convince and win over compatible persons, train them and find out ways and means to infiltrate them in the target organisations. Such agents take longer gestating time, earn confidence of the inner core of the target area and gradually rise up.

In certain cases the process may take years and certain other cases, depending on efficiency of the infiltrated agent, a couple of months. The case officer has to be very patient and should not prod every now and then for hardcore intelligence. He must keep in touch, brief him about happenings inside the target area and to look for the real nugget. This training process is continuous and the case officer is also required to be briefed by his controlling officer.

To illustrate this task we require falling back on real instances. In case number one, it was noticed that certain madrasas in Uttar Pradesh were imparting training in militancy and egging on the students to take up jihad against kafir Hindoostan. Case officers were summoned and briefed to raise agents in some of these madrasas. The stark truth is that for Indian agencies the area of jihadist militancy is the darkest area. HUMINT assets are negligible. If there are any, the status of the agents is merely peripheral and limited to certain observation and surveillance utilities. Negative feedback was expected and received in no time.

The agency than opted for embedding some won over assets into some of these madrasas. To avoid suspicion intending students were cultivated from some states in other parts of India. After prolonged briefings they were asked to seek admission as students. Three such hits were successful. After about a year these assets started producing good results. The mission was successful.

In the other case the agency faced total blackout in infiltrating an important Sikh religious seminary which was suspected to be involved in promoting militancy and separatism. No one in Punjab dared to offer services and the case officers failed to raise any recruit for the mission of infiltrating the seminary.

A study was carried out about some former students of the seminary who were involved in religious activities in states outside Punjab. After deep research two assets were located, one from eastern India and the other from western India. They were cultivated and motivated to approach their alma mater again and seek some services in key temples in the most highly affected areas. After offering voluntary service to the seminary for three months they were deputed to serve as granthi and pathi (in charge of the holy book and daily recitation) in two temples in explosive areas of Amritsar district. Gradually the agents infiltrated certain armed militant groups and brought their leaders closer to the controlling officer. Later these leaders of the militant groups helped to counter Pakistan’s inputs in Punjab turmoil and scuttling the efforts of the separatists. The Punjab insurgency was not won by guns alone. The intelligence agencies played cardinal roles.

In these categories of agents the case officer and his controlling officer are required to exercise utmost restraint, patience and adopt all possible tradecraft measures of secret communication and contact. Almost all categories of agents require continuous briefing and debriefing about his tasks and he may also require additional input for sharpening his look out capability. This teacher student relationship is required to be maintained at steady pace and the agency officers should maintain delicate balance between suspicion and trust. Nothing should be taken as absolute truth as there is nothing called absolute truth in human behaviors.

Having discussed these preliminaries about the character and qualification of the case officer and other pyramidal hierarchy we may now move to the mysterious areas of tradecraft and discuss each item in details.

Most important task of an intelligence agency is to generate and put in place in the target country the “sleeper cells” or Long Term Resident Agents. This technology is rather complicated. For penetrating the targeted foreign country several categories of agents are created. In short, they are: shallow depth trans-border agents, who are mostly border smugglers; Itinerant short duration agents (maximum 3-5 months). They are assigned certain specific tasks in designated areas and targets. Say, in case of Pakistan, an itinerant may be assigned task to film a particular airbase or a nuclear facility.

The most important is the task of creating “sleeper cells” or Long Term Residents. These targets are chosen after in depth study and trial. Out of 50 targets only 5 may qualify. The qualified agents are given credible “cover”, taught A to Z about the target country and infiltrated through normal immigration route or through illegal channel. They are taught to obtain records of citizenship, social welfare cards, national identity cards and other techniques to merge with the background.

In case of the 10 Russian agents the Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki (SVR), the foreign intelligence agency had spotted, recruited and trained the assets with meticulous care. However, whatever little is known from FBI records some of these agents had not observed the security lessons given to them by the SVR handlers. One lady agents had called her father, working in the FSB (internal intelligence) organization. Others also committed mistakes and behaved with laxity that had drawn FBI attention. Once logged on the FBI had activated surveillance, secret enquiry, and telephone monitoring and covering their several tradecraft modalities. Agents cannot afford to be off guard. The counterintelligence agencies are not always five steps ahead of the LTRA. But once these LTRA assets commit tradecraft blunder they become easy prey.

It is expected that the Russian “sleeper agent” case will become a matter of serious case study by most intelligence agencies. The countries may be different, targets may vary, the agents may be multifarious but the tradecraft techniques are unique and more or less common to most agencies.

For constraints of space other aspects of Spying Tradecraft could not be accommodated in this essay.