The Way Forward

by Izeth Hussain

(June 19, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) It seems to me that Tissa Vitarana’s article on the way forward towards a solution of the national question in the Sunday Island of June 13 is far too important to be read in a perfunctory way and to be set aside thereafter. It calls for supportive comment. Vitarana can speak more authoritatively than any one else on all the efforts that were made over many years to establish a consensual basis for a solution. Obviously the expertise and experience that he has gathered in consequence should be used in making further efforts towards a solution.

Basically he makes out a case for the continuation of the APRC process. In setting out the main recommendations of the APRC – the result of over three years of exhaustive discussions – he states that they have been accepted by thirteen political parties. A notable absentee from his list is the UNP, but Vitarana feels sure that it would re-enter the process. So do I. It is not that I anticipate a sudden access of patriotism in the UNP which will make it co-operate fully in working towards a solution. My anticipation is based on the fact that the UNP is what it always was: a pro-Western neo-colonialist party. That means that it can be expected to succumb to Western pressure to co-operate fully in the peace process. It does seem on the basis of data provided by Vitarana that it will not be difficult to establish a solid consensus on the provisions for a solution among the Sinhalese and the Muslims. What about the Tamils? The signs are that a strategy of accommodative pragmatism will find favour with the majority of them. Besides, it has to be expected that as in the case of the UNP there will be significant external pressure on them, exercised by Delhi, Tamil Nadu, and the powerful members of the international community, to adopt such a strategy as the chimerical search for something approximating to Eelam will only bring more suffering to the Tamils. The crucial point is that it is only those external actors who may be able to persuade the Government to concede a significant measure of devolution. The TNA in particular will have to co-operate with them, or very probably the Tamils will get nothing.

The most interesting part of Vitarana’s article is on the opinion polls carried out by Dr Colin Irwin of the University of Liverpool. His credentials for carrying out opinion polls on the acceptability or otherwise of the APRC proposals are very impressive. An internationally reputed sociologist, and an expert in conducting public opinion polls, he played a key role in resolving the Northern Ireland problem, for which he earned praise from all the stakeholders. He carried out three surveys on the APRC proposals in March 2008, 2009, and 2010. His report was published in summary form in the local Daily Mirror, from which I will cite only the most significant details. A key finding is that "the preliminary APRC proposals have gained more Sinhala support after the war, so that they are now equally acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamils, Up-country Tamils and Muslims." According to the March 2009 survey only 59% of the Sinhalese were supportive of the proposals, while in March 2010 the percentage was 80%. During those two periods over 80% of the Tamils and the Muslims were supportive.

Vitarana writes,:"It is clear from these studies that a large majority of the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims are all for a political solution on the lines of the consensus reached by the APRC. The moves to avoid a reasonable political solution on the lines of a purely economic approach is probably only favoured by an extremist minority." This view would appear to get some substantiation from the fact that the two parties which are regarded as adopting the hard line on the ethnic problem, the JVP and the JHU, don’t have much support among the people.

On the basis of the data provided above the way forward towards a political solution seems to be clear. The 13th Amendment with some modifications could get the broad consensus of the political parties and of the Sri Lankan people, together with the support of India and of the powerful members of the international community. What then is the problem about proceeding in the way forward? According to Vitarana, after the victory over the LTTE and the overwhelming electoral victories of the President and the SLFP, the view has been gaining ground within the Government that an economic solution, without a political dimension to it, will suffice to meet the aspirations of the Tamil people. It seems to be a foolish expectation. It is well known that the free market strategy of economic development leads to serious inequities which have to be dealt with by a well-equipped state, as in the case of Singapore. In Sri Lanka, with the contempt shown by successive governments for the principle of meritocracy, we are miles removed from such a state.

There is also another possible strategy: not just economic development, but that plus a liberal democratic approach to the ethnic problem in which the individual has an unmediated relationship with the State, which ensures his rights and fair and equal treatment. I have argued the case for it earlier, but I shall not do so again because by now it has become apparent that all that is highly theoretical. The only realistic approach to the ethnic problem now has to be based on realpolitik, the politics of power. Bismarck, one of the supreme maestros in the realm of realpolitik, famously observed that the great issues of history are decided not by speeches but by blood and iron, and even more famously Mao observed that power flows through the barrel of a gun. Neither would have held that it is only power in that crude sense that applies in politics. But there are cases in which we must think primarily in terms of power relations, and our ethnic problem at present is one such case.

Why on earth are we not pursuing the obvious way forward towards a political solution? The answer follows from the fact that the LTTE put itself thoroughly in the wrong, the Government fought a just war, and exterminated the LTTE militarily. The Tamils are therefore in the position of the conquered, and it is normal for the conquered to accept the will of the conqueror. The Sinhalese will give fair and equal treatment to the Tamils as they (the Sinhalese) think fit, not as others think fit. The fallacy in this line of thinking in which military power prevails over everything else is that though the Government has destroyed the weapons of the LTTE, it has not destroyed the weapons of New Delhi. Those weapons can be deployed against Sri Lanka. Apart from "hard power", military power, there are also various forms of "soft power", including notably the power to sway opinion. I will not go into details, but I will merely assert what should be evident: in both forms of power India can overwhelm us.

Bearing that fact in mind, we must recognize that there seem to be just two options open to us. One is to go for a political solution based on devolution or decentralization within a unitary system, for which the APRC has established the ground for a solid consensus. The other is to go for an economic solution. Unless we reach some measure of understanding with India about the latter option, it can lead to serious problems for Sri Lanka. I am wondering in fact whether all the excessive fuss about our human rights record and alleged war crimes, all the outrageous double standards shown by the international community, and all the harrying and bullying of Sri Lanka that has been going on, has behind it – to some extent at least – Indian inspiration. It is not that India has imperialist designs against us. The objective, I suspect, is to get the help of the international community to move SL towards a lasting solution of the ethnic problem.