US founders on AfPak rock

by G Parthasarathy

(June 10, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) Just as Mr Barack Obama’s ‘Air Force One’ was readying to land at Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase on March 28, his National Security Adviser Gen James Jones was telling accompanying journalists that the US President would give his Afghan counterpart a dressing down on corruption and incompetent governance. The journalists were later told that Mr Obama had spoken about the need for “building a stronger Government and battling corruption” to his Afghan host.

Earlier, American Ambassador Gen Karl Eikenberry had referred to Mr Hamid Karzai as being “not an adequate strategic partner” and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen had conveyed a “stern message” to the Afghan President. Worse still, a senior Pentagon official, while expressing dissatisfaction at Mr Karzai’s brother, Mr Ahmed Wali Karzai’s alleged links with the Taliban, reportedly remarked that once these links were established, “We can put him (Ahmed Karzai) on the target list and capture and kill him.”

Unable to bear such sniping any longer, Mr Karzai hit back, raising doubts publicly about the appropriateness of a proposed American military operation in Kandahar and hinting that he would go his own way on “reconciliation” with the Taliban. By the time Mr Karzai arrived in Washington on May 7, the Obama Administration had taken a U-turn, with presidential adviser Doug Lute proclaiming, “There is a new compact between his (Karzai’s) Government and the Afghan people.”

Shortly after the unsuccessful terrorist attack at New York’s Times Square by Faisal Shahzad, evidence emerged that he had visited North Waziristan where the ‘Haqqani Taliban network’ of the Afghan Taliban and the Al Qaeda are based. American anger at the refusal of the Pakistani Army to act against the Haqqani network was soon voiced. The US Attorney-General, Mr Eric Holder, asserted that if Pakistan did not take “appropriate action” against the Taliban elements located on its soil, America would do so.

Ms Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, warned, “Some Pakistani officials know more about Al Qaeda and the Taliban than they actually let on. I believe that somehow in the (Pakistani) Government, there are people who know where Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Mullah Omar and the Afghan Taliban leadership are.” Ms Clinton said that the US expected more cooperation from Pakistan to help bring to justice, capture or kill, those who attacked it on 9/11, adding, “We cannot tolerate having people encouraged, trained and sent from Pakistan to attack the US.”

The fact that the Obama Administration is a house divided, however, soon emerged, with Defence Secretary Robert Gates seeking to justify Pakistan’s terrorist connections, alluding to a “deficit of trust” between Washington, DC and Islamabad. Mr Gates also said there was “some justification” for Pakistan's concerns about past American policies, because of what the Americans did during Pakistan’s “past wars with India” and the imposition of American sanctions in 1992 after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The Centcom Commander, Gen David Patraeus, rushed in with an apologia for his Pakistani friends, by claiming that while Faisal was inspired by militants in Pakistan, he did not necessarily have contacts with the militants. Both Adm Mike Mullen and Gen Patraeus fancy themselves to be “soldier statesmen” a la Gen Dwight Eisenhower. Adm Mullen has visited Pakistan 15 times and Gen Patraeus no less frequently. Both evidently have high opinions of their abilities to persuade Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani to crack down on the Haqqani network in North Waziristan and the Taliban’s Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura. All American officers in southern Afghanistan know that they cannot prevail in the ongoing military operations, unless Taliban strongholds across the Durand Line in North Waziristan and Balochistan are neutralised. Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus evidently do not want to acknowledge that hard options have to be considered if their soldiers are not to die at the hands of radicals, armed and trained across the Durand Line.

The most cogent explanation of the implications of Faisal Shahzad’s Times Square misadventure was voiced by former CIA official and Clinton White House Aide Bruce Reidel, who played a key role in crafting the Obama Administration’s AfPak policies. Mr Reidel noted, “What we are witnessing in Pakistan is a very dangerous phenomenon. The ideology of Al Qaeda, the ideology of global Islamic Jihad that all jihadis ,should focus on the United States as the ultimate enemy, is gaining ground, with groups beyond Al Qaeda.

We saw this in 2008 in Mumbai, when the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba attacked American and Israeli targets. These are the targets of Al Qaeda and global jihad. This spreading of the idea of globaljihad is very dangerous and as it gets deeper and deeper into the extremist groups in Pakistan, it means we can expect more attacks like the one we saw at Times Square.” While unable to rationalise the views of Gen Patraeus, Mr Reidel observed, “We can’t eliminate the terrorist problem in Pakistan without Pakistan’s help. And yet we have failed for decades now to get the Pakistanis to give us help, and we have not found the cure to make this happen.”

Knowing this American dilemma, a hard headed professional like Gen Kayani, known by the CIA to have described Afghan Taliban leader Jalaluddin Haqqani as a “strategic asset”, is hardly likely to end his support for radical Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, merely because Adm Mullen and Gen Patraeus endeavour to massage his ego. Afghan Taliban leaders will conveniently ‘disappear’ even if military ‘operations’ are commenced by Gen Kayani in North Waziristan at America’s behest.

The Pentagon’s current Kayani-centric policy of acting as apologists for the Pakistani military establishment amounts to abetment of terrorism against their Army in Afghanistan and their population at home. The Americans will hopefully realise this and discard their present policies of “all carrots and no stick” in dealing with Pakistan’s military establishment. American forces need not cross the Durand Line to take out Taliban strongholds. They surely have ‘local assets’ to achieve this. Virtually no Pashtun recognises the Durand Line as an international border.

Mr Obama will have to recognise that while his Generals may be militarily competent, they should avoid pretensions of being diplomats, or statesmen, as well. Interestingly, Mr Robert Gates and Mr Manmohan Singh attribute problems arising from Pakistan-sponsored terrorism to a “trust deficit”, thereby glossing over the pernicious role of the Pakistani military. Is this merely due to a subliminal meeting of minds?