Suicide Bombers of Sri Lanka -Part One

"The Black Tiger suicide attacks evolved as one of several militant strategies of the LTTE. The first suicide truck bombing was carried out by ‘Captain’ Miller of the LTTE who drove a truck packed with explosives into a Lankan army camp at a Nelliaddy school on 5 July 1987, reportedly killing over 100 soldiers."
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By Daya Somasundaram

Abstract

(June 20, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The phenomena of suicide bombers in Sri Lanka share some similarities with but also have some marked differences with what is seen in other parts of world today. Increasing discrimina¬tion, state humiliation and violence against the minority Tamils brought out a militancy and the phenomena of suicide bombers. The underlying socio-political and economical factors in the North and East of Sri Lanka that caused the militancy at the onset are examined.Some of these factors that were the cause of or consequent to the conflict include: extrajudicial killing of one or both parents or relations by the state; separations, destruction of home and belongings during the war; displacement; lack of adequate or nutritious food; ill health; economic difficul¬ties; lack of access to education; not seeing any avenues for future employment and advance¬ment; social and political oppression; and facing harassment, detention and death. At the same time, the Tamil militants have used various psychological methods to entice youth, children and women to join and become suicide bombers. Public displays of war paraphernalia, posters of fallen heroes, speeches and video, particularly in schools and community gatherings, heroic songs and stories, public funeral rites and annual remembrance ceremonies draw out feelings of patrio¬tism and create a martyr cult. The religio-cultural context of the Tamils has provided meaning and symbols for the creation and maintenance of this cult, while the LTTE has provided the organisa¬tional capacity to train and indoctrinate a special elite as suicide bombers. Whether the crushing of the LTTE militarily by the state brings to an end the phenomena of suicide bombers or whether it will re-emerge in other forms if underlying grievances are not resolved remains to be seen.

Keywords

suicide bombers, Sri Lanka, sacrifice, altruistic suicide, ethnic conflict, insurgency

The decimation of the Liberation Tigers of Thamil Eelam (LTTE), its top leadership (including Prabhakaran), their supporters, and over 20,000 Tamil civilians by the Sri Lanka state in May 2009 (University Teachers for Human Rights, 2009) could have put an end to the phenomena of suicide attacks in Lanka. The successful crushing of a till-then powerful separatist movement by military means has profound implications for modern counter-insurgency strategy the world over. Already countries like Pakistan are seeking to emulate the ‘Lanka model’ to address their own local insurgencies (BBC, 2009). The Sri Lankan state also feels justified in continuing with the Malaysian ‘Bhu¬miputra’ model of governance in dealing with minorities whereby the major¬ity, ‘sons of the soil’, are given privileged status. The discriminatory state policies and repression of minority rights may have been one of the original causes of the ethnic conflict (Hoole, 2001) and subsequent evolution of sui¬cide terror tactics by the weaker rebels. Thus, it is not only of historical and academic interest, but of paramount importance in designing counter-insur¬gency strategies and solutions to try to understand what happened. The Black Tiger suicide cadres of the LTTE shared similarities with other suicide bomb¬ers across the globe but also had significant differences (Gunaratna, 2000; Chandran, 2001a, 2001b; Bloom, 2005; Hassan, 2008a).

[Click on the picture to enlarge] Unlike most other groups but similar to the PKK, the LTTE have used a large number of female suicide bombers, believed to be around 35%. The context for the LTTE recruiting increasing number of women and children arose when they started to run out of youths and men willing to join and fight.

The Black Tiger suicide attacks evolved as one of several militant strategies of the LTTE. The first suicide truck bombing was carried out by ‘Captain’ Miller of the LTTE who drove a truck packed with explosives into a Lankan army camp at a Nelliaddy school on 5 July 1987, reportedly killing over 100 soldiers. Apparently Miller was deeply upset by the LTTE pulling out of Vadamarachy, the northern part of the Jaffna Peninsula, under the onslaught of the state forces and personally instigated this course of action. Miller became a folk hero and 5 July has ever since been publically celebrated in a grand way as Black Tiger Day by the LTTE. The military effectiveness, emo¬tional repercussion among the cadre and public, and spectacular media and propaganda value may have led the LTTE to adopt the same strategy. Some of the original militants are said to have undergone training in the Middle East and the leaders would have at least been acutely aware of what was hap¬pening there in terms of the use of suicide bombers. Thus, it is said that sui¬cide terror ‘outbids’ other methods available to a weaker, non-state guerrilla force. Subsequently over 300 (see Table 1) mostly successful suicide attacks have been carried out by the LTTE (SATP, 2009) making it the most prolific in the world! Like Hizbullah, Hamas and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), the Black Tigers are an elite, highly trained and indoctrinated, specialised unit within the overall militant organisation that also included such conven-tional wings as air, sea, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, artillery, demolition, women, young, special units, political, and other units. Unlike many Islamist jihadi groups with multiple, smaller, semi-autonomous, ‘home-grown’ origins, the Black Tigers are found only within the monolithic LTTE in Sri Lanka. They have only carried out one attack overseas in India, killing former prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi. The targets have been carefully chosen with alleged military, political, economic or symbolic value (see Table 1). Military and political leaders, including Tamil leaders considered by the LTTE to be against them (‘throhi’ or traitors), military, strategic, political, symbolic and economic institutions or infrastructure, pre-emptive strikes and plain military objectives have been targeted by a variety of suicide methods. These have included vehicles, such as trucks, motorbikes, bicycles, boats and planes with explosives, and people with explosives strapped to them. There is intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, meticulous planning, rehearsals, compartmental¬ised cells with support teams and, where possible, dry runs before the actual mission. According to the LTTE, civilians have never been targeted directly but are so called collateral damage. There have been warnings to the public not to go close to possible targets. Sometimes ‘sleepers’ have lived in the tar¬get area for years as ordinary civilians with economic resources, amidst allur¬ing temptations, cultivating social relationships without raising suspicion before carrying out their mission. Very rarely has there been any wavering, fear, signs of doubt, misgiving or uncertainty and the attacks have been car¬ried out with extraordinary precision. This shows a high degree of commit¬ment, singleness of purpose, devotion to cause, allegiance to the leader, motivation, clarity of mind about day-to-day functioning, skill and loyalty maintained over long periods of time (over three years in the case of President Premadasa) in adverse environments and without the need for regular sup¬port, ritualistic practices or encouragement. Only in more recent times has the state managed to ‘harden’ potential targets with increased security mea¬sures and thwart intended aims.

In joining the Tamil Tigers, the cadres commit themselves to die and wear a cyanide capsule (usually on a necklace) at all times to be used in the event of imminent capture, ostensibly to avoid giving information under torture. This pattern of suicide is similar to what the sociologist Emilie Durkheim (1951) called ‘altruistic suicide,’ in which the individual feels so closely identified with a group and committed to the cause, that he is willing to sacrifice himself for the greater good, or ‘fatalistic suicide’ where there is high degree of control and indoctrination. An estimated one-third of the LTTE’s combat deaths up to 1992 can be attributed to these forms of suicides (Schalk, 2003). Thus, they could be technically considered suicide cadres. Among the veteran cadres that I have interviewed or treated over the years (admittedly those with psychological problems), there is a strong death wish (perhaps a result of the harsh realities of battle, death of comrades, and hopelessness of fatal outcome). Almost all of them have a strong desire to join the elite Black Tigers; in fact, it is seen as an honour and opportunity to be worthy and useful. The recruiters are looking for able and skilled combatants to be used as instruments in the war, precision weapons of high effectiveness by the weaker party in an asymmetrical war .

(Hassan, 2008a). Though the term ‘suicide terrorism’ is commonly used, these acts cannot be regarded as suicide in the way it is usually understood, nor as homicidal killings (Hassan, 2008b). According to the LTTE and their sympa¬thisers, these were not suicide (thatkollai ) but self sacrifice, the Tamil term being thatkodai. Roberts (2007) has described it as sacrificial devotion (thiayaham) with deep cultural roots. The related phenomena of altruistic suicide or self sac¬rifice for a larger cause were brought out by the Gandhian-type death fasts of Theelepan (in 1987) and Annai Poobathi (in 1988) significantly during the direct Indian presence, as well as self immolations in the last phases of the mili¬tary annihilation in the Vanni (2009) in places as far afield as India, Malaysia, Switzerland and the U.K. as a form of moral protest asking for an end to the plight of Tamils. The fact that, except for Theelepan, the others were not LTTE militant cadres brings out the deeper pan-national dimension of Tamil ethnic emotions and the spirit of self sacrifice it can evoke. Those who had died were revered as martyrs, heroes who were honoured and ceremoniously remembered. Though modern terror experts have pointed out that the most effective preven¬tion of this form of altruistic suicide would be to address the underlying social injustices and inequities rather than the increasingly elaborate security measures (Asad, 2007; Hassan, 2008b), the Lankan state has managed to eliminate this threat by militarily destroying its leadership.

Unlike most other groups but similar to the PKK, the LTTE have used a large number of female suicide bombers, believed to be around 35%. The context for the LTTE recruiting increasing number of women and children arose when they started to run out of youths and men willing to join and fight. Female suicide bombers do not arouse suspicion and are less often checked thoroughly for cultural reasons, blend in more easily with civilian populations, and are able to conceal the explosive devices within their clothes and body. Thus, they are said to be able to penetrate and gain access to their targets more easily; however, this changed with increased intelligence, enhanced security measures and the ‘hardening’ of targets. They also tend to be more committed and purposeful in carrying out their missions. According to Nelfouer De Mel, the phenomena of female suicide bombers has raised issues of ‘autonomous choice, agency, feminist politics, cultural role models, and the gendered nature of sacrifice/martyrdom’ (Bloom, 2005) within a more general female emancipation or empowerment through militancy in a traditional, patriarchal society (Hellmann-Rajanayagam, 2008).

The Tamils of Sri Lanka have traditionally been a relatively peaceful soci¬ety. Although there has been considerable internal violence, for example, in terms of domestic violence, child abuse, caste violence, and suicide, the inci¬dence of external aggression, killings and large-scale civil violence were not seen. In fact, only a few decades ago, before the onset of the current civil or ethnic war, a single homicide would bring on a general paralysis, rumours, extreme fear and apprehension, so much so that people would stay indoors for weeks or even months on end (Somasundaram, 1998). A single killing would become a major issue, discussed in the media and people would talk about it for weeks. The war brought about a gradual habituation to violence and killing that became part of the day-to-day social climate.

The Tamils had often been stereotyped as somewhat submissive. Thus, the term, ‘Demala,’ used by Sinhalese to describe Tamils had a derogatory tone to it. The 1983 pogrom (Piyadasa, 1984; Roberts, 2003) can be seen as an attempt to teach the ‘Tamils’ a lesson, to send them running with their tails between their legs. Indeed, I believe the Sanskrit root of the term Dravidian, means ‘to run.’ It is only more recently, after the militant reaction to the vio¬lent suppression that the term ‘kotiya’ has replaced this stereotype and with it some grudging respect! So the question arises how the Tamils, youth in par¬ticular, could have become militant so quickly; even how the notorious Black Tiger suicide cadres developed. It would appear that social sanction for a group to behave violently can bring out aggressive acts they had learned or seen, for example, in the media. Although it is generally accepted that certain ethnic groups have special martial abilities (in the Indian subcontinent, the Gurkhas, Sikhs and Rajputs are famed for their fighting prowess), this may as well be a sub-cultural influence, depending on how the males are brought up in the community, their expectations and training. Thus, it is significant that an overtly peaceful society, the Tamils of Sri Lanka, have been able, when provoked, to develop quite competent (a competency artificially bolstered by modern easy to use light weaponry) military capacities so quickly, capacities able to stand up to the aforementioned regiments during the ill-fated Indian intervention in Sri Lanka (Hoole et al., 1988). In the final analysis, the out¬come of this historical confrontation may well have proven that between two well-trained and equipped fighting units, the decisive factor is their motiva¬tion. The defeat of the LTTE by the Sinhala state from 2006 to 2009 may also be due to the crucial difference in motivation and moral — a deteriora¬tion in the LTTE and an upsurge among the state forces (UTHR-J, 2009).

The development of the Tamil militancy and the LTTE suicide bombers can only be understood in terms of the socio-cultural and political contexts. I would like to look at the motivation for the militancy in general, and the elite suicide cadres among them in particular, as arising from the confluence of several push and pull factors. The use of push-pull categorisation has been used more recently in relation to child labour by the International Labour Organisation’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour1 and, more specifically, child soldiers2 (Somasundaram, 2001). In reality, the causative factors will not fall neatly into dichotomous categories, but show overlaps and exceptions. The suicide cadres are chosen from among the ordi¬nary LTTE who show extreme capacity, commitment and, particularly, apti¬tude for these types of operations. They are in a sense the crème de la crème. The organisational character of the LTTE and their martyr cult would have then moulded, indoctrinated, trained and honed them into the elite Black Tigers (Arnestad & Daae, 2007). The causes were more clear and valid at the beginning of war; the complex picture has changed with time and the same factors may not be operative now. Towards the end of the fighting, recruit¬ment became more coercive, and selection and choice minimal.

To be continued...