Kanishka Disaster --- Salient points of the major commission report - Part Eight

Previous Parts: one | two | three | four| five | six | Seven

by B. Raman

(June 21, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Prior to the bombing, the Government as a whole had the following information relevant to the risk that Sikh extremists could successfully carry out the bombing of an Air India plane:

It was aware that Sikh extremists were serious about a terrorist attack during June 1985 against a symbol of the Government of India. It knew the identity of the extremists likely to be involved in such an attack.

It was aware that Air India’s fl ights were likely to be a target of Sikh extremists and that a likely means for such a terrorist attack was a time-delayed explosive concealed in checked baggage.

It was aware that the most serious threat to civil aviation was no longer hijacking, but sabotage.

It knew that Transport Canada’s regulatory regime was inadequate to deal with this sort of threat and that the specific security measures currently instituted by Air India were inadequate and were based on unreliable technology and untrained screeners.

It was aware of rules and procedures that could have been prescribed by Regulation, and that would have been more eff ective in responding to security risks posed by interlined baggage and by baggage checked-in by passengers who did not show up for their fl ights.

It was also aware of more eff ective procedures, such as passenger-baggage reconciliation, and practices for screening baggage and identifying potential risks.

Nevertheless, because the Government did not address what was, by its own evaluation, a security regime wholly inadequate to identify and respond to known serious threats, it failed to prevent the bombing of Air India Flight 182.

( To be continued)