By Lt Col. (Retd) Anil Amarasekera
(The views expressed in this report are the authors' own)
( May 13, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Wars are invariably fought for the acquisition of land. The separatist war between the LTTE and the security forces in our country is no exception. However a false claim to acquire territory cannot and will not succeed just as much as falsehood cannot and will not succeed to overshadow the truth in the long term. With regard to territorial claims made by the LTTE the word ILAM (Eelam), comes into much prominence. It is, apparently, being used to connote the impression of “a land of the Tamils”. Indeed, the Tamil word ILAM was never before used in that sense. On the contrary, this Tamil word ILAM did not refer to Tamil land but to the “Land of the Sinhala people”. None other establishes this than the Tamil lexicon published under the authority of the highest seat of Tamil learning- the University of Madras. Page 328 of this Tamil lexicon has the following entry: ILAM, Pali, Sinhala, 1. Ceylon. What it says is that ILAM means the land of the Sinhala people. The Tamil word given as the meaning of ILAM reads “SINHALUM”. The term ILA in Tamil means “SINHALA”, having its origin in the word HELA, by which term the ancient people of LANKA were known. Thus ILAKKACHU in Tamil means “Sinhala Coins”- ILA means Sinhala, Kachchu means Coins. Similarly, since NADU means LAND, ILANADU means the Sinhala land. According to the said lexicon the word ILANADU was derived from ILAM. The foregoing establishes the fact that the word ILAM (Eelam) never referred to any Tamil land but always signified the Sinhala land. Therefore if one were to ask for ILAM (Eelam), what is being asked for is the traditional homeland of the Sinhala people. Therefore such false claims cannot and will not succeed and that perhaps is one reason for the defeat of the LTTE.
The tacit support of India is an important necessity for any separatist war against the security forces in Sri Lanka to succeed. This the LTTE had during the initial stages of their campaign, when LTTE training camps were located in India. However with the implementation of the Indo Lanka Accord and the subsequent refusal by the LTTE to honour this accord, hostilities broke out between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Many LTTE carders were killed by the IPKF. Perhaps one of the biggest mistakes made by Prabhakaran was his decision to assassinate the former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in revenge. After the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi whatever sympathy the central government of India had for the LTTE evaporated and it began to cooperate with Sri Lanka in her efforts to eradicate the LTTE threat. This then could be considered as yet another reason for the defeat of the LTTE.
Prabhakaran made his next mistake when he decided to fight a conventional war instead of continuing with his highly successful form of guerilla warfare. The security forces were finding it difficult if not impossible to prevent the well planned LTTE hit and run operations, which were beginning to prove highly successful. To achieve the proposed Tamil homeland of Eelam, Malwathu Oya, Yan Oya and the Maduru Oya river basins had to be dominated. These three river basins had therefore to be ethnically cleansed of the Sinhalese and Muslim population. This was very successfully achieved during the commencement of hostilities through well planned terrorist attacks on Sinhalese and Muslim villages in these river basins. Many innocent people including women and children were killed during these attacks and there was a large exodus of the population from these threatened villages southwards. The security forces were therefore compelled to establish forward defense lines to protect the threatened villages.
In the next phase of warfare the LTTE commenced to attack the week points in the forward defense line with fighting patrols, which they did very successfully at the initial stages. The security forces too commenced limited operations to search and destroy LTTE bases, but did not have adequate strength to hold on to additional territory beyond the forward defense line. It was at this point of time that the cease fire came into operation. Both the security forces and the LTTE made use of this opportunity to train new recruits and to reequip. The breakaway of the LTTE eastern commander Karuna weakened the LTTE considerably during this period. However the LTTE was receiving more arms and ammunition than ever before with support from vested interests and recruitment was fast tracked in readiness for a conventional engagement with the Security Forces.
The next mistake made by Prabhakaran was when he prevented the Tamils in the LTTE dominated areas from voting at the 2005 presidential elections. This enabled President Mahinda Rajapakse to win. His decision to appoint Lt Col (Retd) Gotabaya Rajapakse, his own younger brother as the Secretary of Defence saw the formation of a modern well equipped Army, Navy and Air Force. He was an officer who had served under General Denzil Kobbekaduwa, as one of his battalion commanders, during the Vadamarachchi Operation and was well aware of the mythology needed to defeat the LTTE. He therefore rapidly increased the strength of not only the Security Forces but even the Police including the Special Task Force. An additional Civil Defence Force was also formed to protect threatened villages. The army was therefore released from a defensive commitment for offensive operations. In conventional warfare the winning side needs a three to one superiority in manpower. Therefore when Prabhakaran decided to take on the Sri Lanka Government in conventional warfare, due to the well planed effort of the Secretary of Defence the government had the three to one superiority in manpower to defeat the LTTE.
The Commander of the Army General Sarath Fonseka should also receive his due share of credit for it was his driving force that was responsible for the rapid forward march of the army. It is said that the soldier feared General Fonseka more than the LTTE Jonny Batta that would blow off his legs. Hence the well known saying, “Issarahata geyoth Jonniya, pittipassata aawoth Fonniya”. One of the biggest setbacks in the army at the initial stages was due to the fact that soldiers were not accustomed to night operations. While the soldiers from the south were jittery to move around during the night, the LTTE carders from the north who were used to night movement had no such fear. The army overcame this problem in later years and in fact did very much better than the LTTE with the training of Commandos, Special Forces and Long-range Reconnaissance Patrols. These units were able to penetrate deep into LTTE territory and carry out offensive operations, both during day and night. Therefore the credit for all land operations that contributed towards the defeat of the LTTE must be given not only to the Commander of the Army but also to his officers and men.
To meet the challenge posed by the Sea Tigers the Sri Lanka Navy was greatly improved and with the achievement of blue water capability they were in a position to intercept and destroy any LTTE ships transporting weapons to Sri Lanka even in international waters. Many such LTTE ships that were in fact floating warehouses of weapons were destroyed. The transport of soldiers and supplies to the north was another important operation that was successfully carried out by the Sri Lanka Navy, despite the threat of LTTE suicide boat attacks. The credit for all these Navy achievements that contributed towards the defeat of the LTTE must be given to Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, his officers and men.
Though the ‘Kuramba atti’ Air Force of the LTTE could pose little or no threat to the Sri Lanka Air Force, the fear psychosis it created among the civilian population, mostly in Colombo was substantial. The steps taken by the Sri Lanka Air Force to counter this threat and their invaluable air support with precession bombing of targets, to make the forward march of the ground troops such a success and also their quick and efficient evacuation of battle casualties for immediate medical treatment also contributed tremendously towards the defeat of the LTTE. Therefore credit must be given to Air Martial Roshan Gunatilleke, his officers and men for their contribution towards the victory.
While the Police maintained law and order and did their duty in apprehending LTTE suicide bombers, their handlers, sleeping cells and LTTE spies, the Special Task Force of the Police engaged the LTTE in the forward areas together with the Security Forces. Therefore the contribution that they made towards the defeat of the LTTE must also be very much appreciated. Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, his officers and men in the Civil Defence Force too were actively involved in protecting towns and villages under immanent LTTE threat and services that they performed too contributed towards the defeat of the LTTE.
After the LTTE commenced its war to divide this country and establish Eelam, first it was President J.R.Jayawardene who gave into Indian pressure with the famous “Parippu drop’ and discontinued the Vadamarachchi Operation. He then introduced the Indo Lanka Accord and temporarily merged the Northern Province to the Eastern Province sans the approval of his subjects. Next was President Ranasinghe Premadasa, who had peace talks with the LTTE and even supplied weapons to the LTTE with the intention of driving the IPKF out of this country. Though he did succeed in ultimately sending the IPKF back to India, the weapons he gave to the LTTE were next used against our soldiers. President D.B.Wijetunga during his short term as the President was unable to do much and was succeeded by President Chandrika Kumaratunga who also had peace talks with the LTTE. Her peace efforts culminated with the LTTE blowing up several Navy vessels at the Trincomalee harbor. It was during her period in office that Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe implemented a cease fire agreement and demarked LTTE controlled areas. After the tsunami President Chandrika Kumaratunge agreed to establish for the LTTE an Internal Self Government Authority. However this was challenged in the Supreme Court and was never implemented. All these Presidents were unable to take any positive steps to defeat the LTTE partly due to foreign interference and pressure.
Foreign interference and pressure had little effect on President Mahinda Rajapakse who was willing to listen to his people and not willing to dance to the tune of foreign leaders and governments. Therefore he decided to fight and defeat the LTTE and in doing so he had to withstand pressure from the international community controlled by the western nations such as America, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, France etc that were pressurizing him to let LTTE off the hook. To counter such pressure he made friends with countries such as, China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Libya and even with India. His handling of foreign policy was far better than that of any of the previous Presidents and this was one of the main reasons for the defeat of the LTTE.
Last but not least it must be mentioned that many patriotic citizen both in this country and abroad stood solidly behind the President and the Security Forces in their effort to defeat LTTE terrorism. The sum total of all the above mentioned reasons and not any individual effort was responsible for the tremendous victory that this country achieved by crushing what the FBI designated as the most ruthless terrorist organization in the world. Just as much as many other countries celebrate their war victories, we too therefore have reason to celebrate a victory where the evil of terrorism was defeated after thirty long years because of a commendable joint effort.
Home LTTE Some reasons for the LTTE defeat
Some reasons for the LTTE defeat
By Sri Lanka Guardian • May 13, 2010 • History of Sri Lanka History of Wars LTTE • Comments : 0
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