[This paper was presented at the Seminar organised by Center for Asia Studies and Indian Center for South Asian Studies]
(May 18, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) What distinguishes Sri Lankan democracy from other political systems in South Asia is that it is founded on a quicksand – ‘the Sinhala Only’. The quest for supremacy, arising from fear and insecurity, has undone the requirements for building democracy in a genuinely plural society. A political system or say, any polity, should be evaluated on the basis of two working principles-democracy and justice. In other terms there is a continuous need to apply the principle of justice to understand the working of our democracies. If justice does not prevail in a system or even opportunities for remedial justice does not exist, a political society shall have no choice but to explore the question: should we resist or reconcile? The socio-political memory of Tamils in Sri Lanka is a sore reflection of this historical predicament. The course from the peaceful agitations to the end of Eelam-IV war has been a excruciating circle for the Tamils. This course remains a full circle because they have returned ironically to where they began from, dispossessed and disempowered beyond recognition in their own land without a home, awaiting rehabilitation and destiny surrendered before the unknown. There is nothing so clearly perceived and experienced as injustice by the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
The pursuit of justice and democracy in a liberal democracy make the elections resemble as an inevitable process of addressing them. But the decay of Sri Lankan polity is so deep that the conditions for the working of a representative democracy in a plural society no longer exist. The chief virtue of representative democracy is that it can neither be sustained with the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a majority community nor on the powerlessness of the minorities. The Sri Lankan elites and the political parties are habitual seekers of political power citing the Tamil question as a threat to national unity and integrity of Sri Lanka. The people have overwhelmingly responded to this challenge with a mandate that the same political elites in Sri Lanka could never disregard, reflecting the ethnic divide between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. In many ways the Presidential Election of 2010 is a continuation of the previous elections as far as the political agenda and manifesto of the political parties concerned but for the claim that the military solution has, at last, been found.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE’s) have been militarily defeated and the almost three decade old civil war had come to an end in May 2010. The military victory and the celebrations of the Sinhala civil society were soon followed, in order, by the Presidential Election that was advanced almost for two years to make good of jubilant mood of the majority community – the Sinhalese. Therefore this election resembled like an icing on the cake in terms of consolidating the military gains with the projection of final solution along with the constant reminders of historical folklore glorifying Duttugamuni’s success against the last Tamil King Eelara. There were also bitter fruits of the war like the parting of the ways between the President Rajpaksa and the then chief of the Armed Forces, General Sarath Fonseka .
Despite the military victory of the armed forces against the LTTE and the projection of final solution, the Tamil question and identity remains a challenge to the average Sri Lankan political mind and the peeved political system. The global community stared the internment of ethnic Tamils with complete disbelief and bewilderment at their captivity in the detention camps or “welfare villages” as the Government called them. There are two interesting but bottomless arguments held by the successive Sri Lankan governments for this situation. Firstly, that all Tamils are sympathetic to LTTE. Secondly, the LTTE does not represent all the Tamils. The deductive rationale of these two reverse arguments is that the Tamils, however, are not beyond doubt and suspicion. The Sri Lankan State and the political elites have consistently applied these two arguments as jacket frames that could be connected and disconnected according to the circumstances. There were no surprises for the Tamils who had no choice but to find a succor in a person of no less significance than, General Sarath Fonseka who was instrumental in conducting the operations of the war against the LTTE. The presidential election was held on 26th January 2010 against this overall socio-political background.
The following is an overview of the result of the 2010 Presidential Election announced on 27th January, 2010 by the Commissioner of Elections:
The general reading of this mandate is quite clear that President Rajapaksa had won an impressive 57.88% of the valid votes while his opponent General(Retd)Sarath Fonseka had managed to secure 40.15% of the same. The margin of victory is quite convincing given the fact that the mandate was sought against the background of the Eelam War-IV. Both Rajapaksa and Fonseka have had a share larger than life in determining the outcome of the war with the help of several hidden and known national and international actors. They both knew that their moment of glory must be utilized to catapult their political ambition before fading into political oblivion. The political manifestos did not reveal much difference regarding the basic political and constitutional orientations of the Sri Lankan polity. While Rajapaksa talked about economic reconstruction and development, Fonseka dwelt upon the need for change, ethnic reconciliation and even made references to human rights violations during the Eelam War-IV without any conviction. These were steps undertaken to gauge their political constituencies and explicitly acknowledge the shift in political axis. Hence it was not a surprise that Fonseka, an admired war hero until then, became a traitor for Rajapaksa and his family but a convert who emerged as a sudden beacon of hope in the midst of despair for the Tamil population. In electoral terms that both Rajapaksa and Fonseka needed an opportunity to readjust and redefine their political constituencies. A much greater revelation of this Presidential Election 2010 is the uncanny ability of the Tamil population to convey their political position despite all the odds thrown up before them by the decades of civil war and the Sri Lankan political system. The demographic spread of votes revealed that neither the military victory of the armed forces nor the defeat of the LTTE could humble the political question of Tamils into submission or obsolete without the fighting potential of LTTE. The Sri Lankan State and the political system must ponder over this political challenge than rue over the political masks sported by its power elites to remain in or capture power.Select Demographic Distribution of Votes:
The demographic distribution of votes serves a purpose in explaining the meaning of this 2010 Presidential Election. Rajapaksa had secured sixteen electoral districts spread in Central, West and South but none in North and East. Tamil majority districts of Jaffna, Wanni, Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Digamadulla in the North and East had voted for Fonseka virtually redrawing the political map of Tamil homeland with the exclusion of Puttalam on the West. The ethnic Tamil ballot against Rajapaksa was so evident that Nuwara Eliya in Central Province with significant population of plantation Tamils also voted in favour of Fonseka. This was the only district outside the North and East to be secured by Fonseka because of the underlying fact that this district contains a large population of plantation Tamils. It may be mentioned here that the war hero General (Retd)Sarath Fonseka had even lost his home constituency of Ambalangoda in Galle district of Southern province. There are three factors that have clearly emerged against the background of the 2010 Presidential Elections. They may be summarized here below here:First, the Tamil vote for Fonseka is a verdict against the incumbent President Rajapaksa more than the support base for Fonseka;
Secondly, the ethnic polarization as revealed in this Presidential election keeps alive the questions raised by raised the Tamil community for over several decades now with or without the LTTE factor; and
Thirdly, the preference for others in Jaffna (11.40%), Vanni (5.84%), Batticaloa (4.80%) and Digamadulla(4.80%) are far beyond the national average informing the underlying search for options.
We have not yet taken into account of the heavy presence of the Sri Lankan armed forces in the North and East, the extremely low turn out of the IDPs (not more than a quarter of the Tamils in the camps voted) and the impact of organized political violence preceding the presidential election 2010, as factors responsible for deterring the Tamil voters in coming out in bigger numbers against Rajapaksa. Centre for Monitoring Election violence (CMEV) reported 174 incidents on Election Day of which 94 were categorized as major. There were several blasts in Jaffna and Vavuniya town areas on the election day. There were multiple explosions in Nallur, Uduppidy, Manipay, Vaddukottai, Chavakachcheri and Tellipallai in Jaffna. All these acts of organized violence were aimed at preventing the voter turn out in the Tamil areas (Cited in ‘CMEV Election Day Communiqué,’ No.2, http://cmev.wordpress.com). It is believed, based on the experiences and incidents, that the high military presence and their role in the electoral process holds a negative influence on the voters, especially the Tamils, in this context, who are both reluctant and discouraged to challenge the military on violations or discrepancies because of the fear of punishment or reprisals that are meted out as reward for protesting. This election had been held after the defeat of LTTE and in the so called peace time. Several observers including the United Nations, the United States of America, the European Union and the international monitors have noted that the 2010 Presidential Election as one of the most violent elections in more than 20 years.
The Election Commissioner of Sri Lanka issued guidelines ,on 8th December 2009, based on the provisions of Article 104B(4) of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution regarding the use of state resources in electoral campaigns. These guidelines were completely disregarded by the major political actors and without exception by the incumbent President Rajapaksa. According to Transparency International (of Sri Lanka), there were several incidents where state resources were used by the President and his party for campaigning prior to the Presidential election in January 2010.(Cited in ‘Elections and Minorities: Present Problems and Alternatives for the Future’, Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, April,2010). The Interim Report-I on the Presidential Election-2010 dated 25th January 2010 placed by the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence(CMEV)read that “CMEV is deeply concerned that the integrity of t he electoral process has been seriously challenged in the course of this Presidential election campaign. In particular, CMEV wishes to record its grave concerns over the blatant disregard demonstrated for the Rule of Law, the authority of the Election Commissioner, allegations of irregularities in the conduct of postal voting, the intervention of military officers in the political campaign and the misuse of state resources and of state media organs. We also wish to reiterate our concern over the effective disenfranchisement of a large number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and over the problems previously highlighted in respect of voting identity documentation.”
A rueful confession of the process and conduct of the Presidential Election -2010 became public on 27th January 2010 when Dayananda Dissanayake, the Election Commissioner of Sri Lanka sought the approval of the Sri Lankan government to resign. He had also observed that the government institutions misbehaved and the state media violated his guidelines. He expressed his desire to leave as he poured his grief in words as “I request to be released and I cannot bear this anymore”. This is the rarest of rare testimony on the process and conduct of elections anywhere in the world. (Sri Lanka has on record of the statement of then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka on the status of Tamils in the detention camps and later the statement of then serving Chief of Armed Forces regarding the violations of human rights including the International War Protocols and terms of surrender). Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team on the Presidential Election -26th January 2010 observed in its concluding remarks that “overall the 2010 Presidential elections in Sri Lanka did not fully meet key benchmarks for democratic elections.” (Cited in ‘ Sri Lanka: Presidential Election – 26 January 2010’, Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team, Commonwealth Secretariat, Colombo,27 January 2010)
This election neither points to the consolidation of Sinhala constituency nor any creation of opportunities for reconciliation. The exclusive or the excessively preponderant principle of ‘Sinhala Only’ has been the root cause for the emergence of a tyranny of the majority in the name of political democracy and the rise of Tamil militancy as a countervailing resistance. The thirty year old civil war may have ended but the substantial questions about the Sri Lankan polity remain unaddressed. The chief virtue of representative democracy is that of providing a peaceful means of adjusting civil law and government to changes in the structure of society. The Sri Lankan political system and its ruling elites, in the post–independent period, have consistently failed to cultivate or create conditions for the successful functioning of a plural or representative democracy. The political elites in Sri Lanka see the ‘State acting in the name of their personal will and themselves acting in the name of the State.’ The convergence of this view led them to believe that ‘they are the State’ and hence any one disagreeing with the other naturally became the enemy of the State and force was resorted without any reservation to resolve the contradictions. General (Retd) Sarath Fonseka is now learning this hard lesson at the hands of Rajapaksa. The unjust political system will have a natural enemy and if none exist, it must invent one to survive. The search for and extinguishing of the enemy from within the dominant Sinhala political society has just begun. There will be major ground shifts in alliances and coalitions of interests including the growing influence of armed forces in the emerging realities of the Sri Lankan polity. The possibility of a new coalition of interests between the armed forces, Janatha Vimukti Perumana(JVP) and the radical Buddhist clergy portends an anxious decade for Sri Lanka.
The process of reconciliation is no longer an emotional issue for the Tamils or the Sinhalese majority. It must be politically constructed with appropriate constitutional and administrative measures. Sri Lanka remains as one of the most militarized State and civil societies in South Asia. With the building of cantonments in the North along with the existing high security zones and the excessive military presence in the region does not promote the idea of reconciliation. The idea of development in the North and East without democracy cannot be sustained for long and hence naturally it would require internal colonization by the Sinhalese to support and stabilize the political economy of the North and East. The government is deeply aware of this rationale and thus wants to achieve both the military control of the North and promote the Sinhala settlements in the traditional Tamil homeland areas. Hence the fear of Tamil population in the North and East cannot be totally dismissed as unfounded.
The Sri Lankan government is confounded with political uncertainty after the unprecedented military victory against the LTTE because of the absence of political mechanism or at least a political will to address the questions posed by the Tamil community. The Sri Lankan President sought an absolute majority in the Parliament to take bold steps in addressing these questions. The Parliamentary Elections in April 2010 had almost given him what he wanted – an absolute power. He may not carry reconciliation in his heart but he must at least pretend to do so if he wants to implement the political reforms that will ultimately extend his political future as well as transform the Sri Lankan polity. He will no doubt be hugely contested by his political opponents. Rajapaksa has become the State in the classical assumption of power elites in Sri Lanka and he must now reinvent the enemy sans the LTTE. There are no surprises for guessing but the combination and wherewithal of resources indicate the multiplicity of resistance from within the Sinhala constituency. The ridges are now once again visible after a long crack of time.
(Author teaches ‘Foreign Policy of India’ in the Department of Politics & Public Administration, University of Madras, Chennai)
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