PM must act on Maoist terror

By Ashok K Mehta

(May 26, New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) The most profoundly disappointing parts of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Press conference last Monday were those related to questions on Maoism. To the question whether UPA1 had underestimated the Maoist threat, he said: “No, I have been saying for the last three years that Naxalism is the biggest internal security challenge facing the country.”This is at variance with Home Minister P Chidambaram’s contention that successive Governments had underestimated the Maoist threat.

On Mr Chidambaram’s statement that he had a limited mandate to deal with Maoists, Mr Singh’s reply was lost on the electronic media but what was retrieved from Vigyan Bhavan said: “This is a strategic issue and will be discussed in the Cabinet” or words to that effect. Answering yet another question on fixing responsibility for tackling Maoism between States and the Centre, he said: “I talk to the Chief Ministers… and we have to work together”.

Mr Singh’s responses on the Maoist challenge illustrate the startling lack of clarity in Government strategy and his own comprehension on the dissonance between his party and the Government especially among dissidents like Congress general secretary Digvijay Singh and Member of Parliament Manishankar Aiyar who have trashed the Home Minister for his policy and pronouncements. It is simply bizarre for a Prime Minister to merely say that his country faces a grave challenge without getting anything meaningful done to meet it. This is akin to issuing a public warning about a bomb threat without trying to defuse it.

Accountability, delivery and implementation of counter-Maoist strategy have become hollow words. For years, Prime Ministers had focused on the dangers of cross-border terrorism but decisive action to overhaul intelligence investigation and counterterrorism mechanism was taken only after the Mumbai attack. Similarly, the Government only woke up to the severity of the Maoist threat after the Dantewada massacre and the subsequent massive landmine blast in the same district. Chhattisgarh which, next to Andhra Pradesh, has taken some of the most effective counter-Maoist measures including the controversial Salwa Judum operation, is being repeatedly targeted by the Maoists.

Clearly, it is time to refine the grand strategy — if there is one — in the light of recent events and the public debate on how best to defang the Maoists: Dialogue, development or disarmament. While Mr Digvijay Singh says Maoists are not terrorists, and States should be enabled to combat the challenge, Mr Aiyar has expressed other non-combat ideas which essentially contradict Mr Chidambaram’s action plan. But not really. Mr Chidambaram, himself, is lamenting the limited mandate given to him which obviously falls short of operational necessity.

The Prime Minister needs to get all his people together and thrash out differences instead of publicly debating strategy and tactics to defeat the Maoist menace. US President Barack Obama revised strategy for Afghanistan, incorporating inputs from 26 think-tanks, panels and committees which recommended action towards improvements in governance, socioeconomic development and military operations. But it had, as far as field commanders were concerned, clarity of mission, adequate resources and a mechanism to monitor delivery and achievements. Mr Chidambaram must be given an ‘adequate mandate’ and he or anyone else should not go around saying “we will not use the Army or the Air Force”. Why do we excel in foreclosing options? Just before the Kargil counter-offensive the Government declared “we will not cross the LoC”. These are operational matters and are best left to field commanders. Political riders, if any, need not be made public at least.

Having lost at least a decade to the Maoists in checking their expansion, the Government has to act decisively now. A political consensus must be forged and Maoism recognised as a full fledged insurgency and not a mere law-and-order problem under State jurisdiction. Maoism is a national problem transcending State boundaries and must be contained and rolled back. Till the constitutional issue of law and order being a State subject is harmonised, wriggle room is available under the Fifth Schedule area which authorises the Centre to issue directives to States about the administration of forests and tribal areas. A modus vivendi has to be found for States and the Centre to be on the same page.

Mr Chidambaram must stop the charade of asking Maoists to abjure violence for 72 hours. If this is to appease the peace lobby, it is doomed to failure. Right now, it is the Maoists who hold the initiative. Mr Chidambaram must offer talks from a position of strength even though Maoists use talks as a tactical break to buy time and regroup. The second factor in overall strategy is military operations. This deals with building resources and capacities in counterinsurgency skills to fight the Maoists. With a limited mandate, the Dantewada inquiry has exposed the congenital deficiencies in the CRPF which is the lead counter-Maoist force. Far too many problems about manpower and leadership bedevil the CRPF. But till a separate force is created, that’s what we have.

To augment the shortfall in training and motivation, Army trainers and mentors must be attached to ground forces and the Air Force used to enhance surveillance, mobility and fire power. A Centre-State coordination mechanism for individual States and, more importantly, between all Maoist-affected States is required — a super-unified command. An operational strategy of clear, hold and develop indicates that the administration, Government and development must occupy space reclaimed from the Maoists. Many innovative ideas have come up about assimilating tribals, restoring land ownership, giving them a stake in mineral resources and establishing joint forest management committees with locals on board. In short, the development process is to be devolved to the tribals to start addressing the root causes. None of the socioeconomic development schemes can work till security forces reclaim the liberated zones where officials have feared to tread.

The Maoists are efficiently organised, armed and funded. While their annual collection is estimated to be around Rs 1,400 crore to Rs 2,000 crore, their annual budget is between Rs 80 crore to Rs 100 crore including pay and cost of intelligence, arms and explosives. The Maoists are costing the state annually up to two per cent of the GDP, denting the expected growth rate to 8.5 per cent. This should be a strong enough incentive for Mr Singh to get his Government’s act together rather than repeatedly pointing at the gravity of the Maoist challenge.