Rajapaksa’s re-election

New Delhi has to tread warily in using its persuasive power with Rajapaksa for a political settlement of the Tamil problem.
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By M K Bhadrakumar

(February 03, Bangalore, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory in the election held on Jan 26 becomes a defining moment for regional security. The speed with which western countries endorsed his victory has a deeper meaning than what meets the eye. It comes at the culmination of a barrage of condemnation of the Rajapaksa regime for the past several months. The acquiescence follows the unwarranted interference by the American embassy in Colombo during the peak of the election campaign expressing concern over a free and fair election.

Given the presidential system of government, Rajapaksa was indeed more equal than other candidates but his victory is convincing. The opposition alliance’s decision to field ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka as its common candidate was a mistake. Fonseka lacked the charisma or the savviness to take on an old war horse like Rajapaksa and his candidacy failed to impress the people.

There were other faultlines, too. Despite the Fonseka gaffe, the opposition vote bank probably remains intact at around 40 per cent, which underscores the level of public disaffection. It has implications for the forthcoming parliamentary elections where local issues and public grievances come into play. Secondly, the Sinhala electorate voted overwhelmingly for Rajapaksa, while Fonseka polled exceedingly well in the Tamil and Muslim-dominated regions. How Rajapaksa defines his mandate of Sinhala nationalism remains an open question.

India should be pleased with Rajapaksa’s victory. Although Delhi kept aloof, there was no mistaking as to where its preference lay. A strong leadership in Colombo will be best placed to take tough decisions. Though the military victory over the LTTE has been conclusive, peace is far from won and deep wounds take time to heal. The time is approaching to reflect and begin to prepare a road map.

This is where Rajapaksa’s ‘fractured’ verdict becomes problematic. Sinhala nationalism historically acted as a brake on Colombo’s political willingness to accommodate Tamil minority aspirations. To what extent Rajapaksa dares to break out of the old paradigm is the big question. The Sinhala regions of the rural south, which gave him rock-like support, also happen to be the heartland of chauvinism that feeds on atavistic fears of Sri Lanka being the last remaining bastion of Theravada Buddhism.

Delhi has to tread warily while deploying its persuasive power with Rajapaksa to advance a political settlement of the Tamil problem. Having extended unstinted support to Colombo’s war efforts against the LTTE, Delhi ought to be in a position to harness peace dividends, but appearances sometimes can be deceptive. The plain truth is that Delhi now deals with a vastly strengthened Rajapaksa who is at the pinnacle of his political career. To put it mildly, the alchemy of the obscure interdependence between Delhi and Rajapaksa may have transformed to his advantage.

Contested commons

Meanwhile, a new template is appearing on the Sri Lankan political landscape. The United States is determined to fasten the ‘contested commons’ in the Indian Ocean (to use an idiom gaining currency with American strategic thinkers), which connect the Persian Gulf with the South China Sea. These ‘commons’ also happen to be a vital artery for China’s economy and, therefore, Sri Lanka becomes a vital chip in this developing great game.

Paradoxically, the competing rivalries enhance Colombo’s options. Rajapaksa has already been a beneficiary. All the Anglo-American pressure on Rajapaksa over his alleged war crimes came to nothing ultimately due to Moscow and Beijing’s support for him in the United Nations. The indications are that Washington is pragmatically reassessing the wisdom of driving Rajapaksa to a corner — just as it did a rethink recently on the Myanmar regime. But Rajapaksa is a tough grassroots politician. In all likelihood, he would prefer to offer a level playing field to all protagonists active in Colombo, while at the same time keeping the leash in his hands.

Much depends on the US policy. Left to himself, Rajapaksa will probably want to mend fences with Washington but there is a bottom line as there is great sensitivity about the last phase of the war against the LTTE. According to the Colombo grapevine, Rajapaksa has chosen Russia as the destination of his first visit abroad after the election. Without doubt, Sri Lanka is a key country for China and will be even more so as it develops an alternate transportation route to the Gulf region via Myanmar that reduces the dependence on Malacca Straits. All in all, China can be expected to further build on its presence in Sri Lanka. Beijing will be greatly thrilled at the prospect of Rajapaksa remaining at the helm of affairs.

Delhi did well to ignore the brouhaha raised by the West about Rajapaksa’s human rights record. But the US expects India to be its key partner in the Indian Ocean as part of its strategy to counter China. Delhi may have some hard choices to make in the period ahead, especially if Washington wades into the Tamil problem as a means to put pressure on the Rajapaksa government.

Aligning with the US policies toward Sri Lanka — or towards any of our neighbouring countries — do not serve India’s interests. Despite the vicissitudes in India-Sri Lankan ties, which are endemic to neighbouring countries of such manifest asymmetry, Delhi will always remain a privileged partner for Colombo. Our challenge is how to enrich the partnership with content.

(The writer is a former diplomat of the Government of India)