Voting for Fonseka for all the wrong reasons?

By Kalana Senaratne

(January 21, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Presidential election of 2010 has brought out some of the most glaring delusions and dilemmas which shape the political stance of the Opposition, and which confront the voter, in particular. The run up to the election of 26th January has largely shown how bankrupt the political elements opposing President Rajapaksa are, which indeed is a great political tragedy – for while President Rajapaksa’s track record concerning notions of good governance is somewhat dismal, the alternative that is offered to the voter in the form of Sarath Fonseka and his political allies, is abysmal. In supporting Fonseka, numerous problems are conveniently forgotten, and people seem to be imagining that a country under the leadership of Fonseka would be a very beautiful, splendid and different one - where corruption doesn’t exist, where ‘executives’ will not rule, and where human rights would be guaranteed to all. Fonseka promises ‘change’, but it lacks coherence, direction and is frighteningly unsustainable, in the long term.

The choice of voting in President Mahinda Rajapaksa for a second term would have been an easy one by any measure, if Ranil Wickremesinghe had been his opposing candidate. The former is popular for defeating the LTTE, the latter is not so for reasons we all know. But the entry of General Fonseka changed all that, and all of a sudden, you were (are) faced with two ‘war heroes’; one who gave the much required political leadership, the other who gave a brave military leadership.

However, at the time of Fonseka’s entry into politics, ‘good governance’ wasn’t what he really wanted to ensure. His entry was largely motivated by personal grievances, even animosity and hatred towards the Rajapaksas (especially Mahinda and Gotabaya), as his famous and (again) controversial letter of resignation of November, 2009 very clearly shows. It didn’t take long for the man to call President Rajapaksa a ‘tin-pot dictator’; a statement that placed Fonseka firmly, on par, with the rest of the politicians who are well known for their outrageous remarks and character vilification. This wasn’t the change that was required; and was disadvantageous for many who loved Fonseka, for he was a man who could have received greater admiration than that received by our run-of-the-mill politician. Furthermore, it was never explained to us, why this man who claimed to have forgiven the likes of Ranil, Mangala, Ravi and Kiriella for their past utterances was unable to forgive, with what seems to be a rather delicate, humane and forgiving heart of his, a President and a Defence Secretary who gave him all the necessary powers to fight the LTTE to the end.

The suspicion that Fonseka is in it for personal revenge, and not really to ensure democracy, was made very clear when he stated that Gotabaya Rajapaksa made ‘stupid’ orders to shoot LTTE leaders who would try to surrender with white flags; as was told by him to The Sunday Leader. Sarath Fonseka, it should be noted, did not retract what he said. He merely clarified, and thereafter reiterated his point in subsequent interviews. Frederica Jansz, to her great credit, stood by her story. This was followed by a most coruscating account of the final stages of the war, written by DBS Jeyaraj; in which he alleges that it was Fonseka’s Special Task Force personnel who shot the surrendering LTTE leaders, and not Brig. Shavendra Silva’s 58th Division, and certainly not under the orders of Gotabaya Rajapaksa. This compelling and most damaging accusation levelled by DBS Jeyaraj was never countered squarely by the Fonseka camp.

The reasons are quite obvious. While Fonseka’s sole intention has been to pin down Gotabaya, he finds himself utterly lonely within his camp when it comes to the issue of ‘war crimes’. Apart from, perhaps, MP Sajith Premadasa (and Karu Jayasuriya, who was part of the government but crossed over before May 2009), there has been no credible voice from the Opposition that has come out decisively, declaring that the Armed forces did not commit war crimes during the conflict, or that they will be defended; only a reluctant ‘thanks’ by Ranil, and that hilarious spectacle when Mangala thanked Ranil for not signing the Rome Statute. And the UNP, by and large, has taken a very calculated approach, under Ranil’s leadership, by remaining silent on the issue; knowing very well that ‘war crimes’ is the only issue on which the government could be stumped, brought down.

But the danger in being silent is this: ‘war crimes’ could also be the only weapon left for Ranil to bring down Fonseka, in case Fonseka is elected, and international pressure is brought to bear upon Fonseka. And at that moment, Ranil would have no qualms whatsoever of sending his gallant leader packing. In a sense, this could be a trap that Fonseka has fallen into, and will find difficult to get out of, unless of course he adopts a military stance; which would not be too difficult with the JVP backing him to the hilt. And an Opposition which is silent on ‘war crimes’ is today supporting the man accused of committing war crimes; which raises a lot of troubling concerns.

What is equally alarming, and this adds to the confusion inherent in the Fonseka-camp today, is the support he received from the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA was the proxy, the alter ego, of the LTTE. And its claim over the years has been that the Sri Lankan Army was a most brutal one; which raped and murdered Tamil women, girls and children, which killed innocent Tamil civilians, and which carried out a campaign of genocide against them. How then could the majority within the TNA come to believe that this man who was part of that alleged brutal outfit, who had ordered the killing of their political masters carrying white flags, was fit enough to lead the nation of which they were citizens? Is there a hidden ploy to elect Fonseka and oust him; which would greatly benefit the demands of the TNA which still come out now and then wrapped up in the old and ragged secessionist garb.

Isn’t there also a grand game of deception at play here? Fonseka remains absolutely silent on the 13th Amendment or a ‘political solution’ (silence which is quite amusing, for a man who talked about going beyond 13A during his first press conference), and TNA remains mum on what it exactly needs in terms of a political solution: the intention of both being, it seems, to get into power and ‘take it from there’. And this mutual approach is greatly disturbing, and the question posed by Prof. Sumanasiri Liyanage whether the TNA is getting ready for the second phase of its Eelam struggle is a pertinent one. On the other hand, TNA’s deception has virtually thrown it into a political dustbin. It is far removed from what I believe is the most pragmatic two-point programme it could have adopted, as pointed out by Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka – i.e. full implementation of the 13th Amendment within a specific time-frame and a move towards equal rights legislation. And while Rajapaksa offers 13A as a start, TNA chooses a man who doesn’t promise anything. This raises reasonable suspicion as to the ulterior motives of both Fonseka and the TNA; suspicion that promises nothing in terms of ethnic reconciliation and greater unity. Is this acceptable ‘change’?

And what of political stability and democracy with the JVP’s overpowering support? (did the TNA forget?). How can there be greater reconciliation with a JVP that does not even believe in 13A which plays such a prominent role within the alliance? In the face of the JVP, terms such as ‘13A’ or ‘political solution’ are redundant. And when you consider the eclectic mix of parties within the Opposition having contradictory and conflicting ideas, the most immediate problem that a Fonseka-presidency would face is not ethnic reconciliation but inter-party reconciliation. And such a situation takes us back, rather than forward, as a nation.

That Fonseka promises us nothing much in terms of getting rid of corruption which is rampant within the Rajapaksa administration is clear by the unaddressed and unmet accusations of serious corruption charges levelled against Fonseka and his relations. And more importantly, that Fonseka lacks a proper vision as regards the rule of law, human rights and the independence of the judiciary is also seen by the role that is played by former CJ Sarath N. Silva; a brilliant legal mind which gave all types of dubious, even flawed, judgments during his tenure. The Sunday Leader, which editorially supports Fonseka, calls him the ‘bully’ in its recent edition. And Silva adds greater confusion when he says what would really happen if Fonseka is elected is not the ‘abolishing’ of the Executive Presidency (because Fonseka cannot ‘abolish himself’) but rather a whittling down of the powers of the President.

And if Fonseka’s promise of the rule of law and human rights is to be realized, I do not think it can be through Silva’s magic wand: given Silva’s tragic attitude towards international human rights law in particular, as signified most pitifully in his Singarasa case judgment of 2006. Can Fonseka be considered to be really thinking of human rights protection and rule of law when he gets the assistance of a man who one fine day in 2006 thought that the ICCPR rights are not part of Sri Lankan law, and then forgot about it and thought that they are part of our law in 2008?

The current support for Fonseka, it should be noted, is driven by a lot of anti-Rajapaksa sentiment, and only that. There is no cohesion within the Opposition camp. Some support Fonseka, and only him. Others support those supporting him, and not Fonseka. And many of the parties which are rallying behind Fonseka do so, not because he is the hope for the future, but because their sole intention is to throw Rajapaksa out. Such a political alternative does not promise hope. Rather it leads to a lot of uncertainty, doubt and eventually, internal friction; and it could easily dissipate causing much chaos.

Mano Ganeshan, talking to Al Jazeera, said something that he will never be able cry out from Fonseka’s political platform; i.e. it is ‘not that we believe totally in Sarath Fonseka … we have no choice’. This is a damning indictment. Listening to Mano, a different thought struck me: is this Fonseka-campaign a move to oust Rajapaksa, or really, a move to oust Ranil Wickremesinghe? Is Rajapaksa the true ‘villain’ here, or is it an exaggerated anti-Rajapaksa cry that shows how bitter they are with Ranil? This again throws up a lot of doubt on what this Fonseka coalition is really gearing towards, in a post-election period. Ousting Rajapaksa would never address the underlying problem of a ‘leadership deficit’ within the UNP or the Opposition, which is also a national problem today; it would only exacerbate it.

Much of this would not have been the case if the UNP had been able to find for itself a credible and popular leader apart from Ranil, who could promise the kind of change that is truly needed today. This has not happened. Until that happens, until there is greater vision and clarity as to what the Opposition wants to do with this nation and her people, continuity, I am sad to say, is a safer option than change.