Mobilise now for post-election conflicts

Second preference blues for Sivaji and the Left

By Kumar David

(January 12, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) It is quite understandable that Bahu and Siritunga, who have loads of intelligence and reservoirs of experience, though they do grasp the importance of regime change, don’t want to mention second preference voting. They see the danger that if radical voters become agitated by the importance of regime change as a priority, then they will plonk directly for Fonseka, not wanting to risk second preference counting. (I think it is correct to say that voters with even the residue of a brain, leftists, and minorities, universally loath the Rajapaksas).

Bahu and Sivaji are actually shooting themselves in the foot by explaining their strategy of wanting to hold both candidates below 50% in the first count so as to push the decision to the second count. Firstly, they will panic voters, who if persuaded that the race is so close, will make the decisive choice straight away, not deferring it to the uncertainty of a recount. Secondly, they put themselves in political no man’s land; to extol the virtues of delaying the decision to second preference counting, but not announcing a second preference recommendation, lands them in limbo. Voters will see them as sleepwalkers. I empathise with the Left’s conundrum, there is no easy way out; only voters with deep political understanding will retain their nerve and vote: ‘First for the Left; second for Fonseka’.

Unlike these well grounded motives of the Left, the reason why Sivajilingam is being an obstinate mule is hard to understand. His standing for election is a justifiable indictment of the TNA for not doing so. A TNA candidacy would have helped mobilise the Tamil people, reawakened them from despondency and projected their concerns locally and internationally.

Second preference

It would have been a position of strength from which to offer a second preference to Fonseka in exchange for an acceptable package - or indeed even the first preference if the deal was particularly good. By declining this move the TNA has discouraged several hundred thousand Tamils from visiting the polling booth and has put itself out of the front line in the campaign. In this context Sivaji has presented himself as a substitute Tamil and to this extent he deserves support. But his pigheadedness in refusing to ask his voters to cast their second preference for Fonseka is either cockeyed or is troubling.

He is both tactically and strategically wrong, or the matter smacks of a deal with Rajapaksa. The tactical error is that this refusal is a roadblock to a compromise with the Sampanthan wing the TNA which may have brought him another 200,000 votes (the other, the boycott wing of the TNA, is of unsound mind). Sivaji is also strategically wrong because a Tamil candidate, while projecting the identity of his community, also needs to reach for an understanding with the majority community - unless he is making a case for secession. Hence while there are overlapping similarities between the way in which a Left and a minority candidate should project himself, there are also certain crucial differences which must be kept in the foreground. Sivaji has shown that he lacks this flexibility.

What is more troubling is that this is being portrayed by some analysts as a ploy by Sivajilingam to strengthen Rajapaksa. I am not making this charge but he has nobody but himself to blame for this talk doing the rounds. To say that Fonseka is exactly the same as Rajapaksa is an argument discouraging regime change; why bother to reject Rajapaksa if regime change will bring no benefits or democratic opportunities? Secondly, only a small minority of Tamil voters are likely to support Rajapaksa, therefore if Tamils are discouraged from going to the polling booth in large numbers, Fonseka may lose four or five times as many votes as Rajapaksa.

No way can I believe that Sivaji is not aware of these two points. Then why is he doing it? I don’t know; but when commentators accuse him and some of his close campaign backers of being in cahoots with the Rajapaksa brothers, he has nobody but himself to blame for this muck being thrown at him. He has only a few days within which to reach a mutually advantageous compromise with the TNA’s Sampanthan wing if he is indeed not working hand in glove with Rajapaksa.

Post-election mobilization

Whichever candidate wins the most important period is the post-election phase; the election phase is only a launching pad for building a strong and pluripotent movement for facing inevitable future challenges whichever candidate wins. This long term preparation is the decisive factor, more important than the electoral campaign per se.

If Rajapaksa wins it will all be revenge, vindictiveness and horrific violence on an even wider scale than the fascistic outbursts we now witness on a daily basis.

Nepotism and abuse of state power, government funds and public resources, is fast becoming an outrage of Saddamist or Mugabeist proportions. To thwart this, mobilisation and regrouping is progressing in the democratic camp thanks to the election campaign itself. I do not know if Fonseka will stay and lead the resistance if he is defeated, but a period of resistance is what a pluripotent mobilisation must steel itself for. Even if Rajapaksa wins the presidency, and subsequently a parliamentary election, his will be a bankrupt and crisis soaked regime which can’t last long. If not on 26 January, then soon, this monster will go belly up; so mobilisation for post-election struggles is the bedrock of a democratic strategy.

And if Fonseka wins the people will have to prepare themselves to deal with a different set of arduous tasks. Yes the circumstances of struggle will be more favourable for democracy but the struggle still onerous. Many who are now with us in the mobilisation will cross over into high places and air-conditioned offices; Mano, Mangala, Ranil, Hakeem, one or more JVPer and perhaps Sampanthan, may be stalwarts of a putative Fonseka cabinet. A new leadership of the people will have to be crystallised to tackle this administration of erstwhile allies. Democracy, press freedom, a fair deal for the minorities, economic development for the people, no, none of this will gush out like superfluous gifts. The mass movement will have to stand up strong and grab its prizes.

The greatest lesson that the Rajapaksas have taught Sri Lanka is how incredibly corrupt, repressive and abusive the leaders of the state can become. Let us learn this lesson well, let us trust no government, let the people trust only their own strength and preparations. Herein honest citizens who are prepared to take a stand, political radicals, the Left and the oppressed minorities are kings and kingmakers because the trumps are in their hands.