By Maya Ranganathan
Abstract
(January 17, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) In the context of the systematic and ingenious use of Internet in the just-concluded civil war for a separate Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka, the article argues that, despite the potential of the virtual space to be free and fair, the articulation of Eelam online mirrored the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka. Much like in the 'real' world, a sense of fear and censorship prevailed in the virtual world with computer-mediated communication becoming a dark and dangerous alley that one must fear to tread. Although all parties involved in the ethnic conflict were responsible for the silencing of critics through coercion, this article, through an exploration of selective online engagements, highlights the efforts at silencing dissent by players professing pro-Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) views. The pro-LTTE players have been chosen for the study in view of the extensive ways in which the Internet has been employed in the construction and sustenance of an Eelam national identity among Sri Lankan Tamils worldwide.
Introduction
The three-decade civil war for the separate Tamil homeland of Eelam in the North and East of Sri Lanka, which was brought to an end with the announcement of extermination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) by the Sri Lankan Government in May 2009, has been accompanied by systematic and ingenious use of the Internet, so much so that the Internet has been a weapon in the armoury of both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government. Studies have established the way in which the Internet has been employed by the LTTE in the construction and sustenance of an Eelam national identity among the Sri Lankan Tamils spread worldwide.1 Even as the methods employed by the LTTE on the ground and in virtual space are coming to light in the aftermath of the end to the military conflict, this article argues that the articulation of Eelam online mirrored the situation on the ground in Sri Lanka. This is of significance in the context of the assumed potential of the Internet to facilitate a free and unhindered public sphere. The article argues that, although the Internet is difficult to rein in, the LTTE had managed to simulate a sense of fear and censorship in virtual space, thus subverting the democratic potential of the medium. Although both the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE have been responsible for silencing critics through coercion, this article highlights the efforts at silencing dissent by players professing pro-LTTE views, mainly for methodological reasons and owing to the fact that the LTTE has used Internet in its struggle longer and far more consistently than the Sri Lankan Government.2 The article focuses on the ways in which online criticism was countered by pro-LTTE members, but it in no way argues that such methods were used solely by the LTTE or that it was organized by its leadership.
Democratic potential of the Internet
Although authors like Bowers, Burnham, Cronkite and Zuboff looked at the Internet as a tool to realize the Orwellian society, later works perceived the Net-based technologies as an answer to many of the social, the cultural and the political problems that plagued society. The Net, when considered in isolation, seems indeed to have the potential to liberate and free the world.3 Writers like Howard Rheingold have looked at the Internet as a technological wonder that will eventually create new worlds that rival the 'real' (as opposed to the virtual) world by incorporating even the sensations of touch and sound. In Virtual Reality, where he lists the way in which technology is poised to change reality, Rheingold indicates that the technology may, however, result in 'dystopia or empowerment' depending 'in part upon how people react in different ways to the news that reality might be an illusion, depending on their personal emotional attachment to their brand of reality'.4 Rheingold's overriding positive projections are based purely on the attributes of the technology of the Internet. In the political arena, the Web is regarded as a tool that can bring people together on common grounds, creating new politics and social relations by its ability to incorporate a whole range of texts, its ability to transgress physical distances efficiently, the facility it extends to the user to assume anonymity and indulge in identity play and the creation of a virtual public sphere.
The geographical border-transgressing nature of the Net that enables the bridging of 'temporal and spatial “gaps”' and the facility to mask identities have sparked utopian projections of a 'public sphere', the absence of which Juumlrgen Habermas discussed in The structural transformation of the public sphere.5 Net-based technologies have the potential to create a sophisticated version of the Greek agora, where citizens interact with one another and enable the state to arrive at a political consensus on the issues affecting the nation. This is best elaborated by Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan whose work looks at Internet-based technologies as an answer to voter apathy and lack of grass roots or local, regional involvement in politics. Talking about 'media and the crisis of political participation', the authors point to the lack of 'proper public spaces', 'of a public sphere not colonized by state and political parties and not subjected to the logics of commercialization and commodification prevalent in contemporary Western societies - a public sphere in which citizens could freely engage in deliberation and public debate'. They prophesy that new media technologies will provide this public space that will consequently herald the resurgence of democracy. Their projections are based solely on the attribute of the medium to permit relatively free access to information and the interactivity of the medium that facilitates easy reply. However, as Tsagarousianou argues, the effectiveness of the medium would depend on the way in which it is employed by the people.6 Social, political and economic factors decide the question of access to the medium and the extent of interactivity that is permitted by the medium, and it is in this context that the evolution of the nationhood of Eelam online must be evaluated.7
The situation in Sri Lanka and its extension online
A study of the media's intimidation in Sri Lanka has shown a steady increase in the past couple of years. In 2005, the number of killings, threats or assaults on journalists was 24; it increased to 34 in 2006 and to 64 in 2007 and touched 52 in June 2008.8 In fact, on the eve of victory celebrations on 3 June 2009, senior journalist Poddala Jayantha was attacked and injured.9 It is difficult, if not impossible, to list out the cases that the LTTE and other groups were responsible for and those that the Sri Lankan Government was responsible for. In a war where the maxim 'if you are not with us, you are against us' holds, both the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE have been intolerant of criticism and have perceived all those who questioned their stand or methods as 'traitors' to be silenced. 'Reporters without borders for press freedom' in its annual report 2007 listed a series of cases of abductions and killings of journalists who were critical of either the Tigers or the Sri Lankan Government and army.10 It spoke of the Draconian control the Sri Lankan Government exerted over the media and intolerance of the LTTE to any questioning of their methods. It pointed out that many journalists had fled the country for fear of being 'next on the list of journalists killed'.11 Indeed, in post-LTTE Sri Lanka, President Rajapakse's declaration that the only distinction was between 'those who love their motherland and those who don't' has been seen as a threat to Sinhalese critics of the government, including journalists, media agencies and human rights NGOs.12
In situations when the media and the civil society have been intimidated into 'near silence', the Internet has emerged as the alternative media and so it has been the case in Sri Lanka.13 Battling proscription in many countries of the West that led to denial of voice in the media, the Sri Lankan Tamils, led by the LTTE, found in the Internet an effective means to get their message across to the world. In fact, the Sri Lankan Tamils' use of information and communication technologies, particularly the Internet, to create and nurture Tamil nationalism, especially in the technologically developed West, is interesting. The advantages that the medium offers to the Sri Lankan Tamils who are widely dispersed is primarily that it crosses man-made and geographical borders with impunity and that it defies control, giving the Tamils and their organizations a strong voice to counter the dominant media that is critical of them or indifferent to them. With the migrants to the West possessing at least rudimentary computing skills,14 the Internet has emerged a potent tool to reach them as after all the struggle has to be sustained financially and emotionally by the expatriates.15 This is especially significant in the light of the argument that the diaspora influences the trajectory of the conflict and may play a decisive role in its resolution.16
According to Dr Peter Chalk, an analyst with the National Security Division of the US-based think tank, the Rand Corporation, at least 95% of the LTTE funding comes from overseas.17 The free Tamil weeklies through negative propaganda against the Sri Lankan Government manipulate the diaspora to 'fund the war machine, which in turn supports Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran's empire'.18 As Chalk details in another work, the Internet forms an essential part of the publicity and propaganda activity of the LTTE, the aim of which is to increase international political pressure for the Tamil cause.19 With the Internet emerging as an important means to articulate the 'imagi-nation' of Eelam,20 it has become imperative to chart the negotiation of websites to understand the 'reconfiguration and remaking' of Tamil Eelam online.21 Having realized early the potential of the Internet to carry their voice across man-made and natural boundaries, the LTTE, and in effect the people who are supportive of the organization, have stolen a march over others in the use of Internet to spread their message.22
The Tamil diaspora and cyberspace
An analysis of the contents of some of the Sri Lankan Tamil websites operated by both the LTTE and those supporting the Sri Lankan Tamil cause in 2003-2004 established that the Internet was used by the Sri Lankan Tamils to create, nurture and crystallize a distinct Eelam identity so much so that although Eelam was yet to be realized on the ground it had already taken root in the minds of the people.23 It was found that through consistent portrayal of a distinct culture and glorification of the land and people, a clear identity was sought to be created and nurtured. This was not confined to political websites that overtly declared their agenda but also by news websites with the purported aim of reporting on news relating to the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Mark Whitaker, in an 'autoethnographic' study, details how Tamilnet.com, an Internet news agency, 'has allowed Sri Lankan Tamil nationalists to speak effectively and subversively to the globalised world'.24
For the members of the diaspora who have fled the conflict in the home country, the communication technologies, including the Internet, help alleviate the anguish of being 'excluded from one's native land … which 'is as cruel as to be rejected by the loved one'.25 At a more fundamental level, these technologies provide knowledge about the homeland and at a more sophisticated level enable emotional investment in it, providing for the LTTE and those who believe in its mission 'the form of nation-as-territory'.26 To draw from Anderson's seminal work, communication technologies facilitate the imagination of the nation (1991). This imagination is, however, not a static composite whole, for the very nature of the technologies allows for multiple perspectives on the homeland.27 Indeed, research has now established that there has been a shift in the reasons for the Sri Lankan Tamils' use of the Internet - from linking the members of Eelam to 'interaction' with a view towards 'community-building'.28
It is in the above context that dissenting voices in cyberspace need to be evaluated. With any search on the Eelam Tamil issue online yielding an overwhelming number of returns that were pro-LTTE, especially in the years that the organization was engaged in a military conflict with the Sri Lankan Government, those holding moderate views or espousing views opposed to the LTTE seemed negligible. A parallel could be drawn to the situation that prevailed on the ground as the LTTE is known for annihilation of groups and individuals opposed to their methods leading to dissent remaining non-articulated. The University Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR (J)), an independent group that chronicles human rights abuses by all parties in Sri Lanka, operates from outside Sri Lanka and has had a presence online, but does not turn up in any of the initial searches on 'Sri Lanka', 'Sri Lankan Tamils' or even 'Jaffna'. Recounting the odds under which they operate, founder members M.R.R. Hoole and K. Sritharan state in the website, 'By combination of internal terror and narrow nationalist ideology the LTTE succeeded in atomising the community. It took away not only the right to oppose but even the right to evaluate, as a community, the course they were taking. This gives a semblance of illusion that the whole society is behind the LTTE.'29 Although LTTE functionaries and its supporters claimed that they were true representatives of the Tamils and that all Tamils backed the LTTE, it was not uncommon to encounter Tamils who supported the cause but not the means adopted by the LTTE. For various reasons their voices were often feeble online. To quote from the UTHR's Special Report 31, released when the civil war raged in mid-2008:
The people's relationship with the LTTE is complex. The general mood among the people of the Vanni was strongly anti-LTTE four months ago, and resistance continues. Resistance however to the LTTE is either passive or tragically fatalistic. With increased aerial bombing and shelling and stories of increasingly repressive treatment of minorities coming from other parts of the country, the mood is changing. Despite this the LTTE, by October 2008, had once again become very aggressive in conscription.30
The media had been forced to or opted to suppress or distort inconvenient truths. It has been pointed out that in many cases the Tamils did not need threats from the LTTE and that well-known killings, assaults and threats have led members of the Tamil diaspora to police themselves.31 In its mission statement, the UTHR states:
Since the UTHR (J) was part of the initiative in trying to open up space in the University, many sharing its aims associated with it openly in the early days. This was until Rajani Thiranagama was killed. Abandoning and winding up the UTHR (J) now would mean capitulating to the oppressor. We therefore felt that it is essential to continue with the reports under the same name, although we had been forced to leave the University of Jaffna.32
It is perhaps for the same reason - the inability to counter the tactics of terror on the ground - that dissenters had to move to cyberspace and take advantage of the anonymity it provided to facilitate 'debate and engagement in the public sphere'.33
The focus in this article is on diasporic online engagement, including access of political websites and contributions to online publications on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue, for various reasons. First, refugees/migrants to the West most often have the requisite technological skills to engage in discussions online; secondly, where internet use is more ubiquitous, connectivity and technical infrastructure can be taken for granted making the process of communicating more simpler, cheaper and efficient; thirdly, with the community newspapers clearly divided into pro-LTTE and the anti-LTTE lobbies and facing threats of closure and intimidation, online engagement, which offers a cloak of anonymity, seems infinitely safer; and fourthly, given that the Internet transgresses geographical and man-made boundaries, the medium offers the most effective way of reaching the widest audience possible without fearing legal reprisal.
It becomes imperative to briefly dwell on the relationship between the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and the LTTE, particularly, when it was spearheading the military struggle for Eelam. The complexity of the relationship between the Tamils and the Tigers in the years of civil war was brought out in an article by Meena Nallainathan in Ryerson Review of Journalism in 2007, where she cited the case of journalist D.B.S. Jeyaraj living in Toronto, Canada.34 The article elaborated how Jeyaraj seemingly vacillated in his stand as an LTTE supporter critical of the local Tiger leadership to a critique of the Tigers' expulsion of Muslims from the North, child recruitment and suicide bombers; from having agreed to help the late political ideologue of the LTTE Anton Balasingham in steering the Tiger organization away from hardliners, he fell out with Balasingham and later sung paeans on his death. It must be noted here that Jeyaraj had borne the brunt of the intolerance of the LTTE. In the mid-1990s he published a Tamil weekly 'Muncharie'. The paper reported LTTE's defeats then and Jeyaraj 'began to receive systematic, threatening phone calls on a daily basis. In November 1995 he received 37 abusive calls in a single day'.35 Jeyaraj seems to typify the plight of the more discerning Tamil nationalist. One activist in Melbourne requesting anonymity said that Jeyaraj represented the breed of Tamil nationalists who supported the cause espoused by the Tigers but were critical of some or all of its methods. After shutting down his newspaper, Jeyaraj moved to online media.
Nallainathan also recounted the case of 'Ckrhushchev', who after being repeatedly harassed by Tiger supporters in Canada for being critical of the organization started an online edition of his newspaper 'Thayagam' to unveil the presentation of the Tamils as victims by bringing to light instances where the Tamils and Sinhalese had worked and were working together.36 The online media requiring little as it does by way of infrastructure, investment and skill could function without huge advertising support. For instance, the London-based Tamil Broadcasting Corporation, which was critical of LTTE abuses, had found to its dismay that advertisers were intimidated, creating insurmountable hurdles for it to operate commercially.37 It thus followed that online engagement could not only expand the democratic space but could also contribute to the much needed change in the culture of the 'Tamil polity (that) has been decimated, mainly thanks to the LTTE and its systematic elimination of dissent and those politically opposed to its totalitarian claims'.38
However, the issue that needs to be addressed is how safe is cyberspace. It has been pointed out in the aftermath of the decimation of the LTTE that 'the political and economic base for the LTTE's separatist project was not the Tamil people of North and East, whom it cynically used as cannon fodder and as a population to prop up the LTTE's interests, but rather, the mobilised section of the Tamil diaspora in the West which extended the LTTE unconditional support'. In the final stages of the war, the role of the diaspora became clear when they organized protests in many of the Western nations. The LTTE exerted a stranglehold on the social and economic institutions in the Tamil diaspora,39 making dissent almost impossible. Although extermination is impossible in virtual space, and despite the perception of the virtual space as being free, all the methods of terror adopted on ground were easily replicated online, making cyberspace figuratively a dark, dangerous alley that one must fear to tread. If 'Tamil activists in the UK and Canada have been subjected to smear campaigns for speaking out against LTTE abuses or organising events independent of the LTTE', it was not hard for an online journalist to be defamed online.40 Cyberspace, while providing an opportunity for the members of the diaspora to play the 'combatant', could also make them targets of terror. Even when members of the diaspora wrote under the cloak of anonymity, often assuming pseudonyms, it was not difficult for them to be identified and there were many instances where anonymous writers were targeted for abuse and slander online. What set such criticism apart from those faced by journalists elsewhere was that the vilification was often of extremely personal nature, which led to ostracizing by the Tamil societies abroad and subsequent isolation. Considering the dynamics of the diasporic society, this was indeed a cruel punishment and often led to silencing the 'dissenters', at the same time deterring others from voicing opinions that may not resonate with that of the LTTE's. There are also reports that such critics were threatened that they would be killed when they set foot in Sri Lanka's north and east and that some expatriates who returned home mysteriously vanished.41
Terror online
Anoma Pieris has detailed the dynamics of the Sri Lankan diaspora, both Tamil and Sinhalese in Australia which is 'intensely radicalised around political issues'.42 She has asserted that intimidation 'is a common tool used by both and to various degrees and there is plenty of insecurity to work on'. On Tamil nationalism, Pieris has pointed out that although the diasporic community was setting up more and more websites, radio stations and propaganda organizations few had dared voice dissent as some had even been 'culled' for doing so. Indeed any efforts to raise the debate above blind chauvinism to intellectual levels met with virulent resistance. This perhaps also sums up the experience with the LTTE online. The few who have consciously or unconsciously dared to raise their voice against the LTTE's policies were vilified and condemned so that most fell by the way side and only a few carried on stoically. Terror online took several forms.
Slander and vilification
In the following sections are detailed the online experiences of four persons who had articulated views that were not in consonance with the LTTE's stand on issues and/or had striven to highlight alternative points of view. They are drawn from a cross-section of people with similar experience, and who are all Tamils, though not essentially Sri Lankan Tamils. Although they were from different walks of life, what they had in common was that they consistently questioned and critiqued the LTTE's methods or ideologies. The cases in point have been chosen to indicate the pattern of handling dissent online on the part of those supporting the LTTE. However, while attempting to delineate this process of countering criticism online, I would like to assert that I am in no way commenting more broadly on the integrity, credibility or objectivity of the individuals involved. Rather, I seek to draw attention to a particular series of events that sought to effectively silence online participation. It also needs to be stressed here that this article does not deal with what can strictly be called 'journalistic sources'. The online publications that I have used are not always dealing with 'facts', are often vague and lack details, are at best ideological and are read here to understand how they handled views that did not resonate their own. The focus here is on how dissenters are critiqued, criticized, vilified and eventually silenced, often not necessarily by making a logical argument.
Nagaraja was a journalist working for the diasporic radio station 'Inbathamil oli' in 1999 when the LTTE overran the Elephant Pass. While reporting the news of the LTTE victory, he highlighted the strategies of the organization, which had swayed the operation's outcome in its favour. In his analysis of the operation, he said that the LTTE managed to cut water supply to the Sri Lankan army and used its artillery effectively - a comment that was looked upon as belittling the organization by the pro-Tiger groups in Australia. He was coerced to quit the job with the radio station, after which he became a casual producer with the Australian public service broadcaster, the then Special Broadcasting Services (SBS)43, which also he had to quit for drawing a comparison to the situation in Sri Lanka while commenting on a news item over the Bali bombing in 2002.44 This set off a vilification campaign against him by the Tamil Co-ordination Committee and the New South Consortium of Tamil Associations that asked Tamils to send protest letters to the SBS management.45 'Inbathamil oli' reportedly broadcast four programmes within a week, mounting personal attacks against the journalist. It is learnt that the journalist lost a job opportunity with the British Broadcasting Corporation later thanks to the lobbying by pro-LTTE Tamils. Nagaraja was forced to join the anti-LTTE camp and wrote in local newspapers that clearly professed an anti-LTTE stand. For his pieces in support of the breakaway faction leader Karuna he was charged in Nitharsanam, a pro-LTTE paper available online, as being a lackey of the leader.46 While drawing attention to the experiences of Nagaraja with the pro-LTTE Tamils, it must also be mentioned that his experience with the anti-LTTE lobby was not very different. A source stated, on condition of anonymity, that Nagaraja's contributions to a local newspaper, Uthayam, available online, and having a pronounced anti-LTTE stand, continued as long as he was highly critical of the LTTE and stopped when a piece he wrote was rejected on grounds that it could be perceived as supportive of the Tigers.47 And Nagaraja wrote no more, neither critical of the LTTE, nor in support of them. Nagaraja's experiences indicate how the diaspora is systematically denied a choice of what Georgiou and Silverstone refer to as 'representational spaces'.48
Of a more personal nature was the charge laid against poet and writer 'Natchathiran Sevvindian' (Star Red Indian), a regular contributor to publications critical of the LTTE. In Issue 25 of the London-based Tamil magazine Thesam, he strongly criticized the bestowing of the Maamanithar title on the slain Sri Lankan journalist 'Taraki' Sivaram and the encomiums heaped on him by the members of the diaspora. Detailing Sivaram's past as a member of the PLOTE, and citing other sources, the writer charged that the journalist was involved in intra-party murders and questioned his journalistic integrity by arguing that the slain journalist had been clearly biased towards the LTTE. In the next issue, Issue 26 of Thesam, he wrote that Rajan Hoole of UTHR (J) was deserving of the Nobel Prize for peace and also the 'The Right to Livelihood Award'. The article passionately defended the UTHR against the oft-made criticism by the pro-LTTE press that the organization was supportive of the Sri Lankan Government. It pointed out that the UTHR documented human rights violations by all parties concerned, including the Sri Lankan Government and other groups such as the Eelam People's Democratic Party, and that even pro-LTTE Sri Lankan Tamils cited its reports to support their applications for asylum in countries of the West. 49
As a response to his criticism of a pro-LTTE journalist and praise of an anti-LTTE academic, Natchathiran Sevvindian was dubbed a gay person who worked in close association with 'the traitor to the Tamil cause', Douglas Devananda, from whom he had accepted a 'best writer' award. The article that appeared in Nitharsanam in June 2006 carried a picture of Sevvindian which was taken at a wedding reception he attended in Australia and alleged that he was in the payrolls of India and of Jayapalan, a pro-Indian Sri Lankan Tamil poet in exile, who had supposedly helped the Norwegian peace mission, though it was never clear what was the 'help' rendered or if there was any 'help' at all. No rebuttal or a counter to the charges made by Natchathiran Sevvindian was published.50 In an interview granted to this researcher in another context, however, Natchathiran Sevvindian observed that perhaps the charge on his sexuality was made not only because he had penned an article on homosexuality among Tamil youths in the anti-LTTE local newspaper Uthayam (available online) in 1999-2000, but also because he had no close family members who could be threatened and was of marriageable age; and such allegations would affect his chances of finding a partner.51
As a rule, receiving an award from any organization or individuals other than those connected with the LTTE was denounced in no uncertain terms and used as a handle to question the credibility of the persons concerned. Editor of Melbourne-based Uthayam Dr Noel Nadesan has been castigated as an opponent of Tamil nationalism and a Buddhist chauvinist by Nitharsanam, mainly for receiving an award in October 2004 from the former Sri Lankan Army chief of North East, Janaka Perara, although it was made to be an issue of a freelance journalist - whose primary vocation is not journalism - being considered for the best journalist award.52 The article also refers to a statement of an 'official' from the World Journalists Association condemning the bestowing of the award on a person who is not a full-time journalist. Thus, even while the Internet was used to facilitate the imagination of the homeland, its potential to serve as a site to contest 'national and transnational political ideologies and cultural expressions', or even permit 'counter-expressions of identity' was curbed.53
Non-Sri Lankan Tamil critics of the LTTE were not spared either. When one popular Indian Tamil actress visited Melbourne in 2004 to release an international calling card, negative references were made to her uncle - who edited a political weekly in Tamil Nadu and had been consistently critical of the LTTE - and who was called 'a traitor to Tamil nationalism'54. Such efforts indicate an attempt to obfuscate the problems in defining 'Tamilness', which is fraught with differences arising out of territory, occupation and even religion.55
Intellectual malaise
The modus operandi of dealing with intellectual arguments was different. Academic pieces or newspaper columns written for a specific audience were countered by writers of equal academic standing, who disclaimed any affiliation to the LTTE, even as they claimed to be votaries of Tamil nationalism. Such pieces were first reproduced in online sites devoted to the Sri Lankan issue and then dealt with for their views not in consonance with that of the LTTE. N. Ram, editor of The Hindu, one of the largest circulated English newspapers in India with multi-editions, comes in for special mention and criticism in many Sri Lankan Tamil websites. Ram presides over a powerful media publishing house in Chennai in Tamil Nadu, India, the state that shares physical and a perceived emotional proximity to the Sri Lankan Tamil ethnic issue. Secondly, 'the Hindu' is known for its virulently anti-LTTE stand that perhaps has its origins in Ram's involvement in the Indo-Sri Lankan accord that was disagreeable to the LTTE. On 8 October 2008 an editorial penned by Malini Parthasarathy in The Hindu warning Tamil Nadu politicians against whipping up emotions on the Sri Lankan issue thus received inordinate amounts of criticism from pro-Tamil quarters, although other newspapers, including the Chennai edition of the Times of India, expressed much the same view.56 Sachi Sri Kantha, holding two PhDs and a self-professed Tamil nationalist 'but not essentially supportive of the LTTE'57, writing in Tamilnation.org in an article titled 'Malini Parthasarathy's Malodorous Malady' called the writer's assertions regarding the reluctance of successive Indian governments to interfere in Sri Lankan affairs a 'bold-faced lie'.58 But his most acerbic comments were reserved for the editor of the newspaper.
Ram's editorial on 25 October 2008 titled 'Curbing dangerous tendencies' was critiqued in an article titled 'Naivete and Rascality of Narasimhan Ram'.59 This is not to say that Sachi Sri Kantha's outpourings were no more than heaps of abuse. He did indeed counter Ram's assertions with well-researched facts, but they were punctuated with ill-concealed hatred that took the form of personal attacks. The piece started with a reproduction of the unsavoury remarks of Sivanayagam, a journalist who had worked in Sri Lanka, and who had punned on the word 'Ram', referring to an 'uncastrated male sheep' in an article published in Tamilnation.org in 2005. Interestingly, while Ram and Malini Parthasarathy's pictures were prominently featured alongside the links to their columns, neither that of Sachi Sri Kantha nor of Nadesan Satyendra, the editor of the website, featured anywhere. There was only an onsite link to a feature on Sivanayagam, where he was nominated as one of the 100 prominent Tamils in the century, and which contained his photograph. The critics exploited the cloak of anonymity that the medium offers, on which projections of the Internet as an ideal public sphere typically rest.
In yet another instance, a media analysis piece contributed by this researcher to an Indian online Web journal was similarly pulled out by a pro-Tamil website, Sydney Tamils, and reproduced with an introduction denouncing the writer's credibility and attributing aspersions.60 Thus, the situation online reflected the situation on ground - an intolerance of opinions different from that professed by the LTTE. In some cases, a logical argument was made but even that was punctuated with invectives. In most other cases, however, such views sparked vituperative outpourings, offering at best uncompromising perspectives on how the conflicting ideas must be understood and contested.61
Conclusion
A survey of more instances accompanied by an analysis of the content will no doubt delineate the use of terror to silence heterodoxy in virtual space, replicating such attempts in real life. But the above cases are indicative of the way in which dissent online was handled by the LTTE. Although the aim and purpose in the virtual world was much the same as that of intimidation in the real world - to stifle dissent - the modus operandi was more clearly defined online. When 'unacceptable' views were aired and they could not be countered logically, the strategy was to defame the person, to launch a smear campaign and perhaps supplement it with a whisper campaign in the real world. Given the border transgressing nature of the Internet recourse to legal action is fraught with problems and there are few rules that govern this relatively new space. This works towards making the individual alienated in the diaspora that often can be traumatic. The trauma could be equated to threatening ones' family members of disastrous consequences in the real world, thus instilling fears in the minds of loved ones. The consequences of being slandered online are indeed more terrorizing than being threatened in the real world as the Internet's 'replicator technology' breeds infamy very easily and at great speed. More and more similar-thinking websites chose to reproduce the charges; online slander and vilification can have a debilitating effect on the writer thus 'exterminating' the writer from cyberspace.62 This effectively forecloses different perspectives of either the homeland or the conflict, thus curbing the potential of communication technologies, particularly the Internet, to function as a public sphere.
A common refrain was to brand all those who thought differently as 'traitors to Tamil nationalism' and/or lackeys of the Sri Lankan Government. Lesser-known bloggers and occasional contributors to regular journalists and well-known media men have been branded thus. Describing the situation of the expatriates, UTHR (J) points out that since 1988 when the LTTE began its monopoly of Tamil organizations 'with either the innocent or not so innocent complicity of some leading Tamil names', expatriates were divided by fear for their lives.63 The dissenters were reviled for being disloyal to their ethnic group and as having sold their souls to the oppressor for material gains, power or prestige. Thus, a question mark was placed on the credibility of the writer and his locus standi to speak about the issue at all. With the modus operandi being adopted by all parties involved in the conflict, the members of the diaspora remained polarized, contributing perhaps unconsciously to the 'protractedness of the conflict'.64
In the case of erudite comments, an effort was indeed made to counter them by an equally erudite person. But first a face was put to the name of the writer who dared to write against the views of the LTTE or the Tamil nationalists. This was almost always possible owing to the spectacular advancements in technology. Crawlers helped retrieve pictures and information stored in the archives of the World Wide Web. For instance, every time tamilnation.org reproduced an article by this writer (and without her permission) it included alongside a hazy picture that was featured in a University newsletter when she was a post-graduate student.65 Similarly all details found on the Web were collected, collated and twisted out of context to malign writers. Although this was perhaps to be expected, what is significant is that the authors who chose to counter the arguments themselves remained faceless if not nameless. The lack of definitive regulations divested the space of the Web of safeguards that govern the more traditional media, which are bound by physical boundaries, and consequently the laws of the land and codes of practice. Significantly, the very features of the medium that had raised hopes of it emerging as a free and unhindered vehicle for expression were exploited to stifle expression. With the democratic potential of the medium subverted, the Internet has progressed into becoming a dangerous weapon in cyber warfare.
Post script
A month since the 'exit' of the LTTE in Sri Lanka the media is preoccupied with ascertaining the uncertainty of the future of Tamil nationalism. The focus of the media, both traditional and new, seems to be on addressing the political problems of the Tamil community. Tamilnation.org that closed on 17 May 2009 following the announcement of death of Prabhakaran 'reopened' on 18 June 2009 with an explanation that the month's closure was to mourn the death of a national hero and to allow time for 'reflection'.66 But changes, if any, are hardly discernible. Although disagreeing with journalist Anita Pratap's column in The Week on the lessons to be learnt from the military rout of the LTTE, tamilnation.org wrote: 'But they (Tamils) do not need lectures on that score from the Anita Prataps of the world.'67 The denunciation of the journalist's views was peppered with insinuations, although when compared to some of the comments made on earlier pieces, the language was tempered. Pratap's pictures were featured while the commentator from the website remained faceless and nameless. Tamilnet.com now focuses on the 'increased importance' of the diaspora in the struggle for Eelam. On 7 June 2009 Tamilnet.com's editorial board wrote68:
While not denying the fact that the nature of politics is going to be determined by the ground realities of oppression in the homeland, a parallel political stream in the diaspora is not a liability but contributory to the Tamil nationalist cause. The diaspora on one hand cannot be idling at a historic responsibility in meeting the demands of the homeland and on the other hand has to look after its own needs of identity, self-respect and emotional integrity as well.
It has also called for the creation of a transnational government of Eelam Tamils.69
The decimation of the LTTE in the North-East has thrown the spotlight on the diaspora. The LTTE's only surviving leader S. Pathmanathan had reportedly said in an email audio file, which circulated in the Tamil diaspora, that the goal of a separate Tamil state would be pursued from abroad.70 The call for 'different kinds of Tamil voices', from a 'range of actors' including clergy, academics, professionals and community activists involved in humanitarian work, has been made in the post-LTTE era.71 It is too early to analyse the impact on the 'virtual' world of the consequences of the extermination of the LTTE in the 'real' world and if indeed the cyberspace reflects the situation on the ground or is moving towards a situation that is far removed from it. As Kadirgamar argues:
Over the next year, two scenarios are possible; either there will be a greater opening including the space for dissent and democratization, or there will be greater repression particularly in the South.72
It also remains to be seen whether the developments on the ground can lead to heterodoxy in the virtual space, a heterodoxy that may perhaps have no space in the real world.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks University of Adelaide Adjunct Associate Professor Michael Roberts for his comments on an earlier version of the paper presented at the Globalising Religions and Cultures in the Asia Pacific conference, organized by the Australian Research Council (ARC), Asia-Pacific Futures Research Network and the Adelaide Asian Studies Group, University of Adelaide, Australia, 1-5 December 2008. She also thanks the anonymous referees of the article for their comments and suggestions. The article is a part of the results of a study on how the members of the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora in Australia negotiate information on political websites and with what consequences to their national identity.
Appendix 1. Sydney, 28 October 2002 LTTE support groups declare war on an Australian
Tamil journalist
LTTE support groups in Australia have declared war against a Tamil journalist of the Australian state SBS radio for comments he made over the recent Bali terrorist bombing.
The Tamil Coordination Committee and the New South Consortium of Tamil Associations are carrying on a vilification campaign against this journalist. An email campaign organised by the Consortium of Tamil Associations had exhorted Tamils to send protest letters to the SBS Management calling for the expulsion of this journalist. Hand bills have been widely distributed in Sydney and Melbourne criticising this journalist.
'Inbathamil Oli', a 24-hour Tamil radio station, is conducting a concerted vilification campaign against this SBS Tamil journalist. Throwing to winds all media and journalistic ethics, this LTTE support radio station has broadcast four programs within a week full of attacks of personal nature. Anonymous callers came over the airwaves of this Tamil radio exhorting and threatening violence against this journalist. The journalist has now sought the protection of Australian police. It may be recalled that 'Imbathamil Oli' radio station collected $270,000 for LTTE funds from listeners immediately after LTTE victory at Elephant Pass in 1999.- Sydney Reporter
Notes
1. Ranganathan, 'Nurturing Eelam on the Net'.
2. Chalk, 'LTTE's International Organisation and Operations'.
3. Bowers, The Cultural Dimensions of Educational Computing; Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State; Cronkite, 'Foreword'; and Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart Machine.
4. Rheingold, Virtual Reality, 388.
5. Baker and Ward, 'Bridging Temporal and Spatial “Gaps”'; Kling, Hopes and Horrors; Negroponte, 'Beyond Digital'; Rheingold, The Virtual Community.
6. Tsagarousianou et al., Cyberdemocracy.
7. Ranganathan, 'Nurturing Eelam on the Net'.
8. Shanie, 'The Culture of Impunity Rides On'.
9. UTHR, 'A Marred Victory and a Defeat Pregnant with Foreboding', at http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport32.htm/ (accessed June 11, 2009).
10. Reporters Without Borders issues its 2007 Annual Press Freedom Survey, http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20843/ (accessed June 18, 2009).
11. Freedom of the press worldwide in 2007, http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/rapport_en_bd-4.pdf/ (accessed March 26, 2008). Instances of threats to and the intimidation of dissenting journalists are too many to list here. See also 'Funding the “Final War”: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora', http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/3.html/ (accessed September 15, 2008) and 'Press Freedom and Freedom of Expression in Sri Lanka: Struggle for Survival' based on joint mission to Sri Lanka in October 2006 by the International Federation of Journalists, International Media Support, International Press Institute, International News Safety Institute and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
12. Philips, 'The Aftermaths of the War'.
13. Mitra, 'Marginal Voices in Cyberspace'.
14. Life in the West makes acquiring computer skills and a knowledge of English absolutely essential. For instance, in an interview, Shobasakthi, author of 'Gorilla' describes how he learnt to use the email and learnt English and French after migrating to France. See http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/04inter.htm/ (accessed October 13, 2008).
15. Ranganathan, 'Nurturing a Nation on the Net.
16. Lyons, 'Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution' and Wayland, 'Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities'.
17. Chalk, interview with ABC.
18. Nallainathan, 'Staring Down the Tigers'.
19. Chalk, 'LTTE's International Organisation and Operations'.
20. See Jeganathan, 'Eelam.com'.
21. Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age.
22. I am aware that not all Sri Lankan Tamils are supportive of the LTTE. This is a distinction being made time and again by the Sri Lankan Government. See http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Rajapaksa+set+to+send+strong+message&artid=tGw1Jos│pIk=&SectionID=oHSKVfNWYm0=&MainSectionID=oHSKVfNWYm0=&SectionName=VfE7I/Vl8os=&SEO=/ (accessed December 23, 2008). However, Tamil national websites that argue that the armed struggle of the LTTE is justifiable far outnumber those opposed to the LTTE in cyberspace. See, for instance, http://www.tamilnation.org/tamileelam.htm#tamilnation/ (accessed December 23, 2008). It is in this context that the terms LTTE and Sri Lankan Tamils are used interchangeably in this article.
23. Ranganathan, 'Nurturing Eelam on the Net'. This is not to say that the identity has been created solely through the Internet. Although a distinct identity was propagated through traditional media and did exist before the era of the Internet, the Internet enabled it to be propagated among those who were outside the reach of the nation. Some of the characteristics of the technology of the Internet help crystallize the identity among migrants as detailed in the above work.
24. Whitaker, 'Tamilnet.com'.
25. F. Pellizzi, 'To Seek Refuge'.
26. Jeganathan, 'Eelam.com'.
27. Radhakrishnan, 'Ethnicity in Age of Diaspora'.
28. Vidanage, 'Cyber cafes in Sri Lanka'.
29. UTHR (J), http://www.uthr.org/history.htm/ (accessed March 26, 2009).
30. Special Report 31, 2008, UTHR, http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport31.htm/ (accessed November 4, 2008).
31. 'A Culture of Fear: LTTE Intimidation, Threats and Violence', Human Rights Watch, 2006, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/ltte0306/3.htm/ (accessed September 15, 2008).
32. UTHR(J), online.
33. Kadirgamar, 'Democratic Space, Political Culture and the Diaspora'.
34. Nallainathan, 'Staring down the Tigers'.
35. Human Rights Watch, 2006, online.
36. Nallainathan, 'Staring Down the Tigers'.
37. Human Rights Watch, 2006, online.
38. Kadirgamar, 'Democratic space, political culture and the diaspora'.
39. Kadirgamar, 'Sri Lanka's post war political economy and the question of minorities'.
40. Human Rights Watch, 2006, online.
41. Asian Tribune, 'Tracking Tigers' trail', Asian Tribune, May 24, 2005.
42. Pieris, 'Diasporic Differences'.
43. Since June 2008, the acronym stands for 'Six Billion Stories'.
44. Information collected through personal interviews over telephone with members of the diaspora in Melbourne and Sydney, in September 2008.
45. Sydney Reporter, October 28, 2002, archives of which are no longer available online. See Appendix 1 for a copy from the files.
46. Nadesan, 'Ilangaiarasa Pulanaivuthuraiyin Adutha Ilaku …', Nitharsanam, February 28, 2005. www.nitharsanam.com (accessed November 15, 2008).
47. Nagaraja's account has been constructed through interviews with Sri Lankan activists in Australia in April-July 2008 and through diasporic press reports which are cited.
48. Georgiou and Silverstone, 'Diaspora and Contra-Flows Beyond Nation-Centrism'.
49. Sevvindian, 'Taraki Sivaramin Unmai Varalaru'; and Natchatiran, 'UTHRum Rajan Hoolum'.
50. Siva, 'Yaar Indha Australiavilulla Natchatiran Sevvindian?'.
51. Personal interview held in Sydney with the poet and writer in May 2008.
52. Kalainesan 'Janaka Pereravidam Padhakam Petra Tamizh Inathin Drogi'.
53. Georgiou and Silverstone, 'Diaspora and Contra-Flows Beyond Nation-Centrism', 34.
54. 'Kanchi Sanakaraman Kolai Vazhakil Kisu Kisukappatta Nadigai …', Nitharsanam, December 13, 2004.
55. Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern Age.
56. See Lal, 'The Other Tamils'.
57. This description was made by Sri Kantha in an email correspondence with another academic.
58. SriKantha, 'On Malini Parthasarathy's Malodorous Malady'.
59. SriKantha, 'Naivete and Rascality of Narasimhan Ram'.
60. http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/1019/37/ (accessed November 6, 2007)
61. Lyons, 'Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution'.
62. Bolter and Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media.
63. UTHR, 'A Marred Victory and a Defeat Pregnant with Foreboding', Special Report No 32, http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport32.htm/ (accessed June 11, 2009).
64. Lyons, 'Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution'.
65. See for instance http://www.tamilnation.org/selfdetermination/nation/maya_ranganathan.htm/ (accessed December 23, 2008).
66. http://www.tamilnation.org/ (accessed June 20, 2009).
67. See Pratap, 'Lessons from the Tiger Defeat'.
68. 'Historic Task Awaits All Freedom Fighters', http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=99 &artid=29547/ (accessed June 8, 2009).
69. Tamilnet Editorial Board, 'Breaking the Deadlock Through Transnational Governance', June 15, 2009, http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid+99&artid+29596/ (accessed June 18, 2009).
70. 'LTTE Plans to Reorganise, Colombo Dismisses the Move', http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=LTTE%2Bplans%2B%to%2Breorganise,%2BColombo%2Bdismisses %2Bthe%2Bmove&artid=p6kRaZrN/tk= (accessed June 18, 2009).
71. Kadirgamar, 'Sri Lanka's Post War Political Economy and the Question of Minorities', 73.
72. Ibid., 75.
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