By Jehan Perera
(December 22, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Who will the Tamil people vote for has become an important question at the forthcoming Presidential elections. The departure of former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, and worse still his joining the opposition, has deprived the government leadership of its monopoly regarding credit for the war victory over the LTTE. This has meant that President Mahinda Rajapaksa can no longer appeal to the majority Sinhalese electorate for their vote of gratitude to himself alone. A recent visit to the Southern Province suggested that the President retains the affection of most southern Sinhalese which will be hard to ever dent. But General Fonseka is making a claim for his share of the credit, both as a southerner and the victorious army commander.
The entry of General Fonseka into the ranks of the opposition has also rejuvenated it, particularly the UNP which was unable to face up to the President’s war victories and appeal to the ethos of the Sinhalese electorate. The role of the UNP leadership, in particular Ranil Wickremesinghe with his cosmopolitan outlook and anti war position, could not attract the ethnic majority vote, which became a virtual fiefdom for the President. Many traditional UNP voters from the Sinhalese ethnic majority began to vote either for the President’s party or for other Sinhalese nationalist parties. With General Fonseka becoming the common opposition candidate there is a strong likelihood of these renegade UNP voters returning to the fold.
In these circumstances, the ethnic majority vote is likely to divide on traditional party lines. With the vote banks being roughly of similar size, this suggests that the Sinhalese vote will be more or less evenly split. The advantage that accrues to President Rajapaksa on account of being the incumbent president will be offset by the JVP vote that will go to General Fonseka as the common opposition candidate. Unlike at past elections, President Rajapaksa can no longer be confident of obtaining a decisive majority of Sinhalese votes that would enable him to ignore the ethnic minority vote. The President will be hoping that his unparalleled political skills and his access to the powers and resources of the presidency will help him to pull ahead as the campaign goes on. But at the present time, the odds are even.
IMPORTANT VOTES
The ethnic minority vote becomes important in the context of a split in the Sinhalese vote. The ethnic minorities account for about 25 percent of the electorate and their vote can be decisive in determining which candidate will prevail at the Presidential elections. This is what happened at the 2005 elections when the LTTE’s enforced boycott of Tamil voters in the north and east, which kept out at least half a million voters, helped to give President Rajapaksa a narrow victory by 180,000 votes. On the other hand, while the ethnic minority vote can be decisive in getting a presidential candidate elected, like the rest of the electorate they have no control over a candidate once he or she is elected. The unfortunate reality in Sri Lanka is that once presidents are elected, they are free to act as they will, and break any or all of their promises if they are so inclined.
Both presidential candidates have been bidding for the ethnic minority vote. As the largest ethnic minority, the Tamil vote is particularly important and its direction is unsure. There is doubt whether the Tamil people will wish to vote at all. Some of them, especially those who have been displaced due to the war, may not even be in a position to vote at all as they have no identity documents. Unless these people are encouraged to register to vote, many of them may not bother to do so, as it is an effort that they may deem is not worth the benefit to them. On the other hand, as head of the government, President Rajapaksa is clearly at an advantage when it comes to delivering benefits to them.
In the past several weeks, the government has been acting in a constructive manner to address the problems of the war affected Tamil people. The most welcome of these actions was the decision to release all IDPs from the welfare centres to which they had been confined, and to give them the option of either staying within the welfare centres or going elsewhere. The most recent concession by the government has been to remove all restrictions on free movement on the A9 highway that connects the northern capital of Jaffna to the rest of the country. A few weeks ago the government also removed the restrictions on Jaffna residents traveling out of the peninsula, which required that they get a military exit permit for travel outside.
LOST RIGHTS
While these concessions are certain to be welcomed by Tamil voters, they are likely to see them as merely a regaining of lost rights. The government may have to do more than restore rights that the Tamil people feel were unfairly taken away from them in the first place. Even the President’s ally in the north, Minister Douglas Devananda who heads the EPDP, has called on the President to commit himself to a ten point plan that includes several aspects of what most in the Tamil community consider as the rights they are entitled to. In this context the visit to India by a high powered government delegation headed by the President’s younger brother Basil Rajapaksa and the pledge of implementing a progressive political solution to the ethnic conflict may be important in winning the hearts and minds of the Tamil people and thereby influencing the vote of the Tamil electorate.
However, the major problem that the government will face is to convince the Tamil people that it is sincere and will keep to its promises. The government has been making the promise of coming up with a political solution for the past three or more years, but without delivering on it. It is not only with regard to the ethnic conflict that the President has failed to keep his promises. He has also failed to deliver on his promise made to the JVP during the 2005 presidential election campaign that he would abolish the institution of the executive presidency should he win, and he also failed to work with the UNP in a bipartisan manner despite signing an agreement with it in 2006. The disappointing track record of the President in keeping to his promises suggests that further promises will not suffice, only concrete actions will.
Indeed, if the President so desires, there are political reforms that could assuage Tamil sentiment that he can put into effect without too much delay. But he will need to be prepared to convince his nationalist Sinhalese electorate that such reforms will not jeopardize the national interest, which he is better equipped to do than any other political leader. For the past two years, one of the most responsible members of his government, Prof. Tissa Vitarana has been chairing the All Party’s Representatives Committee on a political solution to the ethnic conflict, which has generated report after report as to what can be done in terms of political reforms that would address the ethnic conflict. There are undoubtedly many proposals in it that can be made law and implemented immediately with the help of the simple majority that the President currently enjoys in Parliament. The President only needs to request Minister Vitarana to prepare such legislation and have it passed into law in Parliament as a first step.
-Sri Lanka Guardian
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