Redefining civil-military balance

By Sumanasiri Liyanage

(December 03, Kandy, Sri Lanka Guardian) A combination of several factors in synergy has contributed to unleash since 1977, a process of increasing militarization of the Sri Lankan political and social landscape. Among them, three main factors are of great significance.

First, the market-oriented economic policies introduced in 1977 were put into practice with the notion that democratic engagement of trade unions has to be restricted and semi-oppressive labour regime needs to be put in place.

The dominance of this view was expressed in explicit terms in the series of actions taken by the Government in suppressing the General Strike in July 1980. Army and Police were used widely and the trade union leaders were imprisoned and tortured. Government-backed subterranean groups were used to obstruct pickets and public meetings. Secondly, the armed contestation of the Sri Lankan State by the secessionist LTTE and nationalist JVP had made it necessary to increase the strength and the fire power of the Sri Lankan Security Forces.
Powers of military

This has in turn increased the powers of the military elite in the process of decision-making process through setting up of new mechanisms and institutions. As a result, at the time of the comprehensive military defeat of the LTTE the Security Forces emerged a quasi-independent force with substantial support of the Sinhala segment of the population. Thirdly, the introduction of executive presidential system without corrective checks and balances has also facilitated the process of militarization of the Sri Lankan political landscape with government-backed subterranean groups operating side by side with the police and Security Forces. Although these factors operated in synergy, it may not be possible to give all these factors an equal weight and importance. There is no doubt that the prolonged armed conflict between the Government and LTTE was the key independent variable with higher parametric value in the equation.

The relationship between the process of militarization of the political landscape and country’s deep-rooted democratic institutions and mechanisms is complex, tense and dialectical. On one hand, the process of militarization of the political landscape has resulted in weakening the democratic institutions, mechanisms and values as democratic institutions and mechanisms were constantly fashioned and refashioned according to the needs of the former.

Resistance

Hence, the qualitative nature of the Sri Lankan democracy has also changed significantly and the democratic values were redefined by the laws of the market and the powers of the State.

However, on the other hand, Sri Lankan democratic institutions have had substantial resilience so that they had resisted against this militarization tendency using their limited capacity, resources and power especially at the time of short-lived peace in 1990, 1993-4, 2002-mid-2006.

Although their definition of democracy is exceedingly limited and contracting, the civilian political leadership was always careful in ensuring that military does not pass beyond a certain threshold point. Thus the architecture of the war machine is designed carefully placing civilian leadership in between the civilian executive president and the upper echelon of the Security Forces.

Appointment of Lalith Athulathmudali as the first National Security Minister was not only to make the war effort more effective but also to strengthen civic monitoring over military affairs.

The same role was subsequently played by Ranjan Wijeratne and Anuruddha Ratwatte under President Ranasinghe Premadasa and Chandrika Bandaranaike respectively.
Civil-military balance

Ranil Wickremesinghe disrupted this equilibrium almost completely during the peace talks. When Mahinda Rajapaksa decided to defeat the LTTE rather pressurizing it to come to a negotiated settlement using military methods, he had to redesign the military architecture not only to maintain civic-military balance but also to intensify military operations. Conducting a war does not follow democratic principles particularly in the context of internal armed conflicts. It was totally incorrect to interpret the appointment of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa as the Secretary to the Defence Minister as an example of increasing nepotism.

In the view of high level of intense military engagement, the architecture of the war machine had to be redesigned not only to maintain civic-military balance but also to maintain the balance between Three main Forces led by very efficient leaders who were expected act in synergy but at the same time not making a space for them to gang up against the civilian leadership. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa using his sophisticated military and technical skill has established himself as the central wheel of the war machine.

However, the way in which the Security Forces achieved comprehensive military victory over the LTTE and the media coverage given to it in both print and electronic media had made the Security Forces popular particularly among the Sinhala segment. An effective military action needs that day-to-day military operations should be freed from civilian political decisions particularly in a context in which civilian political leadership is subject to re-election.

Influences

So the intense military operation had given not only a relative independence to military hierarchy but also made it possible for them to influence decision-making even in activities that were not directly related to military operations in the war zone. So the relative independence of the military elite, their ability to influence decision-making in general and its popularity among Southern Sinhala population may have had an effect on the way in which military elites tend to think about the country’s future.

General Sarath Fonseka in his letter of resignation to the President Mahinda Rajapaksa informed he had reason to believe that the upper echelon of the Government had suspected that he would try a military coup to capture power. We have no evidence to substantiate his speculation that some people had suspected that he would try a military coup to capture power.

We have no evidence to substantiate his speculation that some people had suspected the possibility of a military coup led by General Sarath Fonseka. At the same time, no substantive evidence exists to support the view that General Sarath Fonseka himself was planning such a coup. However, given the circumstances described above, one may not, at least in abstract theoretical domain, deny the presence of some critical drivers leading towards a military coup.

When the war came to end with a comprehensive defeat of the LTTE, it is natural for civil leadership to avoid any kind of military takeover redefining the civil-military balance while addressing the issues of continuing security concerns.

Changes introduced in the military hierarchy immediately after the war may signify a first step towards demilitarization.

Demilitarization operates in different levels. For both economic and political reasons reduction of the number Armed Forces is not possible.

Sarath Fonseka at his new position as the Chief of Defence Staff sought not only the co-ordination of the activities of Three Forces and Police but a full control over them. It seems that this effort was thwarted by the Defence Ministry Secretary. So, Fonseka was dissatisfied as his plan of taking over the command structure of the Security Forces and Police to his hands did not materialized. He had to find other means and found the leadership vacuum in the opposition circle. That was the context in which General Fonseka took a decision to enter politics.

Although his support base was amorphous and internally contradictory, they all have had one objective in common, overthrowing Mahinda Rajapaksa from power. The JVP has seen its support base getting increasingly weakened as the United Peoples Freedom Alliance was able gradually in attracting youth in the periphery. Mangala Samaraweera was able to penetrate into already weakened UNP offering a shortcut to power that many UNPers were seeking for their own benefits. In the past three years, the SLMC almost lost its support base in the Eastern Province. Western imperialist countries are also unhappy about Mahinda Rajapaksa regime because of the change of orientation of its foreign policies. However some rhetoric has to be articulated in bringing all the varying internal forces under one umbrella. Hence came the promise of abolition of Executive Presidency that does not go beyond usual rhetoric.

Tissa Attanayaka has recently informed that a bill would be presented to Parliament one month after the Presidential Election. There will not be a major change in the Parliament even the result of the Presidential Election would be in favour of the UNP. So one may even wonder as to why UNP did not bring such a bill before the Presidential Election. It is clear that what General Fonseka seeks is what he was not able to achieve as the Chief of DS.

He has already informed that he was unhappy because he was given not controlling power but only the power of co-ordination while the Three Forces and Police would operate under their own command structure. From the point of civil rule, the existing structure is much more democratic and barrier for possible military coup. The LTTE was comprehensively defeated.

Time has come to reverse the process that had developed in the past 25 to 30 years. The removal of the danger posed by General Fonseka would be a first step although the first step would not be adequate in reversing a process that has been at work in the past three decades.

(The writer is a lecturer in Political Economy at the Peradeniya University )

-Sri Lanka Guardian